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Captain Thomas Speed
From a photograph

THE UNION CAUSE IN KENTUCKY

1860-1865

BY

CAPTAIN THOMAS SPEED

Adjutant 12th Kentucky Infantry and Veteran Infantry Vols. 1861-65

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Author of "The Wilderness Road," etc.

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
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A FOREWORD BY JUSTICE HARLAN

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WASHINGTON, D. C., October 27, 1904.

DEAR CAPTAIN SPEED:

I have just concluded my final examination of the several articles prepared by you under the general title of "The Union Cause in Kentucky." They are to be commended for the fairness and fulness with which the facts are stated, as well as for the genuine patriotic spirit pervading them all. The survivors of the struggle of 1861 in Kentucky, and equally their descendants, will wish these articles published in book form, and that the book shall go into every library in the country. And they will, I am sure, feel grateful to you for having, after patient investigation and great labor, brought together the facts connected with the defeat by the Kentucky Unionists of the attempt to ally our old State with the Southern Confederacy.

No more valuable services were performed in the struggle to preserve the Union than were performed by the Union men of Kentucky. I make this statement without the slightest doubt of its accuracy. The country at large never has had an adequate conception of the sacrifices made and the work done by the Union men of the Border Slave States. It is not too much to say that if the people of those States had been as favorable to secession as were the people of the Cotton States, it would, most probably, have been impossible to prevent

the dissolution of the Union. No one, after reading what you have written—certainly no one familiar with the situation as it was at the commencement of the secession movement—will fail to recognize the truth of this view. And yet a strenuous effort was made, after the close of the war, to minimize the work of the Unionists of the Border States, and to create the impression that what they did was not worth remembering, nor of any particular value to the country. I confidently assert that, after the flag was fired on at Sumter, a large majority of the people of Kentucky were at all times for the maintenance of the Union and unalterably opposed to its disruption by secession. Kentucky was the first-born of the Union, and, despite the strong ties of kinship and business between them and the friends of secession, a large majority of its people held steadily to the view that if the Union ship went down, our State must be the last to desert it. That was the spirit in which the Kentucky Unionists rallied to the standard of the country in 1861. While some did not approve, indeed openly disapproved, many things done in the course of the war which were supposed injuriously to affect the institution of slavery, the Kentucky Unionists, all of them, clung unflinchingly to the idea that the dissolution of the Union was not a remedy for any evil, and that, cost what it might in men and money, the national authority, as derived from the Constitution, must be reinstated over every foot of American soil. To say nothing of the colored men in Kentucky who were mustered into the service of the United States towards the close of the Civil War, it is safe to say that the white men in Kentucky who openly and actively sided with the Union cause, and wore the uniform of Union soldiers, outnumbered, at least twice (I think three times), those who openly and actively sided with the Confederate cause.

I observe that you call attention to certain statements

made after the war in a brief History of Kentucky as one of the American Commonwealths. Those statements were to the following effect: "The Confederacy received the youth and strength from the richest part of the Kentucky soil. The so-called Blue Grass soil sent the greater part of its men of the richer families into the Confederate army, while the Union troops, though from all parts of the State, came in greatest abundance from those who dwelt on thinner soils. . . . The Kentucky troops in the Confederate army being fewer in number, and from the richer part of the State, were, as a whole, a finer body of men than the Federal troops from the Commonwealth."

These statements are akin to those sometimes heard in 1861, that the secession movement in Kentucky had the approval of the "gentlemen" and holders of property in that Commonwealth; that, in the main, the Union cause had the support only of those who had no special social standing and were not identified with the State by ownership of property to any great extent. Those who then lived in Kentucky and had a knowledge of its history and people are aware how reckless were and are all such statements. The Union leaders in Kentucky whose names are given in your book, and many others who might be named, constituted a body of men of whom it may justly be stated that, in respect of social standing, family history, character, education, and intellectual power, they could be favorably compared with any like number of men living at any time in any State of the Union. Many of them were born or were reared in counties popularly known as Blue Grass counties, while the others were, as Lincoln was, born or reared on "thinner soils." But, whatever the nature of the soil on which they were born or reared, they were of noble nature, gentlemen in the best sense of that word, and of the highest social position. No intimation to the

contrary will be accepted as true or just by any one who knew Kentucky and the Kentucky people of 1861.

The same observations may be made in respect of the officers and soldiers who went into the Union army from Kentucky. A very large part—I will not say a majority—of the Kentucky Union officers and soldiers came from counties which, by reason of the richness of their soil, might be called Blue Grass counties—such as the counties of Jefferson, Shelby, Mason, Fleming, Fayette, Bourbon, Woodford, Scott, Harrison, Henry, Washington, Nelson, Marion, Jessamine, Mercer, Boyle, Clarke, Madison, Garrard, Warren, Logan, Christian, Barren, Todd, and Daviess. Undoubtedly the Confederate officers who went from Kentucky were men of high character and won distinction as commanders of troops. But they were of no higher character, certainly did not possess more skill, and did not win more renown than those who commanded Kentucky Union troops. The fact is, the Kentucky Union officers and soldiers and the Kentucky Confederate officers and soldiers were, as bodies of men, whether born on Blue Grass soil or on “thinner soils,” the peers, in all respects, of the officers or soldiers of any army ever organized. As Kentuckians, we should be proud of the reputation both sides won in the Civil War for courage and fidelity to the cause each espoused.

You have attempted to bring out the truth and the whole truth as to the contest of 1861 in Kentucky. And you have succeeded most admirably. By all means, my dear Captain, put what you have said in book form.

Yours truly,

JOHN M. HARLAN.

Capt. THOMAS SPEED,
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY.

PREFACE

IT is the purpose of the author of this book to give a narrative of the struggle of the Union men in the State of Kentucky to hold their State in the Union, when other States were seceding and strenuous efforts were made to carry Kentucky into the Southern Confederacy; also to show what services were rendered by the Union soldiers of Kentucky in the Civil War. It is due to the Kentucky Unionists that such a narrative should be prepared and published. They performed a great work in their day for the salvation and perpetuity of our national Union, which was not fully understood or appreciated by many even at the time, and no effort has ever been made to create a better understanding.

Histories of Kentucky have been written since the war, but in them injustice is done to the Kentucky Unionists both negatively and positively. They not only fail to recount matters richly deserving mention, but contain many misrepresentations.

It is a remarkable fact that after the Union was restored the Union men of Kentucky refrained from writing about the events of the past. They were satisfied with the result. That was enough. They did not desire to recall and dwell upon the experiences through which they had passed. Therefore the story of their services has remained untold except in so far as it is found embedded in the records of the war and scattered through many volumes, documents, and current publications of all descriptions, practically inaccessible to the general reader.

Upon this point one of the most distinguished citizens of Kentucky has remarked that

“the manner in which the Kentucky Unionists relegated the war into the past, immediately upon its close, is nothing less than a phenomenon. Nothing like it can be found in any history. When the great fact that the Union was preserved became a certainty, all the Union element in Kentucky, which preponderated during the conflict, controlling the State and serving magnificently on the field, at once ceased to talk or think of the war, and became from that time voiceless. They have not only refrained from heralding their own services, but have also refrained from censure of those who antagonized them.”

In a certain sense the history of the war was written as it progressed. Its true history is found in the documents of the period, and to these original sources of information all should go who desire to know the exact facts. But the documents of the period are not accessible to all, and to search for them requires far more time and labor than can be given by general readers. In order that the facts they contain may be popularly known, it is the province of the historian to gather them together and cause them to tell their story in readable form.

Much of the writing about the events of the Civil War rather ignores the record-facts, instead of using them. Many writers have endeavored to make history, rather than to compile it from authoritative sources. Impressions received from having lived through the war period, either of the writer himself or of individuals who narrate their impressions to him, are written down, instead of searching out what was written down at the time by the actors themselves. Thus erroneous views are often presented. Absolute accuracy is not to be expected in recounting the events of the past, but in telling the story of the Civil War, or any particular feature of it, the best material to be found is that which was written at the time. It is common for individual participants to de-

scribe orally the campaigns and battles through which they passed. In every such instance, if the movements were of any magnitude, the relator is certain to fall into error, unless he has studied the case as it is found in the records. No one person can know much of a large battle from what came within the range of his own vision, and he is apt to magnify what he actually saw, and to minimize what he did not see. But the reports of regimental commanders and brigade commanders and commanders of divisions and corps, together with the reports of the officers in chief command, will enable the reader to arrive at a clear and distinct idea of all that occurred.

It is the same with the conduct of civil affairs. The speeches and writings of public men—recognized leaders and official characters—show their sentiments and positions far better than the statements of misinformed or biassed persons, who may recount impressions instead of facts. Many accounts have been written to sustain a theory, or in support of one side or the other of a controversy. Such writing may be graphic and the work of one who was a participant, but, unless it is based upon the record-facts, it is apt to be misleading.

A complete history of the events in the State of Kentucky, civil and military, might be written from the records. Such a history would give account of the good and the bad on both sides. So, also, the history of any feature of the war time in Kentucky might be written—as, for instance, the civil history, irrespective of the military, or *vice versa*; or an account might be given of the Federal troops alone, or of the Confederate troops alone, but in any such writing the truth is best found in the records of the period.

It is from documentary sources the present writer will draw the facts pertaining to the Union cause in Kentucky during the war. While he lived through that period and was a participant, to some extent, in many events con-

nected with the war, it is not on that account that the history is proposed. What is here recorded is deduced from an examination of the record-sources of information.

The writer desires to emphasize the fact that such a treatise as this is really called for. Much has been written upon the other side. Various volumes stand upon the shelves of the libraries written from the opposite standpoint, which celebrate the services and exploits of those Kentuckians who went into the Confederacy, and miserably misrepresent the Kentucky Unionists, but no volume has been prepared to show what was, in truth, done and endured and accomplished by these Kentucky Unionists. It is true a volume has been published giving brief accounts of the Union regiments of Kentucky, but this touches but lightly the civil struggles of the war period.

In view, therefore, of the fact that the Southern side is already represented in the libraries, and that the Union side is not, it is believed that there is a demand for the present work.

The writer believes that the time has arrived when the history of the work and struggles of the Kentucky Unionists may be published without calling forth any complaint of "opening up old controversies." Surely, after the lapse of forty years, they may be written about without incurring the criticism of reviving any bitterness of the past.

The keynote of this work will be that Kentucky was a Union State; that the issue was thoroughly understood, and that the people of Kentucky manifested their intention to remain in the Union, and not to go into the Confederacy, by overwhelming majorities at the polls, at fair and impartial elections, untrammelled by any suggestion of military interference, for the elections occurred before any soldiers were in the State. Basing the conduct of the people upon this unquestioned fact, it will

be shown that the Kentucky Unionists did that which it was their right to do, in adhering to the Union. When it is charged that the Union leaders of Kentucky "played a dark and deceitful game," it is proper that the true position should be stated according to the records. It is stated by one writer, as late as 1882, that:

"The history of no country, or no part or period of the late Civil War, presents a darker chapter than that which records the first six months of the war, and the means by which Kentucky was finally occupied by the Federal army, and, being thus bound, was claimed to be loyal, in the sense of sanctioning such a policy." (*Memorial History of Louisville*, Vol. 1, p. 196.)

When the struggle of the Union leaders of Kentucky is thus characterized, surely it is in order to present the facts which repel the charge, and justify their conduct. When it is gravely written, in accepted histories of Kentucky, that the "flower of the military material of Kentucky went into the Confederate army," surely it is in order to present the record-facts of the period which show that the most conspicuous "rush to arms" in Kentucky was to save the Union, and not to destroy it.

It is also proper, and in order, to present the record-facts which correct many misrepresentations upon other points found in treatises claiming to be historical. An adequate presentation of the case as it is found in the records of the period cannot fail to show that the people of Kentucky were true to the Union, and that they magnificently carried into practice the principles they most emphatically avowed at the polls; and the attempt will be made in this work to do justice to the splendid body of troops, which, under trying circumstances, sprang forth to aid in preventing the dismemberment of the Union, and the destruction of the American Republic.

Concerning the general subject of the Union cause in Kentucky the eloquent words penned by Gen. D. W.

Lindsay in 1866, in his preface to the Adjutant-General's report, are here quoted:—

“ It has been fashionable with some to reflect upon the loyalty of our State, but every true man must feel and cordially confess that Kentucky has, during the late war, under circumstances far more trying than those surrounding any other State in the Union, discharged her whole duty. She has, at all times and under all circumstances, promptly responded to the quotas assigned her, not with the mercenary, purchased by excessive State or local bounty, but with citizens prompted by patriotism to the defence of their government. In proof of this, the gallant record of our State, I would refer those doubting to the casualty statistics of this report, the record of battles in which Kentucky troops have borne an honorable part, and lastly to the seventy-nine stand of colors, those silent yet eloquent souvenirs of toil and danger, now displayed in the Capitol of the State, to remain as evidence of the bravery of her sons, and as an incentive to continued patriotism and sacrifice wherever duty calls. Many of these flags have been pierced by shot and shell and their folds stained with the blood of their bearers, but all bearing evidence of the duty which Kentucky troops were expected to, and did, perform. Certainly no one will rejoice more than your Excellency in the fact that there is not a blemish upon the escutcheon of a single organization from Kentucky.”

The author is greatly indebted to Justice John M. Harlan of the Supreme Court for his painstaking reading of this book before publication, his numerous suggestions, and kindly aid in many particulars. Also to Gen. D. W. Lindsay of Frankfort, Ky., who served in the field, and also as Adjutant-General of Kentucky, and as such published his excellent and invaluable report, in which the names of all the soldiers furnished by the State appear.

The author is also indebted to Hon. Walter Evans, Judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, who served in the 25th Ken-

tucky Infantry, and having represented his district in Congress, as well as in the Legislature, has a wide knowledge of the affairs of the State; to Col. R. M. Kelly, who served through the war and has written numerous accounts for the Loyal Legion Society, and for the *Century War Book*, and other publications; to Col. John H. Ward, a gallant officer from the "Green River Country" and deeply interested in everything pertaining to the history of Kentucky; and also to Hon. John W. Barr, retired United States District Judge, who, as Major of State Troops, was thoroughly informed as to the most of the events treated of in this work; also to Col. Andrew Cowan, who, though not a native of Kentucky, has resided in Louisville since the close of the war. He was Colonel of Artillery in the Army of the Potomac, and fought his guns in all the great battles in which that army was engaged from Bull Run to Appomattox. A man of great practical wisdom and intelligence, he has given the writer the kindly benefit of the judgment of a friend contemplating the story contained in this work from the standpoint of a disinterested soldier and critic; also to James F. Buckner, Dr. Wm. Bailey, Logan C. Murray, L. N. Dembitz, to all of whom the author acknowledges his indebtedness.

LOUISVILLE, KY.,

November 26, 1904.

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UNION CAUSE IN KENTUCKY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE last contest in Kentucky between the political parties known as Whigs and Democrats occurred in 1853. At the regular August election in that year five Whigs and five Democrats were elected to Congress; twenty-two Whigs and sixteen Democrats to the State Senate, and fifty-five Whigs and forty-five Democrats to the lower House. (Collins, vol. 1, p. 67.) After this the Democratic party was opposed by the American or "Know-Nothing" party. At the August election, 1855, the Know-Nothing party elected the Governor, Charles S. Morehead, also six of the Congressmen, and a decided majority of the State Legislature. That party was short-lived. In 1859 those opposed to the Democratic party had no other designation than simply "the Opposition." In 1859 Beriah Magoffin was elected Governor by the Democrats over Joshua F. Bell, "Opposition." At the same time a Legislature was elected in harmony with the Governor. This Governor and this Legislature were in office when the troubles of 1861 came upon the State and country. In the succeeding chapter some of

the events of the year 1860, particularly the voting, will be shown. It is enough in this place to say that, in that year, the "Opposition" party came to be called the "Union" party, and the Democratic party was known as the "Southern Rights" party. The latter party maintained its old organization, but on the part of the Unionists there was no organization, and in this respect they were at a disadvantage. The general direction and management of the Union party naturally fell into the hands of those who came to be termed "Union leaders." The names of a number of these will appear in this work. It may be here said of them, that at no time in the history of Kentucky was there within her borders a more illustrious galaxy of patriots and statesmen than those who espoused the Union cause in 1861. They were men of high character, wide reputation, ability, and true worth. They were the thoughtful, calm, and judicial-minded men of the State. Some were old line Whigs, some had been identified with the Democratic party, but at this time all stood together as Unionists, and they were worthy of the position that was accorded to them of "Union leaders."

Some eminent men espoused the Southern cause, but if anything can be true in history, it is true that the greater portion of Kentucky's chief citizens in 1861 were Unionists precisely as the great majority of the voters of the State were Unionists. Among the interesting studies sometimes made is that of selecting the names of the twelve greatest Kentuckians. In the lists so prepared the names of the great Unionists of 1861 liberally appear. If an effort should be made to determine who were the twelve most distinguished citizens of Kentucky in 1861, it would not be possible to find any who would be named before John J. Crittenden, James Guthrie, S. S. Nicholas, Chief Justice George Robertson, Robert J. Breckinridge, Charles A. Wickliffe, James Speed, James

F. Robinson, Joshua F. Bell, Archibald Dixon, James Harlan, and William H. Wadsworth. Yet when they are named, another twelve appear, of like prominence: Garrett Davis, Joseph Holt, George D. Prentice, John H. Harney, Charles S. Todd, Francis M. Bristow, Joshua F. Speed, Joseph R. Underwood, Thomas L. Crittenden, Judge Henry Pirtle, Curtis F. Burnam, and John B. Huston. Such lists might be repeated many times over, all being Unionists.

It is proper to state, in this connection, that a few distinguished men who allied themselves with the Unionists at first, and thereby gave the weight of their influence to set public sentiment toward the Union, after a time changed their minds, and supported, by their sympathy, at least, the other side. Notable among these was ex-Governor Charles H. Morehead, who was elected as a Unionist to the Border State Convention by the vote of May 4, 1861. On the 19th of September, 1861, he was arrested by the Federal authorities and confined in Fort Lafayette, New York. In his biography it is said:

“The sole offence of Gov. Morehead was that he sympathized with the Southern people in their struggle for liberty; but not only had he committed no overt act, but he had a short time previous been a member of the Peace Conference, among the foremost councillors for conciliation and peace.” (Collins, vol. ii., p. 388.)

Hon. Joshua F. Bullitt, Judge of the Court of Appeals, was a leading Unionist. He assisted in getting arms for the Union men of Kentucky in the early summer of 1861. In September he accompanied the troops which went out from Louisville to resist the Confederate advance. In that fall he was especially trusted, as an earnest Union man, by Gen. W. T. Sherman. Later, however, he gave his influence to the other side.

The work of the Union leaders was beset with difficul-

ties. Opposition to the plans and purposes of the Southern Rights party, which strove to carry Kentucky into secession, had to be made without party organization. The leaders had behind them, as they believed, a majority of the people, but it was not until the voting of 1861 came that they could be assured of that fact. They were on new and untried ground, all through the early months of 1861, and they came upon many uncertainties and many surprises. The struggle, on their part, to save the Union from destruction was unlike anything ever before experienced. Suddenly they found old lines broken up, and from both of the old political parties men were joining hands in a contest that was all new.

By the splendid services of these men the people were held steady against all the efforts to get up excitement and a frenzy that would rush them into secession. Not, indeed, that it appears that there was at any time any wavering on the part of the people in their allegiance to the Union; but it is in accord with natural reason that the influence and example of the great men who have been named and will be named, along with many others who cannot be named for want of space, had much to do with the firm and resolute stand of the Kentucky people for the Union during the crisis through which they passed.

The leaders were charged by the Southern Rights men with being the authors of all their misfortunes, and the charge, in general, is true. In the contest, the Southern Rights advocates were defeated, and the Unionists won. The defeat of secession was the object for which the Unionists contended. But coupled with the general charge were criminations and epithets wholly wrong and wholly unjust. As a specimen of the style and nature of these charges, the following quotation is made from a letter of George W. Johnson, just after he was chosen to be Provisional Governor of Kentucky, in which he gives

the reasons why Kentucky ought to be admitted into the Confederacy. The letter is dated Nov. 21, 1861, from Russellville, Ky., and is to President Davis. After presenting his case in his own way, he says:

“This recital is made for one purpose alone, and that is to show that the whole body of the people of Kentucky have, in the last year, repeatedly avowed themselves in favor of an intimate, peaceful connection of the State, by a vote of the people, with the Confederate States. The Union leaders avowed the same intention until they had organized an army sufficient to protect themselves against the rage of the people. . . . No one could have anticipated the unparalleled audacity and treachery of the leaders of the Union party when they violated their own position of neutrality and deliberately determined to plunge the State in war.”

As a further specimen, the following is quoted from an editorial of the *Louisville Courier* of February 11, 1862, then published at Bowling Green. This paper was the organ of the Southern Rights party in Kentucky:

“In an hour fraught with woe and misery to the future of the State, there came forth from the wrecks of the past upon the active theatre of the present, to resume again the councils of the State, such men as John J. Crittenden, Garrett Davis, James Guthrie, S. S. Nicholas, George D. Prentice, and a host of lesser satellites, whom the people had long since repudiated as unworthy of their confidence.

“At the time when the propriety of a State convention was being discussed and delegates being chosen by the people to represent them in the State convention, these men showed the cloven foot in attempting to engraft upon the present constitution germs of emancipation which were ultimately to spring up into a full harvest of their, so much coveted, result. Basely deceiving the people with the false cry of neutrality, they designedly sought this means of deluding them for a time, during which they might thrust their poison into the very vitals of their political existence. Hypocritical in their boasted professions of love and friendship for the South, they

greeted her with alluring smiles, while the very spirit of the devil was lurking in their bosoms. These bold and reckless leaders have played a successful game upon the people of the State, which for fraud, deception, and hypocrisy is without a parallel in the records of infamy."

Then John J. Crittenden is individually described as Janus-faced; Garrett Davis as "the little, petty tool of despotism"; James Guthrie "would see the people of the State sacrificed to utter ruin if such a step were necessary to subserve his own selfish purposes and intents," "and the same is applicable to S. S. Nicholas." And the article winds up by saying:

"Freemen of Kentucky, you have been confidingly led into your present deplorable condition by a set of vile traitors." ¹ [*Louisville Courier* (at Bowling Green), Feb. 11, 1862.]

The high character of the men thus assailed is sufficient answer to the charges, and sufficient to prove the folly of such intemperate writing. Instead of words of blame, they should be given all the credit for doing what was right, at a time when it was necessary in order to prevent others from doing that which was wrong. Time has vindicated them. The right and the wrong were plainly visible in the day they acted, as well as at all times since.

The great work which was accomplished by the Unionists of Kentucky was a great task as well. The absence of party organization and the fact that in the Union party, which was formed for the occasion, were many who had come out from the ranks of the opposite party, produced much misunderstanding and confusion. But the issue was simple; the pole-star to guide the course was the Union; the danger to escape was secession. The Kentucky Unionists, in common with patriots everywhere, never had to use the expression that they con-

¹ See Appendix, § 1, p. 336.

tended "for what they thought was right," but could always say they contended for that which *was* right—then and now.

It is a common form of speech that "if" something had or had not occurred, the South would have won. The question then arises, what would it have won? The answer is found in utterances common even to this day, "The Southern States would have won their freedom." Are they not now free? Is it any burden to them to-day to form a part of the United States? What this Union is now is what the Unionists of Kentucky contended for in 1861.

The misrepresentations contained in the histories of Kentucky written since the war are very numerous, and seem to spring from the frame of mind which, in the war time and afterwards, exalted all that belonged to the South and regarded with contempt all that was allied with "Yankees." Those who desire to know about Kentucky during the war, and consult the histories for that purpose, will find three histories of Kentucky—Collins's, Shaler's, and Smith's.

Many years before the war Lewis Collins published, in one volume, a history of Kentucky. Shortly after the war, Richard H. Collins enlarged this history to two volumes. He was engaged upon the work some five years and collected a mass of material of great value. A large part of the first volume is devoted to the *Annals of Kentucky*. Under this head are noted briefly, on successive dates, the principal events in Kentucky, from the earliest times down to the date of publication. That portion which covers the period of the Civil War occupies sixty-five pages, and more than a thousand events are noted. Collins was thoroughly Southern in sentiment, and this plainly appears even in the entry of the most ordinary events. He has a sneer for the Union side and approval for the other. He makes the Southern side

appear fair, while condemnation falls upon the Federals. Annotation of events in the manner and tone of Collins tends to mislead any one searching for the truth.

In the same volume, the *Outline History*, which covers the war period, was written by a Confederate officer, Gen. Geo. B. Hodge, a Kentucky secessionist in 1861 who went off to the Confederacy. Instances of his misrepresentations will be referred to in other chapters.

Shaler's *History of Kentucky* is one of the "American Commonwealth" series. In the preface the author says he "was a Unionist during the war," adding: "If injustice has been done, he can only plead in extenuation that he sincerely feels that the honor won by the Confederate heroes is as dear to him as the fame of those who were on his own side."

As the book is perused, it will strike the reader that the "fame" of his own side is ill-fame, and that the object in view as to the other is to exalt its virtues, valor, and prowess. The reader will search in vain for any words of approval of the earnest struggle of the Kentucky Unionists, disorganized as they were as to party advantages, against the organization of the opposite party and its possession of the State government machinery. On the other hand the reader will learn that the secession strength in the State was in the "wealthier districts," and that it was on the "poorer soil" that there was opposition. (P. 232.) This statement will be shown to be incorrect, as shown by both the voting of 1861 and the enlistment of soldiers.

Writing of events at the very beginning of the trouble, he says:

"In a certain sense the Democratic party was now the conservative party of the Commonwealth. It was the party that desired to maintain the existing state of institutions, against a faction that was decidedly revolutionary in its tendencies, in

that it was willing to take some active measures concerning slavery.”

It would be difficult to find, in any history, a more complete reversal of the facts of the case. In the first place, the Democratic or Secessionist party was the revolutionary party. It sought to disrupt the existing order; take the State out of the Union, and join the Confederacy, and this the Union party was resisting. In the second place, no disposition appeared anywhere on the part of the Kentucky Unionists to intermeddle with the slavery question in any manner whatsoever. The only way that an anti-slavery sentiment can be imputed to them is to assume, as did those who antagonized them at the time, that they concealed their real motives, were treacherous and Janus-faced, and were a set of “vile traitors.” Other instances of injustice on the part of this historian will appear in the course of this work.

Z. F. Smith's *History* is written from a purely Southern standpoint, and the author is content, in large measure, to adopt the views and statements of Shaler, from whom he quotes liberally. The spirit of this history is found in the lament that the right of revolution was not appealed to by the South instead of secession. He says:

“The sovereignty of the people, original and unquestioned, is greater than the measure of sovereignty they delegate to any government, and the right of revolution for sufficient cause is of universal concession. On plea of this right our fathers justified their act of revolution and the War for Independence before an approving world. . . . Had the people of the seceding States planted themselves on the right of revolution as in the Colonies, and, recognizing that necessity, safety, and independence were paramount to States' rights, marched their armies across Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, and established their military lines upon the front borders of these, there is not a doubt that the soldier element would have

gone into the ranks of the Confederacy as solidly in the three States mentioned as in Virginia, Tennessee and Texas."

This, he says, would have doubled the resources of the Southern army for supplies and controlled the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. But, unfortunately, the foresight of statesmanship, military skill, and bravery were all sacrificed to *doctrinairism*. Military necessity, he says, cannot afford to halt at abstractionism; that there never was a time more urgent of Napoleonic action, but "the etiquette of abstraction could not admit of it."

Thus he bewails, as late as 1885, that the South did not adopt effective means to break up the American Union. Other illustrations of his views will appear in the course of this work.

All of these histories abound in wholly gratuitous statements. They are not content to relate the facts as they occurred, but deal freely with general assertions which are nothing except opinions, and yet appearing upon the historic page are apt to mislead the reader who is not cautious. It will be seen in these pages that there was unusually good ground for knowing the mind of the Kentucky people at the beginning of the war. Two general elections in 1860, and three in 1861, all resulting in the same way, ought to satisfy any reasonable mind that the great majority of the Kentucky people were opposed to the Southern movement, but instead of emphasizing this fact these historians lay more stress upon the assertion of what the Kentucky people believed about the abstract or moral right of a State to secede, or what they believed on the subject of coercion. Also such assertions as that "the undoubted preference of the Kentucky people was that the Southern States should be allowed to go in peace," and that "the people clearly believed that both sides had left the paths of the Constitution, and that the war was essentially unconstitutional."

They abound also in complacent uses of the little words

“if,” and “had,” and “but for,” of which the following illustrations are sufficient: “If General Buell had not arrived on the field of Shiloh, Grant’s army would all have been captured.” “Had General Johnston lived, the three hours remaining would probably have served for the capture of the whole, the defeat of Buell, and a triumphant return march to the Ohio River.”

When there is such an immense fund of historic material pertaining to the Civil War, it discloses the animus of a writer when he uses space for indulging fancy, and dwells upon his fond imaginings of what might have been.

It is not proposed in the present work to make a general history of Kentucky during the Civil War. The object is rather to furnish to the reader a volume which will serve at least to lead away from misrepresentations, which have so long remained unanswered, to the true and real sources of information—the contemporaneous records. In order to show what difficulties, labors, trials, and hardships were undergone by the Kentucky Unionists, it will be necessary to recount some of the work of the opposite side, both civil and military. All this, however, will be covered briefly, in fact, in many instances only suggested for the reason that events in Kentucky, such, for instance, as Bragg’s invasion, and the battles incident thereto, have been written about, at large, in many general histories. In the mention of that particular invasion, the main object of this author is to point out the fact that the people of Kentucky then showed their Union sentiment by enlisting in Union regiments in great numbers in response to the call of the Union Governor to rise and repel the invader. If there had been any doubt about the stand of Kentucky people, if they had had any inclination to join the Confederacy, the summer and fall of 1862 was the time that it would have been manifested, and it was not. So, also, with the raids of General John H. Morgan. They will not be

recounted in detail, as the general histories sufficiently set them forth, but they will be mentioned enough to show that whenever Morgan came into Kentucky he encountered the Union soldiers of Kentucky, and that they caused these raids to be less prolonged, destructive, and disastrous to the State than they would have been without such defence. In like manner the guerilla evil will be dealt with, in order to show by the records who the guerillas were, and that the Kentucky Unionists in protecting their State against them were fighting the authorized agents of the Southern Confederacy, who, being encouraged by their backing in this respect, were the more bold, and rendered the task of defending the State against them more difficult.

The farcical proceedings in the Confederate military camp at Russellville in November, 1861, by which Kentucky was resolved out of the Union on paper, will be shown, for the reason that on this account the State was claimed to belong to the Confederacy, and therefore subject to the Confederate law of conscription. Arrangements were made by General Bragg in 1862 to enforce this law in Kentucky, as will be shown; and in December, 1864, Confederate General Lyon actually enforced it in the western part of the State, during his temporary presence in that section. (Collins, i., p. 150.)

The total white population of Kentucky in 1860, according to the census of that year, was 919,484. Out of this population, more than 80,000 were enlisted as soldiers for the Union cause. According to the best authorities, in the neighborhood of 25,000 went into the Confederate armies. The historian Shaler, in several places, puts the number at 40,000 (pp. 357, 384); but, as he says that 40,000 left the State for the Confederacy at the very outstart (p. 269) and afterwards fixes this number at 35,000 (p. 282), either of which is far beyond the mark, his figures do not seem to have been well consid-

ered, and the estimate given by Col. Ed. Porter Thompson as about 25,000 appears more reliable.

A chapter will be devoted to the numbers engaged as soldiers on both sides, from all the States, in order to meet the oft-repeated statement that Confederate failures were due to "overwhelming numbers" of Federals. It will be seen that, according to the records, more than a million were engaged on the Southern side against about 1,700,000 on the National side. Instead of "overwhelming numbers" at any point, there was a constant demand everywhere for more troops. At the front, the lines far from base had to meet those concentrated from shorter distances. Along the lines of communication, small bodies of guards had to contend with far larger raiding forces. In Kentucky there was sore need for more troops than could be spared from the front for protection. An illustration of this is found in the appeal for help made by Col. William H. Wadsworth, of Maysville. He says: "My district has sent six infantry regiments to the Federal army, and in addition the Tenth Cavalry was principally raised in that district." Yet he says all are ordered away, "and left us naked to bands of mounted rebels." (*War Records*, series 1, vol. 16, pt. 1, p. 1146.)

The same conditions prevailed everywhere. The great battle for the Union was fought at the front, where the Confederates had the advantage of concentration on shorter lines, while the battle for protection was fought at the rear, where bodies of raiders would fall unexpectedly upon exposed places.

When all the facts are fairly considered under which the National cause was defended, and the war brought to a successful end, no words can do justice to the undaunted resolution and courage of those who, from 1861 to 1865, lent all their energies to the preservation of the Union.

This work has been submitted before its publication to the careful scrutiny of Justice John M. Harlan, of the Supreme Court of the United States. No man living is as competent to speak concerning its character for accuracy as he. He was born in Kentucky and his home was the capital of the State. He was there associated, up to 1861, in the practice of law with his father, Hon. James Harlan, also a native of Kentucky, and at the outbreak of the war one of her most prominent and honored citizens. Both father and son were leaders of Union sentiment. At their law office in Frankfort were held the councils of the Union leaders. John M. Harlan also became identified just at that time with Louisville, and there in the prime of young manhood was captain of one of the military companies formed for the defence of the city in the spring of 1861. His first service was in connection with obtaining arms for the Kentucky Unionists, a statement of which appears in another part of this volume. In September, 1861, with his own company and others, all under command of General W. T. Sherman, he advanced southward as far as Elizabethtown to resist the advance of the Confederates on Louisville. In the same month he declared his purpose to raise a regiment, which was in camp at Lebanon in the month following. His regiment was a part of General Thomas's original division and assisted in driving Zollicoffer's troops from Kentucky. It participated in the great campaign against General Bragg. Immediately after, it was found resisting the raiding of Confederate General John Morgan. In all his career Colonel Harlan was conspicuous for earnestness and vigor. Physically and intellectually he stood in the very front of all the activity of the time. All the events of 1861 were familiar to him, and by reason of his close association with the chiefs of the Union leaders, nearly all came under his personal observation.

What is set forth, therefore, in this work touching the civil and military affairs of the war, particularly of the Union sentiment, and of neutrality, and the action of the Legislature, can be judged by no one so well qualified to pass upon its accuracy as Justice Harlan. It is with peculiar gratification, then, that the author is enabled to publish a letter received from Justice Harlan written after he had made a careful examination of the manuscript. It is inserted as an Introduction at the beginning of the book, permission having been obtained to do so.

It is proper to add in this connection that, in order further to secure accuracy, and prevent errors which might arise from wrong conceptions and impressions, the several chapters in this work have been read by others who were cognizant of the events dealt with. These have been mentioned in the preface.

In every other way the effort is made to place the events of the war pertaining to Kentucky in a true light.

CHAPTER II

THE ISSUE

IN the eventful period of 1860-61 there was but one issue in Kentucky: Union or Secession. The year 1860 was a Presidential year. Four tickets were in the field, Lincoln and Hamlin, Bell and Everett, Douglas and Johnson, Breckinridge and Lane. The first three were all Union, as opposed to disunion. The last stood for ultra Southern rights. Its followers avowed the right to secede, and the purpose to secede under certain circumstances. Breckinridge was a favorite son of his native State, Kentucky. With many he seemed to be an idol. He was Vice-President of the United States, able, gifted, cultivated, eloquent, and endowed with personal fascinations. Kentucky had many affiliations with the other slave States. In the campaign of 1860 the cause of the South was eloquently presented by the ablest speakers. It was freely said that the election of Lincoln would disrupt the Union; that secession would follow, and the question was, would Kentucky ally herself with the seceding Southern States, or remain in the Union? All the real and fancied wrongs of the South were duly proclaimed. It was urged that slaves were property like other property and should be treated as other property, by fugitive-slave laws in the Northern States and by the laws of the Territories. It was declared that by the election of Lincoln the principles of his party would prevail, and thus, with equal rights destroyed and the

Constitution "infracted," the compact would be broken, and nothing left to all the slaveholding States but to withdraw from the Union, under the doctrine of State rights.

On the other hand, it was contended that, whatever might be the "wrongs," secession was a remedy for no evil; that although Lincoln were elected President, both houses of Congress would be opposed to carrying out any of the alleged extreme tenets of his party, and he would be powerless to do any harm to the Southern people, even if he were so minded.

Long before 1860 there had been discussion of the possible dissolution of the Union. The differences between the North and the South called forth from Jackson, when President, the words, "The Union must and shall be preserved." The question whether a State had the right to secede had been debated in societies for years. Upon the stone which Kentucky contributed to the Washington monument was engraved the sentiment that Kentucky, the first admitted into the Union, would be the last to leave it.

But in the administration of James Buchanan there were events which brought to the front, in angry fashion, the old discussion. The troubles in Kansas, and the John Brown raid which occurred in 1859, greatly inflamed popular feeling, and the complaint of unequal rights in the Territories and failure to enforce fugitive-slave laws revived the threats of secession and dissolution of the Union.

So rife became the discussion that early in 1860 "Union" meetings were held in various places in Kentucky. On January 2d one was held in Maysville, and on the 22d of February there was a large meeting at Frankfort at which it was resolved that the people of Kentucky were for the Union and the Constitution intact; that the Union must and shall be preserved; that Kentucky will redress her wrongs inside of the Union

and not out of it. (See Collins's *Annals*, pp. 82 and 83.)

Also as early as January 6, 1860, Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge, D.D., addressed a long and eloquent letter to his nephew, Hon. John C. Breckinridge, who was then Vice-President, upon the subject of the maintenance of the Union. Events of this sort, occurring in 1860 before the Presidential nominations were made, serve to show that the subject was upon the minds of the people, growing out of the continued agitation of the question of equal rights under the Constitution. Therefore, after the Presidential election in November, 1860, when Abraham Lincoln was elected, it is not surprising that popular feeling was intensified, and, immediately following, meetings were held in many places. In Collins's *Annals*, p. 84, it is said that from November 19th to December 1st "Union meetings were held, usually without distinction of party, in Frankfort, Newport, Hardinsburg, Brookville, Maysville, Mt. Sterling, Vanceburg, and other places." Also, in December, 1860, Hon. John J. Crittenden, in the United States Senate, was urging compromise measures looking to the adjustment of difficulties and to avoiding the dissolution of the Union. It is plain, from what has been said, that in 1860 the people of Kentucky were alive to what was the great question of the day, which was union or secession, and so positive did the union sentiment become, it afterwards gave the name "Union" to its party.

This party, in the year 1860, nominated as its candidate for the office of clerk of the Court of Appeals General Leslie Combs, of Lexington. The candidates against him were Clinton McClarty, States' Rights, and R. R. Bolling, Independent. The election took place August 6th, at which Combs, the Union candidate, received 68,165 votes; McClarty, 44,942; Bolling, 10,971; the majority for Combs over both being 12,252, and his

plurality over the Southern Rights candidate 23,223. (Collins's *Annals*, p. 84.) In the same year, 1860, in November, the Presidential election took place. At this election Bell and Everett received 66,016 votes; Douglas and Johnson, 25,644; Breckinridge and Lane, 52,836; Lincoln and Hamlin, 1,366. The Douglas men and the Bell men and the Lincoln men were all alike Unionists, and their votes added together, amounting to 93,026, represent the Union vote, as against 52,836 for Breckinridge. (Collins's *Annals*, p. 84.) These events of 1860 show that, even in that year, the issue was made up. The live question of the hour was union or secession, and it is plain that the great majority of the voters of Kentucky favored the Union and were opposed to secession.

As the eye rests upon the map of the United States, the pivotal situation of Kentucky in the Civil War is at once seen. Kentucky was not upon the western flank, like Missouri; nor was it enveloped by free territory, like Maryland, with no natural boundary. It was central, and bounded along the north for seven hundred miles by the Ohio River, then unbridged. Kentucky was a slave State, and much like the States of Virginia and Tennessee in the character and sentiments of her people.

In the division which took place in 1860-61 there were many natural reasons for the Kentucky people to side with the South, and, in the look to her at that time, there was intense anxiety. Her decision was fraught with weighty consequences. As she did not join in the Southern movement the advantages to the cause of the Union were manifest in the results which followed. If the decision had been different the results can only be a matter of conjecture, but the difficulties of suppressing the rebellion would certainly have been enhanced.

It is possible, though not at all certain, that an act of secession, however brought about, might have carried

the people with it. An illustration of this is found in the career of General Robert E. Lee, who was for the Union until his State seceded and then he followed his State. Whatever might have been the temper of the Kentucky people under such circumstances, it was a cause for rejoicing, on the one hand, that secession was not adopted, and, to the other side, a matter of sore disappointment.

As Kentucky was a slave State, it seemed to be expected by the seceding States that she would, without fail, unite with them in the Southern Confederacy. This expectation led to much urgency and earnest solicitation on the part of the seceding States. Strong arguments were presented, and all the inducements offered, but without avail. The records of the period do not show that any outside influences were brought to bear to help out the Kentucky Unionists. It would seem that the leaders of the Union cause in Kentucky were regarded as sufficient for the occasion. No abler men in the country could have been found to champion the cause than were then exerting all their energies in the State, and they were left to fight out the battle without aid.

It is a plain proposition that the people of Kentucky, with a clear and intelligent perception of the situation, deliberately rejected secession, and firmly resolved to remain in the Union. This has been agreed to by the historians, and it was established by the voting of 1860 and 1861, which voting of 1861 will be fully detailed. Yet the grossest injustice has been done to them, and especially the leaders, by charges of duplicity, and even treachery, in the practical carrying out of their repeatedly expressed wishes, and in defeating the persistent efforts to frustrate their will.

It is stated in Collins's *History of Kentucky* (vol. I., p. 333) that "A vast majority of the people of the State were devoted to the cause of the Union." That is true.

It is proved by the voting and the volunteering. The statement on the next page, however, is not true. There are no grounds whatever for saying:—

“ But it must not be less clearly apparent to the observer that a decided majority of her people believed honestly in the abstract right to secede, and a vast majority were firmly opposed to the attempt to coerce the people of the State to remain under the control of a federative government which had become unacceptable to them.”

There is no authority for this statement. It is simply an assertion. It is demonstrated by the voting that the people were Union in sentiment, but there is no ground for saying they believed in State supremacy; there is no evidence of it and no way to prove it. The same writer complacently says that nearly all Kentuckians held firmly, as a cardinal principle, the doctrine of the Resolutions of 1798, that a State had the right to withdraw from the Union, and that it was a crime to attempt to compel the State to remain a part of the United States.

By this ingenious assertion of a thing which was never proved and not susceptible of proof, the effort is made to show that the Kentucky people sided with the States which actually seceded, although they might hold that the movement was “unwise and ill-advised.” It is the oft-asserted claim that, while the Kentucky people refused to secede themselves, they supported in sentiment those who did secede, which claim was not only folly but absolutely untrue. The evidence upon the subject establishes exactly the contrary proposition. The Unionists of Kentucky repeatedly based their opposition to secession upon the saying which became proverbial in 1860 and 1861 that “secession is a remedy for no evil, but an aggravation of all.” They saw this as clearly as the people of any State in the Union. To say that they believed in secession as a right, admits that they had

information on the subject, and so they had. They had heard the question discussed. The Resolutions of 1798 were familiar to them, but when the moment came for the actual exercise of the claimed right they turned away from it, as a remedy for nothing and the greatest evil that could befall the country. They understood that a union had been formed whereby the United States passed out of a confederation into a union and that it was never contemplated that any one State could, at will, destroy the whole fabric. In addition to this, they understood the reasons against secession with a peculiarly clear perception. The people of 1861 had heard their fathers tell of the early troubles, about the navigation of the lower waters. The only outlet of the State, in the early days, was the Mississippi River. If there were obstacles in that navigation it vitally affected all the prospects of Kentucky. If the country at the mouth of that river was controlled by Spain, or France, or England, free communication with the sea was cut off. All this was familiar to Kentuckians.

Now, if the State of Louisiana could withdraw from the Union and set up an absolutely independent government and take its place as one in the family of nations, which was the claim of secession, then it could enter into alliance of any kind it saw fit with any foreign power, and thus the interests of all who depended upon the navigation of the Mississippi might be affected, and so much affected as to destroy them hopelessly. It is an imputation upon the intelligence of any people to say they believed that the State of Louisiana had the right to so jeopardize the whole country of the Mississippi Valley. The entire recklessness of the scheme of secession was understood by the people. In every town and village in the State there were men of thought and sound sense who, by writing and speaking and in conversation, presented the ruinous consequences of secession,

and the results were shown at the polls. Notwithstanding the efforts to fire the popular heart with the portrayal of the "wrongs" by the North upon the South, the conclusion remained that secession was a remedy for no evil, but an aggravation of all.

The same recklessness of statement is found in Collins (p. 349) where it is asserted that all the dire predictions made of the barbarous intentions of the National government were fulfilled when the rebellion was crushed. The language is:—

"In April, 1865, the war ceased with the entire and complete subjugation of the South. All that the States' Rights men had prophesied would be accomplished if unresisted, all that the Union men had indignantly denied to be the objects of the war, was accomplished. The South was conquered, the slaves were freed, and negro political equality recognized throughout the nation."

Thus the effort is made to have the historic page perpetuate the double falsehood that the Unionists brought on the war, and then carried out all that was predicted.

In the course of this work quotations will be made of what had been prophesied by the States' Rights men, and the reader of to-day can determine, as he contemplates the Southern States at present and for years past, whether the direful predictions were fulfilled.

With an overweening confidence in their military prowess, the Southern States did that which necessarily and inevitably produced war. These States set themselves up as independent territory, open to alliances of any and all kinds with foreign powers. This of itself, if tolerated, was a death-blow to the American Republic. They, also, forcibly and otherwise, took possession of all the property belonging to the United States within their limits. This of itself was enough to cause the Government to resort to force or else ac-

knowledge itself too weak to look after its own interests.¹

In the course of the war it became apparent that one of the sources of strength in the South was the ownership of the negroes. Therefore, they were liberated. This was one of the consequences of the war.

The harmful results of the war, ending as it did, may all be catalogued, and even exaggerated; but let it be supposed the Federal troops had been overcome, and the Confederacy established, where could be found a genius so stupendous for folly as to be equal to the task of so portraying the consequences, even in imagination, as to make conditions better than now exist? Imagination might picture how deplorable they would be, but it would be impossible to conceive of a broken-up republic giving to the inhabitants of this land the blessings and the prosperity and the honor and credit which they now enjoy.

It is plain, therefore, when the people of Kentucky, in their meetings of all sorts, resolved that secession was a remedy for nothing, but an aggravation of all evils, that it was subversion of order and a step towards anarchy, and when they cast their suffrages for the Union, they had a clear perception of the real situation, and a clear understanding of the issue that was before them and the whole country.

The same writer, upon the assumption that the political faith of the Kentucky people was the doctrine of the Resolutions of 1798, that "each State was the final judge of the remedies it would pursue when aggrieved by the action of the Federal government," goes on to say:

"Basing upon that principle of political faith and upon that other principle which had become a political axiom, that no government ought to exist save by consent freely given of the governed, they almost unanimously drew the corollary that

¹ See Appendix, § 2, p.

when the people of a State became convinced that the Federal Union no longer protected them and guarded their rights they had, as a State, an unchallengeable right to withdraw from it." (Collins, i. p. 336.)

This quotation is made to show that even Confederate writers (the author of the quotation was a Kentucky secessionist and a general in the Confederate army) concede that the people have some rights, that it is a political axiom that government ought to be with the consent of the governed; and yet, although the Kentucky people were Unionists by a "vast majority," and voted to stay in the Union, and against going out of it, still the Southern leaders vilified them and their leaders, and applied bitter epithets to them, and endeavored to treat them as without any rights at all, when the effort to drag the State into secession proved abortive.

Surely, if it could be true that the State had the right to withdraw from the Union at will, it must be true that it had the right to refuse to do so; yet when the issue was up and discussed, and plainly understood, and decided in favor of the Union, the friends of the Confederacy in Kentucky went South and did all in their power to place their own State in a false position, and actually went through the form of declaring on paper that Kentucky was out of the Union and a member of the Confederacy.

It is proper, and it is due to the memory of the great men who led the hosts of Kentucky Unionists in the troubled times of the Civil War, that the records of the circumstances under which they acted, now existing only in scattered form, should be consecutively narrated so that they may be known to all general readers.

CHAPTER III

THE LEGISLATURE

IN order to understand the events of the winter and spring of 1861, the character and work of the Legislature which sat in the months of January, February, April, and May must be borne clearly in mind. The members of that Legislature had been elected in the year 1859. Therefore, they were elected before the question of union or disunion actually came up, as it did in 1860 and 1861. It was not until the Presidential nominations were made in 1860 that the question became a serious one. The nomination of Lincoln and the possibility of his election brought out distinctly the threat of secession. In the speeches of that campaign it was declared the Southern States would withdraw from the Union if Lincoln should be elected, and it became a matter of anxious inquiry what would Kentucky do in that event?

Soon after the November election, at which Lincoln was elected, South Carolina seceded. In the same month, December, the Governor of Kentucky called a special session of the Legislature to meet January 17, 1861. His message to that body showed unmistakably his secession proclivities. He declared that the verdict of the election in November was a deliberate expression of the purpose of the North to administer the government detrimentally to the South; that Kentucky will not submit to inequalities in the Union, and the question is, what will be the attitude of Kentucky? He mentioned the fact that Virginia and Tennessee had referred the whole subject to the people, and said:

“I therefore submit to your consideration the propriety of providing for the election of delegates to a convention to be assembled at an early day, to which shall be referred for full and final determination the future of Federal and interstate relations of Kentucky.”

He further said :

“Kentucky will not be an indifferent observer of the force policy” that “the seceding States have not, in their haste and inconsiderate action, our approval, but their cause is our right and they have our sympathies. The people of Kentucky will never stand by with arms folded while those States are struggling for their constitutional rights and resisting oppression, or being subjugated to an antislavery government”; that “the idea of coercion, when applied to great political communities, is revolting to a free people, contrary to the spirit of our institutions, and if successful would endanger the liberties of the people.” (*House Journal.*)

He also urged the necessity for arming, equipping, and providing munitions of war for the “State Guard.”

He also desired the Legislature to declare its unconditional disapprobation of force in any form against the seceded States. The tone of the message indicates a confident feeling that all that was asked would be granted. It appeared then that it might reasonably be regarded as certain that the “Southern Rights” sentiment would predominate in the Legislature. It had elected John C. Breckinridge to the United States Senate over Joshua F. Bell, by a vote of 81 to 52. The Unionists had but little hope, and were extremely anxious. Although the people had voted in the August election, 1860, and in the November election, 1860, against the Southern movement, no one could tell what impression actual secession had made upon their minds. Furthermore, if they were called upon to vote for delegates to a Sovereignty convention, great excitement and possible violence might be expected. The views of the Unionists

were expressed by George D. Prentice in the *Louisville Journal*, that it was unnecessary to consider the question of secession; that secession was not necessary, but adherence to the Union was; that hasty and inconsiderate action would be contrary to the Constitution and simply revolutionary. In this he was supported by the Governor's own words in his message, where he said, "The hasty and inconsiderate action of the seceding States has not our approval." In other words, the calling of a Sovereignty convention "at an early day" would itself be, and would also lead to, hasty and inconsiderate action, which was not desirable. Under these conditions of hope and fear and uncertainty the Legislature met, January 17, 1861. Its sittings that winter and spring were as follows:—

From January 17th to February 11th, when there was an adjournment to the 20th of March.

On March 20th it reassembled and sat until April 4th, when it adjourned without day.

The Governor very promptly called another special session for May 6th, on which day it assembled and sat until May 24th, when it adjourned and its work was at an end.

From that time until September 2d there was no Legislature. On that day another Legislature came in which had been elected at the preceding August election.

What was done by the Legislature which sat in the winter and spring of 1861, and on which so much depended? The only answer is, practically nothing, considering the momentous issues at stake. Memorable as the occasion was, that body is far more noted for what it did not do than for what it did. The main object for which it was assembled was to provide for a convention to consider secession, but no convention was called. Nor was there any act, or joint resolution, passed on the subject of

neutrality or coercion, which were also the themes of the hour.

The historians have conveyed the idea that neutrality was adopted by the Legislature, but this is error. Shaler in his history says:

“The Legislature of Kentucky caught this universal will of the citizens for neutrality, and proceeded to shape its action accordingly.”

This would indicate legislative action, but there was none that had the approval of both houses so as to become the act of the Legislature.

On the 21st day of January Hon. Geo. W. Ewing introduced resolutions in the lower House, of which he was a member, the first of which expressed regret that the States of New York, Ohio, Maine, and Massachusetts had, by their Legislatures, tendered men and money to be used in coercing the seceded States. The second requested the Governor to notify the executives of those States that whenever armed forces were sent for the purpose of forcing the people of the South to the extremity of submission or resistance, “the people of Kentucky, uniting with their brethren of the South, will, as one man, resist such invasion of the soil of the South, at all hazard, and to the last extremity.” These resolutions were adopted only by the lower House.

The historian General George B. Hodge, who was a member of that Legislature and went into the Confederacy, writing in Collins's *History of Kentucky*, is wholly misleading in his mention of these resolutions, conveying the idea that they were adopted by the Legislature. (Collins, 1, 341.) The truth is, they passed the lower House of the Legislature only, and were not acted upon at all by the Senate (Collins, 1, 86) (*House Journal*, 1861, p. 69).

On the 25th day of January a joint resolution was passed favoring an amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the calling of a convention from the

various States for the consideration of such an amendment. Also, on the 29th of January, a joint resolution was passed appointing commissioners to the peace conference to be held at Washington. The commissioners appointed were General Wm. O. Butler, James B. Clay, Joshua F. Bell, Charles S. Morehead, Charles A. Wickliffe, and James Guthrie. (Acts 1861, 47.) These were all distinguished and able men. The conference was composed of such men from twenty-one States, and sat from February 4th to February 27th, but accomplished nothing.

On the 29th day of January Hon. R. T. Jacob introduced a resolution in the lower House, of which he was a member, upon the subject of neutrality, which had at that early date come to be popular. The resolution was:

“That the proper position of Kentucky is that of a mediator between the sections, and that as an umpire she should remain firm and impartial in this day of trial to our beloved country, that by her counsels and mediation she may aid in restoring peace and harmony and brotherly love throughout the land.”

That was the idea of neutrality indorsed by the Unionists of Kentucky, but no action was had upon the resolution.

Then, upon the 11th of February, joint resolutions were passed under the following title:—“Resolutions declaring further action by the Legislature on political affairs unnecessary and inexpedient at this time.”

The resolutions were as follows:

“*Resolved* by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:

“That the people of Kentucky view with the most lively apprehension the dangers that now environ the Union and threaten its perpetuity;

“*Resolved*, That we appeal to our Southern brethren to stay the work of secession, to return and make one mighty effort

to perpetuate the noble work of our forefathers, hallowed by the recollection of a thousand noble deeds;

“ *Resolved*, That we protest against the use of force or coercion by the general government against the seceding States as unwise and inexpedient and tending to the destruction of our common country.”

The next and last resolution of the series favored the calling of a National convention to amend the National Constitution, and concluded with these words:

“ It is unnecessary and inexpedient for this Legislature to take any further action on this subject at the present time, and, as an evidence of the sincerity and good faith of our propositions for an adjustment, *and our expression of devotion to the Union and desire for its preservation, Kentucky awaits with great solicitude the responses from her sister States.*

On the 4th of April the Legislature passed an act to amend the militia law, the only section of which that it is important to mention provided that any member of the State Guard shall have the right to withdraw therefrom without the consent of any officer.

On that day, April 4th, the Legislature adjourned, but it was called in special session again May 6th. Between these two dates Fort Sumter was fired upon and President Lincoln called for 75,000 troops and the Governor of Kentucky rudely responded, refusing to comply with the call for the quota due from Kentucky.

The Legislature meeting after such exciting events was expected to act in some resolute and positive manner, but nothing was done in any way looking towards secession. On the contrary, the influence of the Unionists became more apparent than at the former sessions.

That there was not harmony in the counsels of those who favored secession is apparent from a letter, which is found in the records, from General Humphrey Marshall to Governor Magoffin, written from Virginia March 23, 1862. General Marshall, having left Kentucky for the

Confederacy, wrote to Governor Magoffin, rebuking his failure to take action in 1861 and suggesting that, even at that date, March, 1862, "circumstances offered a new and favorable opportunity to appeal successfully to the people of Kentucky."

Referring to the spring of 1861, he says:

"You cannot fail to remember the pertinacity with which I urged you not to call that extra session of the Legislature which stripped you of power, and actually usurped your constitutional functions of commander of the military forces of the State."

General Marshall was an active promoter of secession, and, in the summer of 1861, before complaints were made of the Unionists going into camp at Camp Dick Robinson, had organized in Owen County quite a force in the interests of the South, which followed him out of the State in the fall of 1861. In his pertinaciously advising against the calling of the extra session of the Legislature for May 6th he doubtless acted in concert with others like himself who had lost all hope of getting favorable action from that Legislature and proposed to proceed independently of it.

At the May session, May 16th, resolutions were passed by the lower House:

"That this State and the citizens thereof should take no part in the civil war now being waged, except as mediator and friends to the belligerent parties, and that Kentucky should, during the contest, occupy the position of strict neutrality.

"*Resolved*, That the act of the Governor in refusing to furnish troops or military force upon the call of the executive authority of the United States, *under existing circumstances, is approved.*"

While these resolutions were adopted by the House, there was no concurrence by the Senate, and therefore they only reflected the mind of the one body.

It will be observed that, in both resolutions, the language is very guarded—the first provides for mediatorial, not armed, neutrality; and the second approves the refusal by the Governor to furnish the troops “*under existing circumstances.*”

What these circumstances were will be more fully shown in the two chapters following, but they were, in substance, that a popular stand had been taken in favor of neutrality, and to furnish troops would be inconsistent therewith. It was the same position as that taken by the Union State Committee in April, approving the Governor's refusal upon the ground that the *present* duty of Kentucky is to remain neutral. In both instances there was a wise, sensible, and patriotic motive, as will be shown, there being a possibility at that time that if Kentucky did not ally herself with the seceding States this might be such a turning weight in the scale as to avert the actual calamity of war. But this expression, as stated, was only by the lower House, there being no joint action by the Senate.

At this session two very significant acts were passed. On the 24th of May it was enacted that the State should be armed. For that purpose a “military board” was constituted, consisting of Governor Magoffin, Samuel Gill, George T. Wood, General Peter Dudley, and John B. Temple.

The majority of this board were Unionists. It was authorized to borrow \$1,600,000 for the purchase of arms and munitions of war to be furnished equally to the Home Guard companies and the State Guard companies. The importance of this appears when, as will be hereafter shown, the State Guard organization was largely in sympathy with the South, while the Home Guards were Unionists.

The act also provided that the members of the State Guard companies as well as of the Home Guard companies

should take the same oath as the officers, requiring fidelity to the Constitution of the United States.

The act further provided :

“ That nothing in this act shall be so construed as to authorize said board or any of the military organizations created by the militia laws of the State to use in any wise the arms and munitions of war herein authorized to be purchased, or those already belonging to the State, against the government of the United States, nor against the Confederate States, unless in protecting our soil from unlawful invasion—it being the intention alone that said arms and munitions of war are to be used for the sole defence of Kentucky.” (Acts 1861.)

The other significant act was that the next sitting of the Legislature should be on the first Monday in September, instead of the January following. It thus appears that, contrary to the expectations of both sides, the Legislature which had been elected in 1859, and was supposed to be of like political complexion with the Governor, passed away without bringing upon the State any complications. The members were so evenly divided in sentiment that they could do nothing radical. The general result was bitter disappointment to the Governor and a cause of rejoicing to the Unionists, who believed that they were in the majority in the State, and that they would certainly elect a Union Legislature at the ensuing August election, which was done by a great and overwhelming majority.

General Hodge, writing in Collins's *History of Kentucky*, referring to the expression of opinion of the 21st of January already mentioned, and speaking of the entire work of that Legislature sitting in the winter and spring of 1861, says :

“ Beyond this expression of opinion the Legislature declined to go.”

He further says :

“The Legislature had done nothing to prepare the State for the awful ordeal which was before her, save to provide a few arms, half of which were distributed to the State Guard and subsequently passed into the Southern armies, and half of which were distributed to Home Guards and were used exclusively in aid of the Federal government; and yet in no deliberative or parliamentary body in the whole country had the exciting questions of the day been more earnestly or more fully discussed.” (Collins, i. 341.)

As there could be no secession of Kentucky without the calling of a convention by the Legislature, and as the danger had passed, it is interesting to inquire by what means and instrumentalities did the Kentucky Unionists not only save their State from secession, but also from even the first step in that direction.

To accomplish the result of having that Legislature pass through all its meetings without doing the specific thing for which Governor Magoffin assembled it, called for the highest exercise of patriotic effort on the part of the best and wisest men of the State, irrespective of party affiliations.

The Bell and Everett party and the Douglas party joined hands. Each arranged to meet in convention in Louisville on the 8th day of January, 1861. The two conventions met on that day. The delegates of the Bell party were called to order by Judge William F. Bullock, of Louisville, and John B. Huston, of Clark County, was made temporary chairman. The permanent chairman was John L. Helm. Conspicuous in the meeting were Hon. Garrett Davis, of Paris; Judge Warner L. Underwood, of Bowling Green; George H. Yeaman, of Owensboro; Joshua F. Bell, of Danville; J. M. Shackelford, of Madisonville; W. C. Goodloe, of Lexington; Alfred Allen, of Breckinridge County; Phillip Swigert, of Frankfort; General Leslie Combs, of Lexington; W. R. Grigsby, of Nelson; John H. McHenry, of Owensboro;

R. J. Browne, of Springfield; Henry Grider, of Bowling Green; Colonel Thomas L. Crittenden, and Judge Zachariah Wheat, of Columbia. Speeches were made by a number of these distinguished men, all breathing a spirit of devotion to the Union, and deprecating the Southern movement. While many blamed the "fanaticism" of the North, all united in the sentiment that all wrongs could be redressed in the Union. The National flag was displayed, and the music of *The Star-Spangled Banner* aroused the greatest enthusiasm. A committee on resolutions was appointed, which reported the following day, and on the next day following, the convention, conjointly with the convention of the Douglas followers, in session at the same time, adopted the resolutions reported.

There were many notable men in the convention of Douglas men. Prominent among them were ex-Governor Charles A. Wickliffe, ex-Governor Archibald Dixon, Col. William P. Boone, Joshua F. Bullitt, Thomas L. Jones.

The resolutions placed the highest estimate on the Union. The election of Lincoln was not a cause for dissolution. The efforts of Governor Crittenden for removal of difficulties, and adjustment of differences, were commended.

Governor Helm in his speech urged that "we cling to the Union as long as it exists, and resolve that it never be destroyed."

Hon. Garrett Davis, in a speech, asked, "Will you preserve the Union or rush into the vortex of revolution under the name of secession?" Hon. J. F. Bell said, "Let us offer everything we can to avert the torrent of evil, but let us always stand ready to support our rights in the Union"; that "the State is deeply and devotedly attached to the Union."

The fusion of these two large elements of the people of Kentucky made a deep impression. They had polled

at the November, 1860, election, two thirds of the vote of the State, and now they clasped hands in the one supreme task of saving the State from rushing into secession. The echoes of the Louisville conventions did not die away for many days afterwards. In all parts of the State meetings were held, approving their spirit and resolutions.

The expressions in the resolutions of some of these meetings were very strong, declaring that the election of Lincoln was no cause for dissolving the Union; that the President should see that the laws were executed, by force, if necessary; that secession was a remedy for no evil; that the Union was dear to all and the only safety; that if any fighting was to be done it should be done in the Union.

A true idea of the attitude of the Unionists may be gathered from a speech made by Hon. J. T. Boyle, in Lincoln County, early in January. General Boyle was not only a Unionist, but proved his faith by service afterward in the field. He said in the speech referred to:

“ There can be no benefit or advantage, no civil or political right, no interest of any kind whatever, secured by government in this Southern Confederacy, which you do not now enjoy under the blessed Union formed by our fathers. On the other hand, this Utopian Confederacy can never give Kentucky the security of life and liberty, and peace and property, which we now enjoy; but it must entail upon us not only all the real and pretended evils which now exist and which we endure, and all these accumulated ten times over, with hundreds of evils and wrongs not dreamed of and which we will never experience if we abide by our glorious Union. What, then, should Kentucky do in this crisis? In my opinion, we should stand by the Star Spangled Banner and cling to the Union.”

But the Unionists of Kentucky were placed in a most trying and delicate position. It would have been suicidal

for them to have used expressions, in speeches or resolutions, which would have been interpreted to mean complete accordance with all that was so abundantly charged against the Northern people. If they had not been discreet, all would have been lost. A clue to the situation is found in the words of Joshua F. Bell, in his speech January 8th at Louisville: "Let us offer everything we can to avert the torrent of evil, but let us always stand ready to support our rights in the Union."

The Unionists, therefore, did nothing to aggravate the opposite party. They left hard speeches to them, and sought by conciliatory words to save their State from secession and the country from anarchy. They honestly joined in objecting to the views of Northern extremists and in declaring that, if the Northern people entered upon such a crusade against the South as was outlined by the fierce and fiery orators of the day and proclaimed by the Southern press, they would join hands in resisting. But they endeavored to allay such wild apprehensions and to keep before the public the great and inestimable value of the Union, and never ceased to declare that secession was a remedy for no evil.

The crisis brought to the front the great men of the State. Business considerations were laid aside. Old age and infirmity were overcome by energy. Men of weight and influence did not spare themselves nor their means. They travelled from place to place and addressed the people on all sorts of occasions. They made sacrifices of ease and comfort, and, with the most unsparing diligence and activity, strove to hold Kentucky in the Union. The splendid work of the Union leaders, from one end of the State to the other, through the winter and spring of 1861, deserves to be remembered with gratitude by all who, at this day and in all future years, enjoy the benefits of the beneficent government of the United States.

It was the wise and discreet conduct of the Union leaders which prevented precipitate action in the Legislature. There was a small majority of Union men in the Senate, but the House was about equally divided; therefore strong and positive utterances might have influenced some of the members. It has been said by one writer that:

“The balance of power in each house was held by a small number of men who were opposed to secession but unwilling to take any active measures for the support of the government, and, throughout the three successive sessions of this Legislature during the winter and spring, care had to be taken not to drive these men to the disunion side.” (R. M. Kelly in *Union Regiments of Kentucky*.)

He also says:

“The Union men believed the new Legislature to be elected in August would be more favorable to the government, and were fighting for time. Popular pressure was brought to bear on both sides. No sooner would delegations of secessionists appear in Frankfort than the telegraph would summon Union men from all parts of the State.”

The result was that there was no action by this Legislature upon the matters which were uppermost in the minds of all, except the act for the regulation of the militia, which has been mentioned. In order to have legislative action it must be the work of both houses, and except the act mentioned there was none, and no joint resolution was passed.

CHAPTER IV

NEUTRALITY

NEUTRALITY in Kentucky cannot be understood without a fair consideration of all the circumstances. It should not be judged in the light which shines back upon it from subsequent events, but in the light of the time when it was born, and it must be remembered that its birth antedated actual hostilities by at least two months. Four States had passed ordinances of secession before the end of January, 1861, but in that month there was no organized Confederacy and no certainty that there would be a war. In that month of January, 1861, the idea of Kentucky standing neutral in the event of war first began to be considered by leading men who were ardently devoted to the preservation of the Union. On the 17th of January the called session of the Legislature assembled, and on the 29th of January Hon. R. T. Jacob, a member of the lower House, brought in a series of resolutions, the third of which was as follows:

“That the proper position of Kentucky is that of mediator between the sections, and that as an umpire she should remain firm and impartial in this day of trial to our beloved country, that by her counsels and mediation she may aid in restoring peace and harmony and brotherly love throughout the entire land.’

This was an apt expression of the sentiment of the most prominent public men of the State, excepting, of course, those who favored secession.

The feeling at that time was that war was possible, but that it might be averted. It was precisely the feeling which animated the assembling of the celebrated peace conference at Washington on the 4th of February, wherein twenty-one States were represented by 133 commissioners; which conference sat for more than three weeks, striving to devise some means to avert civil strife. Early in 1861 it was believed by many that wise and temperate counsels might exert a wholesome influence and stay the wild passions of the hour. Therefore there was nothing unnatural in the slave State of Kentucky, bordering upon the free States, taking the position of mediator and attempting to act as an umpire between the two sections, with the patriotic view of possibly preventing a collision.

Nothing could be more unjust than to attribute to the distinguished men who urged and advocated this position any motives other than absolute sincerity. As well might the peace conference at Washington be charged with base and sinister designs as to suggest such designs in connection with the effort made in Kentucky to preserve peace.

In the biography of John C. Breckinridge it is said :

“He was the avowed friend of the South, but, impressed with the magnitude of the bitter struggle which would ensue if all were submitted to the arbitrament of the sword, he strove most earnestly to secure by peaceable means the rights desired to that section. He labored in the Senate and among his own people to avert the disaster of war. As long as there was a hope of peace he bent his energies to secure it. But when it became evident that the North could be satisfied only with the subjugation of the South, he quitted the Senate and took up the sword.”¹ (Collins, vol. ii., p. 203.)

This was in the fall of 1861. If he could be commended for striving to avert war up to that date, it could not

¹ See Appendix, § 3, p. 338.

have been other than commendable for the Kentucky Unionists to labor to the same end in the beginning of the same year.

On the 27th day of May, 1861, the Border State Convention met at Frankfort. After a week's session it issued two addresses; one to the people of the United States and one to the people of Kentucky. From the latter the following language is quoted:

“Your State, on a deliberate consideration of her responsibilities, moral, political, and social, has determined that the proper course for her to pursue is to take no part in the controversy between the government and the seceded States but that of mediator and intercessor. She is unwilling to take up arms against her brethren residing either North or South of the geographical line by which they are unhappily divided into warring sections. This course was commended to her by every consideration of patriotism, and by a proper regard for her own security. It does not result from timidity; on the contrary, it could only have been adopted by a brave people, so brave that the least imputation on their courage would be branded as false by their written and traditional history.”

This address, which was written about June 1st and after hostilities had actually commenced, shows, by its language, that the stand for neutrality was taken before all hope for peace was abandoned. It goes on to say:

“Kentucky was right in taking this position, because from the commencement of this deplorable controversy her voice was for reconciliation, compromise, and peace. She had no cause of complaint against the general government, and made none. The injuries she sustained in her property from a failure to execute laws passed for its protection in consequence of illegal interference by wicked and deluded citizens in the free States, she considered as wholly insufficient to justify a dismemberment of the Union. That, she regarded as no remedy for existing evils, but an aggravation of them all. She witnessed, it is true, with deep concern, the growth of a wild

and frenzied fanaticism in one section, and a reckless and defiant spirit in another, both equally threatening destruction to the country, and tried earnestly to arrest them, but in vain."

As the address was written some days after the refusal of the Governor to respond to the national call for troops, the following language explanatory is quoted:

"In declining to respond to a call made by the present administration of the government, and one that we have reason to believe would not have been made if the administration had been fully advised of the circumstances by which we were surrounded, Kentucky did not put herself in factious opposition to her legitimate obligations. . . . So far from being denounced for this action, it is everywhere looked upon as an act of purest patriotism, resulting from imperious necessity and the highest instincts of self-preservation, respected by the very administration that alone could have complained of it, and will, we doubt not, be ratified by it; if not in terms, at least by its future action. That act did not take her out of the Union."

This address was signed by the following eminent citizens of Kentucky: J. J. Crittenden, president of the convention; James Guthrie, R. K. Williams, Archibald Dixon, F. M. Bristow, Joshua F. Bell, Charles A. Wickliffe, G. W. Dunlap, C. S. Morehead, James F. Robinson, John B. Huston, Robert Richardson.

Such was the spirit of neutrality. It was inaugurated when there was a possibility of preventing bloodshed, and it was adhered to even in the first days of the struggle, while it yet appeared from the limited number of troops called out (only 75,000) that the actual struggle would be small in its proportions and not of long duration, the thought then being that it would not last longer than ninety days at the furthest. It is a wrong to the earnest-minded men of that time to lose sight of the fact that few persons, if any, in the entire country, then

looked forward to such a stupendous struggle as did come on. It is also due to them to credit them with honestly striving to pursue the best and wisest course in a crisis which called for the exercise of the soundest judgment with which human beings are endowed. It will be observed that in the language of the address quoted the words occur that "dismemberment of the Union is no remedy for existing evils, but an aggravation of them all."

This shows that in the minds and hearts of those who favored mediatorial neutrality there was the same devotion to the Union and opposition to secession which had manifested itself in the elections in 1860, and which had caused the Bell and Everett party and the Douglas party to unite in the convention of the 8th of January. The attitude of the Kentucky people who were not secessionists may be thus defined: They hoped for a peaceable solution of the troubles upon the country; therefore they would do nothing to excite strife, but by precept and example would seek to secure peace. Failing in that, the Union must be adhered to. In whatever stand was taken there was no thought of leaving the Union.¹ Not only so, but all schemes and machinations for taking Kentucky out of the Union were watched, resisted, and counteracted. That there was a struggle to bring about the secession of the State there can be no denial, and it is equally true the Kentucky Unionists resisted it with all their might. The Governor was a secessionist, and the Legislature was an unknown quantity when it met in January, 1861. If those who favored the Union had been less active and vigilant, there is reason to believe the State would have been declared out of the Union even though a majority of the people opposed it.

The resolution offered by Hon. R. T. Jacob in the

¹ See Appendix, §§ 4 and 5, pp. 339 and 340.

Legislature, on January 29th, in which it was declared that "the proper position of Kentucky is that of a mediator," has been mentioned. He himself has left a valuable commentary upon the events of that day, in an address made before the Federal Historical Society of Louisville, on the subject of neutrality. In this address, commenting upon the resolution named, he said:

"This leading sentiment of mediation was endorsed by the Union men of both Houses of the Legislature. . . . Some may say, Why did not the Kentucky Legislature go for coercion? For two reasons: First, some States, it is true, had seceded from the Union, but war had not actually commenced. Second, the men at that time who would have undertaken to force coercion upon the Legislature would have been in the hopeless minority, and would have immediately given a majority to the secessionists. It would have ended in total destruction to the cause of the Union in the State. Those resolutions were for two purposes: In good faith they were intended to compromise all differences between the States, and, if possible, to restore peace between the sections. If that failed, they were intended to hold, if possible, our meagre majority of one, until the people could act, and we had no doubt that when they did speak it would be in unmistakable tones for the preservation of the Union."

Although Colonel Jacob's resolutions were not agreed upon so as to become the Legislative act, they showed the position of the Kentucky Unionists. Even before the date of those resolutions, which was January 29th, the prominent leaders had advocated that stand, and such was the position of the Kentucky Unionists all the way through the whole course of neutrality. It was for mediation, and became known as "mediatorial neutrality" as against "armed neutrality," which was the stand taken by the secessionists, when they were not able to accomplish secession. This is clearly shown in Colonel Jacob's address, but before quoting, it is proper to

mention that the Legislature made a call for a Border State Convention to meet in Frankfort on May 27th. Delegates were nominated for this convention and the election took place May 4th. That election unexpectedly sent a thrill of joy throughout the loyal States. All the delegates elected were then regarded as Union men, and all were, with perhaps one exception. They were John J. Crittenden, James Guthrie, R. K. Williams, Archibald Dixon, F. M. Bristow, Joshua F. Bell, Charles A. Wickliffe, George W. Dunlap, Chas. S. Morehead, James F. Robinson, John B. Huston, Robert Richardson. All were great men and chiefs among the people. The vote they received was 107,334, which showed such a preponderance of Union sentiment in the State as to cause general rejoicing. It was this vote to which the Hon. Joseph Holt referred in his magnificent letter to Joshua F. Speed, May 31st, beginning:

“The recent overwhelming vote in favor of the Union in Kentucky has afforded unspeakable gratification to all true men throughout the country.”

Referring to this election, Colonel Jacob says in his address:

“As soon as the people sustained the Union cause, Governor Magoffin issued his proclamation placing the State in ‘armed neutrality’ in contradistinction to ‘mediatorial neutrality.’ One was placing the State independent of both sections, and was simply nonsense. The other was simply the logical position forced upon the people by the want of power to hold any other, and retain the power so that they could ultimately, if peace could not be preserved, preserve the State to the Union.”

Colonel Jacob then goes on to say:

“Immediately after Governor Magoffin’s proclamation of ‘armed neutrality,’ which was after the State had elected the Union men to the Border State Convention by an overwhelming

majority, the secession members got up in the two Houses and declared they were for neutrality, meaning 'armed neutrality.' Here was where the confusion came in, and so much injustice has been done to the Union members of that Legislature, holding them and confining them to a position they never held, but always successfully opposed."

Governor Magoffin's neutrality proclamation will be given entire, as it is a very remarkable document, and has never been published in full, except in the newspapers of that day. It will be observed it is not based upon any legislative enactment, but solely upon the two grounds that many good citizens applied to him to issue it, and in order to remove distrust from himself personally.

Such neutrality as is set forth is grotesque, and was so regarded at the time. Without any authority, or any possible way to sustain himself, he solemnly forbade either the United States or the Confederate States to set foot on the sacred soil of Kentucky.

Following is the proclamation:

"Whereas numerous applications have been made to me from many good citizens of this Commonwealth, praying me to issue a proclamation forbidding the march of any forces of this or any other State or States over our soil to make an apprehended attack upon the Federal forces at Cairo in Illinois, or to disturb any otherwise the peaceful attitude of Kentucky with reference to the deplorable war now waging between the United States and the Confederate States; and whereas numerous applications from the good citizens of this Commonwealth have also been made to me, praying me to issue a proclamation forbidding the occupancy of any post or place, or the march over our sacred soil by any force of the United States for any purpose; and whereas it is made fully evident by every indication of public sentiment that it is the determined purpose of the good people of Kentucky to maintain with courageous firmness the fixed position of self-defence,

proposing or intending no invasion or aggression towards any other State or States, forbidding the quartering of troops upon her soil by either of the hostile sections, but simply standing aloof from an unnatural, horrid, and lamentable strife for the existence of which Kentucky neither by thought, word, or act is in any wise responsible; and whereas the policy thus recommended by so many of my fellow-citizens of all political leanings is, in my judgment, wise, peaceful, safe, and honorable, and the most likely to preserve peace and amity between the neighboring bordering States on both shores of the Ohio River, and protect Kentucky generally from the ravages of a deplorable war; and whereas the arms distributed to the State Guard, composed as it is of gentlemen equally conscientious and honest, who entertain the opinions of both parties, are not to be used against the Federal Government nor the Confederate States, but to resist and prevent encroachment upon her soil, her rights, her honor, and her sovereignty, by either of the belligerent parties, and to preserve the peace, safety, prosperity, and happiness and strict neutrality of her people, in the hope that she may soon have an opportunity to become a successful mediator between them and in order to remove the unfounded distrust and suspicions of purposes to force Kentucky out of the Union at the point of the bayonet which may have been wrongly and wickedly engendered in the public mind in regard to my own position and that of the State Guard,

“Now, therefore, I, Beriah Magoffin, Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and Commander-in-Chief of all her military forces on land or waters, have issued this my proclamation, hereby notifying and warning all the other States, whether separate or united, and especially the ‘United States’ and the ‘Confederate States,’ that I solemnly forbid any movement upon the soil of Kentucky, or the occupation of any port, or post, or place whatever within the lawful boundary and jurisdiction of this State, by any of the forces under the orders of the States aforesaid, for any purpose whatever, until authorized by invitation or permission of the Legislature and Executive authority of this State previously granted. I

also hereby especially and solemnly forbid all good citizens of this Commonwealth, whether incorporated in the State Guard or otherwise, making any warlike or hostile demonstration whatever against any of the authorities aforesaid, earnestly requesting all citizens, civil and military, to be obedient hereto, to be obedient to the law and lawful orders of both the civil and military authorities; to remain, when off military duty, quietly and peaceably at their homes, pursuing their wonted lawful avocations; to refrain from all words and acts likely to engender hot blood and provoke collision; to pursue such a line of wise conduct as will promote peace and tranquillity and a sense of safety and security, and thus keep far away from our beloved land and the people the deplorable calamities of invasion, but at the same time earnestly counseling my fellow-citizens of Kentucky to make prompt and efficient preparations to assume the armor and attitude presented by the supreme law of self-defence—and strictly of self-defence alone. Praying Almighty God to have us evermore in His holy keeping, and to preserve us in peace, prosperity, and security forever.

“In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my name and caused the seal of the Commonwealth to be affixed. Done at Frankfort the 20th day of May, A. D. 1861, and in the 69th year of the Commonwealth

“By the Governor,

B. MAGOFFIN.

“THOMAS B. MONROE, JR.,
“Secretary of State.”

In order to show clearly how a distinction was made between “mediatorial” and armed neutrality, it is set forth in Colonel Jacob’s address, which follows the record of the House Journal, that on May 8th a resolution was offered in the House approving Governor Magoffin’s refusal to comply with the Lincoln call for troops. On this there were forty-five affirmative votes, and forty-five negative. Then, on May 16th, two resolutions were

offered: one that the State should take no part in the war except as a mediator and friend of both sides, and should occupy the position of strict neutrality; the other that, under existing circumstances, the refusal of Governor Magoffin to furnish troops was approved. Both of these resolutions were adopted by the House. This was mediatorial. After this a resolution was offered to the effect that Kentucky cannot submit to armed forces hostile to her neutrality invading her soil. This was armed neutrality. The vote being taken caused a thrilling scene. It was moved to lay the resolution on the table; only forty-seven voted ay, and forty-eight voted no. Colonel Jacob says this caused exultation on the part of the secessionists, and dismay among the Unionists. Then the vote was taken on the resolution itself, when forty-seven voted ay, and forty-eight no. This result changed the feelings of the respective sides. So armed neutrality was defeated in the House by one vote, but it was enough, and settled the question in the House. "Thus," says Colonel Jacob in his address,

"the Union men had only been able to defeat 'armed neutrality' by one vote; that though unable to aid the government actively, or to make peace, yet, by 'mediatorial neutrality,' they were able to turn over the struggle to the people who, true to their love for the Union, elected a new Legislature with nearly three-fourths majority in the House for the perpetuation of the Union and a largely-increased majority in the Senate."

The neutrality of Kentucky was, therefore, forced upon the Unionists by the necessities and circumstances of the times. They had to deal with a Legislature elected in 1859 before the question of Union or disunion was actually upon the people. It is plain if it had been elected in 1860, when the question was up and the Unionists triumphed both at the August and November elections, there would have been no occasion for

neutrality. Under the circumstances, the Unionists did all they could to save the State from being stamped out of the Union. If they had acted without discretion, and had allowed themselves to be led into the vortex of secession, they would have been unwise and censurable.

The prime object of the Unionists was to save the Union, and at a time before the war had actually commenced, when it was thought it might possibly be averted, there was reason and patriotism in the stand taken. All that was done and said by the Kentucky Unionists manifested a determined purpose on their part not to join the secessionist movement. There were grounds for believing that this refusal to aid the South might, as was constantly pleaded, serve to moderate the passions of the Southern people, and also cause the Northern people to make such concessions as might preserve the peace. The language of the address of the Border State Convention shows this:

“To our fellow-citizens of the South we desire to say, though we have been greatly injured by your precipitate action, we would not now reproach you as the cause of that injury, but we entreat you to re-examine the question of the necessity for such action, and that if you find it has been taken without due consideration, as we verily believe, and that the evils you apprehend from a continuance in the Union were neither so great nor so unavoidable as you supposed, or that Congress is willing to grant adequate securities, then we pray you to return promptly to your connection with us, that we may be in the future, as we have been in the past, one great, powerful, and prosperous nation.”

These and other like patriotic words were intended for a good purpose, and the names of the men who signed the address are a guarantee of their absolute good faith. The signers were John J. Crittenden, James Guthrie, R. K. Williams, Archibald Dixon, F. M. Bristow, Joshua F. Bell, Charles A. Wickliffe, G. W. Dunlap, James F.

Robinson, John B. Huston, Robert Richardson, of Kentucky; H. R. Gamble, Wm. A. Hall, J. B. Henderson, W. G. Pomeroy, of Missouri; John Caldwell, of Tennessee.

The Kentucky Unionists regarded secession as causeless and unnecessary. Their constant expressions on the subject show this. When Hon. Charles A. Wickliffe was nominated for Congress in the first part of June, 1861, he addressed a letter to his constituents, dated June 10th, in which he said:

“It has been charged that the war has been inaugurated by the United States for the purpose of crushing and subjugating the slave States. This charge is not true. I was opposed to its commencement for any purpose. It was commenced by South Carolina and the seceding States by various acts of open hostility; by the seizure of forts, arsenals, navy yards, custom-houses, sub-treasury, mints, money, and other property of the United States by armed force.” (*Louisville Journal.*)

The feelings of the Kentucky Unionists cannot be better described than by quoting from the last speech of Senator Stephen A. Douglas, for whom so many Kentuckians had voted for the Presidency. The date of the speech was May 1, 1861. Mr. Douglas said:

“What cause, what excuse do disunionists give for breaking up the best government on which the sun of heaven ever shed its rays? They are dissatisfied with the result of a Presidential election. Did they ever get beaten before? Are we to resort to the sword when we get defeated at the ballot-box? They assume that on the election of a particular candidate their rights are not safe in the Union. What evidence do they present of this? I defy any man to show any act on which it is based. . . . There has never been a time, from the day that George Washington was inaugurated first President of the United States, when the rights of the Southern States stood firmer under the laws of the land than they do now. There never was a time when they had not as good a cause for disunion as they have to-day.”

While the sentiments of those Unionists were strong and unmistakable for the Union, they were hampered in the full exercise of their wishes. A way seemed to open up for the solution of the terribly perplexing question of the day. That way was neutrality. It is a noticeable fact that precisely what was done in Kentucky was attempted in Tennessee. On the 18th of April eleven distinguished Tennesseans published an address declaring that:

“The present duty of Tennessee is to maintain a position of independence—taking sides with the Union and the peace of the country against all assailants, whether from the North or the South. Her position should be to maintain the sanctity of her soil from the hostile tread of any party.”

This address was signed by John Bell, who had been a candidate for the Presidency, and also Neil S. Brown, Russell Houston, E. H. Ewing, C. Johnson, R. J. Meigs, S. D. Morgan, John S. Brien, Andrew Ewing, John H. Callender, Baillie Peyton. (Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vol. i., p. 71, *Documents*.)

After the Legislature of the winter and spring of 1861 failed to call a convention to consider secession, the secessionists themselves began to insist upon neutrality. Yet, when the people voted so tremendously for the Union and began to organize and provide themselves with arms, then these secessionists began to hurl epithets at the Union neutrality men and charge them with duplicity. They insisted upon armed neutrality after they found they could not get secession, but they charged bad faith on those who had been for mediatorial neutrality all the time. Not only were the originators of the neutrality plan accused of bad faith, at the time and in subsequent histories; they have also been subjected to ridicule by historians who have the advantage of looking backward upon all the events of the period, while those

actors in a great emergency had to shape their course without knowing what those stupendous events would be.

In Nicolay and Hay's *Life of Lincoln* we read:

"It makes one smile to read the contradictions which eminent Kentucky statesmen uttered in all seriousness."

The utterances of James Guthrie and Archibald Dixon are then quoted. Also, the resolutions of the Union State Committee, taking the same ground as that taken by the Tennessee statesmen. The expressions are called "illogical" and "preposterous assumption," but that most excellent and invaluable history does the justice to quote the explanation of neutrality given in a letter written by John J. Crittenden to General Scott, dated May 17, 1861. Crittenden was prominent in it all. He was a great man, and as noble as he was great. He understood the case, and was capable of laying it before the high official to whom he wrote. What he said is as follows:

"The position of Kentucky and the relation she occupies toward the government of the Union is not, I fear, understood at Washington. It ought to be well understood. Very important consequences may depend upon it and upon her proper treatment.

"Unfortunately for us, our Governor does not sympathize with Kentucky in respect to secession. His opinion and feelings incline him strongly to the side of the South. His answer to the requisition for troops was in terms hasty and unbecoming, and does not correspond with usual and gentlemanly courtesy. But, while she regretted the language of his answer, Kentucky acquiesced in his declining to furnish the troops called for, and she did so not because she loved the Union less, but she feared that if she had parted with those troops, and sent them to serve in your ranks, she would have been overwhelmed by the secessionists at home, and severed from the Union. *And it was to preserve substantially and ultimately our connection with the Union that induced us to acquiesce in the par-*

tial infraction of it by our Governor's refusal of troops required. This was the most prevailing and general motive. To this may be added the strong indisposition of our people to a civil war with the South, and the apprehended consequences of a civil war within our State and among our own people.

“I could elaborate and strengthen all this, but I will leave the subject to your own reflection, with only this remark—that I think Kentucky's excuse a good one, and that, under all the circumstances of the complicated case, she is rendering better service in her present position than she could by becoming an active party in the contest.” (Vol. iv., p. 233.)

The judgment of John J. Crittenden, expressed in this letter, at the time he wrote, is of more weight than the speculations of any historian.

Nicolay and Hay's work contains the following pregnant sentence:

“From the beginning Lincoln felt that Kentucky would be a turning weight in the scale of war.”

This being the case, it is but natural that at the Confederate capital the feeling was the same. If so, who can estimate the keen disappointment there, when the secession of Kentucky was not accomplished? As we now look back upon the mad passions of the hour, it may seem chimerical for the Union leaders in Kentucky to suppose the failure to get Kentucky might have stayed the progress of the Southern movement, and thus brought about peace. But at the time there was reason in hoping that the Southern people who were going out to make war might be induced to sit down and take counsel whether they would be able to meet their antagonist without the aid of so important a State as Kentucky. And in the neutrality stand there was, all the time, a trumpet note of no uncertain sound in favor of the Union and no less decision in the constant declaration that secession was a remedy for nothing. There was never a thought of ultimate connection with the

South, but a steady purpose to stay in the Union, and when the time came, the Unionists of Kentucky were found fighting in the ranks of the Union armies to preserve the Union, to which they never for a moment lost their adhesion.

CHAPTER V

RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNION STATE COMMITTEE

WHAT has been said in explanation of neutrality serves also to explain the position of the Union State Central Committee in its famous resolutions immediately following Governor Magoffin's refusal to furnish troops in response to the call of President Lincoln. That committee, it will be remembered, was appointed in January, 1861, when the Bell party and the Douglas party made a fusion—both being for the preservation of the Union. It is a fact that this Union Committee indorsed the refusal of Governor Magoffin to furnish troops, and it also used language many claim committed Kentucky to the South. That was on the 18th day of April, 1861. On the one proposition the resolutions said:

“The government of the Union has appealed to her [Kentucky] to furnish men to suppress the revolutionary combinations in the Cotton States. She has refused; she has most wisely and justly refused.”

On the other, they said:

“What the future destiny of Kentucky may be, we cannot, of course, with certainty, foresee. But if the enterprise announced in the proclamation of the President should at any time hereafter assume the aspect of a war for overrunning and subjugation of the seceding States—that then Kentucky ought to take her stand with the South.”

Both of these expressions have been much commented on. Much has been made of them by writers who seek to convict the Union men of Kentucky of duplicity. The committee was composed of eminent and widely-known Union men—John H. Harney, George D. Prentice, Charles Ripley, Philip Tompert, Nat Wolfe, William F. Bullock, James Speed, William P. Boone, Hamilton Pope, Louis E. Harvie. All, excepting the one last named, remained true to the Union throughout the entire struggle. It is claimed that these Union leaders took ground against war for the Union, and also pledged Kentucky to the South in the event of war, and that they were afterwards false to their expressed position in their resolutions. The questions arise, Why did the committee indorse the Governor's refusal to furnish troops? And why did they use the language quoted concerning the future of Kentucky? As we have said of neutrality, that it must not be judged in the light which shines back upon it, but rather in the light of the time when it was born, so it must be said of the resolutions of the committee. Both of the questions propounded are easily answered when the circumstances and conditions are considered, and when the other language in the resolutions is considered. The committee was called upon to speak and it was so situated that it could not have spoken except as it did. The Kentucky Unionists had theretofore taken the stand for neutrality for a wise and reasonable purpose, as has been shown. Now, shall the committee, while this neutral stand is the order of the day, resolve that Kentucky should furnish troops? What, in such case, would become of the idea of neutrality? The committee must either suddenly fly in the face of the position the people had taken, or else agree that under the circumstances the refusal was proper. The language of the resolutions is as follows: "The *present* duty of Kentucky is to maintain her *present* independent posi-

tion, taking sides not with the government and not with the seceding States, but with the Union, against them both." They also contain this language:

"Seditious leaders in the midst of us now appeal to her [Kentucky] to furnish men to uphold those combinations against the government of the Union. Will she comply with this appeal? Ought she to comply with it? We answer with emphasis, No."

The *present* duty of the State, so far as the committee could speak, was to stand neutral in the fight, but to *stand in the Union*. That was all it could say upon that point.

Then, as to the future of the State, we must note the language, and consider the inflammatory writing and speaking which abounded at that day. The resolutions say, "If the enterprise announced in the proclamation of the President should at any time *hereafter* assume the aspect of a war for the overrunning and subjugation of the seceding States," Kentucky would draw the sword in resistance.

It is plain that the committee did not regard the aspect of the war at that time as intending to overrun or subjugate the South, and the committee expressly so stated in the resolutions, using this language in regard to it:

"Such an event, *if it should occur*, of which we confess there does not appear to us to *be rational probability*."

It may be asked, What meaning could the call for troops have other than subjugation? The question must be answered in the light of the public writing and speaking of the time. It was charged that the party which elected Lincoln was insane with fanaticism, and that its purpose was to crush and overrun the South, wantonly destroying property, perpetrating outrages, and in every conceivable manner mistreating the Southern people; that the election of Lincoln meant that the people of the South were to be deprived of their liberties

and brought into subjection as conquered provinces. It was on account of these anticipated wrongs that the States seceded. They insisted that the purposes of the North towards them were so brutal and savage that in order to protect their lives and property, and to save their women and children from unspeakable horrors, they were forced to secede.

All this the committee regarded as folly, and worse than folly. But as the country rang with such wild ebullitions of passionate talk, and as this was what was meant by the word "subjugation," the committee naturally said if such things should come to pass Kentucky would draw the sword against it. And so, doubtless, she would have done, but the committee saw no such future in the call for troops. It did not regard the call for troops to suppress insurrection as looking to "subjugation," as that word was interpreted then to mean.

In the first place, the call for only 75,000 troops did not look like "subjugation." The expectation of the time was that the war would be over in "ninety days," and that did not look like "subjugation." Nor did it appear that the Confederate authorities at that time anticipated any great or extended war. On all sides the indications were that there would be only a small and short-lived trouble. This was evidenced not only by the call of 75,000 troops for ninety days, but also by the views of the President of the Confederacy.

On the 29th of April, two weeks after the call for 75,000 troops, Jefferson Davis sent his message to the Confederate Congress, in which he used the following language:

"There are now in the field at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and Pulaski, 19,000 men, and 16,000 are now en route for Virginia. It is proposed to organize and hold in readiness for instant action, in view of the present exigencies of the country, 100,000 men. If

further force be needed, the wisdom and patriotism of Congress will be confidently appealed to for authority to call into the field additional numbers of our noble-spirited volunteers who are constantly tendering their services, *far in excess of our wants.*"¹

This did not indicate that a great and prolonged war was expected by him, nor a war that would call out all who could fight. In the second place, the committee entertained no such ideas of the awful intentions of the North as stated. And in order that it may be seen what extreme expressions on the subject were prevalent, attention may be called to some of them, though to mention all would require volumes.

In the speeches before the Virginia convention, February, 1861 (*Moore Reb. Rec.*, vol. 12, p. 142), we find these expressions:

"Avowed purpose to take possession of every department of power and employ them in hostility to our institutions."

"The government has become our foe and oppressor, never to pause until our dearest rights as well as our honor are crushed beneath its iron heel."

"Light up the fires of servile insurrection, and give your dwellings to the torch of the incendiary and your wives and children to the knife of the assassin."

"The degradation of the South, the result of Lincoln's election."

"Take possession of the power of the government and use it for our destruction."

"The government of the United States will come down on us in overwhelming numbers, our men will be exterminated, or compelled to wander as vagabonds on a hostile earth, and as for our women, their fate will be too horrible to contemplate even in fancy."

"The white race having been exterminated, the land will go into the exclusive possession of the blacks, and will, in

¹See Appendix § 6, p. 341.

consequence, rapidly pass into the condition of San Domingo and become a howling wilderness."

"At last the fanaticism and eager haste for rapine, mingled with their foul purposes, engendered those fermenting millions who have seized the Constitution and distorted its most sacred form into an instrument for our ruin."

"Threaten to send the ruffians of Boston and New York to re-enact the scenes of 1813 at Portsmouth and Hampton.

"A savage war in which no age or sex is spared."

It was thus that the commissioners from the already seceded States represented the purposes of the North toward the South in the Virginia convention.

The same extreme language emanated from the very highest sources.

In a speech of Alexander H. Stephens April 30, 1861, he said: "We fight for our homes, our fathers and mothers, our wives, brothers, sisters, sons, and daughters; they for money—the hirelings and mercenaries of the North are hand-to-hand against you."

In his message to the Confederate Congress July 20, 1861, President Davis says the events of the last few weeks lift the veil behind which the purposes of the Federals have been concealed, and their odious features are revealed. The purpose is subjugation of the South, by waging an "indiscriminate war with savage ferocity unknown in modern civilization"; "in this war rapine is the rule"; that dwellings and property are destroyed "after the inhabitants have fled from the outrages of brutal soldiery." "Mankind will shudder at the tale of outrages committed on defenceless families." "Special war on the sick, including women and children." "The sacred claims of humanity, respected even during the fury of actual battle by careful diversion of attack from hospitals, are outraged in cold blood, by a government that pretends to desire a continuance of fraternal relations."

When Mr. Davis came to write a history of the war a number of years after it was over, he indulged freely in the same kind of extreme language: "Plunder and devastation of the property of non-combatants; destruction of private dwellings, and even edifices devoted to the worship of God; expeditions organized for the sole purpose of sacking cities, consigning them to flames, killing the unarmed inhabitants, and inflicting horrible outrages on women and children were some of the constantly recurring atrocities of the invader." (Vol. ii, p. 709.)

In the same way that the Southern Commissioners presented the case to Virginia, so was it presented to the State of Kentucky.

December 28, 1860, Governor Magoffin addressed a letter to the Commissioner from Alabama, Hon. F. S. Hale, in response to one received, in which the direful purposes of the people of the North are depicted. Magoffin says that Mr. Hale in his letter to him has not exaggerated "the grievous wrongs, injuries, and indignities" to which the citizens of the South have long submitted. He speaks of those who are "so madly bent upon the destruction of our constitutional guaranties"; that the people of Kentucky realize "the intolerable wrongs and menacing dangers you have so elaborately recounted"; that "when the time of action comes (and it is now fearfully near at hand) our people will be found allied as a unit under the flag of resistance to intolerable wrong." He speaks of the Southern States as "confronted by a common enemy, encompassed by a common peril."

He says "the Legislature of Kentucky will assemble on the 17th of January, when the sentiment of the State will doubtless find expression."

In the letter to which Governor Magoffin replied as above, Mr. Hale represents the feeling of the Northern people as terrible in its savagery and brutality towards the South. He says:

“The more daring and restless fanatics have banded themselves together to carry out in practice the terrible lessons taught by the timid, by making an armed incursion upon the sovereign State of Virginia, slaughtering her citizens for the purpose of inciting a servile insurrection among her slave population, and arming them for the destruction of their own masters. During the past summer the abolition incendiary has lit up the prairies of Texas, fired the dwellings of the inhabitants, burned up whole towns, and laid poison for her citizens, thus literally executing the terrible denunciations of fanaticism against the slaveholder—alarm to their sleep, fire to their dwellings, and poison to their food.”

He speaks of Lincoln's election in these words: “As the last and crowning act of insult and outrage upon the people of the South, the citizens of the Northern States, by overwhelming majorities, on the 6th day of November last, elected Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin.”

He says of Lincoln that “He stands forth as the representative of the fanaticism of the North,” and that “his election cannot be regarded otherwise than as a solemn declaration on the part of a great majority of the Northern people of hostility to the South, her property, and her institutions. Nothing less than a declaration of war for the triumph of this new theory of government—destroys the property of the South, lays waste her fields, and inaugurates all the horrors of a San Domingo servile insurrection, consigning her citizens to assassination, and their wives and daughters to pollution.”

He says: “If the policy of the Republicans is carried out according to the program indicated by the leaders of the party, and the South submits, degradation and ruin must overwhelm alike all classes of citizens in the Southern States.” “Who can look upon such a picture without a shudder?” “Our lives, our property, the safety of our homes and our hearthstones—all that men hold dear on earth—is involved in the issue.”

Governor Magoffin approved all this, and much more, contained in Mr. Hale's letter, and said Mr. Hale had not exaggerated the case.

Such fearful portrayals of the alleged demoniacal spirit and purposes of the North were everywhere rife at the time. It is therefore not unreasonable that the Union men of Kentucky, who did not believe one word of such folly, should yet, when called upon to adopt resolutions, say, in order to satisfy the public mind, that *if* such awful conditions should arise, they would take up arms to resist.

In the third place, the committee regarded the war at that time precisely as it truly was, and as it was throughout the entire struggle. The object and purposes of the war were well expressed by Hon. Cassius M. Clay in a letter to the *London Times* May 17, 1861. He answers the question "Can you govern a subjugated people?" by saying: "We do not propose to subjugate the revolted States. We propose simply to put down the rebel citizens. The United States will rise from the smoke of battle with renewed stability and power" (Moore, *Rebellion Rec.*, vol. 1, p. 340.)

The committee saw that the war could be prosecuted for the maintenance of the Union without being a war for subjugation, just as was outlined in the celebrated Crittenden resolutions, introduced in Congress in July, 1861, which may here be quoted entire:

"*Resolved*, That the present deplorable Civil War has been forced upon the country by the disunionists of the Southern States, now in arms against the Constitutional government, and in arms around the Capital. That in this National emergency, Congress, banishing all feelings of mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country. That this war is not waged on their part in any spirit of oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or institutions of

those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all its dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired, and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

It is plain that the distinguished author of these resolutions might well have signed the resolutions of the committee. He counselled mediation and neutrality, with the intense hope that it might accomplish something, and he saw that the war could be, as it was, to maintain the Union, and was not for subjugation; that it had no such object as was declared in the inflammatory utterances of the day, and he could have said with any reasonable person that if it should ever take on the fearful features portrayed by the wild imagination of speakers and writers, then Kentuckians and all other humane persons anywhere would aid in resisting such barbaric, or, rather, demon-like, conduct.

The unequivocal, outspoken stand of the resolutions and of all the Unionists from first to last was for the Union. In view of the dire predictions of the terrible purposes of the North to overrun the South like savages the natural right existed to say that in such event Kentucky would draw the sword to resist. But they saw no such savagery involved in saving the Union. The maintenance of National authority did not call for savage orgies as the fire-eaters proclaimed, and there was no inconsistency in saying such atrocious conduct would be resisted.

Again, there was perfect consistency in adhering to the Union and yet favoring the neutrality of Kentucky. That might be the very best means to avert war, and even such men as Jefferson Davis and John C. Breckinridge declared that they sought to the last to avert war in the way they thought right and best. There was no sort of inconsistency in the Unionists avowedly standing

for the Union, which involved no change, and also favoring neutrality under the circumstances existing.

On the other hand, however, it was altogether inconsistent to claim to respect and observe neutrality, and yet work to accomplish secession. To secede meant positive action and positive change. Therefore, the Southern Rights Kentuckians who were striving for secession could not be called neutral. They could not be promoters of positive change and still respect and observe neutrality. If they did respect and observe neutrality, then they could not be working in the interests of secession.

This difference between the two sides was bound to exist from the fact that no positive action was needed to place Kentucky in the Union, it being already there; but positive action was necessary to make the change and take the State out of the Union.

The manifest object of the resolutions was to satisfy the people of both parties that the neutral stand of the State, for the purpose of trying to allay passion, was to be observed in the striking particular of not, under present circumstances, furnishing troops to either side, and to give assurance that the party represented by the committee abhorred the thought of "subjugation," as subjugation was depicted to be. The committee did not see that there was any "rational probability" of such purposes of subjugation and could justly speak of it as they did.

Everything turned on the meaning attached to the word subjugation. When any violation of law is stopped, or if any insubordination is quelled, or insurrection put down, the word "subjugation" may be used in a general sense, but it does not follow that all who may be engaged in such breach of the peace, together with their families, are to be persecuted with demoniacal fury.

The Civil War, on the National side, was for a definite purpose—to save the Union. But it was a war, and when there is war there is hardship. Incidental harm and incidental changes and disruptions are unavoidable in wars. Deplorable as the consequences of any war are, such characterizing of our own as that found in the passage quoted from Jefferson Davis is nothing but temper, not historic statement. So, also, in the proclamation of the Governor of Georgia, February 11, 1862, in which he says, “a wicked and bloody war is waged upon the South because it threw off the yoke of bondage and refused to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for a haughty and insolent people who claimed the right of obedience to their mandates”; and that, in the “attempt to subjugate us,” all rules of civilized warfare are disregarded: “they have stolen our property, laid waste the country, and with fiendish malignity shot down women and children; they have disregarded all dictates of humanity; they carry on the war for our destruction; our lands are to be taken from us and colonized with Yankees; compel our negroes to cultivate the lands for Northerners; we are to be driven from home; our graves and altars to be trampled under foot by our insolent masters; we must transmit to our posterity a heritage of bondage.” (*War Records* Serial, No. 127, p. 918.) This also is temper, not history nor truth.

This lurid form of expression depicts the “subjugation” of the hour which the committee abhorred.¹ While it spoke out against such subjugation, and respected the neutrality stand of the State, it yet manifested its thorough repugnance to the Southern movement and firm adherence to the Union. That was the whole case, and the whole point. Not to secede covered all, for that was all that was asked. And for Kentucky to stand aloof from the Confederacy was such a startling disap-

¹ See Appendix, § 7, p. 342.

pointment it was with good reason the Kentucky Unionists hoped that thereby the war might be averted.

There was the same juggling with the word "coercion" as with "subjugation." If it were agreed that secession was a right, then to coerce a State back into the Union after it seceded would be a wrong. But secession was not acknowledged as a right. It was not agreed that any State, when it chose to do so, could disrupt the Union and change the whole aspect and condition of the American Republic, by setting up an independency and entering into any relations it chose with foreign powers. It must always be remembered that the contention was made that this could not be done, just as strongly as it was contended that it could be done. Furthermore, the United States claimed that it had rights to its own property, even if it was located in some State which assumed the right to secede.

Therefore, when any one State of the Union saw fit to exercise what it claimed as a right, it was in order for the National government to claim its rights also.

If it be agreed that there were two theories of our Republic, one that a State was supreme, and the other that it was not, it was as natural, when the time came, for the Nation to assert its right as for the State to assert its right. When, therefore, a State seceded, and took all the United States property in its limits along with it, it was puerile to say "All we want is to be let alone." Of course, that was all, but the National government naturally said in reply, "You shall not destroy the whole plan of the Republic nor take all the government property." The United States either had to yield its rights or else insist upon them, even if force had to be used.

The words "subjugation" and "coercion" were therefore misleading, and there was no occasion for their use. To illustrate the real status of the case, the following, which occurred in Congress, is in point:

July 11, 1861, Vallandigham offered a proviso to a bill for raising money to suppress the rebellion, that no part of it should be employed in subjugating or holding, as conquered provinces, any State, or to abolish slavery.

Mr. McClernand said that he, being in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war, would not allow amendments which

“carry an implication with them that the object of the war is very different from the design of those prosecuting it. I have heard no respectable man or set of men say that the object of this war is to subjugate the seceding States and hold them as conquered provinces. . . . I am for prosecuting this war for the purpose of vindicating the Federal authority, and putting down rebellion, and not for the purpose of subjugating the seceding States and holding them as conquered provinces, nor for the purpose of abolishing slavery, and I repudiate all reflections of that kind. The imputation is unjust to the friends of the war.” (*Congressional Globe*, July 11, 1861.)

Many persons chose to attach the meaning of the most extreme kind to the words “subjugation” and “coercion,” but the committee and the Kentucky Unionists, in common with the true men of the whole country, saw that war could be made and prosecuted for the suppression of the rebellion without making it demoniacal in its purposes. They saw that secession and appropriation of government property could be resisted rightfully and legally, although it was claimed that such resistance was subjugation and coercion. They foresaw—precisely what came to pass—the overthrow of armed opposition to National authority and the salvation of the American Union.

CHAPTER VI

THE UNION LEADERS

THERE has been so much misrepresentation of the Union men of Kentucky, and as there has never been any response to such misrepresentations in historical form, it is due to the men who were true to the Union, and who were instrumental in holding the State of Kentucky in the Union, that they should here have some particular mention. It would scarcely be possible to name them all, but some of the names may be given, showing in a general way the principal leaders of the Union sentiment in various parts of the State.

It has been unjustly said that the Union men of note were few in number. In the sketch of the life of Hon. Garrett Davis in Collins's *Kentucky*, it is said "He was among *the few* leading Kentuckians who opposed secession in 1861" (vol. i., p. 82).

It is also said in Shaler's History that "The intellectual and political leadership of the Commonwealth was mainly in the hands of men who, though often unconsciously, were steadily acting in a way to lead the people toward secession."

It would have been most singular if the people of the State had voted overwhelmingly against the Southern movement, as they did, without leadership. When we reflect upon the influence which is exerted upon the popular mind in critical times by the men who are looked to as the natural leaders of public sentiment, the conclusion

is irresistible that there was in Kentucky a leadership of the highest intellectual and moral force which stemmed the pressure brought to bear in favor of secession.

The Governor was a secessionist and it might have been readily supposed, indeed, almost taken for granted, that the Legislature elected in 1859 would act in harmony with the Governor. All the inducements, arguments, and inflammatory appeals which could be urged were presented to persuade or fire the hearts of the people of the State to join the Confederacy, but all were of little avail comparatively. When the test came in 1860 the people refused to vote for the Southern Rights candidate for the Presidency. When the test came in the meeting of the Legislature in the winter and spring of 1861, the members refused to obey the behests or respond to the earnest wishes of the rebel Governor and his chosen friends. When the test came at the polls in 1861, the people declared in favor of the Union by overwhelming majorities.

Shall it be said all this occurred when the principal men of the State were of a contrary mind? The perversions of the case deserve to be answered. A list of names will here be presented, which might be greatly enlarged, but it is enough to show the folly of the statements which have appeared in historical works to the effect that the leading men of Kentucky were secessionists. The very opposite is true. All the facts show it,—the names themselves, the voting at all the elections, and the logic of the figures which show that *more than three times as many enlisted as Union soldiers as there were Confederate soldiers from Kentucky.*

Of those mentioned it may be said that all had attained distinction in professional or business life, and in public service before the war. It would be an endless task to enumerate all who achieved high position by service in the war. There were four thousand commissioned officers, most of them young men who began their career

in military life, and afterwards engaged in pursuits which established them as the most valuable citizens of the State, or of other States to which many removed. This great body of Kentucky Unionists must remain unnamed in the list here to be presented.

Hon. John J. Crittenden was the most eminent of the Union leaders. He was mature in life and had had a great and honorable career. Born in 1786, he served in the War of 1812, and was Attorney-General in Harrison's Cabinet; had served in Congress, had been Governor of his State, and at the beginning of the war period was a United States Senator, having served in the Senate altogether for twenty years. All charges against the Union leaders fall upon him as well as others, which is proof of their baselessness.

James Guthrie was one of Kentucky's greatest men. He was an able lawyer; had been Secretary of the Treasury in the Cabinet of President Pierce; was President of the Constitutional Convention of 1849. In the war period he was President of the Louisville & Nashville railroad, and as such is mentioned by General Sherman as follows:

"I have always felt grateful to Mr. Guthrie of Louisville, who had sense enough and patriotism enough to subordinate the interests of his railroad to the cause of his country." (*Memoirs*, vol. ii., p. 12.)

Hon. Joshua F. Bell, who had served in Congress. He made the race for Governor against Magoffin, and was one of the most gifted men and powerful orators in the State.

Judge S. S. Nicholas, the son of the celebrated George Nicholas of Virginia, was distinguished alike for his great abilities and high character. He was eminent as a lawyer and judge. So earnest was he in his Unionism that it is said of him in his biography, "he probably did more than any other man toward saving the State to the Union."

Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge, D.D., uncle of John C. Breckinridge, was the most intellectual member of a family noted for intellect. His trenchant pen and eloquent voice were unceasingly exerted to save the Union.

Hon. James F. Robinson, "The mentor of the Scott County Bar." He was made Governor in 1862, upon the resignation of Governor Magoffin.

Hon. Charles A. Wickliffe, whose distinguished career in the legislative halls, both of the State and Nation, and in the Cabinet of President Tyler, and in the gubernatorial chair, together with his high personal character, made him, in the crucial period, one of the chiefs among the Union leaders.

Hon. Archibald Dixon, distinguished as a lawyer and statesman. He had been Governor of Kentucky and United States Senator.

Hon. James Harlan, the father of Justice John M. Harlan, who had served in the State Legislature, in Congress, and as Attorney-General of Kentucky.

Hon. Garrett Davis, who served in the State Legislature, four terms in Congress, and in the United States Senate.

Hon. George Robertson, the learned and justly celebrated Chief Justice of Kentucky.

Hon. Charles S. Todd, whose father, Thomas Todd, was one of the early Justices of the Supreme Court. He served as Colonel in the War of 1812, was Minister to Russia under President Tyler, and filled many other positions, State and National.

Hon. James Speed, a learned and able lawyer. He filled many honorable positions in the State, and was Attorney-General in President Lincoln's Cabinet.

Hon. Francis M. Bristow, who was an able lawyer and served in the State Legislature, and in Congress, and was a member of the Constitutional Convention of 1849.

Hon. William H. Wadsworth, the noted lawyer and orator of Maysville. He served in Congress, and was tendered the mission to the court of Vienna.

Hon. William A. Dudley, the prominent railroad president of Lexington.

Hon. John B. Huston, of whom it is said by his biographer, "he was one of the most distinguished men who supported the policy of the government."

Hon. George D. Prentice, editor of the *Louisville Journal*, and the most brilliant newspaper writer of his day.

Hon. John H. Harney, editor of the *Louisville Democrat*.

Hon. A. G. Hodges, editor of the *Frankfort Commonwealth*.

Hon. Joseph R. Underwood, of Bowling Green, one of the ablest judges who ever served on the bench of the Court of Appeals, who also served in the United States Senate.

Hon. Joshua F. Speed, a man of affairs, and great ability. He served in the State Legislature; was the trusted friend of President Lincoln.

Hon. Charles A. Marshall, of Maysville, one of the celebrated Virginia family. He had served many times in the State Legislature, and became Colonel of the 16th Kentucky Infantry.

Hon. Leslie Combs, of Lexington, a lawyer of high repute, who had served in the War of 1812, and represented his district a number of times in the State Legislature.

Hon. Curtis F. Burnam, of Richmond, prominent in the State, and had served in the State Legislature.

Hon. Henry Pirtle, the eminent Chancellor of Louisville, distinguished for his great ability and lofty character.

General T. T. Garrard, of Manchester, who was a Captain in the Mexican War, had served in the State

Senate, and became Brigadier-General in the Union army.

Hon. James G. Garrard, the brother of General T. T. Garrard. He had been elected State Treasurer in 1859, at the same time Magoffin was elected Governor.

Colonel James F. Buckner, of Hopkinsville, who had been Speaker of the House, and also served in the State Senate. He raised one of the first Union regiments in the State.

General William T. Ward, of Greensburg, noted as a lawyer, had represented his district in the Legislature, and became a Major-General in the Union army.

Hon. George B. Kinkead, of Lexington, an able lawyer, and had served as Secretary of State.

Hon. Lucien Anderson, of Mayfield, who had served in the State Legislature, and also in Congress.

Hon. John H. McHenry, of Owensboro, who had served in the State Legislature, in Congress, and as an able Circuit Judge.

Hon. Thomas E. Bramlette, a Circuit Judge, who raised an infantry regiment, and afterwards became Brigadier-General and Governor.

Hon. Jerre T. Boyle, of Danville, a leading lawyer, who became Brigadier-General.

Hon. George T. Wood, of Munfordsville, who several times represented his district in the Legislature, and was a member of the "Military Board." He was the father of General Thomas J. Wood.

General Thomas J. Wood, educated at West Point, served in the Mexican war, became a distinguished general in the Union army and in the regular army.

Hon. Robert Mallory, of Louisville, who served twice in Congress.

Hon. Thomas H. Clay, the second son of Henry Clay, and a leading citizen of Kentucky.

Hon. Joseph Holt, of Louisville, in the Cabinet of James Buchanan, and of National reputation.

Hon. David R. Murray, of Cloverport, who had served several times in the State Legislature.

Hon. George H. Yeaman, of Owensboro, a most accomplished lawyer, who served in the Legislature, in Congress, and as a foreign minister.

General Speed S. Fry, of Danville, a Mexican veteran, who became Brigadier-General in the Union army.

Hon. Cassius M. Clay, a man of great talents, who was appointed Major-General, and also made Minister to Russia by President Lincoln.

Judge R. K. Williams, of Paducah, a leading lawyer, who became Judge of the Court of Appeals.

Judge Jesse W. Kincheloe, of Brandenburg.

Hon. Brutus J. Clay, of Bourbon County, member of the State Legislature.

Hon. R. A. Buckner, of Lexington, a noted lawyer, was Judge of the Court of Appeals; served several times in the Legislature and in Congress.

Dr. Ethelbert L. Dudley, of Lexington, first Colonel of the 21st Kentucky Infantry, and the father of Mrs. General Joseph C. Breckinridge, U.S.A.

Hon. Thornton F. Marshall, of Bracken County, member of the State Senate.

Hon. James Sudduth, of Bath County.

Hon. John B. Wilgus, of Lexington.

Hon. Richard Apperson, of Montgomery, member of the State Legislature.

Hon. Aylette H. Buckner, of Winchester.

Colonel Thomas M. Green, editor *Maysville Eagle*, and writer of rare ability; served with Colonel William H. Wadsworth, commander of the State troops in the Maysville district.

Dr. James M. Bush, of Lexington, Professor in Transylvania University.

Hon. Alfred Allen, of Breckinridge County, member of State Legislature, and was Minister to China.

Hon. A. J. Ballard, a prominent lawyer of Louisville.

Hon. Nat Wolfe, of Louisville, a noted lawyer, who served in the Legislature, House and Senate.

General James S. Jackson, of Hopkinsville, member of Congress, who became a Brigadier-General, and was killed at Perryville.

Hon. A. G. Hobson, of Greensburg, lawyer and banker.

General E. H. Hobson, of Greensburg, who became Brigadier-General.

Judge W. C. Goodloe, of Lexington, Circuit Judge for twenty-two years.

General D. S. Goodloe, Lexington.

Colonel Leonidas Metcalfe, of Nicholas County, son of Governor Metcalfe of Kentucky.

Hon. John M. Harlan had served as county judge, and had made the race for Congress in his district prior to the war; was Colonel of the 10th Kentucky Infantry; Attorney-General of the State, and is now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Judge Richard J. Browne, of Springfield, member of the State Legislature.

Hon. William H. Hays, of Springfield, member of the State Legislature; became Colonel of the 10th Kentucky Infantry and Judge of the United States District Court at Louisville.

Colonel William P. Boone, of Louisville, a noted lawyer and member of the Legislature, and Colonel 28th Kentucky Infantry.

Hon. James Weir, of Owensboro, a wealthy banker and lawyer.

Judge P. B. Muir, of Louisville, an able lawyer and Circuit Judge.

Hon. Joshua Tevis, of Louisville, several times in the

Legislature, and became Colonel of the 10th Kentucky Cavalry.

Colonel Laban T. Moore, of Catlettsburg, a distinguished lawyer, member of Congress and State Legislature, and who raised the 14th Kentucky Infantry, of which he was Colonel.

Judge George W. Williams, of Paris, Bourbon County, an eminent lawyer and judge, who served in both Houses of the Legislature.

Hon. John A. Prall, of Paris, an eminent lawyer, who served in the State Senate.

Allen A. Burton, of Garrard, who was appointed Minister to Colombia.

R. A. Burton, of Lebanon, a fine lawyer, who served in the State Senate and House.

Hon. John B. Bruner, of Hardinsburg, a noted lawyer and member of the State Senate and House of Representatives.

Hon. Aaron Harding, of Boyle, several times in Congress.

Hon. John B. Temple, of Frankfort, a leading banker, who became member of the "Military Board."

Hon. Madison C. Johnson, of Lexington, the learned and distinguished lawyer, President of the Northern Bank of Kentucky.

Judge James Stuart, of Brandenburg, a noted lawyer, Judge, and member of the Legislature.

Hon. L. W. Andrews, of Flemingsburg, lawyer and statesman, one of the most distinguished men in north-eastern Kentucky; served in the Legislature and in Congress.

Judge William V. Loving, of Bowling Green, an able lawyer and Judge, who served in the Legislature.

Hon. Henry Grider, of Bowling Green, an eminent lawyer who served in the State Senate and House and also in Congress.

Colonel B. C. Grider, of Bowling Green; was Colonel in the Union army.

Hon. John F. Fisk, of Covington, a leading lawyer, served in the State Senate, over which he presided, and was *ex officio* Lieutenant-Governor.

Hon. J. K. Goodloe, of Louisville, an eminent lawyer, member of the Legislature in both Houses.

Hon. Martin P. Marshall, of Fleming County, a prominent lawyer and member of the Legislature.

Colonel George W. Gallup, of Louisa, a leading lawyer of that part of the State, and became Colonel of the 14th Kentucky Infantry.

Colonel R. T. Jacob, of Louisville, a lawyer and a veteran of the Mexican war, and became Colonel of the 9th Kentucky Cavalry.

Hon. Warner L. Underwood, of Bowling Green, a prominent lawyer, serving in the State Legislature and in Congress.

Hon. Bland Ballard, of Louisville, a leading lawyer and was appointed Judge of the District Court of the United States.

Hon. John W. Barr, an able lawyer who became Judge of the District Court of the United States.

Hon. Caleb W. Logan, Ex-Chancellor of the Louisville Chancery Court.

General Thomas L. Crittenden, of Frankfort, who served in the Mexican war on General Taylor's staff, and afterwards became Major-General in the civil war and Brigadier-General in the regular army.

General Lovell H. Rosseau, of Louisville, a distinguished lawyer, served in the Mexican war as Captain, became Major-General of Volunteers in the Civil War and Brigadier-General in the regular army.

Colonel Curran Pope, of Louisville, was educated at West Point, resigned, and was engaged in business in Louisville. He raised the 15th Kentucky Infantry, was

wounded in the battle of Perryville, and died soon after.

General Green Clay Smith, of Richmond, served in the Mexican war as Lieutenant, became a lawyer, and rose to the rank of Brigadier-General in the Civil War, and afterwards member of Congress.

General William J. Landrum, of Lancaster, served in the Mexican war, and became a Brigadier-General in the Civil War.

General John J. Landrum, of Warsaw, served in the Mexican war, became member of the Legislature, 1851, was a fine lawyer. He became Colonel of the 18th Kentucky Infantry, and Brigadier.

Colonel Pierce Butler Hawkins, of Bowling Green, served in the Legislature, 1850, and afterwards he raised the 11th Kentucky Infantry.

Colonel Marion C. Taylor, of Shelbyville. He had served in the Legislature, was a lawyer of ability, and became Colonel of the 15th Kentucky Infantry.

General Walter C. Whitaker, of Shelbyville. He was a Lieutenant in the Mexican war, served in the Legislature, raised the 6th Kentucky Infantry, and became Major-General of volunteers.

General James M. Shackelford, of Madisonville, a fine lawyer, served in the Mexican war, raised two regiments, the 25th Kentucky Infantry and 8th Cavalry, and became Brigadier-General.

Dr. Joshua T. Bradford, of Augusta, "probably the second most distinguished surgeon of Kentucky" (Collins), who fought a desperate battle with a command of Home Guards against a part of Morgan's Cavalry (Collins, vol. i., p. 112).

Dr. T. S. Bell, of Louisville, one of the most distinguished and honored physicians of the State.

Hon. Algernon Sidney Thurston, of Owensboro, a retired lawyer at the outbreak of the war, but active in

the politics of the day. He had been Attorney-General of Texas.

Hon. Ben T. Perkins, of Elkton, a prominent lawyer of that part of the State.

Hon. Benjamin H. Bristow, of Hopkinsville, an eminent lawyer; served as Colonel in the war; was in the State Senate and rose to have a national reputation as Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. H. G. Petrie, of Elkton, a noted lawyer and member of the Legislature.

Judge John W. Ritter, of Glasgow, an eminent lawyer and Judge, and member of the Legislature.

Hon. George M. Thomas, of Vanceburg, a lawyer, who served in the Legislature, represented his district in the National Congress, and became U. S. District Attorney for Kentucky.

Hon. Matt Mayes, of Cadiz, a leading, wealthy, and influential citizen of that portion of the State.

Judge John E. Newman, of Bardstown, an able lawyer and Circuit Judge.

Judge W. B. Kinkead, of Lexington, an able lawyer and Circuit Judge, who had also served in the Legislature.

General D. W. Lindsey, of Frankfort, who not only stood for the Union but served in the field as Colonel of the 22d Kentucky Infantry, and as Adjutant-General of the State.

Colonel Thomas B. Cochran, of Shelbyville, a lawyer of striking ability, who became Colonel of the 2d Kentucky Cavalry, and afterwards Judge of the Chancery Court of Louisville.

General John W. Finnell, of Covington, a lawyer of ability, who served in the Legislature in 1845. He became the editor of the *Frankfort Commonwealth*, and was appointed Secretary of State by Governor Crittenden, and was Adjutant-General under Governor Robinson.

Silas F. Miller, of Louisville, prominent as a business man.

Captain Z. M. Sherley, of Louisville, prominent as a business man.

Sam Gill, of Louisville, prominent in railroad affairs, and became a member of the "Military Board."

B. F. Avery, of Louisville, prominent as a business man.

Hon. John W. Menzies, of Covington, an able lawyer; served in the Legislature, 1848 and 1855, and was elected to Congress, June, 1861.

Judge T. T. Alexander, of Columbia, a lawyer of ability, Circuit Judge, and public-spirited citizen.

Dr. George D. Blakey, of Russellville, later of Bowling Green.

Hon. John G. Barret, lawyer and banker, of Louisville.

Hon. Sidney M. Barnes, of Estill County; a lawyer of note, served in the State Senate and House, 1848, 1857, and was candidate for Governor. He raised and commanded the 8th Kentucky Infantry.

Judge M. H. Owsley, of Lancaster, a lawyer and Circuit Judge.

Philip Swigert, of Frankfort, born 1798, a most influential citizen. During the war he was secretary of the "Military Board."

Hon. Joseph B. Kinkead, of Louisville, a wealthy and influential lawyer.

Hon. Hamilton Pope, of Louisville, a distinguished lawyer, early in the war became commander of the Louisville Home Guard.

Colonel Charles D. Pennebaker, of Louisville, a lawyer. He served in the Mexican war, in the State Legislature, and was Colonel of the 27th Kentucky Infantry.

Hon. Joshua F. Bullitt, Judge of the Court of Appeals, and one of the most eminent and honored men in the State; he was a Union leader all through the

year 1861. The charges of bad faith so freely made against those leaders fall upon him as well as others, which goes to prove how baseless were all such charges.

Hon. George W. Dunlap, of Lancaster, a prominent lawyer and member of Congress.

Hon. R. Tarvin Baker, of Campbell County, a noted lawyer, member of the Legislature, 1849, also was State Senator.

Captain George M. Adams, a business man of Barbourville.

Hon. John H. McFarland, of Owensboro, who was a prominent lawyer and had served in the Legislature.

M. M. Benton, of Covington, lawyer, railroad president, and member of the Legislature.

Reuben Mundy, of Madison County, member of the State Senate, afterwards Colonel of the 6th Kentucky Cavalry.

Colonel Lyne Starling, of Frankfort.

Hon. A. G. Hobson, of Bowling Green.

Hon. Burrell C. Ritter, of Hopkinsville, member of State Senate and lower House, and also member of Congress.

George P. Doern, editor of the *Louisville Anzeiger*, who represented the practically unanimous German element of the State.

Hon. William H. Randall, of London, a Circuit Judge, and twice member of Congress.

Hon. Q. C. Shanks, a prominent man of Hartford, who raised and led the 12th Kentucky Cavalry.

To this list, already prolonged beyond the limits at first assigned, might be added many others. Those who are named were not simply "Union men." They were recognized leaders among the people.

The first suggestion was to name twenty-five of the most distinguished, but the list easily enlarged to fifty, and as easily grew to a hundred, and to a hundred and

fifty and more. There is no intention to attempt to name all the Union men who were prominent: the purpose is to direct attention to the fact that the Union leaders were numerous, and that they were the conspicuous men in the State and in every community. Those named were native-born Kentuckians, and had filled honorable positions before the war. They were men of the highest character, intellectually, morally, and socially. They were qualified for leadership, and this position was naturally accorded to them by their fellow-citizens. They were capable of forming and directing public sentiment, and in the great emergency of 1861 they threw themselves into the struggle for the Union. They were not of the class who acted individually in thinking and voting, but who were active, energetic, and positive in efforts to accomplish a great purpose. They worked for the cause of the Union, giving their time and talents and means. They originated and carried out movements at large, and in their respective localities. They inaugurated meetings and attended them, and made patriotic speeches, unsparingly and unselfishly promoting by all of the means in their power the cause of the Union as against the industrious effort to create a feeling among the people tending to secession.

Associated with these leaders were hundreds who were men of weight in their respective communities. These all catching inspiration from the recognized leaders, exerted an influence upon the masses and gave direction to the voting. If such had not been the case, it is possible the heart of the people might have been fired with the inflammatory utterances intended to carry them into secession. With the splendid leadership which marked the Union cause in Kentucky there naturally followed a consistent and steady adherence to the Union on the part of the Kentucky voters. There is nothing but reason and calm, intelligent judgment in the spectacle

of the voting in 1860 and 1861. The presence of passion and excitement would have carried the people in the other direction.

When, therefore, the present glory of the American Republic is contemplated, and when we reflect that the views of Abraham Lincoln might have been correct, that "Kentucky would be a turning weight in the scale of war," the feeling must arise that the country owes a debt of gratitude to the great men of Kentucky who, at the critical moment, exerted all their energies, and devoted all their abilities to the task of saving Kentucky to the Union. It is true that when, under the inevitable workings of the law of progressive development, Mr. Lincoln's ideas on the subject of the slaves advanced from what they were at the outset to such as produced the Emancipation Proclamation, the views of many persons in Kentucky did not advance with his. Some became anti-Lincoln, but they were still Unionists. They did not by any means join in the rebellion. The extent of their opposition to Lincoln was an active support of McClellan, with the universally expressed view that he would bring about the restoration of the Union. They supported him because of his avowed purpose, if elected, to use all the men and money necessary to suppress the rebellion and maintain the authority of the Union.

CHAPTER VII

ELECTIONS IN 1861

THREE general elections occurred in Kentucky in the year 1861, all of which showed unmistakably that the people did not favor the Southern movement, but were heartily on the side of the Union.

The first of these elections took place May 4th, and was for delegates to the Border State convention which had been called to meet at Frankfort May 27th. There were in the field two sets of candidates, one being all Union men of pronounced type, the other all Southern Rights men. During the canvass, on April 29th, the Southern Rights candidates were withdrawn by the committee of that party, the reason for doing so alleged to be that they were charged with favoring secession, but the real reason, doubtless, was that it was apparent that they would be defeated. The Union candidates, however, stood for election and were voted for. They were John J. Crittenden, James Guthrie, R. K. Williams, F. M. Bristow, Joshua F. Bell, John B. Huston, Archibald Dixon, Charles A. Wickliffe, Charles S. Morehead. The vote cast for these men was 110,000, or more than two thirds of the total vote cast for all the Presidential candidates in November, 1860. This vote was cast after the secession of ten of the States; after the organization of the Southern Confederacy; and after the State Legislature had refused to call a convention to consider secession. It was regarded as a most decided expression in favor of the Union, and against seceding. It made a

profound impression upon the country. Hon. Joseph Holt, at that time in Washington, wrote his memorable letter to Joshua F. Speed at Louisville, which began with the words:

“The recent overwhelming vote in favor of the Union in Kentucky has afforded unspeakable gratification to all true men throughout the country.”

The second election was on the 20th of June, and was a congressional election. President Lincoln had called a special session of Congress to meet July 4th, and this rendered it necessary to hold a special election for Congressmen in the State of Kentucky. Union candidates were nominated and also Southern Rights or secession candidates. Nine of the ten elected were Union men, and the popular majority in the State was 54,670. This tremendous majority was not made up by an overwhelming vote in any particular section, but was fairly distributed all over the State, as the following statement in detail shows:

In the First District, which was the extreme west end of the State, Henry C. Burnett, States Rights, 8988; his opponent, Lawrence S. Trimble, Union, 6225, the majority of the district being 2763 against the Union and in favor of secession. In this connection it is proper to state that Mr. Burnett, instead of sitting in the National Congress, went South in the fall of 1861 and represented Kentucky in the Confederate Congress.

In the Second District, also in the western part of the State, James S. Jackson, Union, 9271; his opponent, John T. Bunch, secessionist, 3368; majority for the Union, 5903. Jackson went to Congress, but in a few weeks resigned his seat to go back to Kentucky to raise troops for the Union cause. He raised and organized the magnificent Third Kentucky Cavalry, became its Colonel, was made Brigadier-General, and was killed at Perryville October 8, 1862.

In the Third District, central southern part of the State, Henry Grider, the Union candidate, received 10,392 votes, and his opponent, Joseph H. Lewis, 3113; majority, 7259. Lewis went into the Confederacy and became a Brigadier-General.

In the Fourth District, central southern, Aaron Harding, Union, 10344; A. G. Talbott, 2469; Union majority, 7875.

In the Fifth District, central, Charles A. Wickliffe, Union, 8217, and his opponent, Read, 2719; Union majority, 5498.¹

In the Sixth District, central, George W. Dunlap, Union, 8181; scattering, 229.

In the Seventh District, which included Louisville, Robert Mallory, Union, 11,035; his opponent, H. W. Bruce, 2862; majority, 8173. Mr. Bruce afterwards went South and became a Congressman from Kentucky in the Confederacy.

In the Eighth District, which included Frankfort and Lexington, John J. Crittenden, Union, 8272; his opponent, William E. Simms, 5706; majority, 2366.

In the Ninth District, which included Maysville, William H. Wadsworth, Union, 12,230; his opponent, John S. Williams, 3720; majority, 8510. Williams afterward became a Brigadier-General in the Confederacy, while Wadsworth fought for the Union and was the principal figure in the Union cause in his part of the State.

In the Tenth District, John W. Menzies, Union, 8370; his opponent, O. P. Hogan, 4526; majority, 3847.

The third election in Kentucky in 1861 was on the fifth day of August, being an election for representatives in the State Legislature. Two weeks prior to August 5th the battle of Bull Run had been fought. The occurrence

¹ See Appendix, § 8, p. 343.

of an event so significant was certainly calculated to enlighten the Kentucky people on the subject of the war. It was plain the issue had to be fought out, and the issue was between the Federal government and the newly organized Confederacy. How did the people vote when the issue thus confronted them so plainly?

The remarkable fact is they voted for the Union by a larger majority than ever before. One hundred and three Unionists were elected to the State Legislature—Senate and House—and thirty-eight of the opposing party. The popular majority was increased over that of June. When these majorities are considered, being between fifty and sixty thousand, and when it is understood that they were absolutely free elections, without interference of any kind, as at that time there were no soldiers of either side in the State, it becomes manifest beyond any possible cavil that Kentucky voted against secession, and took her stand for the Union.

It is of interest here to mention the vote cast at this election in the city of Louisville, the metropolis of the State. James Speed, Union candidate for the State Senate, received 4788 votes. His opponent, Jefferson Brown, 605. A. B. Semple, Union candidate for the State Senate, received 4615. His opponent, Gamble, 902. For the lower House:

Beeman, Union, 2141; his opponent, Brinly, 63
Nat. Wolfe, Union, 1680; his opponent, Rudd, 321
W. P. Boone, Union, 1990; his opponent, Joyes, 351
Joshua Tevis, Union, 958; his opponent, Johnston, 305

In the county of Jefferson, being the county in which Louisville is situated, the Union veteran editor of the *Louisville Democrat*, John H. Harney, received 1583 votes, and his opponent, David Meriwether, 628.

It would be difficult to find any instance, in any State or country, where questions are determined by voting, a more satisfactory settlement of any question than that of

union or secession in Kentucky. The people at absolutely free and untrammelled elections, declared against going South and in favor of the Union. It is surprising, therefore, to find in histories written since the war, expressions to the contrary. In Z. F. Smith's *History of Kentucky* (p. 610) he mentions the June and August elections, and says:

"It were well-nigh certain that if a sovereignty convention could have been called at any time before the formation of the Union sentiment and policy into active and aggressive life, the State would have been carried off into the act of secession as Virginia and Tennessee were by the sense of sympathy and kinship toward the South."

This is the view also of Shaler (p. 240), who says:

"There is reason to believe that this course [neutrality] was the only one that could have kept Kentucky from secession. If what had been unhappily named a Sovereignty Convention had been called in 1861; if the State had been compelled to accept the decision of a body of men who were acting under the control of no constitutional enunciation, the sense of sympathy and kinship with the Southern States, such as would easily grow up under popular oratory in a mob, would probably have precipitated action."

This is simply speculation, not history, and the speculation is contradicted by the historic facts. The Union leaders of the time may well have dreaded the possibilities of a convention, and were wise to oppose this first step leading toward possible secession. But the historian, looking back upon the voting of 1860 and upon the voting of 1861, can see with undimmed vision that the people of Kentucky deeply and truly sided with the Union against all the allurements to go South. They were in serious earnest in regarding secession as no remedy for anything. If a convention had been called it is clear now that Union men would have been elected to

it. There is nothing to indicate that the complexion of such a convention would have been anything else than Union. The people elected all Union men to the Border State convention in May; they elected nine of the ten Congressmen in June, and two thirds of the Legislature in August. The men they elected were true to the trust reposed in them. Why should it be supposed for a moment that the case would have been different if the people had elected members to a convention?

The important historic fact is, that the people of Kentucky voted for and elected Union men at every election when called upon to vote.

It will be seen, however, that the leaders of the secession movement were not satisfied. They professed "States Rights" doctrine, but they were not content to let their own State determine for herself. To the extent these leaders went South and influenced others to go with them, all went contrary to the expressed will of their State. It will be seen that they acted toward Kentucky as though it had no right to remain in the Union. Beaten overwhelmingly at the polls, they went into the armies of the Confederate States, and came back to coerce their own State; fighting for States Rights, and yet disregarding the rights of their own State; fighting against "coercion" and yet striving to "coerce" their own State out of her chosen position into one they chose for her, and one which she solemnly protested against.

Applying all the tests conceivable, the position of the Kentucky Unionists, from first to last, was absolutely right.

In the first place, they had the right to adhere to the Union if they so chose. No matter how much it may be urged that they had the right to secede, no one can deny that they had the right to refuse to secede. In the

second place, the people having voted to remain in the Union, upon any theory of "States Rights," the Unionists who followed the flag of the Union afterward did so in obedience to the will of the people expressed at the polls. In the third place, the people of Kentucky were right in remaining true to the Union. Their expression, "secession is a remedy for no evil," was absolutely true. Secession meant a broken-up Union and a broken-up Republic. It was inherently fallacious and wrong. Its failure established the Union and our great Republic on a firmer basis than it ever had before, and instead of our land being Mexicanized, the triumph of the Union cause has brought a greatness and grandeur to the United States inexpressible in language. Not only have we a restored Union, but a perfected Union.

It is unfortunate that the historians place so little emphasis upon the elections in Kentucky which have been mentioned. They were intensely significant, and really meant everything at the time. Shaler does not mention the remarkable vote for members to the Border State convention, which, as Hon. Joseph Holt said, so profoundly impressed the whole country.

He mentions the election of Congressmen in June in three lines only, and he devotes only seven lines to the August election, simply mentioning that it occurred and the result, but adds no comment to point its significance (p. 247).

Z. F. Smith briefly says:

"They greatly deterred the leaders in sympathy with the South, and correspondingly encouraged the friends of the Union."

He then adds the "if" already mentioned, to the effect that the result would have been different if the people could have voted for members of a convention (p. 610).

Hodge, writing in Collins, does not mention the vote for members of the Border State convention, nor the

June election for Congressmen, but has the following singular remark about the August election:

“The sympathizers with the Confederacy did not contest to any considerable extent the election of August, 1861. Consequently, the supporters of the Federal government were largely in the ascendant in the next Legislature” (vol. i., p. 243).

It is remarkable that such a statement should be made. Why did they not contest? They had candidates in the field. The complaint of military interference could not be made, for this was before any soldiers were in the State.

The same writer (Hodge) gives an account of a resolution he himself introduced in the Legislature the preceding spring, providing that there should be a vote of the people upon the question “Shall there be a convention?” and if a majority should vote in the affirmative, then a convention should be called. “But,” says Hodge, “this and every other effort for an appeal to the people was steadily resisted; the opponents of it and kindred propositions, denying the right of the State to secede from the Union under any circumstances.” So this author, who was an actor in the affairs of that day, complains, in writing its history, that efforts for an appeal to the people were resisted, and yet when that appeal was made, complacently says his people did not contest the election, and on that account the other side won. Why did they not contest? This was the time of all others to do it. It was an election for members of the State Legislature. If enough Southern sympathizers should be elected to control that body, which was to meet September 2d, they could then get all that was refused by the Legislature of the past spring. Why did they not bring out that vast vote which they claimed they had, and thus get control of the State? Was it because there was a feeling that the vote for Congressmen in the June previous had settled the

question? There would be some plausibility in such a statement. The simple truth is, there was nothing singular, or unusual, or out of the ordinary, in that August election. For many years it had been the custom of the Kentucky people to vote at the "regular August election." That was known to be "election day." It was a day they counted forward to and dated back to. They might be indifferent to some special election, but hardly to the "regular August election." Nor is there anything but assertion in the statement made by Hodge implying indifference. The regular vote of the State was polled, only it went solid against the secessionist party. The appeal was made to the people, and the Union cause won by a great majority, and upon that ground Hodge could truthfully say, "consequently, the supporters of the Federal government were largely in the ascendancy in the next Legislature."

The significance of the vote in August, 1861, deserves to be especially emphasized. The claim was falsely made at the time that the vote was "in favor of neutrality," and since the war the statement has been repeated. In October, 1861, John C. Breckinridge issued an address to the people of Kentucky from Bowling Green, in which he said:

"In every form by which you could give direct expression to your will, you declared for neutrality. A large majority of the people at the June and August elections voted for the neutrality and peace of Kentucky. The press, the public speakers, the candidates (with the exception of those in favor of the government at Washington, so rare as not to need mention) planted themselves on this position. You voted for it and you meant it. You were promised it and you expected it. The minority acquiesced in good faith, and at home and abroad this was recognized as the fixed position of the State. It was taken at the beginning of hostilities, and it is but reasonable to infer that every subsequent act of outrage by the

Washington government has confirmed your original purpose. Look, now, at the condition of Kentucky, and see how your expectations have been realized—how these promises have been redeemed. First, by the aid of some citizens of the State some arms belonging to the whole people were illegally and secretly introduced by order of the President, and distributed to one class of our people upon the false pretence that they needed them for protection against their own fellow-citizens. This was the first violation.

Next, Federal military officers began to recruit soldiers and establish camps in our midst. . . . For a time it was denied that they were Federal camps, and it was said that they were merely voluntary assemblages of Kentuckians for their own protection and that of the State. These monstrous falsehoods have since been freely exposed. This was the second violation."

Such expressions have found their way into historic writings since the war, to give the impression that the Kentucky people did not vote for the Union, but for neutrality, and that thereupon the Lincoln government, through the treachery of the Union leaders, seized the State and held it in the Union against the will of the people.

Shaler in his history gives out this idea. In his brief allusion to the August election he says: "The regular election on the first Monday in August gave the first distinct impression of the will of the neutrality party"; and adds: "the neutrality party had now obtained full control of the State Legislature" (p. 247).

The complete answer to such misrepresentation is found in the great outstanding facts of the time. The legislators who were elected could not have differed wholly and altogether from their constituents, and three weeks after their election they convened, and controlled the State absolutely for the Union. They passed laws for the vigorous prosecution of the war, and for large appropria-

tions therefor, and for the expulsion of the Confederate armies from the State, even passing them over Governor Magoffin's vetoes.

Again, let it be noted that when Confederate General Polk came into Kentucky in September he justified his movement on the ground, among others, that the people of Kentucky had violated neutrality by their representatives in Congress voting men and money to carry on the war against the South. His language was:

"She has by her members in the Congress of the United States voted supplies of men and money to carry on the war against the Confederate States."

Now, if General Polk knew what the Kentucky Congressmen, who were elected in June, 1861, were doing, shall it be said that the people of Kentucky did not know? Yet, when the election came on in August they, instead of rebuking their representatives, elected a State Legislature composed of men precisely like those representatives in Congress, which Legislature ordered General Polk to retire from the State.

Those representatives in Congress were elected by Kentucky Unionists, not by men whose allegiance might fall either way. Those representatives knew that neutrality was for the purpose of mediation and possible peace, but never looked to abandonment of the Union or drifting into the Confederacy. Therefore, it is perfectly natural that in the records we find manifestations of this well understood sentiment. On the 29th of July, 1861, these records show that President Lincoln desired that Jesse Bayles should raise a regiment in Kentucky, and that consent was given by representatives in Congress, Mallory, Grider, Dunlap, J. S. Jackson, and Charles A. Wickliffe (*War Records*, Serial No. 122, p. 364).

Also, in a speech in Congress, the most distinguished one of these representatives—Hon. Charles A. Wickliffe—said on the subject of raising means to carry on

the war: "I want the whole resources of the government resorted to, as was the case in the war of 1812"; and in the course of his speech said: "I have never sought to distract and divide the Union. I have never sympathized with a rebellion against the glory and honor and even the existence of my beloved country" (*Congressional Globe*).

Furthermore, one of the great outstanding facts of the period was that the constituents of the Union delegation in Congress, and the Union Legislature, responded to the call for troops with a zeal which is described as having "sprung to the country's defence."

If the vote had been for neutrality, as stated by Breckinridge, his address to the Kentucky people might have fallen upon ears less deaf to his portrayal of the "usurpations," and "despotisms," and "atrocious doctrines," and "insincerity," and "falsehoods," and "betrayals," and "hirelings," and "outrages" of the Federal government and all that pertained to it.

It may be further said that as the people of Kentucky in 1860 manifested their preference for the Union over the clamor for Southern Rights, so when they came to vote in 1861 there was no change, but only a more decided stand and firmer determination not to yield to any of the seductions looking to the dismemberment of the Union.

CHAPTER VIII

THE "LINCOLN GUNS"

THE details of a very interesting episode in the beginning of the war, known as the bringing of the "Lincoln guns" into Kentucky, are not given in any history. They were made known to the present writer by some of the participants, all of whom are now dead. Fortunately for history, an account was carefully written and published in the *Magazine of American History* by Rev. Daniel Stevenson. Dr. Stevenson had personal acquaintance with many of the men who were instrumental in obtaining these guns, and his information was derived from them.

President Lincoln was watching the state of affairs in Kentucky with intense solicitude, and was kept advised of every step taken, principally through his personal friend, Joshua F. Speed of Louisville. He knew of the existence of the armed and equipped State Guard, and he knew that while the Unionists in the State largely predominated, yet they were unorganized and had no arms. There was perplexity in the question as to what was to be done, and before any solution was offered, the man for the times came voluntarily upon the scene. This was Lieutenant William Nelson, a Kentuckian who had been upon a visit to his native State, and had learned the nature of the situation. It was early in May, 1861, when he called to see the President and laid before him his plan for furnishing arms to the Kentucky Unionists. The President approved his plan and agreed to furnish

him five thousand muskets to be distributed by him in Kentucky. The guns were shipped from Washington to Cincinnati, to which place Nelson proceeded and forwarded some of the arms to Jeffersonville, Indiana, opposite Louisville. From Cincinnati Nelson went to Louisville and had a private interview with Mr. Speed. A correct account is given by Dr. Stevenson:

“Mr. Speed was sitting at his table with some papers before him when a large man entered, who, after glancing around the room, apparently to see if there was more than one person present, asked if he were Mr. Speed. On being told that he was, he asked if he were Joshua Speed.

“‘That is my name’ was the response.

“‘Is there another room to this office?’ was the next question.

“‘There is.’

“‘Is there any one in that room?’

“‘There is not.’

“‘I should like, Mr. Speed, to see you in that room for a short time.’

“Mr. Speed rose and led the way, when the stranger turned and locked the door behind him.”

When seated, Nelson made himself known and stated the object of his visit. He desired Mr. Speed to go to Frankfort with him to consult with prominent Union men there. They went that afternoon. On the same train went also Mr. Speed’s brother, Hon. James Speed. That night a consultation was held at the office of Hon. James Harlan, who was the father of Justice John M. Harlan of the United States Supreme Court. There were present James Harlan, John J. Crittenden, Charles A. Wickliffe, Garrett Davis, Thornton F. Marshall, James Speed, Joshua F. Speed, and Lieutenant Nelson.

It was felt by all that the utmost caution was necessary, as mismanagement might cause the guns to fall into the hands of the other party, and it was agreed that orders

for the guns were to be given by men in different localities in the State to be countersigned by Joshua F. Speed. Twelve hundred guns were assigned to Louisville. They were brought to Louisville, stored in the court-house, and, under the direction of Major John W. Barr, were issued to the Louisville Home Guards. Some of the guns from Jeffersonville were sent to Shelbyville for the Home Guard company at that place, commanded by Dr. William Bailey.¹ Enough were also sent to Hopkinsville to arm one company in the regiment raised there by Colonel James F. Buckner. In other places Home Guard companies were formed as soon as they found that they could be armed. The following extracts from the account prepared by Dr. Stevenson show how the Lincoln guns were distributed in other sections of the State:

"The guns for the counties of Bourbon, Fayette, Clark, and Montgomery were sent up by the Kentucky Central Railroad. The shipment of these guns took place on the 17th of May. Mr. John D. Hearne, at that time of Paris, now of Covington, took an active part in the work. He says that all was kept profoundly secret till the departure of the afternoon train on the Kentucky Central Railroad, when a man designated for the purpose was stationed in the telegraph office at Covington, to prevent any information being sent on the wires. Trains of wagons were hastily loaded in Cincinnati with the guns and sent across the river to the Kentucky Central depot in Covington, where cars were speedily placed in a position to receive the arms.

"'Cincinnati had at that time' says Mr. Hearne, 'a large volunteer patrol, a kind of home guard, whose self-imposed duty, among others, was to prevent any contraband articles from going into Kentucky, without special permission from some self-appointed committee who heard and passed upon all applications, and whose determination was final. Squarely

¹ See Appendix, § 9, p. 344.

up against this patrol came Lieutenant Nelson and the first wagon in the line loaded with muskets and ammunition. As they approached the ferry and were notified what credentials were necessary before being permitted to pass, Nelson demanded from whence came the authority to stop him, an officer of the United States government, and with language more forcible than elegant informed Mr. Patrol that if another of his teams were stopped, he would have the person who stopped it sent to a military prison. I need scarcely say that no more wagons were stopped. The train was loaded and left the depot at 11 o'clock that night, and before daylight the next morning the guns for Bourbon, Clark, and Montgomery counties were landed at Paris and those for Fayette county at Lexington.'

"These last were directed to the care of Mr. Hiram Shaw, Sr., whose loyalty and decision of character made him conspicuous among the Union men in that part of the State. The guns for Clark and Montgomery counties had to be hauled from Paris to Winchester and Mt. Sterling, the county-seats respectively of those counties, in wagons; Winchester being about sixteen miles distant and Mt. Sterling about twenty. The men who took the guns from Paris to Mt. Sterling were intercepted by spies, but, showing a determined purpose, no attack was made upon them. Before sunset of that day the guns for these four counties, all in the heart of the Blue Grass portion of the State, were in the hands of men pledged to use them for the maintenance of the Union and whom it would have been hazardous to provoke to a trial of their ability to use them.

"On the day on which the guns for the counties just named were shipped by cars from Covington, others were shipped by boat directly from Cincinnati, up the Ohio River. The latter were for the counties of Mason and Nicholas. The boat containing them reached its destination, Maysville, the county-seat of Mason County, early in the night, while the train bearing the others was making its way along the track that follows the tortuous course of the Licking River. The next morning, while the Union men of Lexington and Paris were unbox-

ing the guns sent to them, and the men from Winchester and Mt. Sterling were loading wagons with theirs, the men of Maysville were rejoicing in the possession of a similar treasure. The Hon. William H. Wadsworth was the commander of the Home Guards of Maysville. The guns intended for Nicholas County were in charge of Colonel Leonidas Metcalfe, a citizen of that county, and a son of a former Governor of Kentucky and Senator of the United States.

"The news of the arrival of the guns at Paris and Lexington and Maysville, all three prominent places, spread like wild-fire. About the time when Colonel Metcalfe was well on his way, by turnpike, with the arms for Nicholas County, a meeting of disunionists and neutrality men was called at Carlisle, the county-seat of that county, at which a committee was appointed to go down the turnpike, in the direction of Maysville, and meet Colonel Metcalfe, and protest that the introduction of the guns could only result in an immediate and sanguinary conflict. This committee met the Colonel with the wagon containing the guns a little north of the Blue Licks Springs, and delivered their message, which was, in the most unequivocal terms, that the guns must not be brought to Carlisle, and that seventy-five men were banded together to come to the turnpike bridge at the Blue Licks, and prevent them from being taken beyond it. Colonel Metcalfe had with him, besides the driver, only two other men, citizens of his county; but he was fearless and determined, and he said, in response to the bearers of the message, in language made emphatic by an oath, that they might go back and tell the men who had sent them, that seventy-five of them might come to the bridge, but that seventy-five would never go back to Carlisle; and with that he told his driver to drive on. Nobody met him at the bridge, and that night the guns were received by men awaiting the Colonel's arrival, at his residence, on the turnpike, about two miles from Carlisle in whose hands he knew they would do no harm to the government.

"The number of guns received at this time into the State was believed by disunionists to be much larger than it really was. A prominent Southern sympathizer, writing at the time

to another prominent Southern sympathizer, estimated the number that was landed at Maysville at two thousand five hundred, the number that was sent up into the Blue Grass section at five thousand, and the whole number that had been received at Cincinnati for distribution in Kentucky at fifteen thousand. Each gun was thus made to have the moral effect of three or four.

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“Efforts had been made by General Speed S. Fry, at that time Captain Fry, of Danville, the county-seat of Boyle County in the centre of the State, to procure arms for a Home Guard company of that place, from General Simon Bolivar Buckner, commander of the State Guard, but in vain. Hearing that Lieutenant Nelson had guns for distribution to such companies, General Fry, in company with Wellington Harlan, William Goodloe, and Stephen G. Cloyd, of Boyle County, and Dr. Stephen Burdett and Osburn Dunn, of Garrard, an adjoining county, went to Cincinnati with the hope of procuring guns for companies in Jessamine, Garrard, Mercer, Lincoln, and Boyle counties. On reaching Cincinnati they found the city in a state of intense excitement, business of all kinds seemingly suspended, and the war the only subject of conversation. They found Lieutenant Nelson in a cheerful and affable state of mind; and when the object of their mission was made known, a prompt affirmative response was given by him to their requests. He informed them, however, that the excitement in Cincinnati had become so intense, when it had become known that he had arms in his possession for distribution among the Home Guards of Kentucky, that he had been compelled to ship all the arms consigned to him to the care of Mr. Hamilton Gray of the city of Maysville. This excitement had arisen in consequence of the idea that Kentucky loyalty was of so doubtful a type as to render it dangerous to the interests, not only of Cincinnati, but also of the government, to entrust guns to the hands of citizens of Kentucky.

“He at once gave General Fry an order on Mr. Gray for

seven hundred guns; and the general and his companions, without delay, proceeded by boat to Maysville. On presenting their order there they were informed that it would be filled as soon as conveyance for the guns could be obtained, as it was deemed best to take them by the way of the Maysville and Lexington turnpike, although the route lay through certain sections where Southern sympathizers predominated. The distance from Maysville to Danville by this way is about ninety miles. They procured two wagons, one drawn by six horses and the other by two. It was late in the day before the loading was completed, and the sun had set by the time they reached the top of the hill just in the rear of the city. There they encamped for the night, and made a very early start the next morning.

“Before starting, having apprehension that they might encounter some trouble on the way, they took the precaution to load six of the guns with buck and ball, and to lay them in the box hung in the rear of the larger wagon. They expected to get their breakfast at some convenient point on the way. In the course of an hour they passed the house of a good Union man, and an old acquaintance of General Fry, who compelled the General to come in and take breakfast with him. After breakfast this gentleman brought out his buggy and took the General on in it till they overtook the other men, who had gone ahead with the wagons. The rest took breakfast at Mayslick, twelve miles from Maysville. ‘As all our movements,’ says the commander of this little force, ‘had been of a public character—the loading of the guns upon the wagons, and our departure with them from Maysville,—there were doubtless those who were watching us with a view of bearing intelligence of our coming to different points on the road; for as we entered the little town of Mayslick we found the streets thronged with men and boys, the larger mass of whom had come from their homes in the country to witness the passing of the approaching little army with its munitions of war; and doubtless also to join in any attempt that might be made to take the guns from us. It was very evident that nearly all this assemblage, judging from the frowning aspect depicted

in their countenances, were of the extreme Southern type in sympathy and sentiment.'

" 'Just before entering the town, being myself,' says the General, 'in front, and walking alone behind the larger wagon, a gentleman came to the front door of his dwelling, which he opened only sufficiently wide (he was doubtless a Union man) to exhibit his head, waved his hand to me to stop, and then, in a tone barely loud enough for me to hear him, said, "Do not go into the town with those guns," and then suddenly disappeared. I halted the larger wagon. The other portion of my company had betaken themselves to the top of the smaller wagon to give rest to their weary limbs. When they came up I notified them of what had just happened, and a council of war was held, which, after a careful examination of the smaller arms we had upon our persons, resulted in a decision to move forward. We marched into the town, halted opposite the door of the only hotel in the place, and there our wagons stood while the other members of the party went into the hotel and ate their breakfasts, I remaining as the only sentinel to watch the movements of the crowd who gathered around, and to guard the guns.

" 'I took my stand immediately in the rear of the larger wagon, with my hand upon the box containing the six loaded guns; and whilst standing thus alone one of the crowd walked up to my side, and in rather an insolent tone asked, if "they had n't better take some of those guns?" to which I coolly but firmly responded, "There they are; take them." Whether it was the coolness of my response or the fear of danger that might be lurking near, I could not tell, but something induced him to turn away without offering any other remark. My comrades in a very short time came out, when, bidding the crowd good-morning, we quietly moved off, thankful that nothing had occurred to impede our progress.'

" Nothing of interest occurred after this till they reached Millersburg, in Bourbon County, about thirty-six miles from Maysville. Knowing that the sentiments of the people of this place were almost entirely Southern, they deemed it necessary to keep their forces in close order, watching with eager eyes

the crowd that appeared on the street, evidently brought together by the news of their coming, which had preceded them.

"The driver of the large wagon, whom they had suspected of being a Southern sympathizer, had been told, after leaving Mayslick, not to stop in any town. 'But in spite of our positive orders,' says the General, 'he pretended to have some important business at Millersburg, stopped his team right in the centre of the town, dismounted, and ran immediately into some house. Not knowing what information he might communicate to persons he came in contact with, and wishing to get as far on our journey as possible before nightfall, Dr. Burdett, one of our company, at once mounted the saddle-horse, drove the wagon through the town, leaving the driver to overtake us as best he could. Our order was again repeated to him, and his pledge was given that he would not stop again. As luck would have it, the only thing that occurred that had even the semblance of any hostile demonstration (and that was simply amusing and ridiculous, except for the effect that it might have had upon some of the crowd) was the act of an old lady who sat in a door on the street. Raising her clenched fist, she shook it at us with some degree of violence, and exclaimed at the top of her voice, "If I was a man I would not let them guns pass without taking them."'

"They expected to reach Paris, eight miles beyond Millersburg, that night; but when they had gone not quite half the distance, a messenger, sent by the direction of Lieutenant Nelson, met them and informed them that a rebel company had been parading the streets of Paris that day creating considerable excitement among the citizens, and warned them that there was danger if they went into town that night, that an effort might be made by the rebel company to seize their guns. The result of this warning was a determination to go into camp for the night. They halted near the residence of Mrs. Hezekiah Martin, a widow lady of decided Union sentiments, who kindly provided supper and breakfast for them, and furnished them with bedding to spread on the roadside near their wagons, where they deemed it best, for the safety of their guns, to sleep.

“ Early the next morning, they took up their line of march. On entering Paris they found the streets perfectly quiet. On stepping for a moment into the grocery store of Mr. H. T. Brent, through whom the warning had been sent out the day before, General Fry saw a number of guns standing against the wall; and was told, in response to his inquiry what their presence meant, that they had been placed there that they might be ready for use by the Union men of the town in the event of any hostile demonstrations on the part of the rebels against him and his comrades in their passage through the place.

“ ‘Here again,’ says the General, ‘just as we reached the centre and chief business part of the town, our rebel teamster halted his team, dismounted, rushed into a house, pretendedly to see some one on business. Being now fully convinced that his persistent disobedience of our positive orders was intended to involve us in some difficulty, we determined that his folly and perversity should not delay the progress of our march; so that as soon as he dismounted I mounted into the saddle and drove the team through the town and some distance beyond.’

“ They felt some apprehension in approaching Lexington; but they passed through the city without seeming to attract any special attention. They encamped that night four miles beyond Lexington, on the farm of a Mr. Dunn, who, though a rebel sympathizer, entertained them very hospitably at his house.

“ On reaching Nicholasville, the county-seat of Jessamine County, twelve miles beyond Lexington, the next day, they found a company of Home Guards ready to welcome them and relieve them of a portion of their guns. They were heartily congratulated on their success, and were then invited to a rich and bountiful repast.

“ Proceeding on their way, they were met at Mr. Richard Robinson’s, where the road forks—one prong leading to Danville and the other to Lancaster—by a part of the Home Guard company of Garrard County, who, after having received the portion of the guns designed for their county, bade the General and his comrades adieu, and with shouts of gladness

and triumph hastened away in the direction of Lancaster, to rejoice the hearts of the other members of their company.

"With the remainder of their charge the General and his faithful companions turned to the right and proceeded on their way towards Danville. They reached there at a late hour in the night, when the people generally were wrapped in sleep. A few friends, however, were waiting and watching for their coming. With as little noise as possible the guns were removed from the wagons and deposited under lock and key in the house of one of the members of the Home Guard company.

"No suspicion of the visit of General Fry, and the little band of men that had accompanied him, to Cincinnati, for the purpose of procuring guns, had reached the rebel part of the community, 'and it would be impossible,' says the General, 'for any one to describe, in language sufficiently strong, the consternation expressed in the countenances of these people, when they beheld my company of a hundred men file down Main street, with bayonets glistening in the sunlight, pointed above their heads, and nodding to and fro as they "kept step to the music of the Union."'"

"The companies from Mercer and Lincoln counties hastened to Danville as soon as they received information of the arrival of the guns at that place, and received their distributive share of the coveted prize.

"The first issue of guns to Lieutenant Nelson being exhausted, on the fifth of June five thousand more guns were issued and the distribution went on. In proportion to the increase of Home Guards, with these arms in their hands, the courage and the hopes of the Unionists rose, and those of the disunionists fell. The disunionists, in a spirit of hatred and scorn, spoke of the guns as 'Lincoln guns.' The men who carried the guns on their shoulders accepted the title thus given to them with a smile of confidence which was full of meaning. These guns, notwithstanding all the hatred with which they and the bearers of them were regarded by the enemies of the government, had a wonderfully quieting effect in the communities into which they were introduced, and, doubt-

less, were the means of preventing disturbances, and perhaps scenes of bloodshed. Under their influence, moreover, the Unionists began to hope for an early end of neutrality.

“ The President, fully aware of the difficulties under which the friends of the government in Kentucky labored, had avoided doing anything which might have the appearance of bringing any pressure to bear upon the State from without. Colonels Guthrie and Woodruff, Kentuckians, desirous of aiding the government, had gone across the Ohio River and opened a recruiting station in Ohio for such Kentuckians as wished to enlist in the service of the United States; and about the time of Lieutenant Nelson’s first appearance in Kentucky for the purpose of distributing guns, Major Anderson, of Fort Sumter fame, himself a Kentuckian, was commissioned to open a recruiting office in Cincinnati for volunteers from Kentucky and West Virginia. Many Union men of the State were thus seeking service under the flag of the United States outside of the boundaries of the State. But, stimulated by the manifest purposes of the enemies of the government on one hand, and by the rising tide of Union sentiment in the North, and the presence of the ‘Lincoln guns’ in the hands of the Home Guards of the State on the other hand, the Unionists of Kentucky were becoming more and more outspoken in favor of placing the State in active co-operation with the loyal States of the North in the maintenance of the integrity of the Union.

“ From the time of the first important meeting in Frankfort, in May, prominent Union men of the State had been in frequent consultation with one another and with General Nelson in regard to the position of the State; and the thoughts and feelings of the Union people of Kentucky were, through them, gradually but surely giving direction to the policy of the State; and that policy was becoming less and less uncertain every day.

“ Some of the men most prominent in these meetings were, in addition to those already mentioned, General Jerry T. Boyle, Hon. Joshua F. Bell, Hon. Tucker Woodson, and General John W. Finnell. Meetings were held in Louisville, Frankfort, Lexington, Jessamine County, and probably in other places.

"On the fifteenth of July General Nelson visited Lancaster, where he had a conference with several gentlemen who were known to be earnest, active friends of the government, in regard to the proposed enlistments. It was agreed that the most suitable place for the establishment of a camp for gathering recruits was Mr. Richard Robinson's farm, at the forks of the road leading from Lexington to Danville and Lancaster, and it was decided that that should be the place for the camp, and that the troops should begin to assemble there immediately after the August election. At this meeting in Lancaster, General Nelson commissioned William J. Landrum, Thomas E. Bramlette, Speed S. Fry, and T. T. Garrard as Colonels, and Frank Woolford as Lieutenant-Colonel, of volunteers in the service of the United States. Recruiting must have already begun in anticipation of the commissioning of these gentlemen, as General Nelson reported the next day from Cincinnati to the War Department that Kentucky recruits were then arriving at the place or places appointed for rendezvous.

"On the twenty-first of July the battle of Bull Run was fought. On that day a meeting of leading Union men was held at Lexington with General Nelson. Among those present were the Hon. James Speed, Mr. Joshua F. Speed, Hon. Garret Davis, Hon. James Harlan, General Jerry T. Boyle, and Colonel T. T. Garrard. When the news of the reverse to the Union forces arrived, the enemies of the government throughout the State became exultant and did not hesitate to make their feelings manifest in the most open and noisy way. On the return of Mr. James Speed and Mr. Joshua F. Speed to Louisville, they found the city wild with excitement. The feelings of the secessionists, which had been somewhat restrained by the presence in the city of the guns in the hands of the Home Guards, now broke out afresh in the display of secession flags and in shoutings for Jefferson Davis. Secession flags were seen flying from buggies and carriages, as these vehicles were driven through the streets.

"Hon. James Speed was the commander of the Home Guard of Louisville, and soon after his arrival from Lexington, he

received a message from Mr. John M. Delph, the Mayor, who was as true and brave as he was loyal, requesting him to come to the Mayor's office. Mr. Speed at once proceeded to the office, and after a short conference with the Mayor, sent for Captain George P. Jouett, who was Captain of Company A in the Home Guard, and ordered him to call his company together at once, to be held on guard during the night. He directed him to send to the Mayor's office a box of ammunition, and at the hour when the police were to meet for roll-call to send a file of men thither with an order for ammunition. This was done, and Mr. Speed, as commander of the Home Guard, opened the ammunition box and delivered the cartridges to the file of men in the presence of the police of the city, saying to the officer who received them that he must keep his men ready for service at a moment's warning. The scene made the impression desired. The news was spread by the police throughout the city that the Home Guard was prepared for any emergency, and the tumult soon subsided. . . .

“The election of members of the Legislature took place on the fifth of August. Recruiting under the Colonels who had been commissioned by General Nelson had, in the meantime, been going forward; and on the day after the election the recruits began to arrive at Richard Robinson's farm, the place which had been selected for a camp. Several prominent gentlemen, in addition to the officers themselves, were present. The camp was formally opened with public addresses, all breathing a spirit of devotion to the country. The news of the establishment of the camp soon became known throughout the State, and volunteers began to flock to ‘Camp Dick Robinson’ not only from different parts of Kentucky, but also from East Tennessee.

“Two days before the opening of the camp, Governor Harris of Tennessee had addressed a letter to Governor Magoffin of Kentucky, on the subject of the enlistments which were then going on, as contrary to the position of neutrality which had been taken by the Legislature. The Governor visited the neighborhood of the camp, and on the twelfth of August responded to Governor Harris's letter. In his

response, after having given the impressions he had received of the opinions of Union men with whom he had conversed in regard to the existence of the camp, he said, 'In a few days I hope to be able to inform your Excellency of the disbanding of the organizations to which you have been pleased to call my attention.' With the hope of accomplishing this object, the Governor, on the nineteenth of August, sent Mr. W. A. Dudley and Mr. F. K. Hunt as commissioners of the State of Kentucky, to urge the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the forces in camp within the State.

"In his letter to the President of the United States he said: 'If such action as is hereby urged be promptly taken, I firmly believe the peace of the people of Kentucky will be preserved, and the horrors of a bloody war will be averted from a people now peaceful and tranquil.'

"The gentlemen named at once proceeded to Washington, and had an interview with the President. On the following Monday, the 26th, the President handed them a letter to the Governor, written on the 24th, in which, after reviewing the facts and respectfully declining to remove the force from the State, he added: 'I most cordially sympathize with your Excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native State, Kentucky; but it is with regret I search, and cannot find, in your not very short letter, any declaration or intimation that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union.'

"While the Governor was trying to bring about the disbandment of the volunteers at Camp Dick Robinson through the agency of commissioners sent to Washington, others had a mind to try to bring it about by intercepting the arms designed for the camp. Doctor Ethelbert L. Dudley, commander of the Home Guard of Lexington, was informed on Tuesday, August 20th, that guns for Camp Dick Robinson were on their way thither, and that they would reach Lexington that night.¹ Apprehending that there might be an effort to seize them, he sent Mr. H. K. Milward, afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel of the 18th Kentucky Infantry, to the camp to inform

¹ See Justice Harlan's account, below.

General Nelson of the expected arrival of the guns, and of his fears of trouble with the rebels in regard to them. The distance was about twenty-two miles. Accompanied by a young man, Mr. Milward arrived at the camp about three o'clock the next morning. Arousing General Nelson, at the risk of an explosion of that officer's well-known wrath, he delivered his message, and was surprised at the rapidity of the General's commands, and at the quickness which the Colonels displayed in answering his summons. The soldiers were equally speedy in obeying the commands of their Colonels. By the time Mr. Milward's horse was fed and sufficiently rested to return, infantry and cavalry were ready to move. The detachment was under the command of Colonel Thomas E. Bramlette. The infantry proceeded as far as Nicholasville, a distance of ten miles; the cavalry went on to Lexington, arriving there sometime between noon and one o'clock P.M. The day was rainy, and the men were not as yet provided with suitable army clothing. The ladies of Nicholasville, seeing this, had furnished them, in their passage through that place, with some sort of covering for their shoulders which, at the same time, covered the short guns which they carried. On reaching Lexington, the troops rode down Mulberry Street into Main. As they passed the Phoenix hotel, quite a number of persons were crowding the windows of that building, looking at them. Some one, either from one of the windows or from the sidewalk, made some remark intimating the inability of the cavalry to do much as soldiers, when one of the cavalrymen threw back his shoulder cover, displaying his gun, brought it to his shoulder, and pointed it toward the crowd. The action was quite sufficient to convince and scatter it.

“The train bringing the guns designed for the camp had arrived just before day. A knowledge of the arrival of the guns was soon spread throughout the city. Threats were given out that the rebels, under the lead of Captain John H. Morgan's State Guard company, intended to capture them. The blowing of a bugle from the roof of the company's, armory, on the northeast corner of Main and Upper streets, would be the signal for the members of the company

to rally for that purpose. The Home Guard were quietly notified that if the court-house bell rang they must repair to the railroad depot where the guns were. Shortly after the arrival of Colonel Bramlette and his men, a son of Mr. Henry Saxton went to the roof of the armory and blew his bugle loud and long. Immediately thereafter the court-house bell began to ring, and from all quarters the men began to rally—Captain Morgan's men to their armory where their guns were, and the Home Guards to the depot, with their guns on their shoulders. Mr. Hiram Shaw, a nephew of the gentleman of the same name to whose care the first 'Lincoln guns' sent to Lexington were consigned, has furnished me with an account of the occurrences of that day. He was a member of the Home Guard. He says: 'I deliberately locked my store, and went down there,' that is, to the depot. 'Altogether there assembled about one hundred and fifty to one hundred and seventy-five Home Guards who, with Colonel Bramlette's men, made a force which was able to protect the guns and evidently meant to do so.'

" 'It was a demonstration,' says Mr. Shaw, 'which gratified the friends and astonished the enemies of the government. Seeing it, and seeing the uselessness of the effort, and the trouble it would produce, Major M. C. Johnson and Hon. John C. Breckinridge, the former a Union man, went to the armory and persuaded the men assembled there not to attempt to take the guns.' Meanwhile, 'the Union men remembered a piece of brass artillery which was kept near the city watch-house, and had been used for many years on all public occasions when salutes were in order. Although much nearer to the rebel armory than to the depot where they were assembled, the Home Guards sent a squad of men to bring it, which they did, and it was soon ready to be used if it should be necessary. No attack, however, was made. The guns were loaded into the several wagons necessary to convey them to Camp Dick Robinson; the Home Guards went with them to the city limits, and trusting them to the two hundred cavalry or rather mounted infantry, they returned to the city and were dismissed after their bloodless victory.' "

It will be observed that in the narrative of Dr. Stevenson he mentions the arrival of the guns by train at Lexington, and how the trouble apprehended was averted. It is very interesting to note in this connection the statement following, which was prepared by Justice John M. Harlan, as part of a narrative not designed for publication, but he has kindly allowed its use in this work. Justice Harlan says:

“ The situation in Kentucky was very peculiar and very serious. It was particularly embarrassing to those who had no sympathy with the rebellion and were opposed to a dissolution of the Union in any event. The people of the State had been educated to love the Union and the Constitution, and did not think that any errors or wrongs in the administration of the government justified a resort to arms for the disruption of the Union. But the business interests of the State were closely identified with those of the Southern States, and its people were allied by marriage and otherwise with the people of the States in rebellion. There was a line of division running through the whole State, the majority of the people, however, being unquestionably favorable to the Union cause. The difficulties under which the Union people labored were increased by the fact that the then Governor of Kentucky, Beriah Magoffin, was in open sympathy with the rebels, as were most of the officers of the State Guard, then, or shortly thereafter, under the command of S. B. Buckner, who later on joined the rebel forces in the field. One of the principal officers of the State Guard was, however, true to his country, viz: General Thomas L. Crittenden, a son of Senator John J. Crittenden.

“ In the spring or early summer of 1861, there was a called session of the Kentucky Legislature, at which the rebel sympathizers attempted to pass a legislative enactment for what was then styled a ‘ Sovereignty ’ State convention, to be composed of delegates regularly elected and empowered with authority to consider the general situation and to determine the attitude and course of Kentucky in the crisis then pending.

The rebels believed that they could elect a majority of the delegates to such a convention, and they hoped to have that body formally declare either that Kentucky, as a State, would ally itself directly with the States which had assumed to secede from the Union, or be neutral throughout the contest between the Union government and the Confederates. It was hoped that in this way Kentucky would, under the form of law, assist the movement for a dissolution of the Union.

"At that time my father resided at Frankfort, the capital of the State. I had, in February, 1861, removed to Louisville and formed a partnership in the practice of the law with Hon. W. F. Bullock. In obedience to a summons from my father, I went from Louisville to Frankfort and remained there some weeks. With him and others I labored constantly for weeks with members of the Kentucky Legislature for the purpose of defeating the scheme for calling a 'Sovereignty' convention—believing that the defeat of that scheme would result in holding the State in the Union and depriving those intending to assist the rebels of the pretext that in their so doing they would obey the command of the State. Well, we beat the 'Sovereignty' convention conspiracy, and I returned to Louisville and resumed the work of supporting the Union cause.

"During the summer of 1861 nothing was talked of in Kentucky except union and disunion. The courts were virtually closed and there was but little business in my profession. We determined to defer decisive action until the Union men of the State obtained arms, and in the meantime educate the people as to the value of the Union, and as to the horrors and dangers of a civil war, should Kentucky ally itself with the rebel forces. Meetings were arranged for the street corners in Louisville. A band of music was employed to bring the people together. The speaker usually stood on a box obtained from some storehouse near by. It is safe to say that during the summer of 1861 I made at least fifty 'store-box' speeches for the Union cause. The thing we had in mind was to stay the tide then apparently setting towards the rebel cause, and to hold the people in line until the friends of the government in Kentucky could strike effectively for the

Union. In this work many persons were engaged, among the number James Speed, afterwards Attorney-General under Lincoln; his brother, Joshua F. Speed, an early and trusted friend of Lincoln while he (Speed) lived in Illinois; Caleb W. Logan, Chancellor of the Louisville Chancery Court; George P. Jouett (a brother of Admiral Jouett), afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel of the 15th Kentucky Infantry and killed at the battle of Perryville; Hamilton Pope; John W. Barr, afterwards United States District Judge at Louisville; John K. Goodloe; and Mayor John M. Delph. Among those who co-operated with us in Louisville, each in his own way, was Rev. Dr. Edward P. Humphrey, the father of Judge A. P. Humphrey of Louisville. The leaders of the Union cause in Central Kentucky were Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge, my father, James Harlan, Joshua F. Bell, and Thomas E. Bramlette. In the front of the fight to hold Kentucky fast to the Union was also John H. Harney, the veteran editor of the *Louisville Democrat*.

“ Mr. Lincoln had it greatly at heart that the State in which he was born should adhere to the Union. As already indicated, the judgment of the leading Union men of Kentucky was that they should move slowly and not have the State involved in actual war until the Union people were armed and in a position to defend themselves and be of real service to the good cause. President Lincoln respected their wishes, and therefore the rebels had no opportunity to say that Lincoln was attempting to coerce Kentucky by quartering Federal troops within its limits. The Southern Confederacy pursued the same policy and kept its troops out of Kentucky so as not to appear to be dragooning our people into the support of the rebel cause. From this condition of things arose the charge, on both sides, that Kentucky was neutral in the great contest then pending—a position which, under ordinary circumstances, Kentuckians would not have been willing to occupy. But the Union men of Kentucky were content to rest for a time under that charge, knowing that they were unarmed while the rebel sympathizers were armed, and that to enter the conflict before they were ‘full ready’ was to invite disaster to the Union cause

in the State. That the State was favorable to the Union, although on the surface it was 'neutral,' was shown by the special Congressional election at that time—the Union men carrying, I think, every Congressional district. By Union men I mean those who, while differing from their brethren in the Northern States as to some aspects of the war, yet openly avowed their purpose to stand by the country at all hazards. They advocated the employment of all the men and money necessary to maintain the authority of the General government over every foot of American soil.

" Shortly after the conflict of arms commenced, large numbers of loyal men from East Tennessee fled from that State and established themselves at Camp Dick Robinson, on the Kentucky River, not far from Lexington, Kentucky. They were secretly supplied with arms by some arrangement with the government. To that camp many loyal men from the mountains of Kentucky flocked.

" Just then there appeared on the scene of action a very remarkable man—William Nelson, a Kentuckian by birth, and an officer (captain, I think, in the navy). He had been in Washington and had personally conferred with Lincoln. He had expressed a strong desire to go to the assistance of the Union men of his native State. Lincoln determined to meet his wishes and authorized him (though not publicly) to send arms to Camp Dick Robinson, the men there being insufficiently provided for in that way. I knew of Nelson's plans from reading his letters to my father, who was at that time, or shortly afterwards became, United States District Attorney at Louisville, having accepted that position at the urgent request of Mr. Lincoln.

" Nelson came to Cincinnati and shipped from that city, over the Kentucky Central Railroad to Lexington, thence to be conveyed to Camp Dick Robinson, by wagon, several boxes of guns for the use of the men voluntarily assembled at that camp. In some way the rebel sympathizers at Cynthiana obtained information as to these guns being on the railroad train, and when the train got in sight of Cynthiana, Harrison County, the conductor saw a large crowd at the depot, appar-

ently under the control of Captain Joe Desha. Correctly supposing that they intended to seize the guns and prevent them from reaching Camp Dick Robinson, he immediately ordered the train to be stopped, and returned with the train and the guns to Cincinnati, or rather to Covington. I communicated the facts to Joshua F. Bullitt, then a Judge of the Court of Appeals and at that time an earnest opponent of the rebel cause, although at a later date he became an opponent of the war, because of the course of the administration of Lincoln on the subject of slavery. The result of the conference with Bullitt was that I requested Nelson to ship the guns by boat from Cincinnati to Louisville on a named night, marked to my address at Louisville, Kentucky. I wrote to Dr. Ethelbert L. Dudley, the leading physician at Lexington and the captain of a company of Union Home Guards, telling him of what we proposed to do with the guns. I informed him that the guns would leave Louisville before daylight on a certain day and would reach Lexington precisely at a named hour. We were enabled to be thus specific as to time, because the Superintendent of the railroad from Louisville to Lexington—Colonel Sam Gill—was a Union man and cheerfully co-operated with us. I should say that there were two companies of volunteers at Lexington, composed of the first young men, socially, in the city—one commanded by Dr. Dudley, the other by John H. Morgan, who subsequently joined the Confederate military forces and became a noted cavalry officer on that side.

“The guns were shipped from Cincinnati to Louisville on the regular boat, which arrived at the Louisville wharf about two or three o'clock in the morning. I was at the wharf to receive them. Bullitt was with me. We had them put on drays previously provided, and carried them across the city to the depot of the Louisville and Lexington Railroad on Jefferson Street—Bullitt and myself walking in the street by the side of the drays, each being well armed to resist any attempt to take the guns. The train carrying the guns left Louisville on time and arrived at Lexington exactly at the hour fixed. In some way the Confederate company ascertained what ‘was up,’ so

that as soon as the train carrying the guns reached the depot, an alarm bell was sounded for the assembling of Morgan's men at their armory. Immediately another alarm was sounded for the assembling of Dudley's men at their armory. The young men of each company responded promptly, met at their respective armories, and marched quickly to the depot, taking different routes. The two companies reached the depot at the same moment, and an immediate conflict was imminent. Just *then*, in the nick of time, four hundred cavalymen, armed with Henry rifles, appeared on the hill just above the depot building. They were comanded by Colonel Bramlette (afterwards Governor of Kentucky), and were from Camp Dick Robinson. John C. Breckinridge, who had not then 'gone South,' appeared at this moment on the scene and pleaded for peace. He succeeded. No gun was fired. The men from Camp Dick Robinson took possession of the guns and carried them away with them. If a single shot had been fired, the loss of life would have been great, for the two Lexington companies were composed of men used to the handling of guns and full of fight.

"It may be thought strange that the men from Camp Dick Robinson appeared just at the precise moment they were needed. The explanation is that in my note to Dr. Dudley, above referred to, he was asked to send a messenger at once to Camp Dick Robinson, and request that the cavalry be at the depot at a particular hour and receive the guns. My letter reached Lexington by the evening mail of the night before the train carrying the guns reached that city, and after Dr. Dudley had retired for the night. He had been on horseback all day visiting patients in the country and was quite exhausted by his labors. Mrs. Dudley concluded not to disturb him, but having read my letter, she went quietly to the room of her son, who was a boy of about seventeen, and informed him that he must take a horse and go *at once* with my letter to Camp Dick Robinson. The gallant boy said he would go, or die in the effort to reach the camp. He made himself ready for the journey and travelled nearly all the night, reaching the camp in time to bring the cavalry to Lexington."¹

¹See Appendix, § 11, p. 345.

CHAPTER IX

ABANDONMENT OF NEUTRALITY

LOOKING back upon the course of events in the early part of 1861, and seeing how rapidly the storm-cloud of war came over the country, it is now plain that Kentucky's attitude of neutrality was necessarily temporary. It is still believed by many that it saved Kentucky to the Union, and that only in this way would it have been saved, but this is more than doubtful. The temper of the Kentucky people was displayed in so many ways against disunion, and in favor of the Union, it is reasonably certain that if the leaders had taken ground from the start square against the South, and for the Union, the people would have been with them. This is proved by their voting. It is also shown by the character of resolutions adopted in various parts of the State. On May 15th a large meeting was held in Garrard County, at which it was resolved:

“That we regard the doctrine of secession as illegal, unconstitutional, and impolitic—subversive of all legal restraints and constitutional obligation—destructive of all permanent government, and tending only to political chaos and anarchy.” (*Louisville Journal*, May 7th.)

On May 31st, at a large meeting in Casey County, it was resolved:

“That it is the duty of the people of Kentucky to adhere to the Union and frankly resent any effort to change the relations of Kentucky to the Federal government.

“That it is the duty of our Representative in Congress to

support the government of the United States in all legal and Constitutional measures the adoption of which may be necessary to defeat the revolutionists of the rebellious States.’

At this meeting, Hon. Aaron Harding was nominated for Congress. (*Louisville Journal*, June 7th.)

Like resolutions were reported from many other counties. The people were really in advance of their leaders, and this was not unnatural. The leaders felt the weight of responsibility, which made them more or less conservative, but the people became restive under the situation in which they saw they were placed. There was a growing feeling that they were unprotected. Through all the discussion of neutrality it was known that Kentucky had few arms or munitions of war, and that all talk about repelling invaders was idle bravado. Kentucky was situated in the heart of the country, surrounded by other States, and could get nothing except by its being brought through them. The lofty language of Governor Magoffin’s proclamation, “Warning all States, whether separate or united, and especially the United States and the Confederate States” not to come on Kentucky soil, was only calculated to cause people to wonder and smile, who knew that the State was in no condition to assert such independence.

It was a wholly different proposition to undertake mediation. The State might wisely enough, in the beginning, when there was still hope of preventing war, refrain from taking sides for the express purpose of peace. There was both wisdom and patriotism in the speech of Hon. James Guthrie, at Louisville, April 20th, in which he said:

“I want Kentucky to take her stand for peace. Let us stand fearlessly and cry peace; hold fast to that which is good, and let those who want to make the experiment of secession go as individuals.”

There was nothing but consistent good faith from the

first, in standing out resolutely against secession, and it was reasonably supposed at the time it might moderate the excitement in the South.

But when the idea of neutrality reached the point of independence of both the United States and the Confederate States, it practically led to a position that would take the State out of the Union, though not into the Confederacy. The very absurdity of the idea led to the practical abandonment of neutrality, although the name was kept up through the summer months of 1861.

It is necessary at this point to consider the status of the "State Guard," as it was called. On the 5th of March, 1860, the Legislature had enacted a law for the better organization of the State militia. It provided that the Kentucky militia should be divided into three classes,

1. The Active Militia,
2. The Enrolled Militia,
3. The Reserve Militia.

Only the first two classes require notice, as the Reserve was to consist of persons over and below the ordinary military age.

The Active Militia consisted of volunteers who made up companies, and became regularly organized. These were known as the State Guard.

The Enrolled Militia were those who were of the military age, but unorganized.

The organization of the Active Militia was promptly entered upon. Many volunteer companies were made up, and as the machinery of the State government was in the hands of men who had the same politics as the Governor, it was natural that the companies were of the same political complexion, as a general thing. These companies constituted what was called in the Act, the Kentucky State Guard. The Act provided that the State Guard should be a single corps composed of divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies.

Provision was made for arming and equipping the State Guard, and general officers were provided. So prompt was the organization under this law that in January, 1861, the report of the Adjutant-General of the State showed there were forty-five companies fully armed, uniformed, and equipped. General Simon Bolivar Buckner was the Inspector-General and Commander. In less than three months the number was almost doubled.

In this organization, therefore, there were in the neighborhood of six thousand equipped soldiers, and, generally speaking, with Southern tendencies. One of the irritations of that time was that difficulties were found in the way of organizing companies which would be made up of Union men, while no difficulty was experienced on the other side. The whole of the State Guard, however, was not secession in sentiment. It will be seen that some of the companies became the nuclei of Union regiments a little later.

General Simon Bolivar Buckner, a graduate of West Point and an officer of the Mexican war, was made Inspector-General with the rank of Major-General, and was the Commander of the State Guard. General Thomas L. Crittenden, son of Hon. John J. Crittenden, a graduate of West Point and an officer of the Mexican war, was made Brigadier-General, and Lloyd Tilghman and Roger W. Hanson were Colonels.

In the break-up which occurred upon the abandonment of neutrality, General Buckner went South and rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General in the Confederate service. General Crittenden adhered to the Union and served with distinguished ability throughout the war. Lloyd Tilghman was not a Kentuckian. He went South and became a Brigadier-General. Roger Hanson became Colonel of a Confederate regiment from Kentucky and was killed at Stone River.

The two chief officers of the State Guard were types

of the martial spirit of Kentucky. It would be equally wrong to charge either with bad faith. Each one acted from conviction of his duty at the time, and each one was faithful to the cause he espoused. When the struggle ended General Crittenden continued in the military service with high rank in the regular army, until the close of his life, and General Buckner, who is still living, has continuously exerted a wholesome patriotic influence as a leading citizen of his State.

The attitude of the State Guard was a cause of grave apprehension to the Kentucky Unionists. It being an armed force and controlled generally by those who were in sympathy with the South, a strong desire naturally grew up for the organization and arming of a force that would support the Union cause. That which was natural took place. The Unionists sought to get arms where they could, and this led to the introduction into the State of the "Lincoln guns," as they were called.

On the part of some persons, this was regarded as in violation of neutrality, but it will be seen that graver acts than these occurred, both before this date and after, which showed little regard for the neutral position of the State, on the part of the secessionists.

It is noted in Collins's *Kentucky* (vol. i., p. 88): "April 20th, Captain Joe Desha, with a company of over 100 men, leaves Harrison County for the Confederacy. Other companies leave from other parts of the State." Again it is noted, p. 90, "May 15th, a regiment of troops from Kentucky, under Colonel Blanton Duncan, now at Harper's Ferry, Va., in the Confederate army."

It has been seen that the neutrality idea was formally introduced in the Kentucky Legislature on the 29th of January. Before that, and afterward, it was the stand of Kentucky, not by reason of legislative adoption, but simply as a general popular sentiment, and excepting the proviso in the Act of May 24th, that the arms to be

procured were not to be used either against the United States or the Confederate States, Kentucky neutrality was not based on any Act of the Legislature.

But the idea and plan of neutrality existed as plainly as early as January 29th as it ever did afterward. Therefore, if there could be violation of neutrality in May by the introduction of the "Lincoln guns," or at any later date, it was equally susceptible of violation in April. The events of April, therefore, are rich in interest, as they show how the disunionists were then acting, and at what disadvantages the Unionists were placed.

The fact that in April, 1861, troops were raised in Kentucky, and left the State organized and equipped, and with colors flying, led to the strong language used in a speech in the Kentucky Senate, on the 21st of May, by Hon. (afterwards General) Lovell H. Rousseau. He said:

"The neutrality that fights all on one side, I do not understand. Troops leave Kentucky in broad daylight, and our Governor sees them going to fight against our own government, yet nothing is said or done to prevent them. Is this to be our neutrality? If it is, I am utterly opposed to it. If we assume a neutral position, let us be neutral in fact."

It must be remembered that it was in April that Fort Sumter was fired on, and immediately after came President Lincoln's call for troops, to which Governor Magoffin replied:

"I say emphatically Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."

At the same time a call went to him from the President of the Confederacy. The answer to this, whatever it was, appears to have been sent by a private messenger, and was perhaps an oral message.¹

Concerning this answer and the events which occurred

¹ See Appendix, § 12, p. 346.

just at that time, the following dispatches found in the records show the entire disregard of Kentucky neutrality, both at home and at the Southern capital:

“MONTGOMERY, April 23, 1861.

“GOVERNOR MAGOFFIN,
“FRANKFORT, KY.

“If you received my dispatch of yesterday, requesting you to furnish a regiment, I shall be obliged to know your answer.

“L. P. WALKER.”

(*War Records*, Serial No. 127, p. 234.)

No answer to this by Governor Magoffin is found, but there is a letter written by Blanton Duncan to Hon. L. P. Walker, Secretary of War, in which he says the dispatch was received by Governor Magoffin in his presence, and as the Governor “could not respond from motives of policy, I have done so individually.”

The letter says:

“I immediately sent orders to my companies to move and they have done so, hurriedly and without their ranks full. Captain Jo Desha, Captain J. D. Pope, Captain J. B. Harvey, and Captain Lapille left for Nashville this afternoon with about 300 men.”

The letter goes on to say, “The Confederate flag has floated gayly to the breeze as my men this evening marched through our streets, thousands applauding and waving them on.” (*War Records*, Serial No. 108, p. 37.)

Blanton Duncan, on the 16th day of April, published a statement in the *Louisville Journal*, saying:

“As is well known throughout the State, I have been engaged for some weeks past organizing a regiment to be ready to assist the Southern States whenever invaded by Northern forces. The regiment is organized and will soon be called for, as will be seen from the following dispatch to me from Montgomery before hostilities commenced.”

Then follows the dispatch:

“CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,
“MONTGOMERY, April 9, 1861.

“SIR: Although the department is not even yet ready to accept your regiment, the Secretary of War instructs me to say to you that the aspect of affairs is such as to warrant the confident belief that in a very short time its service will be very acceptable to the South. He therefore trusts that you will hold the regiment prepared to move instantly on the call of this department.

“Respectfully,
“Your obedient servant,
“J. H. HOOPER,
“Private Secretary.”

As early as April 13, 1861, the Confederacy manifested its attitude toward Kentucky, and many Kentuckians manifested their willingness to serve the Confederacy, all regardless of the neutral stand the people of the State had taken.

As evidence of this, the following letter appears:

“ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
“MONTGOMERY, April 13, 1861.

“CAPTAIN THOMAS H. TAYLOR,
“REGIMENT OF CAVALRY, MONTGOMERY, ALA.

“SIR:

“You will proceed to Louisville, Ky., via Memphis and Nashville, Tenn., and make examination for the establishment of recruiting rendezvous in each of those cities. You will do the same in respect to Frankfort, Lexington, Covington, or Newport, Ky., and such other places contiguous thereto as in your judgment may offer facilities for recruiting. You will report the result of your examination to this office. I am awaiting instructions for opening rendezvous.

“S. COOPER,
“Adjutant and Inspector-General.”

(*War Records*, Serial No. 110, p. 44.)

The following letter is in the same volume:

“ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL’S OFFICE,
“MONTGOMERY, April 23, 1861.

“FIRST LIEUTENANT GEORGE B. COSBY,
“FRANKFORT, KY.

“SIR:

“As soon as you shall have carried out the instructions of the Governor of Kentucky, or are able to conform to these instructions, you will report in person or by letter to Captain Thomas H. Taylor of the Army, who has been assigned to the duty of procuring men to be enlisted in the Army of the Confederate States, and from him you will receive orders and be governed accordingly. Captain Taylor will also supply you with funds. His address will be Frankfort, Ky., or you may hear of his being elsewhere.

“Very respectfully,

“Your obedient servant,

“S. COOPER,

“Adjutant and Inspector-General.”

(*Ib.*, p. 65.)

In the same volume, page 68, is a letter from St. George Croghan to Hon. L. P. Walker, Confederate Secretary of War. It was written from the Galt House, Louisville, Ky., April 24, 1861. It states that on his arrival at Louisville he found no difficulty in obtaining men for enlistment. “I had,” says he, “an interview with Governor Magoffin last night, and he gave me full permission to enlist as many men as I desired, although he has, in the last three days, discountenanced men leaving the State, owing to the anticipated necessity for their immediate service at home.”

This letter was endorsed “Referred to Adjutant-General suggestively. L. P. WALKER.”

It was again endorsed as follows:

“ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL’S OFFICE,
“April 30, 1861.

“Two officers (Lieutenant Hood and Lieutenant Bullock), both of Kentucky, have been assigned to recruiting duties at

Louisville under the superintendence of Captain T. H. Taylor, appointed from that State. It is believed this arrangement will suffice for the purpose suggested in this letter.

“S. COOPER,
“Adjutant and Inspector-General.”

In the same volume, page 43, is the following letter dated Louisville, April 12, 1861:

“HON. L. P. WALKER.
“DEAR SIR:

“Yours of the 9th by Mr. Hooper is at hand. I will write immediately to the Captains of different companies to be in readiness, and I doubt not we will be able to rendezvous here in a very few days, if ordered to do so. The companies are in different counties, some at considerable distance, but can easily be concentrated upon a given point in three days. It has been my intention to take them by boat to Memphis, which can be done at small cost, and from thence they can go to any designated point by railroad. . . .

“BLANTON DUNCAN.”

In the same volume, page 46, is another letter from the same writer to L. P. Walker, in which he says:

“My regiment will rendezvous here on Tuesday waiting orders from you, and all are eager to be ordered South at once.”

In the same volume, page 53, is the following letter:

“NEW ORLEANS, April 17, 1861.

“L. P. WALKER,

“I tender the Confederate government a regiment of Kentucky Volunteers, Blanton Duncan, Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding. At what point and when shall they be mustered into service? . . .

“THOS. O. MOORE,
“Governor of Louisiana.”

This was answered, same page:

“MONTGOMERY, April 17, 1861.

“GOVERNOR THOS. O. MOORE,

“BATON ROUGE, LA.

“The Kentucky regiment will be received if you tender them as part of the reserve which Louisiana has been asked to hold organized.

“L. P. WALKER.”

In the same volume, page 56, is a letter to L. P. Walker, dated April 19, 1861, advising him that Blanton Duncan “expects to send about 1500 men to the Governor of Louisiana next week.”

April 26, 1861, William Preston Johnston wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War from Louisville, mentioning the resignation of his father, General Albert Sidney Johnston, from the United States army. He says:

“I saw Governor Magoffin to-day, and he told me of his reply communicated to you by messenger. He is satisfied that any precipitate action on the part of our friends will react and damage us.”

He also says:

“Our military organizations are being perfected, but we are badly armed, and I regret to say that other companies are being enrolled hostile to the South, and I fear equipped with Federal gold. The Governor, however, is trying to entrust our State arms only with the loyal men. The sentiment of the Southern States Rights men is opposed to taking action until Kentucky is armed and organized.” (*War Records*, Serial No. 110, p. 71.)

The United States authorities did not establish recruiting stations in Kentucky as early as April, 1861, nor did any Federal troops march out of Kentucky with colors gayly floating to the breeze, amidst the plaudits of Kentucky Unionists. And yet Kentucky was in the Union, never went out of it, and her people were overwhelmingly loyal to the Union.

If such things had happened, we may be sure a great

cry would have gone up from the Governor and all who were in sympathy with the Confederacy, that neutrality was violated.

Whatever may be said about the episode of the "Lincoln guns," it must be remembered that their introduction was antedated by the conduct of the Confederate authorities at the Southern capital, and by their confederates in Kentucky, as shown in the dispatches quoted.

At a later date President Lincoln undertook to give much-needed aid to the Kentucky Unionists, by authorizing General William Nelson to establish a camp in Kentucky. This authority was given in July, but nothing appears to have been done until after the August election, which occurred August 5th. At that election the Union cause was so overwhelmingly triumphant, and the urgency of the Kentucky Unionists to organize was so great, that General Nelson established the camp, which soon became celebrated, known as Camp Dick Robinson. This called for a protest from Governor Magoffin. There was nothing to be done about companies being recruited in the State for the Confederacy. There was nothing but comfort in the fact that the State Guard was organized, armed, and equipped, and, as said by the historian, Z. F. Smith, was "in sympathy with the cause of the South." The Home Guards had no arms, or, at least, but few. In addition to these facts it may be noted that all along the border of Tennessee, in some places up to, and even over, the State line, and in all the mountain passes, including Cumberland Gap, were organized Confederate troops.¹ Besides this, there were recruiting camps actually established in the State, one near Elizabethtown, and one near Glasgow, and one in Owen County within thirty miles of Frankfort. Yet when the Union men of Kentucky cast their magnificent vote

¹ See Appendix, § 12, p. 347.

of August 5th, and then began to organize themselves for self-protection against reasonably apprehended invasion and violence, the protest came from the Governor. He addressed his letter to President Lincoln, requesting the removal, disbanding, and breaking up of the camp at Dick Robinson. He also duly advised President Davis of what he had done. In his letter to the President of the Confederacy he said:

“ Since the commencement of the present unhappy difficulties yet pending in the country, the people of Kentucky had indicated a steadfast purpose to maintain a position of strict neutrality between the belligerent parties. . . . Recently a military force has been enlisted and quartered by the United States authorities in this State. I have on this day addressed a communication and dispatched commissioners to the President of the United States, urging the removal of these troops.”

He adds:

“ Although I have no reason to presume that the government of the Confederate States contemplate or have even purposed any violation of the neutral attitude thus assumed by Kentucky, there seems to be some uneasiness felt among the people of some portions of the State, occasioned by the collection of bodies of troops along the southern frontier.” (*War Records*, Series 1, vol. 4, p. 378.)

On the 28th of August Mr. Davis replied to the effect that the troops along the frontier “ had no other object than to repel the lawless invasion of that State [Tennessee] by the forces of the United States.” He adds that the Confederacy will respect Kentucky’s neutrality “ as long as her people will maintain it themselves. But neutrality, to be entitled to respect, must be strictly maintained by both parties” (*Ib.*, 396).

President Lincoln sent the following reply to Governor Magoffin’s letter to him:

“ I may not possess full and precisely accurate knowledge

upon this subject, but I believe it is true that there is a military camp within Kentucky, acting by authority of the United States, which force is not very large and which is not now being augmented. I also believe that some arms have been furnished to this force by the United States. I also believe that this force consists exclusively of Kentuckians having their camp in the immediate vicinity of their own homes, and not assaulting or menacing any of the good people of Kentucky.

“In all I have done in the premises I have acted upon the urgent solicitation of what I believed and still believe to be the wish of a majority of all the Union-loving people of Kentucky.

“While I have conversed on this subject with many eminent men of Kentucky, including a large majority of her members of Congress, I do not remember that any one of them, or any other person except Your Excellency, and the bearers of Your Excellency’s letter, has urged me to remove the military force from Kentucky or to disband it.

“One other very worthy citizen of Kentucky did solicit me to have the augmenting of the force suspended for a time.

“Taking all the means within my reach to form a judgment, I do not believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky that this force shall be removed beyond her limits, and with this impression, I must respectfully decline to remove it.

I most cordially sympathize with Your Excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native State, Kentucky. It is with regret that I search and cannot find in your not very short letter, any declaration or intimation that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union.”

Shaler, who does not always resolve mooted points in favor of the Union side, says:

“It is claimed by many Confederate sympathizers that the violation of the State’s neutrality came first from the Federal authorities. They cite the recruiting at Camp Dick Robinson as evidence in proof of their assertion. It is hardly worth while to debate this question of precedence when the action of both sides was so nearly simultaneous, and only accom-

plished the inevitable overthrow of the neutrality of the Commonwealth. Still, after a careful review of all the records, the writer has been driven to the conclusion that the actual infringement of the neutrality proclamation was due to the action of Polk and Zollicoffer, and that the simultaneous invasion of the State at points some hundreds of miles apart shows that the rupture of Kentucky neutrality was deliberately planned by the Confederate authorities." (P. 251.)

Shaler takes no note of the action of the Confederate authorities toward Kentucky as disclosed by the correspondence here quoted, in the month of April. It is true the neutrality proclamation was not issued until May 20th, but that did not strengthen or affect in any way the neutrality stand. It was only the personal act of the Governor done at the request, as he says, of good citizens, and also done to protect his own personal good name. Such neutrality as then was in Kentucky was purely a popular stand. It began in January, 1861, and was crystallized in the resolution offered by R. T. Jacob in the Lower House of the Legislature, January 29th, but neither that resolution nor any other, mentioning neutrality by name, was ever adopted by the Legislature.

Therefore, neutrality was as well violated in April as in July or August, and if the invasion by General Polk, September 3d, was not the first actual violation, then the first can only be found by going back to the events and correspondence of the month of April.

The entrance of Polk, September 3d, 1861, produced deep and intense feeling. That movement was certainly in violation of all thoughts of neutrality. The Legislature which was in session passed resolutions that the invaders must be expelled, and that the Governor call out the military force of the State therefor, to be placed under command of General Thomas L. Crittenden. These were vetoed by the Governor, but passed over the veto, and the proclamation was issued.

At this crisis the adherents of each side began rapidly to take position. Here will be noted a feature of the movement, and of the accounts given of it. It will appear in another chapter that an instantaneous rally of the Unionists of Kentucky into regiments took place, so that in that autumn nearly forty Union regiments were filled and in the field. It is of much interest, therefore, to know what number of Kentuckians at this time entered the Confederate service. Confederate General George B. Hodge, writing in Collins's *History of Kentucky*, says:

“The more active partisans of each cause immediately began to take decisive positions. The regiment of State Guards commanded by Colonel Roger W. Hanson at once repaired to Camp Boone, in Northern Tennessee, and upon that as a nucleus gathered companies and battalions of the same force, forming themselves into the organizations known during the war as the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Kentucky Regiments. They were soon joined by the battalions commanded by Lloyd Tilghman and a force commanded by Colonel Wm. D. Lannon, late a member of the Lower House of Assembly. Simon B. Buckner, the commander of the State Guard, repaired to their camp, was commissioned by the Confederate States Brigadier-General, and took command of them.” (Collins, 1, 342.)

This is all the historian has upon the subject. What he says would not lead any one to calculate that more than five or six or seven thousand men were included. If anything like equal numbers had gone elsewhere it is natural to suppose Hodge would have made mention of the fact. That he does not, indicates that those who did go to other points were so comparatively few as not to excite the historian's attention.

This view is sustained by the statement of the historian Z. F. Smith, whose *History of Kentucky* was published in 1886. He says:

“The State Guards moved out almost bodily with the State arms retained, following their commander, General

Simon B. Buckner. The roads were thronged with the hurrying volunteers, eager to join their fortunes with their Southern kinsmen, and in a few months it is estimated that well-nigh ten thousand Kentuckians had gone to the Confederacy." (P. 614.)

A confirmation of Smith's estimate is found in the official records of the war. In February, 1862, the Confederate Adjutant and Inspector-General made a report giving a "statement of troops in the service of the Confederate States." In this tabulated statement, at that date, February, 1862, the number set down as furnished by Kentucky is a little less than 8000, the exact number being 7950. (*War Records*, Serial No. 127, p. 962.)

Therefore, at the first we have less than ten thousand Confederate troops from Kentucky. To this number was afterwards added all who went throughout the war; all who joined Morgan on his trips into Kentucky; all who joined Bragg when he invaded the State; and who in any way gave their services to the Confederacy. As to what this total number was, the following from Colonel Ed. Porter Thompson's *History of the Orphan Brigade* is valuable. Colonel Thompson was an ex-Confederate officer who lived at the capital of the State, and published his history in 1898. He says:

"It is estimated that the maximum [Confederate soldiers from Kentucky] could not have exceeded forty thousand."

But adds,

"Rosters and rolls made at various times during the war, and now on file in the War Office at Washington, indicate that twenty-five thousand is nearer the correct number."

What has been said causes some of Shaler's statements on the subject to appear so extraordinary it is difficult to understand them.

Speaking of the time, September and October, 1861, he says: "There was at this time a common notion that the emigration of some forty thousand of the natural leaders and fighting men of the State had left it with little material that could be made into good soldiers" (p. 268).

Again, speaking of the time, February, 1862, he uses this language: "The depletion of the population from the going South of a force that may be estimated at thirty-five thousand" (p. 282).

At a later date, January, 1865, he speaks of "forty thousand men of military age out of the State in the military service of the Confederacy." Here he makes forty thousand the whole number from first to last. (P. 337.)

There is no consistency in such figures, and furthermore no foundation for them.

The truth seems to be that upon the break-up of neutrality in September, 1861, there was an instantaneous movement on both sides. The Kentuckians who rushed off to the support of the Confederacy must have been under eight thousand. The Kentuckians who rallied to the flag of the Union rapidly filled up between thirty and forty regiments, and if we include the Home Guard companies, more men entered the Union service at that time than went into the Confederate service throughout the entire struggle.

CHAPTER X

THE RALLY

GREAT injustice has been done to the Unionists of Kentucky by the use in historical writing of hasty and unguarded expressions made in time of excitement by prominent persons who were in error at the time. It is of no consequence by whom a statement is made, or by whom an opinion is given, if, upon investigation, it can be shown that the statement or opinion is clearly wrong. From the beginning of the war all through its course, and through all the years since, there has been more or less misunderstanding of Kentucky's true attitude in the war. It was this known and felt misapprehension that led General Lindsey in the preface to the Adjutant-General's Report to use the language: "It has been fashionable with some to reflect upon the loyalty of our State." The movements of the war period were so rapid and vast no one took time to remove erroneous impressions which may have started accidentally or through thoughtlessness, and as no history of Kentucky has been written which might correct errors, they have been suffered to remain uncontradicted, although they were in fact contradicted at the time by the events then taking place.

A communication from Adjutant-General L. Thomas to the War Department, October 21, 1861, contains the following remarkable statement.

"Left Indianapolis October 16 for Louisville, Ky., where we arrived 12:30 o'clock P. M., and had an interview with General Sherman, commanding the Department of the Cum-

berland. He gave a gloomy picture of affairs in Kentucky, stating that the young men were generally secessionists and had joined the Confederates, while the Union men, the aged and conservatives, would not enroll themselves to engage in conflict with their relations on the other side. But few regiments could be raised." (*War Records*, series 1, vol. 4, p. 313.)

On the 10th of October, 1861, General Sherman himself, in a letter to President Lincoln, said: "The Kentuckians, instead of assisting, call from every quarter for protection against local secessionists." (*War Records*, series 1, vol. 4, p. 300.)

General McCook also said in a letter to General Sherman, dated November 8, 1861: "I have no faith in Kentucky's loyalty."

These expressions have been quoted in historical works, and have aided in giving an erroneous and unjust idea of the true condition of affairs in Kentucky at that time. The officers named are of high authority, and they were so situated that they ought to have known the true state of the case. But even the most astute men may fall into error, and if the error can be shown conclusively it can only be said that a mistake was made, even if made by such distinguished men.

The injustice done gives reason for a distinct and definite statement of the attitude of Kentucky at that time toward the war. It has been shown how the Kentucky people voted in August, 1861, and previously. A majority of nearly sixty thousand for the Union ought to give assurance of their loyalty, in so far as expression at the polls can give it. But action is better than words, and if it can be shown that the Kentucky people actually enlisted in the war to fight as they voted, that surely ought to be a satisfactory answer to every possible question.

General Sherman is reported as saying the young men of Kentucky were generally secessionists, and the others

would not enroll themselves in the conflict. Also, that few regiments could be raised in Kentucky.

Now, at that time, October and November, 1861, it is a remarkable fact that *more young men had enlisted in Union regiments in Kentucky than went into the Confederate service all told, throughout the whole period of the war.* In a letter to the present writer, dated January 18, 1897, while the *History of the Union Regiments of Kentucky* was in course of preparation, Colonel L. H. Rousseau used the following language:

“I am glad to know you are engaged upon a history of the Kentucky regiments. *They sprang to the country's defence promptly* and made a fine record. No proper account of them has ever been made.”

Also, Justice John M. Harlan in a letter at the same time, said:

“The country at large has never properly understood what was accomplished by the Union men of the border States.”

In the year 1866 the Adjutant-General of Kentucky, General D. W. Lindsey, published his report in two large volumes, giving the names and dates of enrolment of all the Kentucky soldiers in the Union service. Those volumes are an enduring monument to the fact that the loyal Kentuckians “sprang to their country's defence.” Upon their pages it is set forth in perpetual remembrance that in the summer and fall of 1861 twenty-eight full regiments of infantry and six full regiments of cavalry were enlisted and put in the field.

In his report the Adjutant-General says:

“Under circumstances far more trying than those surrounding any other States in the Union, Kentucky promptly responded to the quotas assigned her.”

The rosters in his work show that a large proportion of the men who enlisted in the summer and fall of 1861 enlisted in the months of August, September, and

October. Two months after October, the Adjutant-General made a report showing the organization of the twenty-eight infantry regiments with 24,026 men, six regiments of cavalry, 4979 men, and two batteries of 198 men; in all, 29,203. Besides these there were numerous companies of Home Guards.

Every one of those regiments had a proud record. Many of them were in active service before they were mustered into the service. Some went with General Sherman from Louisville to Muldraugh's Hill to resist the advance of General S. B. Buckner in September, 1861. Some fought at Barbourville, and some at Green River; some at Albany and some at London, in the same month. In October, others were engaged at Upton Hill, Camp Wild Cat, West Liberty, Cave City, Woodbury, Morgantown, and Rochester; in November, at Ivy Mountain, Brownsville, Somerset; in December, at Bacon Creek, Rowletts, Sacramento; in January, 1862, at Paintsville, Middle Creek, Mill Spring, and Pound Gap.

The regiments which thus sprung to the defence of the country were organized, to a large extent, in the field. It has been well said of them, "In many instances their camp guards while in process of formation were the out-posts of the army."

When respect for neutrality prevented organization in Kentucky, Camp Joe Holt was established opposite Louisville, on the Indiana side, and Camp Clay near Cincinnati. In the former Lovell H. Rousseau assembled the men which largely made up the Fifth Infantry and Second Cavalry, also Battery A. Rousseau was the first Colonel of the Fifth Infantry, but soon became Major-General, and the regiment was led by Colonels H. M. Buckley and William W. Berry, until the close of the war. The Second Kentucky Cavalry was led by Colonels Buckner Board and Thomas P. Nicholas, and Lieutenant-Colonels Thos. B. Cochran, Elijah S. Watts, W. H.

Eifort, and Owen Starr, Colonel Nicholas being the son of the eminent jurist, S. S. Nicholas, and Colonel Cochran afterwards was Chancellor of the Louisville Chancery Court.

At Camp Clay the First Kentucky Infantry was organized by Colonel J. V. Guthrie, and the Second Infantry by Colonel W. E. Woodruff. These two regiments were in West Virginia as early as July, 1861, fighting under Generals McClellan, Rosecrans, and J. D. Cox, where they remained until February, 1862, when they joined the Army of the Cumberland and fought at Shiloh. They served in all the campaigns of the Army of the Cumberland. The First was for a long time led by Colonel David A. Enyart, and the Second by Colonel Thomas D. Sedgwick.

The first steps toward regimental organization in the State were taken in Garrard County. General Nelson arrived there in July and appointed Frank Wolford, W. J. Landrum, Judge Thomas E. Bramlette, Speed S. Fry, and T. T. Garrard to raise regiments. Wolford became Colonel of the First Cavalry, with which was also Colonel Silas Adams. Bramlette raised the Third Infantry, with which served Colonels W. T. Scott, McKee, Spencer, Dunlap, Lieutenant-Colonels D. R. Collier, William A. Bullitt, and Majors Charles H. Buford and John Brennan.

Fry raised the Fourth Infantry. He being promoted, the regiment was led by Colonels John T. Croxton (afterwards Brigadier- and Brevet Major-General) and R. M. Kelly; Lieutenant-Colonels Burgess Hunt, J. H. Tompkins; Major J. W. Jacobs, now Brigadier-General, U. S. A., retired.

Garrard raised the Seventh Infantry. Being promoted, the regiment was led by Colonel Reuben May and Lieutenant-Colonels J. D. Ridgell, John Lucas, T. J. Daniel; Majors I. N. Cardwell, H. W. Adams, and E. B. Treadway.

Also, at Camp Dick Robinson, Colonel William A. Hoskins began the organization of the Twelfth Infantry, which, under his leadership, and that of Colonel L. H. Rousseau, served in all the campaigns of the West, and ended its long career in North Carolina in June, 1865. With it were Lieutenant-Colonel Montgomery Howard; Majors W. M. Worsham, J. M. Owens; Adjutants J. M. Hall, J. F. McKee, E. F. Hays, Thomas Speed.

The Kentucky regiments naturally formed wherever they were most needed. We have seen how they began at Camp Dick Robinson, which, though in the central part of the State, was near the dividing line between the fine fertile blue-grass section and the rougher mountain region. So, also, for the protection of the easterly part of the State a number of regiments organized: the Eighth Infantry, under Colonels Sidney M. Barnes and Reuben May, in Estill and the adjoining counties; the Fourteenth Infantry, raised by Colonel Laban T. Moore, at Louisa and the adjoining country. Associated with him were Colonels John C. Cochran, George W. Gallup; Lieutenant-Colonels J. R. Brown, Orlando Brown, R. M. Thomas; Majors William B. Burke, Drury J. Burchett.

The Sixteenth Infantry by Colonel Charles A. Marshall, in the Maysville section of the State. With this regiment were also Colonels J. W. Craddock and J. W. Gault; Lieutenant-Colonels Joseph Doniphan, J. B. Harris, Thomas E. Burns, John S. White; and Major J. P. Harbeson.

The Twenty-fourth Infantry, raised by Colonels Lewis B. Grigsby and John S. Hurt, in Montgomery and adjoining counties; Lieutenant-Colonel Lafayette North; Major William H. Smith.

In the central and south central portions of the State a number of regiments were raised. The Sixth Cavalry, Colonel D. J. Hallisy, afterwards Colonel Louis D. Watkins. Lieutenant-Colonels Reuben Mundy, W. P.

Roper; Majors Lewis A. Gratz, William H. Fidler, W. H. Stafford; Adjutants Hugh B. Kelly, James R. Meagher.

The Ninth Infantry, Colonels B. C. Grider, George H. Cram; Lieutenant-Colonels Allen J. Roark, John H. Grider, C. D. Bailey; Majors William J. Henson, William Starling.

The Tenth Infantry, Colonels John M. Harlan, William H. Hays; Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Wharton; Major Henry G. Davidson; Adjutant W. J. Lisle; Quartermaster Samuel Matlack.

The Thirteenth Infantry, Colonel Edward H. Hobson, who, being promoted, was succeeded by Colonel William E. Hobson; Lieutenant-Colonels John B. Carlisle, Benjamin P. Estes; Majors John P. Duncan, J. R. Hindman.

The Fifteenth Infantry, Colonels Curran Pope, James B. Forman, Marion C. Taylor; Lieutenant-Colonels George P. Jouett, J. R. Snider, Noah Cartright, W. G. Halpin; Majors William P. Campbell, H. S. Kalfus, James S. Allen, A. H. Chambers; Adjutants William P. McDowell, David N. Sharp.

The Eighteenth Infantry, Colonel William A. Warner; Lieutenant-Colonels John J. Landrum, H. K. Milward.

The Nineteenth Infantry, Colonel W. J. Landrum; Lieutenant-Colonel John Cowan.

The Twentieth Infantry, Colonel Sanders Bruce; Lieutenant-Colonels Charles S. Hanson, brother of General Roger Hanson of the Confederate service, Thomas B. Waller; Majors Benjamin F. Buckner, Frank E. Walcott.

The Twenty-first Infantry, Colonels Ethelbert L. Dudley, S. W. Price; Lieutenant-Colonels B. A. Wheat, James C. Evans, W. R. Milward.

The Twenty-second Infantry, Colonels Daniel W. Lindsey, George W. Monroe; Lieutenant-Colonel William J. Worthington.

The Twenty-third Infantry, Colonel Marc Mundy; Lieutenant-Colonels John P. Jackson, James C. Fay, George W. Northrup; Adjutants W. H. Mundy, J. P. Duke.

The Twenty-seventh Infantry, Colonel Charles D. Pennebaker; Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Ward; Majors John Carlisle, S. J. Coyne, Alex Magruder; Adjutants D. B. Waggener, James B. Speed; Quartermaster Thomas R. McBeath.

The Twenty-eighth Infantry, Colonels William P. Boone, J. Rowan Boone; Majors A. Y. Johnson, John Gault, George W. Barth.

The Thirty-fourth Infantry was organized at Louisville by Colonel Henry Dent. It was afterwards led by Colonels Selby Harney, William Y. Dillard, and Joseph B. Watkins.

The Fourth Cavalry, Colonel Jesse Bayles, was organized near Louisville in September. With this regiment were also Colonels Green Clay Smith and Wickliffe Cooper; Lieutenant-Colonels L. Gwynne, J. Ruckstuhl; Adjutants M. C. Bayles, George K. Speed.

The Fifth Cavalry was raised in the south central section of the State by Colonel D. R. Haggard. On the 31st of October, 1861, General Sherman, in a report, said: "Colonel Haggard is at Columbia with a regiment." Connected with this regiment were Colonel (afterwards General) W. P. Sanders, who fell at Knoxville, Colonel Oliver L. Baldwin; Lieutenant-Colonels Isaac Scott, W. T. Hoblitzell; Majors W. H. Owsley, T. C. Winfrey, J. Q. Owsley, C. T. Cheek, James L. Wharton; Surgeon William Forrester.

In the westerly part of the State the Seventeenth Infantry was raised by Colonel John H. McHenry, and later it was led by Colonel A. M. Stout. With it were Lieutenant-Colonels Robert Vaughn and Ion B. Nall.

The Twenty-fifth Infantry was raised by Colonel (after-

wards General) James M. Shackelford and Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin H. Bristow. With it were many well-known men: Majors William B. Wall, Isaac Calhoun, D. M. Claggett; Adjutants John P. Ritter, Ed. L. Starling; Quartermaster B. T. Perkins; Captains Sam K. Cox, Frank E. Bristow, and T. W. Campbell; also, Lieutenants Campbell H. Johnson and Walter Evans, now Judge of the United States District Court, Western District of Kentucky. These two regiments were in camp at Calhoun, on Green River, about twenty-five miles south of Owensboro. From thence they went to Fort Donelson and fought there in Grant's army, and from thence to Shiloh. After that they were consolidated.

The camp at Calhoun was commanded by General Thomas L. Crittenden. The Eleventh Infantry was there—Colonel Pierce B. Hawkins, who was succeeded by Colonel S. P. Love. The Lieutenant-Colonel was E. L. Mottley; Majors, W. M. Houchin, E. F. Kinnaird.

There also was the Twenty-sixth Infantry, Colonel S. G. Burbridge, who, being promoted, was succeeded by Cicero Maxwell, and he by Thomas B. Fairleigh. Lieutenant-Colonel, James F. Lauck; Majors, John L. Davidson, J. L. Frost, Ignatius Mattingly, C. J. Wilson, F. M. Page; Adjutants, A. J. Wells, James P. Dawson, Richard Vance; Quartermaster, John H. Morton; Surgeon, E. O. Brown; Chaplain, William M. Grubbs. Among the Captains were Gabriel Netter, J. H. Ashcraft, and Albert N. Keigwin.

The Third Cavalry was also at Calhoun. It was raised by Colonel James S. Jackson, who, being promoted, was succeeded by E. H. Murray, who also became a General. The Lieutenant-Colonels were, from first to last, A. C. Gillam, James Holmes, Robert H. King, Green Clay Smith, W. S. Megowan, A. C. Shacklett, Lewis W. Wolfley, George F. White, John W. Breathitt.

To the camp at Calhoun many men came through the

Confederate lines in the fall of 1861, from the southern part of the State. Among them were fragments of a regiment raised near Hopkinsville, in sound of the guns at Camp Boone over the Tennessee line during the summer, by Colonel James F. Buckner, a lawyer and large land and slave owner, who maintained his men in camp for weeks at his own expense, hauling provisions from his farm. He had obtained enough guns to arm one company only. The Confederates coming into the State caused his men to leave for the camp at Calhoun. They were overtaken by Forrest and scattered. The men found their way to Calhoun, but Colonel Buckner was captured and for a long time held a prisoner in the South.

Greensburg, on the upper waters of Green River, was a point in some respects similar to Calhoun. There the volunteers concentrated to fill up the regiments, organizing under the direction of Generals W. T. Ward and E. H. Hobson, Colonels John H. Ward, W. E. Hobson, and other officers.

A camp of instruction was established at Bardstown. Lebanon was also a point of rendezvous.

In this way the forming regiments were kept well out in the State, and it can be easily seen how their camp guards were the outposts of the Federal forces in Kentucky in the fall of 1861. It is not intended to make any detailed mention of these splendid regiments and their resolute and courageous leaders, but only to show, by a brief summary, that at the time the doubt was expressed about forming Union regiments in Kentucky many of these were already filled, and the others were filling so rapidly that in the month following all were completely organized and in the field on active duty.

It is not strange that men who were not fully advised, although in high position, did not grasp the fact that the Kentuckians were crowding into regimental organizations under the most trying circumstances. In the midst of

pressing duties, General Sherman and Adjutant-General Thomas fell into an error as to the real situation in Kentucky in October, 1861, and under the circumstances they ought to be held excusable, especially as they certainly did not intend to do injustice.

But for historians to bring forward such unguarded utterances and adduce them to sustain the unwarranted assumption that there was but little military enthusiasm, as far as enlistments were concerned, and little patriotic ardor which led to volunteering, is without excuse in the face of the record facts of the period. (*Memorial History of Louisville*, p. 197.)

Even the historian Shaler, who finds space to detail what he calls the hegira of Kentucky people south in the summer and fall of 1861, and swells the number to 40,000 at that time, yet does the faint justice to say, in a few words, that out of what was left, Kentucky's quota of Union troops was always full. He correctly stated that the quota of Union troops was promptly raised, and he might have added, more troops were raised than required by the quota, but the accompanying statement that 40,000 Confederates had gone from the State is an error. Not that many went during the entire war. The facts are more correctly stated in Smith's history (p. 614): "In a few months it is estimated that well-nigh *ten thousand* Kentuckians had gone to the Confederacy."

The rush of volunteers into the service in the summer and fall of 1861 filled up the regiments which served that year, and they continued in service through the war, being constantly recruited by fresh volunteers.

In the eventful year of 1862, the First and Second infantry, which had served in West Virginia in 1861, were brought back and united with Buell's army; the Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth were with Grant at Donelson; the Tenth, Twelfth, and Fourth Infantry and First Cavalry were at Mill Spring with General Thomas. After

these events Grant's army went up the Tennessee River to the battle-field of Shiloh, and thither General Buell's troops marched out of Kentucky, and from Nashville. At Shiloh fourteen Union Kentucky regiments were engaged. From Shiloh some marched down the Mississippi with Grant, while others marched with Buell through Northern Alabama and up through Tennessee and Kentucky to Louisville, and out to Perryville, where eight Kentucky regiments were engaged. Then the march was back to Tennessee, where thirteen were engaged at Murfreesboro. Nine participated in General Burnside's East Tennessee expedition in 1863. At the same time fifteen were with General Rosecrans and fought at Chickamauga. In the Atlanta campaign there were more than thirty.

During the summer of 1862, when all the central and eastern portions of Kentucky were overrun by Bragg's invasion, eight regiments of cavalry and three of infantry were raised. This is a striking fact and deserves particular mention. Bragg had come, as he stated, for the "redemption of Kentucky." The Confederate authorities had been persuaded that the people of Kentucky were Southern in sentiment, and great armies came in to give opportunity for a grand uprising to throw off the "Northern yoke." The great armies were fought by Kentucky troops, and retired from the State with not more than two thousand five hundred recruits, all told. In the same summer, eleven new Union regiments were filling up, and in the fall they were full. They were as follows:

In the central part of the State, the Seventh Cavalry under Colonels Leonidas Metcalfe and John Faulkner, Lieutenant-Colonels W. C. Oden, T. T. Vimont, W. W. Bradley, Majors Charles Milward, W. O. Smith, Robert Collier, A. S. Bloom, Adjutants John B. Campbell, F. G. McCrea, D. P. Watson.

In the western part of the State, the Eighth Cavalry

under Colonels James M. Shackelford and Benjamin H. Bristow, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Holloway, Majors J. M. Kennedy, J. W. Weatherford, S. M. Starling, Adjutant J. E. Huffman, Chaplain George F. Pentecost.

In the central part of the State the Ninth Cavalry, Colonel R. T. Jacob, Lieutenant-Colonel John Boyle, Majors J. T. Farris, W. C. Moreau, George W. Rue, J. R. Page, J. C. Brent, Adjutants U. W. Oldham, Frank H. Pope, Surgeon Dr. William Bailey.

In the easterly-middle part of the State, the Tenth Cavalry, Colonels Joshua Tevis, C. J. Walker, Lieutenant-Colonel R. R. Maltby, Majors J. L. Foley, William A. Doniphan, John Mason Brown, J. M. Taylor, A. T. Wood, Adjutants Ridgeley Wilson, J. N. Wallingford.

In the same part of the State, the Eleventh Cavalry, Colonel A. W. Holman, Lieutenant-Colonels W. E. Riley, A. J. Alexander, Milton Graham, Majors W. O. Boyle, Duvall English, Fred. Slater, Surgeon L. L. Pinkerton, Adjutants W. P. Pierce, Harry Gee.

In the middle-westerly part of the State, the Twelfth Cavalry, under Colonels Q. C. Shanks and Eugene W. Crittenden, Lieutenant-Colonels A. W. Holman, James T. Bramlette, Majors N. L. Lightfoot, W. R. Kinney, I. H. Stout, Julius L. Delfosse, J. B. Harrison, George F. Barnes, Adjutants G. J. Blewitt, Z. B. Freeman, William Noland, T. E. Tyler, Surgeons E. L. Brown, L. B. Littlepage.

In the easterly part of the State, the Fourteenth Cavalry under Colonel H. C. Lilly, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Herd, Majors J. W. Stivers, Alfred Smith, J. C. Eversole, R. T. Williams, Adjutants F. B. Tucker, John H. Massie, Thomas C. Reed.

In the westerly part of the State, the Fifteenth Cavalry under Colonel Gabriel Netter, Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Henry, Major Wiley Waller, Adjutant John W.

Lockhead, Quartermaster Thomas Alexander, Commissary P. H. Darby.

In the south-central part of the State, the Thirty-second Infantry under Colonel Thomas Z. Morrow, Major John A. Morrison, Adjutant William J. Hume.

In the middle part of the State, the Thirty-third Infantry under Colonel J. F. Lauck and Adjutant Dawson.

In the eastern part of the State, the Thirty-ninth Infantry under Colonels John Dills, David A. Mins, Lieutenant-Colonel S. M. Ferguson, Majors John B. Auxier, Martin Thornbury, Adjutants L. J. Hampton, J. F. Stewart, R. S. Huey.

All these were recruited in 1862.

Subsequent to that year, regiments were organized as follows:

In the southerly-middle part of the State, the Thirtieth Infantry under Colonels F. N. Alexander and William B. Craddock, Major Thomas Mahoney, Adjutant Thomas J. Hardin.

In the western part of the State, the Thirty-fifth Infantry under Colonel E. A. Starling, Lieutenant-Colonel E. R. Weir, Major Frank H. Bristow, Adjutant Thomas W. Wing, Quartermaster Finis H. Little.

In the central part of the State, the Thirty-seventh Infantry under Colonels Charles S. Hanson and Benjamin J. Spaulding, Major Sam Martin, Adjutant Caswell Watts, Quartermaster W. O. Watts, J. M. Mattingly, Surgeon J. R. Duncan.

In the northerly-middle part of the State, the Fortieth Infantry under Colonel Clinton J. True, Lieutenant-Colonel Matthew Mullins, Majors T. H. Mannen, F. H. Bierbower, Adjutants E. C. Barlow, J. B. True.

In the middle part of the State, the Forty-fifth Infantry under Colonels John Mason Brown, Lieutenant-Colonel

Lewis M. Clark, Majors N. A. Brown, J. C. Henderson, Adjutant James Seaton.

In the eastern part of the State, the Forty-seventh Infantry under Colonel Andrew H. Clark, Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Wilson, Major Thomas H. Barnes, Adjutant G. A. Hanaford.

In the westerly part of the State, the Forty-eighth Infantry under Colonel Hartwell T. Burge, Lieutenant-Colonel W. W. Hester, Major William H. Hoyt, Adjutants J. W. Lockhead, William Sheeler.

In the easterly part of the State, the Forty-ninth Infantry under Colonel John G. Eve, Lieutenant-Colonel P. Stratton, Major James H. Davidson, Adjutant James H. Tinsley.

In the westerly-middle part of the State, the Fifty-second Infantry under Colonels John H. Grider, Lieutenant-Colonel S. F. Johnson, Major John B. Tyler, and Adjutant William H. Murrell.

In the northerly-central part of the State, the Fifty-third Infantry under Colonel C. J. True, Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. Johnson, Major J. G. Francis, Adjutant F. D. Tunis.

In the central part of the State, the Fifty-fourth Infantry under Colonel H. M. Buckley, Lieutenant-Colonel John G. Rogers, Major John D. Russell, Adjutant Ed. Mitchell.

In the northerly-middle portion of the State, the Fifty-fifth Infantry under Colonel Weden O'Neal, Lieutenant-Colonel T. J. Williams, Major Silas Howe, Adjutants J. E. Calvert, R. C. Snead.

In the westerly part of the State, the Seventeenth Cavalry, under Colonel S. F. Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel T. W. Campbell, Majors John B. Tyler, N. C. Lawrence, T. J. Lovelace, Adjutant David R. Murray.

In addition to the regiments named were the Bat-

teries—the First Kentucky Battery, Captain Simmonds, organized in 1861; Battery A, or Stone's Battery, organized in 1861, at Louisville; Battery B, organized at Camp Dick Robinson, 1861; Battery C, organized by Captain John W. Neville, 1863; Battery E, organized by Captain John J. Hawes, 1863.

During all the years of the war, recruiting was constantly going on for the depleted ranks of the regiments in the field, and fragments of regiments were raised—companies and battalions which would be consolidated with other organizations. Throughout the war there was no time that Union men were not enlisting for the protection of the State as well as for the demands of the front.

According to the report of the Adjutant-General, Kentucky furnished over 75,000 white soldiers to the Union service, including the active state guards, who served under orders along with the regularly enlisted men in organized regiments, only they did not go out of the State.

When this number is compared with the actual number in the Confederate service, it will be seen that it is three times as many. From the war records it is difficult to discover how there could have been as many as 25,000 Confederates, all told, from Kentucky. Shaler at first stated that 40,000 went out at once, in the fall of 1861, which statement is manifestly absurd; Smith putting the number at 10,000. Afterwards Shaler mentions the whole number of Confederates as thirty or forty thousand. Ed. Porter Thompson, in the Introduction to his History of the "Orphan Brigade," estimates the total number to have been near 25,000. As the relative numbers can be understood from what is stated, and as the 75,000 Union soldiers served everywhere with credit, it is difficult to see why Shaler, or any other historian, should place the Confederates in some sort of halo of

glory superior to the Union troops from Kentucky. He reaches the conclusion from a consideration of Morgan's Cavalry, which he says never exceeded 4000 and was often less, and not Kentuckians wholly; and the First Confederate brigade, or "Orphan Brigade" which, perhaps, never numbered more than any average brigade. He dwells upon the valor of these two small commands, but is oblivious to the splendid contingent of Union troops from Kentucky, not thrown together as a body, but serving in all the commands as regiments and always mentioned in the reports with credit.

The general officers furnished by the State of Kentucky and under whom her troops largely served were as follows:

Maj.-Gen. Robert Anderson,	Brig.-Gen. Edward H. Hobson,
Maj.-Gen. William Nelson,	Brig.-Gen. James M. Shackelford,
Maj.-Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden,	Brig.-Gen. Green Clay Smith,
Maj.-Gen. William T. Ward,	Brig.-Gen. D. W. Lindsey,
Maj.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood,	Brig.-Gen. W. E. Woodruff,
Maj.-Gen. Cassius M. Clay,	Brig.-Gen. William P. Sanders,
Maj.-Gen. S. B. Burbridge,	Brig.-Gen. Eli Long,
Maj.-Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau,	Brig.-Gen. Louis D. Watkins,
Maj.-Gen. R. W. Johnson,	Brig.-Gen. T. T. Garrard,
Brevet Brig.-Gen. John T. Croxton, Brevet Major-General,	Brevet Brig.-Gen. S. W. Price,
Brig.-Gen. Walter C. Whittaker,	Brevet Brig.-Gen. Alex. M. Stout,
Brig.-Gen. Jerre T. Boyle,	Brevet Brig.-Gen. Wm. J. Landrum,
Brig.-Gen. Speed S. Fry,	Brevet Brig.-Gen. E. H. Murray,
Brig.-Gen. James S. Jackson,	Adj.-Gen. John W. Finnell.

The service of these officers was faithful and able and in many instances brilliant. They were patriots both to their State and country. The greater number led troops at the front and in the great battles. Others were mainly employed in protecting the State from ravage and rapine. No Kentuckians can be named to whom the people of the State owe a heavier debt of gratitude. Yet we scarcely find them even named in the histories of

Kentucky. Some are not mentioned, and those who are, are censured. Space is found to extol the services of Confederate officers from Kentucky and no blame is attached to any of them, but the devoted and resolute men who led the Union troops from Kentucky are treated as though they had been offenders.

CHAPTER XI

LOCATION OF UNION SENTIMENT

IT might occur to the casual observer that it would be natural to find the sentiment of Unionism in Kentucky principally along the northern border, and that it would be weaker in the central and southern parts. Therefore, as so little has been written to put the Kentucky Unionists in their true light before the country, it will be of interest to show in what parts of the State the Union sentiment prevailed. It has already been shown in the chapter on the voting of 1861 that only in the extreme west end was there a secession majority in June, 1861. The result was the same at the August election, 1861. The Union sentiment was neither confined to any narrow limits, nor excluded from any sections. Only in the Congressional district in the extreme west end was it less strong than secession, and even in that district there were 6225 Union voters as against 8988 Southern Rights voters at the Congressional election of June, 1861. All the other districts were Union by large majorities. That which was shown by voting was confirmed by the enlistment of the Union soldiers. The rally to the flag was from no special section, but from all parts of the State. The idea has been expressed that the strong support of the Union came from the mountain districts, where there were few slaveholders, and not from the slave-holding sections. Such an idea is emphatically wrong. It would not have been possible for the east end of the State to have

furnished anything like enough troops to fill the quota assigned to the State. The quotas were more than filled by enlistments in large numbers in all the districts, precisely as the Union sentiment was shown by the results of the elections.

The idea has also been expressed that the fertile and wealthy part of Kentucky known as the Blue Grass region furnished Confederate soldiers, while the Union soldiers were from the less favored sections. The historian Shaler is imbued with this idea. He says :

“The Confederacy received the youth and strength from the richest part of the Kentucky soil. The so-called Blue Grass soil sent the greater part of its men of the richer families into the Confederate army, while the Union troops, though from all parts of the State, came in greatest abundance from those who dwelt on thinner soils.”

He then adds that the Confederate troops were finer than the Union, being from the richer parts of the State. (P. 374.)

This assumption can be better understood when considered in connection with Shaler's extraordinary statements as to the numbers of the Confederate troops mentioned elsewhere in this work.

The Blue Grass region of Kentucky was Union in sentiment by a large majority, and furnished many more Union than Confederate soldiers. The division of sentiment is illustrated by the fact that in the chief city of the Blue Grass region, Lexington, there were three military companies before and at the time the war came on, and two of these adhered to the Union, while one went South.

It would have been singular if the Congressional district which voted more than 2500 Union majority in June, 1861, and in August, 1861, should have sent its fighting men to the Confederacy, nor did it, in fact. It

appears from the report of the Adjutant-General that twenty Union regiments were organized in that portion of the State usually denominated the Blue Grass. This would make about one fourth of all the Union troops furnished by the State. From the best information obtainable, it appears that from ten counties, all being "Blue Grass," there were enlisted 8500 Union soldiers, as follows: Jessamine, seven companies; Woodford, seven; Bourbon, ten; Fayette, eleven; Franklin, eight; Clark, nine; Scott, seven; Harrison, eight; Mercer, ten; Boyle, eight. There being one hundred and ten counties in the State, if the others responded equal to these, there would have been nearly 100,000 soldiers from the State. True, some counties were thinly populated, but, on the other hand, there were many more populous than these ten.

We may take ten other counties with a similar result: Montgomery, seven companies; Bath, eight; Mason, ten; Fleming, seven; Pendleton, seven; Madison, ten; Kenton, fourteen; Campbell, twelve; Bracken, six; Grant, six; making a total of eighty-six companies.

All the companies mentioned were in the regular military organizations. There were, besides, numerous Home Guard companies, which, as has been shown, served with the regular troops, and were as effective for service as any others.

There are no grounds for the statement that the Confederacy received its strength from the richest parts of Kentucky soil, and that the Union troops were from the thinner soils. Nor are there any grounds for saying the greater part of the men from the richer families went into the Confederate army. Such statements are nothing but assumption. The division of Kentucky troops was in no way unlike the division of sentiment shown by the voting. Every part of the State was Union in sentiment, except the extreme west end, and it was from all the other portions of the State where Union sentiment prevailed,

including the Blue Grass, that the main body of the Union troops came.

The Blue Grass section, which is the richest part of Kentucky, comprises, strictly speaking, nearly twenty counties, of which Fayette, with its capital Lexington, is about the centre. In these counties the predominance of Union sentiment was shown in the Congressional election of June, 1861, and in the August election of 1861, and in this general section of the State, it is shown by examination of the Adjutant-General's report that as many Union volunteers enlisted as went to the Confederacy, all told, from the entire State. Lexington, Frankfort, and Covington were Union cities; also such towns as Danville, Paris, Versailles, Nicholasville, Georgetown, Richmond. Many of the most distinguished Union leaders were from these places—the Crittendens, Breckinridges, Marshalls, Robinsons, Goodloes, Smiths, Clays, Buckners, Harlans, Lindseys, Bell, Fry, Dudley, Huston, Davis, Combs, Burnams, Kinkeads, Williams, Prall, Temple, Dunlap, and many others. The division of sentiment was no more marked in the Blue Grass than anywhere else.

Nothing is more familiar to Kentuckians than the division of families, and this division was in like proportion with the division shown by the voting.

The following statement furnished by Colonel R. M. Kelly, who was Colonel of the Fourth Kentucky Infantry, and a well-known citizen of Louisville, illustrates the division of families. He says:

“ My father, who was cashier and manager of the branch of the Northern Bank of Kentucky at Paris, Bourbon County, lived on a place of some fifteen acres. On the east and adjoining was the place of his step-brother, Charles Brent, and on the west was another step-brother, Hugh Brent. Both the Brents were men of means and leading citizens. On the other side of the town resided Garrett Davis, my uncle by marriage, who had two sons, my cousins. I and four of my

brothers went into the Union army; Hugh Brent, son of Charles, was a captain of a Home Guard company, in which was my brother-in-law. His two next sons went into the Union army. The three sons of Hugh Brent went into the Rebel army. Garrett Davis's oldest son went to the Kentucky Legislature as a Union representative from Bourbon. One of my cousins went into the Rebel army and one into the Union army."

He further says:

"John S. Williams (who became a Confederate general) was living in Illinois when the war came on. His older brother Richard was living in Texas. Their father, General Sam Williams, two of whose brothers married sisters of my mother, was a strong Union man. His third son, Clay, went into the Union army. John S. went into the Rebel army. His brother Richard made his way under difficulties, from Texas, and entered the Union service. Two sons of an uncle of John S. Williams were officers in my regiment. His other son was a strong Unionist, as was the father, and as was the other brother who married my aunt."

He further says:

"When my regiment, the 4th Kentucky Infantry, was before Mission Ridge, it was in full view of the 4th Kentucky Rebel Infantry, in which were two brothers of two men of my regiment. This sort of division was common."

This division was so common it is well understood by all intelligent people in Kentucky. The Breckinridge family was divided; also, the Marshalls, the Buckners, the Bufords, the Crittendens, the Clays, the Hansons, and many others. Where there was no division, it was because all were Union, and the divisions generally were in the same proportion as that of the sentiment of the State.

The city of Louisville was the metropolis of the State. In the war time its population was 60,000. At that time the railroad had not superseded the river as a means

of transportation, and the southern trade was largely carried on by steamboat. Along the turnpike roads which led to Louisville the produce of the country was hauled in wagons or driven on foot, and the outlet of trade was down the river. Business connections with the South centred in Louisville. Its citizens were slaveholders, and long intercourse with the Southern country had established many social ties and relations. But Louisville was a Union stronghold. It is surprising, when the facts are considered, with what almost unanimity this Southern city adhered to the Union and repudiated secession. The sentiment of her people was shown both by voting and by the enlistment of soldiers.

On the 6th day of May, 1861, an election took place for mayor. Two candidates were in the field—John M. Delph, the Union candidate, and — Devan, the Southern Rights candidate. The only issue was union or secession. The total vote cast in the city was 6393. Of these Delph received 4822, and Devan 1571.

The August election in Kentucky took place two weeks after the battle of Bull Run. The war was fully inaugurated at that time, but there were no soldiers in Kentucky. Therefore it cannot be said that elections were interfered with by the military authorities. The election in August was as fair and free as the one in May, or any other ever held in the State in any year prior to the war or since.

It has been already shown that at this election the Union candidates were elected all over the State, and the total majority in the State was nearly 60,000. This enormous majority can not be fully appreciated without recalling that the total vote of the State was less than 150,000, as shown by the vote for President in 1860. At this August election of 1861 the voting in the city of Louisville is shown by the following table:

For James Speed, Union candidate for State Senate ..	4788
For his opponent, Jefferson Brown.....	605
For A. B. Semple, Union candidate for State Senate..	4615
For his opponent, Gamble.....	902
For the lower House, Beeman, Union	2141
His opponent, Brinly.....	63
Nat Wolfe, Union.....	1680
His opponent, James Rudd.....	321
W. P. Boone, Union	1990
His opponent, Joyce.....	351
Joshua Tevis, Union	958
His opponent, Johnston.....	305

There is but one conclusion: the city of Louisville was overwhelmingly for the Union. The people of all classes, wealthy, influential, business and professional, and laboring men, seemed to be animated by the same spirit, that of devotion to the Union. Under no other circumstances could there possibly have been such a showing at the polls.

The sentiment of the people was manifested in many ways. Both boards of the City Council were almost unanimously Union. This was shown in April, 1861, when a resolution was offered to the effect that the true position of Kentucky was with the South, which resolution received but two votes. In the same month \$50,000 was appropriated for the defence of the city. In May the mayor reported the names of eighteen companies which had been organized for the city's defence. These companies were formed in April and May, and it will be seen that they did actual and effective service in resisting the advance of Confederate forces in the ensuing fall.

The organization of these companies was materially aided by an association, purely spontaneous, among the citizens, known as the "Union Club." This association was born of the necessities of the hour, and was extremely useful in acquainting the Union men with each other, and

in steady public sentiment. At first, men were uncertain how others stood. There was much angry and defiant talk, and the organization of the Knights of the Golden Circle emboldened the secessionists. The "Union Club" then naturally came into existence. The beginning was small, but it rapidly grew until more than 6000 were enrolled. The questions asked of those who were recommended for membership were very significant:

Are you opposed to secession or disunion?

Do you acknowledge your highest allegiance is due to the United States?

Do you pledge yourself to resist all attempts to overthrow the government of the United States?

Do you pledge your aid and sympathy in suppressing the present rebellion?

An oath was then taken to defend the government of the United States.

The initiated were then admonished to do all in their power to maintain the Union, enjoining them to remember the words of our own immortal Clay:

"If Kentucky to-morrow unfurls the banner of resistance I will never fight under that banner. I owe a paramount allegiance to the whole Union,—a subordinate one to my own State."¹

The military companies which were formed were regularly organized as the Louisville Home Guard. The first commander was Lovell H. Rousseau. He resigned on the 10th of July in order to organize troops at Camp Joe Holt, across the river. His successor was James Speed, afterwards United States Attorney-General in Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet. He served until September 2d, when he took his seat in the State Senate. He was succeeded by Hon. Hamilton Pope. From the beginning, the Major of the organization was John W. Barr, late United States Judge, Kentucky District, who also acted

¹ See Appendix, § 13, p. 348.

as Adjutant. The active service of this body of men was soon required. On the 17th of September the Confederates who had come into the State made their way up the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and Louisville was threatened. Major Anderson was in Louisville, but no troops. He applied to General Hamilton Pope, who told him he could summon fifteen hundred men at the sound of the fire bell. This was done. The whole body volunteered to advance to Muldraugh Hill. Just at that time General Sherman arrived in the city. He went out with the Home Guards. At the depot they were joined by General Rousseau, who brought 2000 men from Camp Joe Holt. Thus Louisville was defended by Louisville men, in number more than three thousand.

It is due to these early defenders of Louisville to record the names of the companies and their officers :

The Calhoun Artillery, Captain Calhoun; Anderson Guards, Captain Theodore Harris, and Lieutenants W. F. Wood and A. N. Keigwin; Gill Rifles, Captain Ed. St. John, Lieutenants Jno. F. Ditsler, J. C. Russell; Tompkins Zouaves, Captain Robert Miller, Lieutenants C. A. Gruber, C. A. Summerville; Avery Guards, Captain S. L. Adair, Lieutenant Peter Leaf; Battle Creek Guards, Captain B. F. Lutz, Lieutenant A. Lutz; Marion Rifles, Captain C. F. Duke, Lieutenants John Hughes, James Barbee; Louisville Guards, Captain Fred. Buckner, Lieutenant A. Ringwald; Jefferson Guards, Captain J. F. Huber, Lieutenants D. W. Henderson, Ed Merkly; National Guards, Captain A. C. Semple, Lieutenants E. G. Wigginton, J. M. Semple; Prentice Guards, Captain El. Shepherd; Island Home Guards, Captain W. L. Tuell, Lieutenants M. M. Rhorer, A. J. Wells; Boone Guards, Captain Paul Byerly, Lieutenants James Fogarty, J. R. Boone; Halbert Zouaves, Captain W. H. Meglemery, Lieutenants H. J. Smith, A. Rush; Hamilton Guards, Captain F. M. Hughes, Lieutenants G. W. Conway, D.

Abbott; Dent Guards, Captain Jesse Rubel, Lieutenants J. R. White, W. H. Fagan; Sumpter Grays, Captain J. H. Bornom; Semple Battery, Captain J. B. Watkins; First Ward Guards, Major A. Y. Johnson, Captain J. D. Orvill, Lieutenant Ed. Young; Delph Guards, Captain John Daley, Lieutenant Thomas Tindall; Captain Miller's Company, Captain Irwin Miller; Crittenden Union Zouaves, Captain John M. Harlan, now Justice U. S. Supreme Court; Villiar Guards, Captain Joseph Have-
man, Lieutenant K. Weaver; Dupont Zouaves, Captain J. K. Noble, Lieutenant William Krull; East Louisville Guards, Captain David Hooker, Lieutenants William McNeal, John Collins; Thruston Guards, Captain Jesse Harmon, Lieutenants John Ewald, Fred Van Seggern; Franklin Guards, Captain William Elwang, Lieutenants P. Emge, H. Canning; Second Ward Rangers, Lieutenants Charles Summers, E. D. Prewitt. Many of these men entered the service regularly.

The city of Louisville and immediate vicinity furnished the principal part of seven regiments for the Union cause:

The Fifth Kentucky Infantry, officered by Lovell H. Rousseau, H. M. Buckley, W. W. Berry, Charles H. Thomasson and others;

The Sixth Kentucky Infantry, officered by Walter C. Whittaker, George T. Shackelford, George T. Cotton, and others;

The Fifteenth Kentucky Infantry, officered by Curran Pope, James B. Forman, Marion C. Taylor, George P. Jouett, Noah Cartwright, William P. Campbell, and others;

The Twenty-eighth Kentucky Infantry, officered by William P. Boone, J. Rowan Boone, A. Y. Johnson, John Gault, and others;

The Thirty-fourth Kentucky Infantry, officered by Henry Dent, Selby Harney, W. Y. Dillard, Joseph B. Watkins, and others;

The Second Kentucky Cavalry, officered by Buckner Board, Thomas P. Nicholas, Thomas B. Cochran, Elijah S. Watts, W. H. Eifort, Owen Starr, and others;

The Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, officered by Jesse Bayles, Green Clay Smith, Wickliffe Cooper, Jacob Ruckstuhl, and others.

While all comprising these regiments were not from Louisville, yet many Louisville men were in other regiments, thus making a fair offset.

The city government was so decidedly in favor of the Union as to attract mention in the Eastern papers. Its expressions were numerous and unequivocal. In July it took steps to prevent persons from inducing minors to go off to the Confederacy. In August it passed a resolution congratulating Colonel W. E. Woodruff of the Second Kentucky Infantry upon his exchange, he having been taken prisoner in Virginia, welcoming him back and rejoicing that he could further defend the cause of the Union. At the same time it appropriated \$200,000 to be used in encouraging volunteers. When it was announced that General Robert Anderson would come to Louisville the Council voted to welcome him and give him the hospitalities of the city. In November it adopted unanimously a testimonial to Lieutenant-Colonel William P. Campbell, who had left the Council to serve in Colonel Curran Pope's Fifteenth Kentucky Infantry, saying "that while the city has lost an able and efficient legislator, our country has gained the service of a true soldier, and loyal and devoted man, whose voice and right arm will ever be raised in defence of American liberty and the preservation of our glorious Union."

In January, 1862, a similar resolution was adopted as to Colonel A. Y. Johnson, who left the city for service in the field, "in which he can render more valuable service to his country."

The two leading newspapers of Louisville, the *Journal*,

George D. Prentice, editor, and the *Democrat*, John H. Harney, editor, warmly espoused the cause of the Union. As the files are now examined, they are found to contain strong and earnest editorial matter and communications from the chief men of the State, as well as stirring speeches, all urging the duty of supporting the Union against the effort to dismember it.

In these papers is mention of incidents and occurrences which show the enthusiasm of the city of Louisville for the Union cause. All through the spring and summer the patriotic citizens showed their faith by raising the national flag. Every day there were notices of flag raisings in different parts of the city, at which speeches were made by the leading citizens. So numerous were the National colors displayed, waving from lofty poles or suspended across the streets, the Louisville *Democrat* said Louisville had become as the "City of Flags."

In fact, the city was ablaze with Union sentiment. As the regiments of troops passed through the streets on their way to the front it came to be a custom for refreshments to be served to them, and in the loyal households the patriotic women had provided plates and cups for the purpose of serving provisions and coffee prepared for the passing soldiers.

Organizations were made for attending hospitals to care for the sick and wounded. Fairs were held to raise money. Committees were active everywhere, for the task grew to be one of immense magnitude. The citizens who could not serve in the field, and the true-hearted women, all through the war, nobly upheld the reputation of the city as a stronghold of the Union cause in Kentucky.

Although the extreme west end of the State gave a majority at the polls for the Southern cause, many volunteered from that section and went into the organizations formed elsewhere. R. K. Williams, Thomas B. Waller, and Colonel A. P. Henry raised troops in the

western counties, some of which were incorporated in the Twentieth Kentucky Infantry, and other regiments. It would be difficult, nor would it be in accordance with the plan of this book, to locate all the volunteers from this or any other district. It will suffice to say that the 6000 voters of the first district were represented in the field by their full share of volunteers.

The second Congressional district, which adjoins the first, and was composed of counties from the Ohio River to the Tennessee line, was decidedly Union in sentiment. It elected James S. Jackson, of Hopkinsville, to Congress in June, 1861, he receiving 9271 votes, and his opponent 3368.

Enlisting in this district was in accordance with the voting. It has been already shown that many regiments were recruited in this part of the State. Among the notably Union counties of the district were Christian, Hopkins, McLean, Muhlenburg, and Ohio. The county of Christian particularly calls for special mention as a Union stronghold. It was said to be the second largest slave-holding county in the State. Its land was fertile and its people wealthy. It bordered on the Tennessee line, and might have been supposed to have Southern sentiment. But such was not the case. Its county-seat was the fine old town of Hopkinsville, located in sound of the cannon at Camp Boone in Tennessee, and within hearing of the roar of the guns at Donelson. It was the home of James S. Jackson, who resigned his seat in Congress in August, 1861, to raise troops to suppress the rebellion. His call as published was that he would raise a cavalry regiment for three years or during the war, to consist of ten companies: "none but active, vigorous men and men of steady habits will be received. I intend to make this regiment in all respects equal to the best drilled and disciplined corps in the regular army." Many of his recruits were from Christian County, and the regi-

ment fulfilled the promise. At first under Colonel Jackson and afterwards under Colonel E. H. Murray, it did service with the great armies in all the great campaigns of the West, and wound up its career at the close of the war in the State of North Carolina, where it had gone through to the sea with Sherman's army.

Hopkinsville was noted for its large number of strong Union men, whose influence had much to do with the remarkable Union sentiment which prevailed in that part of the State. Among them was Colonel James F. Buckner, who, as has been related, raised a regiment in the summer of 1861, but which was dispersed before it was armed, the men making their way to Calhoun, on Green River, where they entered other organizations. General Jackson has been mentioned. It was also the home of General Benjamin H. Bristow, who, in the summer of 1861, in conjunction with Colonel (afterwards General) James S. Shackelford, raised the Twenty-fifth Kentucky Infantry, and led it at Fort Donelson and on the field of Shiloh, and afterward assisted in raising the Eighth Kentucky Cavalry, which he led in the pursuit of Morgan, and who, after the war, attained national distinction as Secretary of the Treasury. Also may be mentioned Colonel Sam M. Starling, who served on the staff of General Crittenden and also with the Eighth Kentucky Cavalry; also, Colonel Edmund Starling, who raised and led the Thirty-fifth Kentucky Mounted Infantry; also, Major John Breathitt, Captains William T. Buckner, and John Feland, of the Third Kentucky Cavalry; also Lewis Buckner, Walter Evans, D. M. Claggett, William A. Sasseen, Ned Campbell, Fielding M. Starling, William Poindexter, all of whom were officers in Kentucky regiments.

Among the prominent citizens who were strong Unionists were A. V. Long, Gabriel Long, William Starling, Newton Payne, B. T. Underwood, Joab Clark, Dr. D. J. Gish, Dr. A. B. Weber, ——— Davenport,

General D. S. Hays, E. S. Edmunds, Ben S. Campbell, Elder Enos Campbell, Judge H. R. Littell, Colonel C. M. Collins, Rev. H. V. D. Nevius, Dr. E. R. Cook, J. I. Landis, all of whom were men of the first order in the community where they lived.

The Union soldiers who were at any time located for a time at this fine old Kentucky town cherished ever afterwards the recollection of the cordial reception they received and the abundant hospitality and delightful entertainment extended to them. The writer's own experience enables him to testify, and to repeat the testimony of others, that, for genuine, hearty, intelligent, and abiding loyalty to the Union cause, Hopkinsville was not surpassed by any town in the State. While there was some division of sentiment, devotion to the Union was most decidedly the prevailing feeling of the town as well as of the adjacent country.

There was a similarity between the cities of Hopkinsville and Bowling Green in respect to Union sentiment; and while it is a record fact that General Albert Sidney Johnston reported Bowling Green to be a Union centre, so it is a fact that when the Confederates first entered Kentucky, and were established at Hopkinsville, the officers expressed their surprise to find a Union sentiment prevalent among the people, saying they had come to Kentucky because they had understood the people were with the South. This expression corresponds with the words of General Bragg in his report after his invasion of Kentucky in 1862: "The campaign here was predicated on the belief and the most positive assurances that the people of this country would rise to assert their independence."

Nor did General Albert Sidney Johnston have any different experience when he reached Bowling Green. On the 22d of October, 1861, he wrote to the Confederate authorities at Richmond as follows:

“We have received but little accession to our ranks since the Confederate forces crossed the line [*i.e.*, the line dividing Tennessee and Kentucky]. In fact, no such demonstrations of enthusiasm as to justify any movement not warranted by our ability to maintain our own communication. It is true that I am writing from a Union county, and it is said to be different in other counties. They appear to me to be passive if not apathetic. There are hundreds of ardent friends of the South in the State, but there is apparently among them no concert of action. I shall, however, still hope that the love and spirit of liberty are not yet extinct in Kentucky.” (*Life of Albert S. Johnston*, by Wm. P. Johnston, p. 351.)

Bowling Green was a Union centre. It is the principal city in the “Green River country.”

Green River takes its rise in the country southeastwardly of Lebanon, in the counties of Lincoln, Casey, and Adair, and flows westwardly through the State, entering the Ohio near Henderson. The upper half of its course is some thirty miles south of the escarpment known as the “Muldraugh Hill Range.” With its principal tributary, the Big Barren, this stream drains the counties of Casey, Adair, Metcalfe, Barren, Warren, Green, Larue, Hart, Edmondson, Grayson, Butler, Ohio, Muhlenburg, McLean, and parts of others.

All of these counties were Union in sentiment. They constituted, to a large extent, the third and fourth Congressional districts, and at the Congressional election in June, 1861, the third district gave to the Union candidate, Henry Grider, 10,392 votes, and to his opponent, Joseph H. Lewis, 3113, making a Union majority of 7279, or more than three to one. At the same election in the fourth district the Union candidate, Aaron Harding, received 10,344 votes, and his opponent, A. G. Talbott, 2469—a majority of 7875, or nearly five to one.

The Green River country furnished soldiers to the Union cause commensurate with its vote. Many went

into the Third, Eighth, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth Cavalry, and the Ninth, Eleventh, Seventeenth, Twenty-fifth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, Thirty-fifth, Thirty-seventh, Forty-eighth, Fifty-second Infantry, besides other regiments.

Greensburg was second only to Camp Dick Robinson in point of time for early recruiting in Kentucky. The Union leaders of this section of the State were all men of unusual ability. General W. T. Ward had served in the Mexican War, as major, and General E. H. Hobson as a lieutenant. Aaron Harding was an eminent and widely known lawyer. Colonel Frank Wolford became a noted cavalry officer. Colonel George T. Wood of Manfordville was not less distinguished as a citizen than his son, Major-General Thomas J. Wood, as a soldier. Hon. A. G. Hobson of Bowling Green was of the same honored family as General E. H. Hobson and Colonel William E. Hobson, and all powerfully upheld the Union cause. Bowling Green has been mentioned as a Union centre. The leaders of public sentiment were numerous at that point—the Underwoods, Griders, Lovings, Hawkins, Mottley, and others.

Associated with General Ward at Greensburg were his gallant sons, Colonel John H. Ward and Major E. W. Ward. In Adair were Judges Zachariah Wheat and T. T. Alexander, and among the soldiers were J. R. Hindman, J. T. Bramlette, F. C. Winfrey, and A. J. Bailey. In addition to those already named from Hart may be mentioned Dr. William Adair, Dr. C. J. Walton, Colonel William B. Craddock, and from Casey, Colonel Silas Adams, Majors L. M. Drye and George W. Drye. Other leading soldiers and citizens of the Green River section were William Lewis of Green, Colonels Cicero Maxwell, S. P. Love, J. W. Weatherford, J. R. Wheat, Thomas Z. Morrow, Hartwell T. Burge, Q. C. Shanks, J. B. Carlisle, W. B. Carlisle, James Carlisle, Captains Ander-

son Gray, W. N. Vaughn, and Hons. Larkin J. Proctor of Brownsville, and Wade Veluzette of Metcalf County.

It has been stated in another part of this work that in the early organization of Union troops in Kentucky the camp guards of the forming regiments were the outposts of the Federal forces. In no section was this more striking than in the Green River section. The camp at Calhoun, where General Thomas L. Crittenden commanded, was the rallying-point for the lower waters, as Columbia and Greensburg were for the upper. All were places of utmost importance in the first stages of the war. In November, 1861, General Sherman at Louisville reported that "Colonels Grider and Haggard are at Columbia and are acquainted with all the country as far as Bowling Green."

The Twenty-seventh and Thirteenth and a portion of the Twenty-first Kentucky Infantry were recruited at Greensburg, while the Confederates occupied Munfordville in the adjoining county, only twenty-four miles distant. General Ward, who was organizing at Greensburg, lost men in killed, wounded, and prisoners before he had an armed company in camp. Many of his recruits came from within the Confederate lines. They had only their own arms, rifles, or shotguns, and it was an event when Lieutenant-Colonel Wheat came with a company armed with some of the celebrated "Lincoln guns" which had found their way that far out in the State. It would be interesting, if space permitted, to recount in detail the experiences of these volunteers rallying to the camps to contribute the splendid regiments which have been mentioned and which served until the end of the war.

In an account of his regiment, the Twenty-seventh Kentucky Infantry, Colonel John H. Ward says:

"Many of our recruits came from inside the rebel lines and

had to fight on the way to the camp. We had no arms except our private ones, and a few Home Guard muskets. We had no countenance from the State authorities, as the Governor, Magoffin, was in sympathy with the South, and no money except what we furnished from our own means; we had no quartermaster nor commissary stores except what we gathered from the country, and for which we gave receipts to the people. I do not see how troops could have greater difficulties to encounter."

Munfordville is situated at the crossing of Green River by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad. This place is noted for the surrender of about 4000 Federal troops to General Bragg when he invaded Kentucky in 1862. It is also noted as the native place of two Kentucky officers who were distinguished on opposite sides in the Civil War, General Simon Bolivar Buckner and General Thomas J. Wood. Both were West Point graduates, both served in the Mexican War, and both are still living. General Buckner has been Governor of Kentucky since the Civil War, and also candidate for the Vice-Presidency of the United States. After a long career in public life he now resides at the place of his birth, near Munfordville, at his delightful ancestral country-seat known as "Glen Lily." His name to-day stands first among Kentuckians, resident in the State, and by none is he more honored than by those who were Unionists in the great struggle.

General Thomas J. Wood is now a resident of the State of Ohio. His career was no less noted than that of the playmate of his boyhood. He had honorable service in the regular army before the war. In the great struggle he rose to the rank of major-general of volunteers, and afterward he held the rank of brigadier-general in the regular service. As a division and corps commander he was conspicuous in all the campaigns in the western theatre of the war and fought in scores of engagements, notably Shiloh, Murfreesborough, Chickamauga, Mission

Ridge, the battles of the Atlanta campaign, Franklin, and Nashville.

A full account of the Green River country, detailing especially the part the people took in the Civil War would make a most interesting monograph.

Beyond the divide between the head waters of Green River and the Cumberland River lay the counties of Pulaski, Whitley, Wayne, Russell, Clinton, and Cumberland. Although four of these counties were on the Tennessee line they were all Union in sentiment and furnished many excellent Union officers. It is not possible in the limits of this book to mention all the officers from the different counties, but Colonels David R. Haggard and M. J. Owsley from Cumberland cannot be omitted, nor the Van Winkles and Tuttle from Wayne, nor Governor Thomas E. Bramlette of Clinton.

From what has been said it appears that instead of Union sentiment being confined to sections of the State along the Ohio River, as some have affirmed simply as a surmise, it extended through and through the State and notably along the waters of Green River and along the Tennessee border.

A glance at the map of Kentucky will show that Garrard County is about in the very centre of the State. It was in this county that Camp Dick Robinson was located. It adjoins Lincoln County, in which is the old town of Crab Orchard. This central portion of the State is interesting from the fact that the old Wilderness Road, laid out by Daniel Boone, from Cumberland Gap to the "level lands" of Kentucky, first reached the "level lands" in the neighborhood of Crab Orchard. The counties adjacent to it are the southern counties of the Blue Grass region. Spreading out northwardly from this central point lies the rich Blue Grass, but southeastwardly, the hill country and mountains are soon reached.

Tributary to Camp Dick Robinson and Camp Nelson, which was established near by, were the strong Union counties lying, north, south, east, and west. No more admirable selection could have been made for the first military post of Kentucky. It was central as to powerful Union sentiment. It commanded the natural way of entering the State from the direction of eastern Tennessee. It was in this direction that General Zollicoffer marched in January, 1862, and from this section General Thomas gathered the troops which met the advance at Mill Spring.

Another interesting Union centre was the Maysville district. Chief among the Unionists at this point was Hon. William Henry Wadsworth. Associated with him was Colonel Thomas M. Green, editor of the Maysville paper, and many other earnest Unionists. This Congressional district, a large part of which is in the Blue Grass section, voted 12,230 for Wadsworth for Congress in June, 1861, against 3720 for his opponent, John S. Williams, who became a Confederate general. As the district voted, so it furnished troops. Colonel Wadsworth mentioned in a report made October 29, 1862, that his district had furnished seven regiments to the Union cause up to that date. (*W. R.*, series 1, vol. 16, pt. 1, p. 1146.)

It was from this section that movements were made to repel incursions into Kentucky out of Virginia, by way of Pound Gap principally. The counties both up and down the river from Maysville, and extending into the State, were strongly Union. In the Big Sandy country there was a lively Union sentiment, and by rallying and keeping together such troops as were not ordered to the front, in conjunction with the Home Guards, the struggle was made to defend this part of the State from the ravages of a persistent and determined set of reckless enemies.

But it would be no easy task to determine in what part of Kentucky Union sentiment most prevailed, or which section was pre-eminent in furnishing troops to the cause of the Union. Excepting the counties at the extreme west end, the entire State was Union in sentiment, and the volunteers were from the Blue Grass, the Green River country, along the Ohio, and from the mountains. Notwithstanding the historian Shaler's remark that they came from the thinner soils, while the Confederates were from the richer soils, the truth about them is well expressed in what Colonel Ed. Porter Thompson says about the First Kentucky Brigade (Confederate), that they represented Kentucky as a whole, not any particular class of its citizens; that they were from the Ohio to the Tennessee line, and from the Big Sandy to the Mississippi—from the Blue Grass section and all other sections.

CHAPTER XII

FORCE AGAINST FORCE

THE following passage from Shaler's *History of Kentucky* is very suggestive:

"It is maintained by many Confederate sympathizers that the violation of the State's neutrality came first from the Federal authorities. They cite the recruiting at Camp Dick Robinson as evidence in proof of their assertion. It is hardly worth while to debate this question of precedence when the action of both sides was so nearly simultaneous, and only accomplished the inevitable overthrow of the neutrality of the Commonwealth; still, after a careful review of all the records, the present writer has been driven to the conclusion that the actual infringement of the neutrality proclamation was due to the action of Polk and Zollicoffer, and that this simultaneous invasion of the State at points some hundreds of miles apart was deliberately planned by the Confederate authorities."

This statement from an author who usually makes it appear that the acts of the Kentucky Unionists were wrong, suggests inquiry. What are the grounds for saying the invasion of Kentucky was deliberately planned?

One of the most remarkable men who ever lived in Kentucky was Robert J. Breckinridge, D.D. His great abilities were enlisted on the Union side. His home was at Danville, in the central part of the State, not far from Camp Dick Robinson. He had abundant opportunity for information, for he was in the counsels of the leaders of the Union cause, and one of the prime leaders himself. His prominence was such that he was offered, but

declined, the nomination for Vice-President in 1864, on the ticket with Abraham Lincoln.

In June, 1862, he published, in the *Danville Review*, an account of what he called "The Secession Conspiracy in Kentucky and its Overthrow." What he details confirms the conclusion reached by Shaler that the "simultaneous invasion of the State at points some hundreds of miles apart was deliberately planned by the Confederate authorities."

It would require strong and abundant proof to contradict the narrative of Dr. Breckinridge. It bears upon its face the evidences of truth, and no one could be named better able to present the facts of August and September in Kentucky than Dr. Breckinridge. The substance of his narrative is here given, and if any one should be disposed to question his accuracy as to the conduct of the secession leaders, his account of what was done by the Union leaders with whom he was associated can hardly be questioned, and the principal object of the present writer is to show the services rendered by the Union leaders of Kentucky in that period, both to their State and to their country. Dr. Breckinridge relates that after the election of August 5, 1861, which resulted in a complete triumph for the Unionists, electing three fourths of the members of the Legislature, on August 17th a meeting of secessionist leaders was held in Scott County at which three plans were propounded, taking it for granted "that the nation was broken up, and the government at an end; that the Confederate government was in full and lawful existence; that Kentucky rightfully belonged to the Confederate States, and that her obstinate refusal to take her proper place among those States imposed upon the Confederate government the necessity of forcing her to do so, and upon the secession party in the State the duty of taking part in her conquest."

The three plans were as follows:

1st. That the armies of Polk and Zollicoffer and the troops along the Tennessee line should simultaneously invade the State, and that there should be a simultaneous rising of the secessionists in the State.

2d. That Governor Magoffin should issue his proclamation, calling upon all true secessionists to rise; that the secession members of the Legislature should be required to convene, and by them the State should be put into the Confederacy.

3d. That Governor Magoffin should demand of President Lincoln the removal of the men at Camp Dick Robinson.

The third of these plans was adopted at the meeting, "which involved a little further delay," and pursuant thereto Governor Magoffin requested the removal of the men at Camp Dick Robinson. This failed. But at the same time Governor Magoffin sent special messengers also to President Davis. "The real object of this," says Dr. Breckinridge, "is sufficiently explained by the events which followed": the invasion of General Polk at Columbus, and of General Zollicoffer at the other end of the State; a few days later Bowling Green was occupied by General S. B. Buckner. The auxiliaries in the State were as follows: The State Guard, about 5000, and a secret band of Knights of the Golden Circle, about 8000. Besides this, the State of Tennessee stood pledged to support the conquest of Kentucky.

Dr. Breckinridge says:

"It well becomes the people of Kentucky to remember those who contrived for them such a destiny, and then carefully led them to it. To those few loyal men who knew precisely what was passing and what was coming, it was a spectacle at once touching and august to behold the calm and intrepid confidence of the people in themselves, under perils they did not understand, but knew to be immense, awaiting some way of assured deliverance which they would find or make. Deliv-

erance did come. The explosion of the conspiracy was delayed. The State was suddenly placed in a posture of defence; the vast preparations of the conspirators were foiled; everything disappeared but armies ranged for combat, and the attempt to subjugate Kentucky assumed the least dangerous of all aspects to her brave people—the aspect of fair battle. At the moment of supreme peril the conspirators suddenly encountered a degree of spirit and courage superior to their own, and out of a condition apparently hopeless there sprung, as by a single effort, a combination of irresistible strength.”

Dr. Breckinridge then narrates how muskets were conveyed through the State to the soldiers at Camp Dick Robinson, and mentions the organization of troops opposite Louisville in Camp Joe Holt, under General Rousseau. He then says that on August 29th, twelve days after the conference in Scott County, a conference was held at the headquarters of General Nelson at Camp Dick Robinson, at which he himself was present. It was known that a great demonstration of secessionists was to be made in Owen County on September 5th. This was regarded by those at the Nelson conference

“as a part of a wide conspiracy, strictly military in its nature, intended to lead to immediate war as a part of a plan which involved a rising in the State, an invasion of it in force, and its conquest and occupancy by rebel forces as one of the main theatres of the war, and its incorporation with the Confederate States.”

Corroboration of this is found in a letter from General Humphrey Marshall to Governor Magoffin, dated Lebanon, Va., March 23, 1862, in which General Marshall reviews the deplorable events of the previous year.

“You cannot fail to remember [says he,] the pertinacity with which I urged you not to call that extra session of the Legislature which stripped you of power and actually usurped your constitutional function of commander of the military force of the State; how, pointing out to you that the Federal

power meant to concentrate troops at Cairo, I advised you to occupy and fortify Paducah, Smithland, and Columbus before a single Federal regiment had marched to its rendezvous, then to secure the navigation of the Tennessee and Cumberland.”

As General Marshall was a conspicuous figure in the demonstration in Owen County, where he had organized troops, and as he was to speak at the “peace” meeting at Frankfort, this letter reviewing the past shows how early the secession leaders were counselling the forcible opposition to the will of the people of Kentucky.

The characterization of the people of Kentucky by this distinguished man, because of their preference for the Union, is in every way remarkable:

“Her sons are now the wonder of the rest of the Southern people. Their love of gold; their inclination to barter everything else for the retention of property; their disinclination to resist plain usurpation of the inestimable rights, has already forfeited the name the State once bore, and has brought my own mind to ponder whether they are fit to be free.” (*W. R.*, Series 1, vol. 10, pt. 2, p. 468.)

Hon. Garrett Davis said, in a speech in the United States Senate, that it was expected that

“Humphrey Marshall was to make his incursion into Franklin county and storm the capital. Some members, especially secession members, of the Legislature, and some citizens of the town of Frankfort, and one or two judges of our Court of Appeals, left Frankfort hurriedly in the expectation that it was to be sacked that night by Humphrey Marshall’s insurgent hosts.”

To defend against the uprising that was expected to occur about the first of September, 1861 (and it must be remembered that was the time the Confederates did, in fact, invade the State) it was ascertained that about 4000 troops could be furnished from Camp Dick Robinson,

about 2000 from Camp Joe Holt, and about 4000 or 5000 Home Guards could be concentrated.

Dr. Breckinridge then says that it was agreed at the conference at Nelson's headquarters that

"A special messenger, some member of the meeting, should be sent immediately to Governor Magoffin and warn him on behalf of General Nelson, and a responsible meeting of loyal citizens, that the plans and designs of the secession leaders, in connection with the Owen meeting, were understood; that any movement in force by armed men would be promptly met by force; and that the Governor would take notice that his being thus advertised beforehand was meant, among other things, to signify that he would be held personally responsible for whatever evil might happen through his neglect or connivance."

This messenger to the Governor was to take an order from General Nelson to the commander of the Home Guards at Frankfort, that he must occupy the arsenal there with a sufficient force to hold it, relying on immediate assistance if opposed. If overpowered before relief came he was to spike the guns and blow up the arsenal.

Messengers were to be sent to General Rousseau at Louisville and to the commanders of the Home Guards at Lexington, Louisville, and Covington, and steps should be taken to complete the preparation of all the loyal troops of the State.

One of the men composing the conference was to go at once to the governors of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and notify them of the peril in Kentucky and invoke aid.

On the second day of September the Legislature convened. On the next day General Polk entered the State. At the same time Zollicoffer came in through the mountains. On the 5th the demonstration took place in Owen County.

"But," says Dr. Breckinridge, "success was no longer possible. The conspirators had been foiled. Wise and

daring as they supposed themselves to be, they had been overmatched both in strategy and courage."

Simultaneously, almost, with Polk's advance to Columbus, General Grant occupied Paducah. This checkmated that movement. The show of force by General Nelson quieted the allies in Kentucky, and afterwards when Zollicoffer's troops advanced they were met and turned back.

Dr. Breckinridge relates that on the 10th of September, five days after the demonstration in Owen County, the secession leaders held a "peace" meeting in Frankfort, and on the 20th another peace meeting at Lexington. He thus disposes of the Frankfort meeting:

"Two gentlemen on the platform struggling for precedence in being heard, one suddenly drew out a large meerschau pipe, which, being mistaken for a revolver, conscience did the rest. Wild cries of danger, a confused struggle and a crash, a vehement and scandalous stampede, and the 'peace' aspect of treason in Kentucky passed away."

He then details what occurred at the Lexington meeting on the 20th. Just before the day it was to assemble the Legislature had adopted resolutions that the Confederate forces were to be driven from the State.

Dr. Breckinridge says:

"To a certain extent the secession demonstration was permitted to go forward, but it was even more fruitless than the great ovation in Owen on the 5th, or the great peace conference at Frankfort on the 10th. The idea of a sudden and triumphant rising in central Kentucky, of the seizure of the capital and the Legislative bodies, of the rapid and almost unopposed march of the three invading armies into the heart of the State, and of a grand *coup de main* by General Bickly and his Knights of the Golden Circle, were no longer suitable to conspirators whose secret plans were seen to be penetrated and counteracted."

He also says:

“General George H. Thomas had just relieved General Nelson in his command. At daylight on the 20th Colonel Bramlette, with his regiment of infantry, was found to have pitched his tents in the suburbs of Lexington during the previous night. During the day Colonel Wolford's regiment of Kentucky cavalry came up. Towards evening a battery of artillery filed through the principal streets of the city on its way to Bramlette's camp. A body of local Home Guards increased the force to about two full regiments in all. No explanations were asked or offered on either side, for every one understood that a disloyal demonstration designed expressly as a menace was appointed for that day; every one understood that Colonel Bramlette's force was there on that account.”

Three days after this the Thirty-fifth Ohio Infantry appeared at the town of Cynthiana. About this same time it was confidently expected that the Confederates would reach Louisville, but that movement was frustrated by the prompt movement down the line of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad by the troops Rousseau had gathered at Camp Joe Holt, and by the Home Guards of Louisville, with whom went General W. T. Sherman.

Dr. Breckinridge says:

“The struggle of parties had been fierce, silent, ceaseless, and deadly from the 17th of August to the 23d of September. The catastrophe came. Its immediate effect was the great deliverance we have explained.”

It is interesting to note that in this deliverance, which was due mainly to the resolute stand of the Kentucky Unionists, there appeared upon the scene at the most critical points those three remarkable characters Grant, Sherman, Thomas.

In the eventful month of September, 1861, there was no obstacle to the rally either to the standard of the Southern cause or to the National flag. All ideas of neutrality went completely to the winds, and it was evident that nothing was in store for the future except force

against force. The Confederate armies were in Kentucky, along the southern border, from Columbus to Cumberland Gap. The ways were wide open for all who felt so inclined to go out and join them. Nor was there any reason for the Unionists to hesitate to organize into regiments wherever they pleased.

It has been stated that the August election of 1861 was the time of all others for the secession element to show its strength at the polls. If that election would send a secession majority to the Legislature, the State would be controlled by them. So another turning point came in September. If, as was so loudly proclaimed, a majority of the Kentucky people were Southern in sentiment, the hour had arrived for them to show it. If, as was so persistently asserted, the "unprincipled Union leaders" had deceived and deluded the people the opportunity was at hand for them to throw off the shackles and stand up for their freedom. Nothing was in the way of a wholesale rush to the Confederate camps at Columbus, Hopkinsville, Russellville, Bowling Green, and other points as far as Cumberland Gap. The historian Shaler truthfully says that it was a valuable commentary on the assertion that Kentucky was at heart with the Confederacy, that with forces much above any that could oppose them, any advance of the Confederates beyond the Southern line was made with extreme caution. (P. 261.)

It is too plain a proposition to require more than a brief suggestion that the Kentucky secessionists knew the people of the State were against them. Therefore, the comparatively few who did leave to take sides with the South did not immediately return in triumph with the armies with which they went to redeem their State from the "oppressor."

Many assertions were made at the time, which have been often repeated since, which had no semblance of

foundation, and the contradiction lies in the facts of the time. The one just mentioned, that Kentucky was at heart with the South, is contradicted by the facts stated, and renders inexcusable the careless writing of historians. For instance, Shaler says that before the end of the month of September 40,000 of the natural fighting population of the State went off to the Confederacy. (P. 269.) On the preceding page he says nearly 20,000 Union Kentuckians were enlisted and ready for the field, and with the newly raised regiments that had come in from the North, the Federal force in the State was about 40,000. Now, if 40,000 had gone to swell the Confederate armies at Columbus, Hopkinsville, Russellville, Bowling Green, and other places, why did they not proceed at once to hold, occupy, and possess Kentucky, which such forces might easily have done?

The truth is, the Confederates knew that no such number of Kentuckians then left the State, and the historian Z. F. Smith more correctly states the number at near 10,000 (p. 614), while the official records make them still less. The Confederates also knew that the Kentucky Unionists were organizing with great activity, and that the numbers of Union troops were in proportion to the Confederates precisely like the voting strength shown at the polls.¹

Another of the oft-repeated assertions of the time was that the purpose of the Northern people was to overrun the South like barbarians and mistreat helpless women and children in every horrible way. Quotations from the lurid speeches on this subject are made in this work. Among others, Commissioner Hale, of Alabama, indulged in such language in his address to Governor Magoffin, and Governor Magoffin replied that he had not exaggerated the case. That such inflammatory utterances were not credited by anybody, even by those who made them, is

¹ See Appendix, § 14, p. 349.

shown by a remark of Dr. Breckinridge in his article in the *Danville Review*:

“It is a characteristic feature of the men and the times that, nearly without exception, such as had wives and children left them to the care of those whose country it was their object to conquer, and to the protection of the government they took up arms to subvert.”

If there had been any expectation of the terrible atrocities predicted by reckless speakers and writers, the natural feeling would have led those who went off to help the Southern cause to carry their loved ones with them, while the way was wide open to escape the awful fate that awaited them at home. Better a thousand times would it have been for them to endure hardships behind the Confederate lines, than to remain where the “brutes” from the North could get at them.

All the conduct of the time showed that the rush into the Confederacy was an experiment, based upon the known fact that the movement was against a beneficent government, and against a people so far removed from barbarians that the Kentucky Confederates left their loved ones behind in implicit trust.

Another of the assertions of the times, when force began to be arrayed against force, and oft repeated afterwards, was that Kentucky was first betrayed and then seized by force, and thus held in the Union. In connection with all this, “usurpation of power” and “despotic rule” were charged. But that the Union leaders who were guiding Kentucky affairs at that time could be guilty of betrayal of the interests of their State is too monstrous a proposition to be entertained a single moment. These leaders were well represented by the members of Congress then at Washington, and who were elected in June, 1861. They were John J. Crittenden, Charles A. Wickliffe, James S. Jackson, Henry Grider, Aaron Harding, George W. Dunlap, Robert Mallory, William

H. Wadsworth, John W. Menzies. At home were such men as James F. Robinson, James Speed, Garrett Davis, Joshua F. Bell, James Harlan, Archibald Dixon, James Guthrie, S. S. Nicholas, and many like them, together with the whole body of newly-elected Union members of the State Legislature. All charges against such men are contradicted by their own personal character.

The other charges of usurpation, despotism, unwarranted arrests, and oppression of the people are well answered by the simple fact that war had been precipitated, and a time of force against force had come. It was not a time to sit down supinely and allow force on one side to work out its natural fruits, and not resist it by force on the other, and when the history of the period is considered, it appears that the Southern Confederacy, which was preferred by some Kentuckians, did not supinely submit to treason against it. It is found that it dealt with men inside its lines with a military rigor far surpassing in severity that of the United States. The array of force against force brought on conditions wholly different from conditions of peace.¹

Without intending to make this work cover in detail all the events of the war in Kentucky, which would, indeed, require many volumes, it will not be out of place to here mention briefly some of the first instances where force met force actually upon the battle-field.

Through the months of October and November and December, 1861, the Confederates occupied their positions along the southern border of Kentucky. Efforts to advance from Bowling Green to Louisville were successfully resisted, and the protection of this important place was due to the Kentucky Unionists who had organized as Home Guards in Louisville, and to the Kentuckians General Rousseau had gathered into Camp Joe Holt, opposite Louisville. The more westerly parts

¹ See Appendix, § 15, p. 350.

of the State were protected by the fast forming Kentucky regiments at Camp Calhoun on Green River, about twenty-five miles south of Owensboro, where Colonel James S. Jackson, Colonel John H. McHenry, Colonel James M. Shackelford, Colonel P. B. Hawkins were organizing their regiments, and, all under command of General Thomas L. Crittenden, were guarding the country.

In the eastern part of the State the Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Twenty-second and Twenty-fourth Kentucky regiments, under Colonels Laban T. Moore, Charles A. Marshall, D. W. Lindsey, and John S. Hurt, respectively, with other troops, successfully resisted all the advances into Kentucky from Virginia. In the middle-eastern section, General Zollicoffer, in October, moved as far into the State as London, where he attacked the Federals at Camp Wildcat, and after serious loss retreated. In this early engagement the First Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel Wolford, and the Seventh Kentucky Infantry, Colonel Garrard, were conspicuous.

In January, 1862, General Zollicoffer began to move further into the State. General Thomas was at Lebanon, and went out with what forces he had to meet this advance. The encounter took place near Mill Springs, about ten miles south of Somerset. His command consisted of eleven regiments and two batteries. Four of these regiments were Kentuckians—the Fourth Infantry, led by Colonel Speed S. Fry; the Tenth Infantry, led by Colonel John M. Harlan; the Twelfth Infantry, led by Colonel William A. Hoskins; the First Cavalry, led by Colonel Frank Wolford. His entire force numbered about 4000, and the strength of the enemy, under Generals Crittenden and Zollicoffer, was about the same. The Tenth Kentucky was not in the battle, being on detached duty when this battle opened. It reached the field just as the

battle closed, and joined in the pursuit of the fleeing Confederates.

On the 19th of January the advancing Confederates first met Wolford's cavalry, which resisted the advance, and the Tenth Indiana came to his relief by order of General Manson. He also ordered up the Fourth Kentucky Infantry, Colonel Fry. Fry rushed his men forward, and was at once in the midst of a severe battle. The opposing forces had approached so close to each other that Colonel Fry, in riding through the trees, encountered a Confederate officer wearing a waterproof coat which so covered his uniform that Fry did not know he was a Confederate. This officer said to Fry, "We must not fire on our own men," and Fry replied, "Of course not." At that moment another rider appeared, who fired at Fry and wounded his horse. Fry then, seeing the situation, fired on the officer whom he had first met. The officer fell, and it proved to be Zollicoffer. At this time the Confederates were getting upon the right flank of the Fourth Kentucky Infantry, and at this time also General Thomas appeared. He hurried the Tenth Indiana to the exposed flank. Another Confederate brigade then came up and the Twelfth Kentucky Infantry was ordered into line, also two East Tennessee regiments and the batteries. The Federal line was held, and as the Confederates pressed the fight, the Ninth Ohio and Second Minnesota reached the field. The fighting was severe and persistent for a time, when a bayonet charge was made by the Ninth Ohio against the enemy's left. This caused a break and at once the whole line gave way. The Tenth Kentucky and Fourteenth Ohio arrived and joined in the pursuit. The retreat was rapid and disorderly. The Confederates abandoned their artillery and wagons, and hurriedly crossed to the other side of Cumberland River. In their abandoned camp, which was on the north side, they left ammuni-

tion, stores of all kinds, muskets, and several stands of colors.

This decisive victory was won in part by the Union regiments of Kentucky, and if anything can be true, these Kentucky troops were defending their Union State against the persistent efforts of the secession party to occupy and control Kentucky, and to conquer her and attach her to the Confederacy, regardless of the vote of her citizens and their oft-expressed will.

Yet we read the following comment on this battle in Jefferson Davis's History (vol. ii., p. 22):

"The heart of even a noble enemy must be moved at the spectacle of *citizens defending their homes* with muskets of obsolete pattern and shotguns against an *invader* having all the modern improvements in arms."

And this in face of the facts that there were four Kentucky regiments in the army of General Thomas, and no Kentuckian with the Confederate force except General George B. Crittenden, its commander.

The defeat of the Confederate advance under Zollicoffer was followed a month later by the fall of Fort Donelson, which led to the evacuation of Kentucky by the Confederates at all points. They did not return in force until the following summer and fall, when Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith came in with another invasion for the "redemption" of Kentucky, and, as will be seen, for the purpose of getting supplies and also of enforcing the Confederate conscription laws upon the people of the Union State of Kentucky.

The battle of Mill Springs was the first of a series of important successes on the part of the Federal arms, and was especially significant to the Unionists of Kentucky. It lifted from them a great apprehension that the State was to be invaded, and brought hope and cheer in place of dread.

In connection with this first serious engagement in

Kentucky the following narrative is deeply interesting. It was prepared by Justice John M. Harlan, with no thought of publication, but he has permitted its use in this work.

He states that in September, 1861, he determined to enter the Union volunteer service:

“In the prosecution of that purpose [says he] I set about raising a regiment of infantry. My headquarters were established at Lebanon, Kentucky, and from that point I went to several adjoining counties making speeches for the Union cause and inviting men to join my regiment. . . . By November, 1861, I had succeeded in bringing into camp about a thousand men. The regiment was accepted by the State and was subsequently (November 21, 1861) mustered into the service of the United States. The names of my officers and men appear in the official report of Adjutant-General Lindsay of Kentucky. When commissioned as Colonel I was only twenty-eight years of age. William H. Hays (who, after the war, became United States District Judge at Louisville) was Lieutenant-Colonel; Gabriel C. Wharton became Major, and after the war United States District Attorney for Kentucky; William J. Lisle was appointed Adjutant, and Rev. Richard C. Nash, a Baptist minister, was Chaplain. The service contained no more gallant men than those who composed my regiment, the Tenth Kentucky Volunteer Infantry. While the regiment was at Lebanon, other regiments of infantry were sent there to remain subject to orders. About that time, General George H. Thomas (who was then about forty-four years of age, and became one of the four great generals of the war on the Union side) came to Kentucky, under orders from Washington, and a division was formed, to the command of which he was assigned. In the same division was the Fourth Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, of which Speed S. Fry was Colonel, John T. Croxton was Lieutenant-Colonel, and P. B. Hunt was Major. In the same division was the Fourteenth Ohio Infantry, of which James B. Steedman was Colonel, George P. Este Lieutenant-Colonel, and

was Major; the Ninth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, of which Robert L. McCook was Colonel; and the Second Minnesota, of which H. P. Van Cleve was Colonel, —George was Lieutenant-Colonel, and —Wilkins Major; the Tenth Indiana Volunteer Infantry, of which M. D. Manson was Colonel, W. C. Kise was Lieutenant-Colonel, and — Miller Major. There were other regiments in the division, but I do not now recall the names of their field officers. My associations were mainly with the regiments above named.

“ In December, 1861, General Thomas received orders to march his division to Mill Springs in Pulaski County, on the Cumberland. We commenced our march on the last day of that month and year, going by the way of Campbellsville and Columbia. It began raining when we left Lebanon, and rained almost continually every day for several weeks. It was understood at the time that a large body of rebel troops under General Zollicoffer were encamped on the Cumberland near Mill Springs, and an invasion of Kentucky by those troops was apprehended. Thomas with his troops was expected to meet and drive them back.

“ The route to Mill Springs was over a dirt road, and the earth was so thoroughly soaked with rain that Thomas's troops could make only a few miles each day. The regimental wagons sank into the earth up to the hubs of the wheels, and had to be lifted out by the soldiers. There was not a day when I did not myself join in that work in order to encourage my men. All along the route we had to cut down trees and saplings and make what were called ‘ corduroy ’ roads, over which the wagons, when lifted out of the mud, would be placed by the soldiers.

“ Finally, the advance regiments of the division reached Logan's Field, three or four miles from the Cumberland River. I do not remember the precise date of their arrival, but I know that it was on a certain Friday night. The Fourteenth Ohio and the Tenth Kentucky were then ten miles in the rear on the march. That night, after our camp had been established, an order came from General Thomas, who was with his advance regiments, directing Colonel Steedman and myself to take our

respective regiments early the next morning, Saturday, and go off to the right to a certain point five or ten miles distant and capture a rebel forage train which was supposed to be in that part of the country. We performed this duty, and kept our regiments concealed all day, in the hope that the rebel train would pass near us. But no such train could be found, and it became certain that the information received by General Thomas was incorrect. At the close of the day we returned to our camp on the main road at about dark—that camp, as already stated, being ten miles in the rear of General Thomas's advance troops at Logan's Field.

“The next morning, Steedman and myself prepared to resume our march and join the other regiments of our division, say about eight o'clock. Just as we were starting, a cavalrman belonging to Wolford's Kentucky Cavalry regiment came galloping up, and brought an order that we must hurry to the front, as the rebels, under Zollicoffer, had, early in the morning, advanced on Thomas, and that a fierce battle was raging. It was a magnificent sight to see how the boys struggled through mud and rain to reach the field of battle. The ground was so wet and muddy under them that their feet slipped at every step. I see now with great distinctness old Father Nash pushing along on foot with the boys. Equally earnest with him was a Catholic priest from Washington County, who had come with Catholic soldiers from that county. There were many Catholics in my regiment.

“Well, we missed the battle, although we tried hard to be in it. When we reached the battle-field, the battle had ended, and the rebels had fallen back or retreated to their fortifications on the river. We went through the battle-field and saw many dead. It was a most harrowing sight to me. We passed right by the body of General Zollicoffer, which had been placed on a plank on the ground (no doubt by some Union officer or soldier). He had on a light-colored rubber overcoat. There was some dispute for a time as to who shot Zollicoffer. But it was clearly established that he was killed by a pistol-shot fired by Colonel Fry. Zollicoffer came upon the men of Fry's regiment in the belief that it was a Confed-

erate regiment. He was ordered by Fry to halt, and as he did not do so, Fry shot him. Fry did not know, when he shot, that he was firing at Zollicoffer. I had all this from Fry himself.

“We did not halt at the battle-field, but moved on to join General Thomas who, with such of the Union troops as were in the fight, followed the Confederates to their fortifications on the Cumberland River. We caught up with General Thomas about five or six o'clock in the afternoon, and found the Union troops in front of the rebel fortifications, which appeared to be quite formidable. It turned out that if Thomas had, before dark, attacked the rebels in their fortifications, he could have carried the day and perhaps captured all the fleeing rebels with their guns. But the General thought otherwise, and made up his mind to defer an assault until next morning, when all his troops would be on hand.

“As soon as Colonel Steedman and myself joined the other troops, we reported to General Thomas. We informed him that our regiments regretted very much that the useless march of the day previous, in pursuit of a supposed rebel forage train, had prevented them from being in the battle. We asked that our regiments be given a chance in the proposed assault of the next morning. He acceded to our request, and directed us to put our regiments in the front, ahead of all the others, and at the break of day move forward and begin the fight. We so located our regiments, and passed the night without any lights or fires to indicate where our soldiers were. At dawn our men were aroused and formed in line, and they immediately moved forward to the rebel fortifications, looking every moment for the rebels to open fire upon us. But they did not fire, and we went into the fortifications ahead of all the other troops, without resistance, and found no rebels there. The rebels, it was ascertained, had quietly crossed the river in the night, on a steamboat they owned or had impressed into their service, and had fled south into east Tennessee. Early in the day I crossed the river with one or two others in a skiff, and went a mile or so down the main road on which the rebels had retreated, and took dinner at the house of a man by the

name of West. While at dinner word was brought that a flag of truce had appeared near by, and that the officer bringing it wished to confer with us. I went down to the road and met that officer. It was Lieutenant Ewing of Tennessee, who was on Zollicoffer's staff. His object was to obtain the body of General Zollicoffer. I informed him that it could not be done—that arrangements had been made to send the body through Louisville to Nashville for delivery to Zollicoffer's family. In a conversation with Ewing, I learned that the rebels, when they retired from the battle-field, were of opinion that the Union forces amounted to more than 10,000 men. But such was not the fact. The only Union regiments engaged in the fight were the Tenth Indiana, Fourth Kentucky, Ninth Ohio, Second Minnesota, a part of Colonel Hoskins's Kentucky infantry, and a company of Wolford's cavalry regiment, not exceeding 3000 men fit for duty.

“The regiments composing Thomas's division camped in the rebel fortifications for a time after the battle; how long I do not remember. Shortly afterwards the division was ordered to Nashville, Tennessee. We went to Louisville, and thence by boat to Nashville. This was, I think, in February, 1862. We camped at a beautiful place near Nashville.”

CHAPTER XIII

“PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT”

THE month of November, 1861, witnessed a remarkable sequel to the refusal to be governed by the solemn stand which Kentucky had taken in the Union. The secessionists, instead of acquiescing in the determination of the people declared at the polls, left the State, and in September returned with the armies of the Confederacy. The same men whom the people had beaten at the June and August elections determined to rule the destinies of Kentucky anyhow. The Confederate military encampment was at the town of Russellville, near the southern border. There in the military camp these men held a meeting and resolved Kentucky out of the Union, and applied for the admission of the State into the Southern Confederacy. They even made a governor—George W. Johnson—and appointed men to represent Kentucky in the Confederate Congress.

The Confederate authorities, being advised of the action, went through the formality of admitting Kentucky into the Confederacy.

In order that it may appear how the will and wishes of the people of Kentucky were utterly disregarded by those of her people who preferred the Southern Confederacy to their own State, as well as to the Union, the details of this extraordinary action will be given.

The convention at Russellville was held November 18, 19, and 20, 1861. How it came to assemble is indicated in the record of its proceedings. No authority existed for

such a convention, and those composing it had left the State, and had returned with the Confederate army. They were at a town near the southern border, and the Confederate military lines extended only a short distance from the Tennessee line. The occupancy in Kentucky was of a fractional portion only, and that military and temporary.

On the 29th of October sixty-three men, who were in Russellville during the occupation of that place by the Confederate troops, met in a hall, selected a chairman and secretary, and appointed a committee on resolutions.

On the next day the committee reported resolutions, which were adopted. The resolutions were, that:

“ *Whereas*, The Legislature of Kentucky has violated solemn pledges, deceived and betrayed the people, abandoned neutrality, invited into the State the organized armies of Lincoln, abdicated the government in favor of military despotism, brought on the State the horrors and ravages of war, voted men and money for the war waged by the North, violated the Constitution by borrowing \$5,000,000 for the support of the war, permitting the arrest and imprisonment of citizens, transferred the prerogatives of the executive to a military commission of partisans, allowed the writ of *habeas corpus* to be suspended, permitted our people to be driven into exile from their homes, subjected our property to confiscation, and our persons to confinement, because we chose to take part in a contest for civil liberty,

“ *Resolved*, That the unconstitutional edicts of a factious majority of the Legislature thus false to their pledges, their honor, and their interests, are not law, and that such government is unworthy of a brave and free people, and we therefore denounce their unconstitutional acts and usurpations, and bid defiance both to the Federal and State governments.

“ *Resolved*, That abandoned and betrayed as we have been by the Lincolnite majority of the Legislature of Kentucky, and proscribed by the abolition party who have usurped the Federal government, and broken down the Constitution of the Federal

Union, and being as yet no part of the Southern Confederacy, and therefore altogether without the protection of law, the people have by the laws of God and the express letter of the Constitution of Kentucky, 'at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may think proper,' and in the language of the same Constitution, we declare, 'that absolute and arbitrary power over the lives and liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority.'

Resolved, That we do hereby declare that the majority of the Legislature by their acts have abandoned, betrayed, and abdicated the government, and that the people have now a right to a fair representation of their will, and that the Governor be and is invited to convene a Legislature to meet outside the lines of the Lincoln army, to be composed of such members as are now elected, and may attend, or new members to be chosen by the people. And whereas we have reason to believe that the Governor is unable to convene the Legislature outside the lines of the Lincoln army, therefore,

Resolved, That we recommend a convention to be chosen, elected, or appointed in any manner now possible by the people of the several counties of the State, to meet at Russellville on the 18th day of November, and we recommend to them the passage of an ordinance severing forever our connection with the Federal government, and to adopt such measures, either by the adoption of a provisional government or otherwise as in their judgment will give full and ample protection to the citizens in their persons and property and secure to them the blessings of constitutional government.

Resolved, That we recommend to the people, in every county where they have the power to do so, to organize at once a county guard, of at least one hundred men, to be armed by the people, in every county, and mounted, if possible, to be paid as Confederate troops, and subject to duty in their own and adjoining counties, and subject also to the rule and regulations of the Confederate States and to the order of the commanding general.

Resolved, That we will never pay one cent of the uncon-

stitutional loan of \$5,000,000 obtained by the Legislature from the banks for the prosecution of this war instituted for the coercion and subjugation of the slaveholding States, and that we will resist, by force of arms if necessary, the collection by the sheriff of all taxes intended to be paid over to the Lincoln party in the Legislature, and that we denounce as enemies to their country and constitutional government all those who may advocate the payment of the same to the sheriffs for the purposes aforesaid.

“*Resolved*, That Robert McKee, John C. Breckinridge, Humphrey Marshall, George W. Ewing, H. W. Bruce, G. B. Hodge, William Preston, G. W. Johnson, Blanton Duncan, and T. B. Thompson be and are hereby appointed a committee to carry out the above resolutions.”

This meeting was styled “the Southern Conference.” Its proceedings were published, and pursuant to the call contained in the resolution the convention of November 18th was held. The proceedings of the convention say:

“Pursuant to a call issued by the Southern Conference, held at Russellville on the 29th, 30th, and 31st days of October, 1861, the people of Kentucky assembled in convention at Russellville on Monday, November 18, 1861, to take into consideration the unfortunate condition of the State and devise, if possible, some means of preserving the independence of the Commonwealth, and their liberties.”

The call, therefore, was issued by those persons who chose to style themselves “the Southern Conference.” They had not been able to have a convention called by the regularly elected representatives of the people in the Kentucky Legislature, so they assumed to call one themselves.

The object of the convention was “to consider the unfortunate condition of the State.” This was an assumption that people of the State did not know what they wanted, or needed, or was good for them; that although the people had declared their will at the polls,

with absolute freedom, a great moral obligation rested upon the defeated party that they should take care of the State. There is more than grandeur in this; it attains to the sublime in audacious presumption.

The convention thus called, for the purpose stated, adopted resolutions:

“That whereas the President and Congress have treated the supreme law of the Union with contempt and usurped to themselves power, and have substituted for national liberty a centralized despotism founded upon the ignorant prejudices of the masses of Northern society, and, instead of giving protection to the people of fifteen States of this Union, have turned loose upon them the unrestrained and raging passions of mobs and fanatics; and because we now seek to hold our liberties, our property, our homes, and our families under the protection of the reserved powers of the States, have blockaded our ports, invaded our soil, and waged war upon our people for the purpose of subjugation to their will;

“And whereas our honor and our duty to posterity demand that we shall not relinquish our own liberty, nor abandon the right of our descendants and of the world to the blessings of Constitutional government,

“Be it ordained: That we do hereby forever sever our connection with the government of the United States, and in the name of the people we do hereby declare Kentucky to be a free and independent State, clothed with all power to fix her own destiny, and to secure her own rights and liberties.”

It will be observed that in the foregoing preamble it is declared that Congress had treated the supreme law with contempt, and usurped powers. So now in a preamble to the next resolution it is declared that the Kentucky Legislature violated most solemn pledges, and deceived and betrayed the people, invited military despotism, and have thrown upon the people the ravages of war, subjected their property to confiscation, and their persons

to the penitentiary, and such-like monstrous practices; therefore,

“Be it ordained: That the unconstitutional edicts of a factious majority of a Legislature thus false to their pledges, their honor, and their interests, are not laws, and that such government is unworthy of the support of a brave and free people, and that

“We do therefore declare that the people are thereby absolved from all allegiance to said government, and that they have the right to establish any government which to them may seem best adapted to the preservation of their rights and liberties.”

The convention then, among other things, appointed three commissioners to negotiate with the Southern Confederacy for the admission of Kentucky into that government.

A form of government was also made for Kentucky—wonderful in its simplicity, and beyond degree strange, emanating from men who were supposed to believe in government by the people.

Section I of the Constitution provided that “the supreme executive and legislative powers of the provisional government of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a Governor and ten Councilmen.”

The Governor and Council have full power to pass laws; and in case of vacancy, the Council shall choose another Governor. All governmental powers were lodged in this Board. (*War Records*, Serial No. 127, p. 740.)

George W. Johnson, of Scott County, was made Governor of Kentucky, and the Council of ten appointed. The Governor and Council thus named proceeded to enact laws for the State, which were duly published in the *Louisville Courier*, which paper was printed and issued at Bowling Green as long as the Confederates remained in Kentucky, which was up to the month of February, 1862.

Among the legislative acts of this singular legislative body were the following:

“That all sales of property made under any judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, or any District Court of the United States, since November 20, 1861, are declared null and void and no title shall pass to the purchaser. Approved January 28, 1862.” (*Bowling Green Courier*, February 7, 1862.)

“An Act to amend the charter of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad. Approved January 25, 1862.” (*Ib.*, February 8, 1862.)

“An Act abolishing the equity and criminal courts of the Fourth Judicial District of Kentucky.” (*Ib.*)

“An Act that the Bank Commissioner of the State of Kentucky shall administer an oath to every Bank President, Director, Cashier, Teller, Clerk, Messenger, or any other officer of every bank in Kentucky, that he will support the Constitution of the Confederate States, and of the provisional government of Kentucky. Approved February 15, 1862.” (*Ib.*, February 10, 1862.)

“An Act prohibiting the opening of the polls and holding an election in the first district under proclamation of B. Magoffin.” In the act Governor Magoffin is mentioned as follows: “In obedience to the proclamation aforesaid, or any other proclamation issuing from said B. Magoffin, or any other person professing to exercise the functions of Governor of Kentucky other than the Governor of this provisional government.” (*Ib.*, February 10, 1862.)

“An Act to change the name of Wolfe County, Ky., the same to be called Zollicoffer County. Approved Jany 28, 1862.” (*Ib.*, February 11, 1862.)¹

George W. Johnson, who had been made Governor, was killed about four months afterward, in the battle of Shiloh, and Richard Hawes, of Bourbon County, was chosen as his successor. In order to keep up the farce, Hawes was inaugurated at Frankfort when the Confederate army under Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith came into Kentucky in the fall of 1862, but retired before the

¹ See Appendix, § 16, p. 351.

ceremonies were over on account of the approach of Buell's army.

The commissioners who were appointed to obtain the admission of Kentucky into the Confederacy successfully carried out their mission. On the 10th day of December, 1861, it was enacted by the Confederate Congress:

“That the State of Kentucky be and is hereby admitted a member of the Confederate States of America, on an equal footing with the other States of the Confederacy.”

It is interesting to note upon what grounds the singular performance of these men, in a military camp, assuming to act for the State of Kentucky, was based by themselves. A full disclosure upon this point is contained in a letter to the Confederate President, from George W. Johnson, dated November 21, 1861.

He did not base the action upon the right of secession, but upon the right of revolution. He declares that, Congress and the Legislature having adopted oppressive and despotic acts, nothing was left but resistance; that the right of secession not being possible, revolution was the only way.

“The foundation, therefore, upon which the provisional government rests, is a right of revolution instituted by the people, for the preservation of the liberty and interests and the honor of a vast majority of the citizens of Kentucky.” (*War Records*, Serial No. 127, p. 743.)

It seems incredible, and doubtless it would not be believed, that such utterances could have come from an intelligent source, but for the fact that the letter of Johnson is embalmed in the records of the country. He knew how the people of Kentucky had voted. He knew that they had decreed by their suffrages that they would not take the State out of the Union and into the Confederacy, and yet he professes to be acting for a vast majority of the citizens of Kentucky.

Johnson goes on in the letter in bitter denunciation of the leaders of the Union party in Kentucky. Who they were he does not say. It might be supposed that the distinguished men who had been elected to Congress in June—Crittenden, Wickliffe, Jackson, Harding, Grider, Dunlap, Mallory, Wadsworth, Menzies—were leaders, but he says the leaders had “embodied in their creed that their party was in favor of an ultimate connection of the State with the South,” and certainly none of these men who were voting in Congress in July, 1861, for men and money to put down the rebellion ever heard of such a creed. It might be supposed that R. J. Breckinridge and Joshua F. Bell and James Speed, James Guthrie, S. S. Nicholas, Garrett Davis, the Clays, the Underwoods, Burnam, Garrard, the Buckners, the Hobsons, the Wards, the Goodloes, the Harlans, and scores of such-like men were leaders, but their creed was “secession is a remedy for no evil, but an aggravation of all.” No one of the Union leaders ever heard of a creed among Union men favoring ultimate connection with the South.

Johnson goes on to say:

“Up to the last moment of safety, we attempted to save the State by State action, and we did this because we knew the people were almost unanimously with us as to the ultimate destiny of the State.”

Such words are astounding in the face of the fact that Kentucky elected Union men against secessionists by overwhelming majorities; in the face of the further fact that at the time the words were written the Union regiments were filling up all over the State, and in the face of the further fact that three times as many Kentuckians served in the Union army as in the Confederate army.

But the representations had the desired effect. President Davis transmitted Mr. Johnson's letter to the President of Congress, Hon. Howell Cobb, saying the powerful exposition of the misrepresentation of the people of

Kentucky by the people they had chosen to vote for led him to the conclusion that “the revolution in which they were engaged offered the only remedy within their reach against usurpation and oppression.”

He also said the proceedings for the admission of Kentucky into the Confederacy were irregular, but there was enough merit in it to warrant a disregard of the irregularity, and admit the State.

In all the annals of history there cannot be found such a revolution as this—a revolution of the people in which the people did not engage—a revolution which the people voted against—a revolution concocted by men whom the people had beaten at the polls—a revolution to drag a people where they did not want to go, and emphatically refused to go.

The farce may have misled the Confederate authorities; especially it may have misled the Confederate military leaders, for they afterwards came into Kentucky in great force and offered to the oppressed people the golden opportunity to rise and break their shackles. But the people met them in battle array and forced them to retire, complaining that they had been misinformed as to the feelings of the people of Kentucky, and the arms they brought to place in the hands of the rising multitudes were carried back or cast away in retreat.

Certainly Governor Magoffin was in sufficient sympathy with all that pertained to the Southern cause to lead him to look favorably upon the action at Russellville if there had been any merit in it whatever, but his expression on the subject at the time was decidedly condemnatory. The message of “Governor” Johnson being published, in which he said “I will gladly resign whenever the regularly elected Governor [that is, Magoffin] shall escape from his virtual imprisonment at Frankfort,” Governor Magoffin said of the convention at Russellville: “I condemn its action in unqualified terms. Self-constituted as it was

and without authority from the people, it cannot be justified by similar revolutionary acts in other States by minorities to overthrow the State governments. I condemn their action and I condemn the action of this one; my position is and has been, and will continue to be, to abide by the will of the majority of the people of the State." (Collins, vol. i., p. 98.)

The mention that has been made of the Russellville "convention" and its proceedings by the historians of Kentucky varies. Shaler calls it a "pretence of legislation." He says:

"Few more curious instances of political pretence can be found in history. It is impossible to see what was the profit of this action. So far from gaining sympathy for the rebellion, in Kentucky, it tended rather to discredit the Confederacy among the people."

But he has no word of condemnation.

He finds occasions to use many strong objugatory words in recounting what was done from time to time by Kentucky Unionists: such expressions as "brutal," "pernicious," "disgraceful," "iniquitous," "exasperating," "usurpation," "prostituted," are applied liberally to the Unionists and all that they did. He speaks of the "utter degradation of the solemnity of an oath"; that "the Legislature in casting about for a safeguard against the numerous sympathizers with the rebellion bethought itself of this bond of the oath," but that "this miscellaneous oath-taking was a degradation of a most sacred relation, that brought no profit to those who prostituted it to political ends."

Thus he characterizes what was done by the Unionist Legislature of Kentucky. But the usurpation at Russellville does not receive from the "Unionist" historian any harsh expression, only a mild disapproval—far milder than that of Governor Magoffin, who was not a Unionist. And while he condemns the "degradation of oath-taking"

as required by the Legislature, he is silent as to the requirements of the Russellville “government” that all bank officers in Kentucky, from president down to messenger, should take the oath of allegiance to the Southern Confederacy.”

Z. F. Smith says: “On the 18th of November the States Rights party met by delegates at Russellville, Kentucky, and organized a provisional government, under which the State went through the form of admission into the Confederacy.”

He gives no details; does not mention that Confederate troops had come into Russellville, and that the people who made up the convention had come in with them. He leaves the reader of his history to infer that a party really met by delegates, in a delegate convention, after the usual practice. Nor does he give any clue to the absurdity of the proceedings by any comment. (P. 619.)

General George B. Hodge, writing the “Outline History” in Collins’s *Kentucky*, makes no mention of the fact that the Confederate forces were at Russellville. He says a call was published—he does not say by whom—“summoning the people of Kentucky to organize a government. A convention of persons claiming to be delegates from all the counties not under control of the Federal armies assembled at Russellville.” He then states that a constitution was adopted and a Governor and a Council chosen, and that “in this body was provisionally vested all the legislative and executive authority of the State.”

Hodge writes upon the subject with all the gravity as if he had been recounting the most orderly, dignified, and bona fide proceedings. His readers would never know from his work that they were as extraordinary as it is plain they were from the account herein given.

CHAPTER XIV

BRAGG'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY

THE greatest military event that ever took place in Kentucky was the invasion of 1862. It is commonly called "Bragg's invasion," but this expression carries the mind mainly to the march of Bragg's army up from Tennessee through Glasgow, Munfordville, Bardstown, and out by way of Perryville, whereas the invasion also extended over the country about Lexington and east of that point. Three Confederate armies entered the State by concerted action—Bragg from Chattanooga, Kirby Smith from Knoxville, and Humphrey Marshall from southwestern Virginia. At the same time raiding bands were active in the western part of the State.

It was called an "invasion" and correctly so. In one very important particular it was an absolutely unwarranted invasion. The invaders came for the avowed purpose of enforcing in Kentucky the conscription law of the Confederacy, precisely as if Kentucky had been one of the States that had joined the Confederacy. The Confederate conscription law forced into the ranks every man of military age. It was not a draft which took one out of several by lot, but conscription swept in all. The voters of Kentucky who steadily refused to secede were to be forcibly taken and forced into the Confederate ranks and made to fight against their own principles.

The invasion was unlooked-for and unexpected, and the State was in no way prepared to resist it. In the first days of August, 1862, Bragg's main army was in the vicinity

of Chattanooga, and Buell, with the opposing Federal army, was in the southern part of middle Tennessee. No one was expecting any movement like the one which suddenly took place.¹

One object of the invasion is stated by General Bragg in his report. He says that the army with him was to co-operate with that of Kirby Smith and that of Humphrey Marshall; that on August 28th Smith moved upon Lexington, Kentucky. "That rich country," says he, "full of supplies so necessary to us, was represented to be occupied by a force which could make but feeble resistance." Smith first moved into this "rich country" and Bragg's advance immediately followed. He marched rapidly up from Tennessee, arriving at Glasgow September 13th. Moving on northwards, he took Munfordville September 17th.

At that time he was, says he, "reduced to three days' rations and in a hostile country utterly destitute of supplies." He says he could not hazard a battle with Buell's army, which was also moving northwardly. "We were therefore compelled to give up the object and seek for subsistence." He therefore hastened on to Bardstown. There General Bragg, leaving General Polk in command, went in person to Lexington. At Lexington he ordered Kirby Smith to move to Frankfort, to which place he went himself, to be present at the inauguration of Governor Hawes. Then he says:

"Finding but little progress had been made in the transfer of our accumulated stores from Lexington," and learning of Buell's advance out from Louisville, "this required abandonment of the capital and partial uncovering and ultimate loss of our stores at Lexington."

He then went to Perryville and met General Polk there with his army, October 7th, and on the next day the battle was fought. After that, he retired from the

¹ See Appendix, § 17, p. 352.

State, through the mountains, over the Old Wilderness Road, and through Cumberland Gap. At the conclusion of his report, instead of acknowledging failure, he boasts of killing, wounding, and capturing "no less than 25,000 of the enemy, taken over thirty pieces of artillery, 17,000 small arms, some 2,000,000 cartridges for same, destroyed some hundreds of wagons, and brought off several hundred more with their teams and harness complete; replaced our jaded horses by a fine remount, lived two months upon supplies wrested from the enemy's possession, secured material to clothe the army, and finally secured subsistence from the redeemed country to support not only the army, but also a large force of the Confederacy to the present time." (*War Records*, series I, vol. 16, p. 1088.)

The State which declined to secede was redeemed by an invasion of her richest section, subsisting an army upon the country, and carrying away whatever could be carried in a disastrous retreat. It is evident that one object of the invasion was supplies. It is said that his spoils loaded nearly four thousand wagons with the plunderings of dry goods stores, groceries, etc. The *Richmond Examiner* boasted that his train was forty miles long, and brought a million yards of jeans, boots and shoes, clothing, bacon. From one house in Lexington more than \$100,000 worth of jeans and linseys were taken. Trains of wagons were moving out of the various towns of central Kentucky day and night, and Lexington furnished the richest harvest the Confederates had during the war. (W. J. Tenney's *History of the Rebellion*, p. 288.)

Another object was recruits for the army, volunteers or conscripts. General Bragg issued a proclamation saying he came to offer an opportunity to the people to free themselves from the tyranny of a despotic ruler. "Believing that the heart of Kentucky is with us, we have trans-

ferred from our own soil to yours not a band of marauders, but a powerful and well-disciplined army. We have come with joyous hopes."

General Smith said:

"We came to strike off the chains which are riveted upon you. We call upon you to unite your arms and join with us in hurling back from our fair and sunny plains the northern hordes who would deprive us of our liberty, that they may enjoy our substance."

The very language of Bragg's proclamation shows that he did not really regard Kentucky as a Confederate State: "We have transferred from our soil to yours" a powerful army. Yet that soil which did not belong to the Confederacy was to be a field for conscription.

While at Bardstown, Bragg issued an address, calling upon the people to rally to his standard: that he had arms and ammunition for all; that the usual pay and bounty would be given; that after twenty companies of cavalry were received the recruits would be placed in the infantry service. Then follows the strange words to the ears of the Kentucky people: "This is the last opportunity Kentuckians will enjoy for volunteering. The conscript act will be enforced as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made." (*War Records*, Serial No. 110, p. 365.)

The historians who find so much to condemn in the conduct of the war, on the part of the Federal commanders in Kentucky, make no comment upon this treatment of the Kentucky Unionists by the Confederates. They denounce as outrages "military arrests of civilians," but pass over in silence this proposed wholesale arrest of all able-bodied men in the State for service in the Confederate ranks. They find no place to express condemnation of it. They do not even mention it in the accounts they give of the invasion.

General Hodge, writing of this campaign, says:

“Bragg, disgusted with the lukewarmness which manifested itself on the subject of recruiting for the army, lost his head, divided his army to meet the division Buell had made of his, fought near Perryville the larger force which Buell had on the south bank of the Kentucky River with the smaller moiety of his own, defeated it, called back his large body from the direction of Lexington and Frankfort, and retreated out of the State with more rapidity than he had entered it.” (Collins, vol. i., p. 348.)

Smith says that after the battle of Perryville

“the two armies, now in full strength, confronted each other, 45,000 Confederates, 54,000 Federals. Their lines were but three miles apart, and it was the general belief that Bragg should and would deliver battle to his enemy, now on terms as nearly equal as is usual in the great contests of war. . . . The expectation of a great battle on that day was disappointed. Bragg ordered his command to fall back upon his base at Bryantsville, and gathering up all supplies collected he continued his march of retreat to Lancaster, where the army was divided, Smith going out by Richmond and Cumberland Gap, and Bragg by Crab Orchard and Tennessee.”

He makes no reflection upon the drain that was made upon the Kentucky people to supply the wants of a vast army, nor upon the preparations to conscript the people themselves into the Confederate service, but contents himself with quoting a wail from General Duke’s book, that thus ended a campaign from which so much was expected, and that the best chance of the war was thrown away. Also that, at the Confederate capital, the Richmond papers spoke of the campaign as a “brilliant blunder, a magnificent failure, profoundly disappointing, and mortifying Southern people and dashing their fond hopes of liberating Kentucky and Tennessee from the Federal hold.” (P. 649.)

Shaler, who finds space to condemn the Federal officers in Kentucky, especially those who were Kentuckians,

on account of the popular stories of the day, unsupported by any records, who condemns the provost marshals and the Home Guards in the same way, has nothing to say about the wrongs done and contemplated by the invasion. He says: "There can be no doubt that the people of Kentucky endured far more outrage from the acts of the Federal provost marshals than they did from all the acts of legitimate war put together." (P. 353.)

He also tells of the "brutal tyranny of the provost marshal system" and of the trouble given by Home Guards who "could not be kept in proper control" and were "an element of great danger in the civil government of the State."

All this and much more is freely set down to the discredit of the Kentucky Unionists. But Bragg's invasion only elicits the following reflection:

"The battle of Perryville, which made the retreat of Bragg an imperative necessity, came three weeks after the defeat of Lee at Antietam. It was necessary that the Confederates should win in both these hazards in order that their cause should succeed. In both cases the result was the sullen retreat of the Confederate forces into their strongholds. Their enemies were checked, but not broken, and the Federal forces were not able to give a crushing pursuit to the forces they had beaten back. Far better than the Northern armies, the troops of the Confederacy withstood the trials of a defeat."

Shaler says he was a Unionist, but he finds many a derogatory word for those of his own side, while he dismisses Bragg's invasion of Kentucky to gather spoils, and conscript Kentucky Unionists, with no word but a compliment.

Having considered the invasion on the Confederate side, it is proper to notice some of the features of the Federal side.

It has been stated that General Bragg knew that there

were no troops in Kentucky that could resist the great invasion. Such was the case. When General Buell heard that Kirby Smith had moved in toward Lexington, he dispatched General Nelson to Louisville to look after the defence. Nelson went on to Lexington, and, collecting the few troops, fought a most unequal battle at Richmond, and, being defeated, returned to Louisville and organized all the troops obtainable, to the number of between 30,000 and 40,000, all that could be rallied from every direction. Nelson was killed in a personal difficulty by a brother officer on the 29th of September.

It should be stated that on the 18th of August Governor Magoffin, finding that he was in no way in accord with the Legislature or the people of Kentucky, resigned his office, and the Speaker of the Senate, James F. Robinson, became Governor in his stead. In less than two weeks, August 31st, the entire State government removed hastily from Frankfort to Louisville, on account of the approach of Kirby Smith's troops. At Louisville the Legislature resolved that the invasion must be resisted and repelled by all the power of the State. At the same time Governor Robinson issued the following proclamation:

“FRANKFORT, KY., August 31, 1862.

“TO THE PEOPLE OF KENTUCKY:

“A crisis has arisen in the history of the Commonwealth, which demands of every loyal citizen of Kentucky prompt and efficient action. The State has been invaded by an insolent foe; her honor is sullied, her peace disturbed, and her integrity imperiled. The small and gallant army raised upon the emergency of the occasion for her defence, under the brave and chivalric Nelson, has met with a temporary reverse, and the enemy is advancing for the accomplishment of his purpose—the subjugation of the State. He must be met and driven from our border, and it is in your power to do so. I therefore, as Governor of the Commonwealth, deem it my duty to call upon every loyal citizen of Kentucky to rally to

the defence of the State. Not a moment is to be lost. I appeal to you as Kentuckians, as worthy sons of those who rescued the dark and bloody ground from savage barbarity, by the memories of the past of your history and by the future of your fame, if you are but true to yourselves, to rise in the majesty of your strength, and drive the insolent invader of your soil from your midst. Now is the time for Kentuckians to defend themselves. Each man must constitute himself a soldier, arm himself as best he can, and meet the foe at every step of his advance. The day and the hour, the safety of your homes and firesides, patriotism and duty, alike demand that you rush to the rescue. I call upon the people then to rise up as a man and strike a blow for the defence of their native land, their property, and their homes. Rally in the standard wherever it may be nearest, place yourselves under the commanders, obey orders, trust to your own right arm and the God of battle, and the foe will be driven back, discomfited and annihilated.

“To Arms! To Arms! and never lay them down till the Stars and Stripes float in triumph throughout Kentucky.

“I but perform my duty in thus summoning you to the defence of your State, and I am assured that it will be promptly responded to. I promise that I will share with you the glory of the triumph which surely awaits you.

“Done in the city of Frankfort this 31st day of August, 1862.

“By the Governor,

JAMES F. ROBINSON.

“D. C. WICKLIFFE,

“Secretary of State.”

Such was the answer Kentucky made to the proclamation of the leaders of the invasion, who called upon the people to rise and emancipate themselves from their own chosen adhesion to the Union, and to rally to the support of a cause which they repudiated.

In response to the call of the Governor, the Kentucky Unionists were rallying to the regiments already in the field, and other new regiments were formed. Eleven new regiments were organized. The State militia filled

up the Home Guard companies, and thousands flocked to the points of danger, especially to Louisville, to put themselves, as the Governor urged, "under the commanders and obey orders."

General Bragg lamented the apathy of the Kentuckians and their indifference to his appeal to rise and throw off the yoke of despotism, but Governor Robinson's proclamation did not fall upon heedless ears.

In the testimony of General Boyle before the Buell Court of Inquiry, he says that when he first heard of the advance of Kirby Smith he had in Kentucky only about 2000 troops. He says he called for troops from everybody; that they increased so rapidly he could not approximate the number, amounting at last to forty or fifty thousand. The sources from whence this aggregation came can be understood in his answer to the question, "What would have been the effective force?" He could not tell; "the men," says he, "marched from camp on the edge of the city for the purpose of review and to learn how to march and to handle their guns. Large numbers broke down. I believe they were all new regiments." (*War Records*, series I, vol. 16, p. 371.)

General Granger testifies of thirty-six or thirty-seven thousand raw recruits at Louisville. (*Ib.*, p. 428.)

In other parts of the State there was a similar rally to the defence against the invasion.

When this spirit of the Kentucky people is considered and compared with the insignificant number which responded to the call of General Bragg, all questions as to their stand are conclusively settled. General Bragg made a report a few days after the battle of Perryville, in which he uses this language:

"The campaign here was predicated on the belief and the most positive assurances that the people of this country would rise in mass to assert their independence. No people ever had so favorable an opportunity, but I am distressed to add that

there is little or no disposition to avail of it. Willing, perhaps, to accept their independence, they are neither disposed nor willing to risk their lives or their property in its achievement. With ample means to arm 20,000 men and a force with that to fully redeem the State, we have not as yet issued half of the arms left us by casualties incident to the campaign."

The largest estimate of Kentuckians who availed themselves of this opportunity to enter the Confederate service is 5000, but Shaler, after investigation, puts the number at 2500. (P. 320.)

Instead of rallying to Bragg, they were rushing into Union regiments all through the summer and fall of 1862.

The Kentucky regiments which had been organized in the summer and fall of 1861 were either with Buell's army, or with Grant, proceeding down the Mississippi toward Vicksburg. Those that were with Buell, being over thirty, made the long and rapid march from the southern part of Tennessee to Louisville in the months of August and September. The season was dry and hot. Water was scarce and the dust intolerable. The march from Elizabethtown to Louisville, forty-three miles, was made in twenty-four hours. Resting a few days, the move was to Perryville. Eight Kentucky regiments were there engaged, notably the Fifteenth Infantry, which lost heavily, Colonel Curran Pope being mortally wounded, Lieutenant-Colonel George P. Jouett and Major William P. Campbell killed; also, Lieutenants McClure and McGrath and sixty-three men killed and two hundred wounded.

Among the killed in the battle of Perryville was General James S. Jackson, a native of Lexington, but who had removed to Hopkinsville to practise law in that place. He had served as a lieutenant in the Mexican War. He had been elected to Congress in June, 1861, but resigned his seat and went home to enter the military service on

behalf of the Union cause. He raised and led the Third Kentucky Cavalry until August, 1862, when he was made Brigadier-General, and in that capacity he was serving at the time of his death. It is proper to quote here what was said of this sad event by Colonel John W. Forney, the Philadelphia editor:

“To die such a death and for such a cause was the highest ambition of a man like James S. Jackson. He was the highest type of the Kentucky gentleman. To a commanding person he added an exquisite grace and suavity of manner, and a character that served to embody the purest and noblest chivalry. He was a Union man for the sake of the Union, and now with his heart's blood he has sealed his devotion to the flag. He leaves a multitude of friends who will honor his courage and patriotism and mourn his untimely and gallant end.”

A singular series of events occurred just preceding and during the invasion of Bragg, in connection with the State government at Frankfort, and the bogus “provisional government” which had been devised at Russellville. On the 16th of August, 1862, Governor Magoffin signified his intention to resign, being entirely out of harmony with all of his surroundings. The office of Lieutenant-Governor being vacant, the Speaker of the Senate, John W. Fisk, would succeed him. Fisk, however, resigned his office in order that James F. Robinson might be made Governor, which was done August 18th. This change is duly noted in Collins's *Annals*, and in less than two weeks thereafter this entry appears:

“August 31, *Sunday night*, the Legislature meets in extraordinary session, attends to the usual routine of business, and agrees to adjourn (out of tender consideration and respect for the Confederate army now approaching uncomfortably near) to meet in the Court House at Louisville on Tuesday, September 2.”

Thus Collins notes, in somewhat gleeful style, the sudden removal of the whole State government from Frankfort on account of the great invasion.

Then, one month and four days after, the following entry appears:

“ Oct. 4. Inaugural ceremonies of the provisional government of Kentucky, at Frankfort. Richard Hawes, of Bourbon, inaugurated Governor and in an address tells the listening crowd that ‘the State would be held by the Confederate army, cost what it might,’ a statement and assurance uttered in perfect good faith, and which his proud and honorable nature would have scorned to make, had he suspected that the vacillating General Bragg had deceived him, and that the Confederate army had even then commenced its ill-advised retreat. Four hours later the new government left Franklin in dignified haste, never to return.”

Thus Collins records in somewhat doleful style the sudden exit from Frankfort of the “provisional Governor” whose credentials were from the governing council named at Russellville in November, 1861, and which council had appointed Richard Hawes Governor of Kentucky after the death of George W. Johnson, who fell at Shiloh.

Another incident of the invasion was the extraordinary escape of the Federal troops from Cumberland Gap. When Kirby Smith moved into Kentucky he left a force to capture the garrison at that place, which was commanded by General George W. Morgan. The point was literally cut off from all aid, and the country without provisions. Confederates were on both sides of the Gap. Kirby Smith's and Humphrey Marshall's forces were in Kentucky. There was nothing for Morgan to do but to abandon the Gap and escape if he could. September 16th the retreat was commenced. The force he had was the Seventh Kentucky Infantry, Colonel Garrard;

the Fourteenth Kentucky Infantry, Colonel Cochran; the Nineteenth Kentucky Infantry, Colonel Landrum; the Twenty-Second Kentucky Infantry, Colonel D. W. Lindsay; Mundy's Battalion of the Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, and Patterson's company of engineers. He also had with him the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Tennessee regiments of Unionists. The retreat was across the east end of Kentucky by way of Manchester, Booneville, and West Liberty to Greenupsburg on the Ohio River. Perhaps the way followed the line of the ancient "Warriors' Path" along which the Indians had travelled long before. The country was familiar to Colonel Garrard and his mountain men, but it was full of Confederates. Marshall had orders to intercept the retreat, and General John Morgan's cavalry was assisting. General George Morgan says: "Frequent skirmishes took place, and it several times happened that while one Morgan was clearing out obstructions at the entrance of a defile the other Morgan was blockading the exit." In one instance a road had to be cut for four miles. For this work he had one thousand men under the supervision of Captain William F. Patterson and his company of engineers, a Kentucky organization which had a remarkable career throughout the war.

The retreating force crossed Kentucky River at Proctor, eluded Marshall at West Liberty, made a feint toward Maysville, and pushed on for Greenupsburg, where the Ohio was reached with the loss of only eighty men. Cumberland Gap had been captured and occupied by General George W. Morgan on the 18th of June, 1862. He abandoned it, as stated, September 16th. For a year the place remained in the hands of the Confederates. In September, 1863, it was retaken by a Kentucky officer, General James M. Shackelford, in connection with Burnside's East Tennessee expedition of 1863, and thenceforth was held by the Federal forces.

CHAPTER XV

MORGAN'S RAIDS

AS this work is not intended to be a history of the war, but is only to deal with the services of the Kentucky Unionists, no effort will be made to describe all the military operations which took place in the State. The various histories of the war have set forth all the larger movements and this will not be attempted here. But in order to show what were the services of the Kentucky Unionists, especially those who enlisted in the various regiments and in the Home Guard companies, it is necessary to mention briefly some of the military operations. Among these are the Morgan raids.

Many of Morgan's followers were Kentuckians, and it was natural that when raiding in Kentucky was thought to be desirable, it was carried on by Morgan. His command was several times in the State, and, while it did damage to the Federal cause in many ways, it is a remarkable fact that such damage would have been far greater except that he was met and turned back by the Union troops of Kentucky. He made five visits to his own State, and every time the visit was a hurried one. Every time he was compelled to retire, and conspicuous among the troops which he either encountered or escaped from were the Union troops of Kentucky. General Morgan's able lieutenant, General Basil W. Duke, has written a volume detailing the exploits of his chief, and in order to show in short space the general features of these

Kentucky raids, the headings of the chapters of Duke's history which describe operations in Kentucky will here be given:

"Chapter 8. Reorganization at Chattanooga. First raid into Kentucky. Fight at Tompkinsville. Capture of Lebanon. Telegraph strategy. Morgan master of the situation. Fight at Cynthiana. Evade the pursuing troops.

"Chapter 10. Again on the march for Kentucky. The Confederate army enters the State. Service in front of Lexington. Efforts to embarrass the retreat of Federal General Morgan. Fight at Augusta. Retreat of the army from Kentucky. Captures Lexington.

"Chapter 11. Morgan's retreat through Southwestern Kentucky. At Gallatin again. Scouting and ambuscades. Driven from Gallatin. A week's fighting around Lebanon (Tenn.). Battle of Hartsville.

"Chapter 12. December raid into Kentucky. Capture of Elizabethtown. Fight at the Rolling Fork. Escape from the toils.

"Chapter 13. Service during the winter of 1863-4. Clark's raid into Kentucky. Battle of Milton. Defeat at Snow Hill.

"Chapter 14. Service in Tennessee, and on the Cumberland River in Kentucky. Fight at Greasy Creek. Active scouting. The Division starts for Ohio. Crossing the Cumberland in face of the enemy. Fight at Columbia, Green River, and Lebanon. Crossing the Ohio. The militia objecting. Fight with the gunboats. March through Indiana and Ohio. Detour around Cincinnati. Defeat at Buffington.

"Chapter 16. Services of the remnant of Morgan's command while the General was in prison. Reception of General Morgan by the people of the South. He is assigned to command in Southwestern Virginia. Fight with Averill. Action at Dublin Depot. Last raid into Kentucky. Capture of Mt. Sterling. Severe engagement next day. Capture of Lexington. Success at Cynthiana. Retreat from Kentucky."

It thus appears that every chapter records evading or escaping pursuers, or else defeat or retreat.

The first raid made by Morgan into Kentucky occurred in July, 1862. His report is found in *War Records*, series I, vol. 16, pt. 1, p. 767. His troops were his own regiment and a regiment of Georgia partisan rangers, a squadron of Texans, and two companies of Tennesseans. He entered Kentucky near Glasgow, moved up to Lebanon, and thence through Harrodsburg, Lawrenceburg, Versailles, Georgetown, Paris, and Winchester, to Richmond. On the way he encountered no force that was sufficient to resist his progress. The mention of the Home Guards is insignificant. At one place they attacked him. At another they undertook to oppose, but fled. At another he took seventy of them prisoners. He did not go to Frankfort, the capital of the State, because he learned there was a force there "of 2000 or 3000 men consisting of Home Guards collected from the adjacent counties, and a few regular troops." He says he "dispersed about 1500 Home Guards." He mentions being "welcomed with gladness," but says nothing of any flocking to his standard. Having arrived at Richmond, he says:

"I had determined to make a stand at Richmond and await reinforcements, as the whole people appeared ready to rise and join me, but I received information that large bodies of cavalry under General Clay Smith and Colonels Wolford, Metcalfe, Mundy, and Wynkoop were endeavoring to surround me at this place, so I moved on to Crab Orchard."

At Crab Orchard he learned of orders to pursue him, and he moved on through Monticello back to Tennessee.

Other reports show that the troops which gathered to oppose Morgan were directed by General J. T. Boyle, and were led by Colonels Wolford, Metcalfe, Mundy, Landrum, Hallisy, Maxwell, and Guthrie, all Kentucky officers, besides the organized Home Guards under Colo-

nels Wadsworth and Worthington and Captain Faulkner. Thus, the first raid was warded off from the capital of the State, nor did it reach the important city of Lexington, but was confined to a passage through unimportant places. Nor could he "make a stand to await reinforcements," and the troops thus interfering with his designs were the organized Kentuckians.

According to his report, he was in the State more than three weeks, and augmented his force by only 500 recruits, which was an inconsiderable number considering that he was in his own State and the claims of being "welcomed with gladness," and the "readiness of the whole people to rise and join him," and considering, further, that he was compelled to retire from Richmond for fear of being surrounded by Kentucky Unionists, who had rallied and gathered under Kentucky leaders for that purpose.

The second time Morgan came into Kentucky was in the same summer of 1862, appearing as the advance guard of the great invasion under Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith. There were no troops in the State to resist this great invasion, and for two months a considerable portion of Kentucky was occupied by the Confederates. Their operations were confined to the country lying east of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. The events of this invasion have been considered in a separate chapter. In this place, however, it will be recalled that a strong demonstration was made toward Cincinnati by General Kirby Smith's forces, and that numerous troops gathered to protect that city. One of the incidents in that connection was the design of a portion of Morgan's troops to cross the Ohio River above Cincinnati, at Augusta, Kentucky, and move down upon the city. At Augusta they encountered the Union Home Guards under Dr. Joshua T. Bradford, and a desperate fight ensued. The design of crossing the river was frustrated.

Some details of this sanguinary battle are given in Collins's *Kentucky*, vol. i, page 112.

At the same time portions of Morgan's command undertook, in conjunction with the Confederate force which came out of Virginia under General Humphrey Marshall, to cut off the retreat of General George W. Morgan from Cumberland Gap. That incident has been mentioned in another chapter, but it is proper to say in this connection that General George W. Morgan successfully fought his way through, and that half of his command consisted of Kentucky troops.

It is well-known history that after the battle of Perryville, on the 8th of October, 1862, the larger forces under Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith retreated out of Kentucky through the mountains of East Tennessee, obstructing the roads behind them by felling trees. Morgan's cavalry, however, made their way across the State westwardly as far as Hopkinsville, and thence returned to Tennessee. This is denominated in General Duke's history as "Morgan's Retreat through Southwestern Kentucky."

A conspicuous feature of this great occasion when Morgan was in Kentucky was the disappointment the Confederates received over their reception. Although great Confederate armies were in the State, and Morgan's cavalry operated from the mountains to the west end, and although a great part of the State was controlled by them for nearly two months, it does not appear that they materially augmented their forces by Kentucky volunteers. The people were called upon to rise and join their "liberators," but they did not respond. On the contrary, at that very time numerous Union regiments formed and organized, which thereafter took a prominent part in repelling future raids. The Kentucky people were appealed to, and they were threatened with conscription. They were insensible to the appeal and the threat, and

forthwith rallied to the flag of the Union in many new regimental organizations.

Morgan's third raid into Kentucky was in December of the same year, 1862. On this occasion he struck the Louisville and Nashville Railroad above Munfordville and proceeded northward. His report is in *War Records*, series I, vol. 20, p. 154. He says that "just as his rear regiments were crossing Rolling Fork, a large force of the enemy—consisting of cavalry and several pieces of artillery which had followed us from Elizabethtown—came up and began to shell the ford at which the troops were crossing." In the fight which ensued Colonel Basil Duke was disabled. "Colonel Breckinridge then took command and maintained the position until Colonel Clark's regiment had crossed the river, when I ordered him to fall back, which he accomplished in good order and without loss." That night Morgan's command reached Bardstown. The next night it was at Springfield. There he learned of "vastly superior forces" gathering, and it was but a short time when he crossed Cumberland River at Burkesville, and was out of the State.

We now turn to the report of Colonel John M. Harlan in the same volume, page 137, and there ascertain who it was that halted Morgan's expedition at Rolling Fork. When Harlan learned of Morgan's expedition against the Louisville and Nashville Railroad he was at Gallatin, Tennessee. He obtained a train of a few cars and proceeded up the road with all expedition. In his command were the Thirteenth Kentucky Infantry, Major Hobson; the Twelfth Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel Shanks; the Fourth Kentucky Infantry, Colonel Croxton; the Tenth Kentucky Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Hays. Colonel Harlan says in his report that he came upon the enemy at Rolling Fork, and

"from a high hill I saw quite distinctly a very large body of

cavalry formed in line of battle near the river. Their officers were riding along their line, apparently preparing to give us battle. Knowing that Morgan had a larger force than I had, I proceeded cautiously, and yet as expeditiously as the nature of the ground and the circumstances admitted. My men were formed in two lines. Skirmishers were thrown out from both infantry and cavalry, covering our whole front, and were ordered to advance and engage the enemy, the whole line following in close supporting distance. The firing commenced on the part of the rebels on our left. It was promptly and vigorously responded to by my skirmishers and the artillery. After a while the rebels were driven away and they then made some demonstrations to occupy an eminence on my right. To meet this movement the Tenth Indiana, Colonel Carroll, was ordered to occupy that eminence, from which four companies were ordered to clear the woods on the right of my line. The Fourth Kentucky, Colonel Croxton, Fourteenth Ohio, Colonel Este, Seventy-Fourth Indiana, Colonel Chapman, were ordered to form on the left of the Tenth Indiana. A section of the battery was ordered to occupy the eminence, and the Tenth Kentucky, Colonel Hays, ordered to support it. This left the Thirteenth Kentucky, Major Hobson, on my left, supporting the section of the battery stationed there. The firing now became general all along the right of our line of skirmishers, but the rebels, after an obstinate resistance, broke and fled precipitately in every direction. Some struck out into the woods, some went up the river as far as New Haven, some swam the river with their horses. Further pursuit that evening was impracticable, and, I may say, impossible in the exhausted state of my men, they having left Munfordville Sunday morning and came up with the enemy the succeeding day at one o'clock—43 miles distant."

Colonel Harlan further says in his report :

"I claim for my command that it saved the Rolling Fork bridge, and most probably prevented any attempt to destroy the bridge at Shepherdsville, thus saving from destruction property of immense value, and preventing the utter destruction

of the line of railway by which our army at Nashville is mainly supplied. And I submit whether the attack on Morgan's forces, the timely arrival of my command at Rolling Fork, did not prevent a raid upon other important points in Kentucky. It is very certain that after my command drove the rebel chieftain across the Rolling Fork in such a precipitate manner, he abandoned the railroad, and very soon thereafter fled from the State, hotly pursued by other forces."

The "other forces" mentioned were under command of Colonel William A. Hoskins, of the Twelfth Kentucky Infantry. His report is in the same volume, page 141. He mentions as in his command a squadron of the Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, under Major Gratz; a squadron of the Ninth Kentucky Cavalry under Major Rue. The Twelfth Kentucky Infantry and a portion of the Sixteenth Kentucky Infantry also joined in the pursuit, but it was easy for a retreating cavalry force to escape, and it did so, not staying to continue further work of destruction.

Thus for the third time Morgan was met by Kentucky troops, and, as stated in the headings of General Duke's twelfth chapter, "escaped from the toils."

Colonel Harlan's prompt and expeditious movement up the railroad all the way from Tennessee, and his attack at Rolling Fork, ended the raid and turned it into a retreat. His success is, as usual, attributed to "overwhelming numbers." He had with him such men of his brigade as could be hurried to the point, and Shaler says Morgan's force was 3000. Harlan says in his report that he knew Morgan had a larger force than his own. Yet Shaler, to account for the discomfiture of Morgan and the checking of the raid, says Morgan was attacked by "about seven thousand Federal troops." (P. 327.) He does not mention Colonel Harlan nor does he tell that Morgan retreated rapidly out of the State pursued by other Kentucky troops. Shaler's work is a *History of Kentucky*, but to him the Confederates constituted

Kentucky in the war period, excepting as he names the Union commanders for purposes of censure.

The fourth raid of Morgan into Kentucky was the celebrated one which extended into Indiana and Ohio.

About the 1st day of July, 1863, Morgan crossed the Cumberland River at Burkesville, and proceeded northwardly through Columbia to Lebanon; thence, turning westwardly, passed through Springfield and Bardstown, and on to the Ohio River at Brandenburg, where he crossed, and proceeded through Indiana and Ohio until captured.

Nothing is shown, by any reports, to have been accomplished by this raid. Collins in his history calls it "startling in its conception, masterly and terrible in its progress and execution, but fatally disastrous in its results." (Vol. i., p. 127.) What it was, except a long ride ending in capture, is not shown in any reports. No important place was touched, and nothing was effected except the excitement incidental to such a passage through the country. Nor was it favorably commented on by the Confederate authorities.

The raid has always been called "remarkable." But it is a fact susceptible of the clearest demonstration that the pursuit of Morgan was far more remarkable than the raid. The telegram announcing the capture of Morgan was from General J. M. Shackelford, a distinguished Kentucky officer, and dated July 26, 1863. Shackelford's official report, made a few days after, tells briefly the story of the pursuit. (*War Records*, series 1, vol. 23, pt. 1, p. 639.) General E. H. Hobson, another distinguished Kentucky officer, who was the ranking officer in the pursuit, also made his report. (*Ibid.* p. 658.) These reports relate the facts, though they have never been carried into the histories of Kentucky which treat of the raid. The usual silence of the Kentucky Unionists

touching their services in the war, which has been mentioned, is applicable in this instance.

In Collins's *Kentucky* (vol. i., p. 126) a short account is given of the raid, in which it appears that when Morgan had reached the vicinity of Cincinnati, "Brigadier-Generals Edward H. Hobson and James M. Shackelford, and Colonel Frank Wolford, with the First, Third, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Kentucky Cavalry, and perhaps other Federal troops, are following close after Morgan, but do not seem to gain much on his extraordinary travelling speed and endurance." Shaler adds nothing to what Collins says. Both, however, condemn the Federal officers for not recognizing a "peculiar surrender" which Morgan made to a "militia captain," who was not a militia captain, or even a militia-man, but in fact nothing but a citizen who was in Morgan's custody at the time.

Some details of the pursuit will here be given.

When it became known that Morgan was threatening to advance into Kentucky General Shackelford was at Russellville. He took his command to Glasgow at once, June 26th. From thence he proceeded to Marrowbone, ten miles from Burkesville, which is on the Cumberland River, and his force united with that of General Hobson, which had moved down from Columbia. Before the troops were aware of it, Morgan crossed the Cumberland at Burkesville, and moved rapidly toward Columbia. He fought unsuccessfully at Green River Bridge July 4th, crossed the stream at another place and went on to Lebanon, where he encountered a portion of a regiment under Colonel Charles S. Hanson, a Kentucky officer. He was not again delayed in his movements until he reached the Ohio River.

From Marrowbone, Shackelford's and Hanson's commands followed the track of Morgan through Columbia to Lebanon. Without delay the two officers passed on

through Springfield and Bardstown and reached Brandenburg soon after Morgan crossed the Ohio. They immediately crossed at the same place and the pursuit went on through Indiana and Ohio.

The troops which have been mentioned were the principal part of the forces—the First, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Kentucky Cavalry, and a portion of the Third Kentucky Cavalry. The First Kentucky Cavalry was led by Colonel Wolford, the Eighth by Colonel Benjamin H. Bristow, the Ninth by Colonel R. T. Jacob, the Eleventh by Colonel Holeman, the Twelfth by Colonel Eugene Crittenden, the Third Cavalry by Major Wolfley. At first there were some infantry, but they could not follow in pursuit. Some other regiments of cavalry, including the Eighth and Ninth Michigan, under command of Colonel W. P. Sanders, a Kentucky officer, joined the pursuers in Indiana, they having moved rapidly to Madison, Indiana, from the central part of Kentucky.

The troops under Shackelford and Hobson which started from the Cumberland River were the ones which ran down the great raider and captured him. They were Kentucky regiments mainly. Their leaders were well-known Kentuckians—Shackelford, Hobson, Jacob, Bristow, Crittenden, Wolford, Holeman, W. O. Boyle, Sanders, Ward, Wolfley. General Shackelford in his report thus mentions the officers of his command:

“Colonel Kautz, who commanded the Seventh and Second Ohio, Colonel Jacob, Ninth Kentucky, Colonel Crittenden and Major Delfosse, of the Twelfth Kentucky, Colonel Bristow and Lieutenant-Colonel Holloway, and Major Starling, of the Eighth Kentucky, Major Wolfley, of the Third Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, of the First Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Melton of the Second E. Tenn. Infantry, Major Carpenter, Second E. Tenn. Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Ross, Forty-fifth Ohio Mounted Infantry, Captain Powers and Lieutenant Longfellow of the Fifth Indiana Cavalry, Captain

Dodd, Third Ohio Cavalry, Captain Kinney, Third Ohio, Captain Ward, Third Kentucky Cavalry, and Adjutant Carpenter of the First Kentucky Cavalry, deserve the gratitude of the whole country for their energy and gallantry."

In his report of the capture of Morgan and Morgan's claim to have surrendered on terms to a "militia captain," Shackelford says he told Morgan

"that we had followed him thirty days and nights; that his demand could not be considered a moment; that I regarded his surrender to the militia captain under such circumstances as not only absurd and ridiculous, but unfair and illegal, and that I would not recognize it at all."

The manner of the surrender to the "militia captain" is given in a communication of Governor Tod of Ohio to General Morgan (*War Records*, series 1, vol. 23, pt. 1, p. 814), in which he says:

"Said Burbick is not and never was a militia officer in the service of this State; that he was captured by you and travelled with you some considerable distance before your surrender."

Burbick's statement to the same effect is found in the same volume, p. 809, in which he says:

"I was captain of no militia whatever, or any other force of men, but was appointed that Sunday morning as Captain by the men that went out with me on horseback, there being some fifteen or twenty in number."

If the capture had been by some fresh troops springing into the chase from some impossible source, it would not have been so remarkable. But such was not the case. The captors were the men who started on the pursuit at Burkesville, on the Cumberland River. As soon as they could assemble for the purpose, they moved on the track Morgan had taken, up through Columbia and Lebanon, on through Springfield to Bardstown. They could not divine that so extraordinary a thing would occur as the

passage of the Ohio River. They naturally looked for the chase to be southwestwardly through Kentucky. When word came that Morgan had gone to Brandenburg and was crossing the river, a push was made to arrive there before the crossing was effected. They were not in time, and there was nothing to do but to follow on through Indiana. They crossed at the same place and pushed on, following the course Morgan took. Where it would lead to they could not guess, but without halt or rest the pursuit continued. Day and night they rode; horses and men gave out but others closed up, and Shackelford gave no respite. Indiana was crossed and then Ohio, and on the far side of the last named State at last the pursuers gained upon the pursued. At first they gathered up many stragglers, then they came upon the main body, passed beyond it by side roads, turned, and enveloped the greater part of the command.

Morgan himself had passed on further, but the pursuit made no halt. At last he was run down and captured with the remaining men. This was nine hundred miles from the point of starting. Morgan had made a great ride, accomplished nothing, and was a prisoner. The Union regiments of Kentucky, with their indomitable leaders, had made a greater ride, run down Morgan and his men, and captured them, making the pursuit far more remarkable than the raid.

Without extending this account further it will be seen that the troops which made that capture rode from Russellville and other points to Burkesville, where Morgan crossed Cumberland River, and from thence followed the pursuit. They were close upon Morgan at the Ohio River. Then with hard riding, night and day, across the States of Ohio and Indiana, they at last outrode, turned upon the pursued, surrounded them, and captured them. It is claimed for Morgan that at one point he made ninety miles in thirty-five hours. If this is true, what must have

been the riding capacity of the pursuers who succeeded in overtaking a force moving so rapidly?

A just consideration of the whole incident makes it clear that the pursuit was more remarkable than the raid. Thus for the fourth time Morgan was discomfited by the Union soldiers of Kentucky.

The fifth and last raid of Morgan into Kentucky was made in the summer of 1864. Having escaped after his capture, he was given a command in southwestern Virginia, and in the month of June, 1864, he entered Kentucky through Pound Gap, in the Cumberland range, and moved rapidly in the direction of Lexington. General Burbridge, in anticipation of such a movement, was making his way toward Pound Gap. In the command of General Burbridge was Colonel John Mason Brown, one of the most energetic and intelligent officers in the service. He was commanding a brigade in which was his own regiment, the Forty-fifth Kentucky. Colonel Brown ascertained that Morgan had entered the State and was headed for the central parts. He counselled a rapid return, which at once commenced, Brown leading the advance. By moving with extraordinary rapidity, making ninety miles in twenty-four hours, the Federal troops began to come up with Morgan. On the 12th day of June Morgan had advanced toward Georgetown, and sent a force ahead to capture Frankfort and secure a crossing of Kentucky River by the bridge at that point, but this force was met by a company of State troops and one or two companies of enrolled militia hastily called out by the Adjutant-General, D. W. Lindsay; and Morgan, finding that his crossing at Frankfort would be seriously resisted, deflected to Cynthiana, where the Federal troops under Burbridge, Brown, and Hanson—all Kentucky officers—fell upon him, and practically broke up his entire command, capturing many and driving the wreck of his force out of the State through the mountains. The

Kentucky regiments thus engaged were as follows: Thirteenth Cavalry, Thirty-fifth Mounted Infantry, Forty-fifth Mounted Infantry, Fortieth Mounted Infantry, Forty-seventh Mounted Infantry, Twenty-sixth Mounted Infantry, Thirtieth Mounted Infantry, Eleventh Cavalry, Thirty-seventh Mounted Infantry, Thirty-ninth Mounted Infantry.

Collins says of this event:

"Part of Morgan's forces escaped through Scott County, while he led the main force, after paroling some 600 prisoners taken on the 10th, on the Clayville and Augusta road through Mayslick, Mason County, on the same night, and Flemingsburg on the next morning. His raid proved exceedingly disastrous." (Vol. i., p. 135.)

General Bragg, in a report dated July 2d, says:

"The accounts received so far do not indicate any satisfactory results of the movement into Kentucky by General Morgan. Should he ever return with his command it will as usual be disorganized or unfit for service until again armed, equipped, and disciplined. The large number of prisoners we always lose by these raiding expeditions has been the source of great evil."

Morgan says in his official report that his intention was to break the railroad from Cincinnati to Lexington, and then strike for the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. (*War Records*, Serial No. 77, p. 65.)

Thus for the fifth time Morgan's plans were defeated, and he was driven from the State by the organized regiments of Kentucky Unionists. Kentucky troops frustrated his purpose to destroy the railroads in central Kentucky and then pass on and destroy the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and forced him back before he accomplished anything.

It is not the purpose in this volume to deal with any of the conduct of Morgan and his men, but only to show that,

while historians have heralded his exploits as so extraordinary, in every instance when he raided his own State, having with him men who knew the roads everywhere, he was met and successfully resisted by the Unionists of Kentucky.¹

The purpose is to show that the noted raider, whose reputation has been exalted by such historians as Shaler, was met and handled by the men of his own State, whose services have not seemed to be worthy of mention in the biased minds of these writers.

It must not be supposed that troops which could be rallied to contend with Morgan in Kentucky were detained in the State simply for that purpose. They had to deal with other raiders, and bands of partisan rangers, any and all of whom would appear upon the scene unexpectedly, and troops were constantly on the alert to protect the State from the whole combination. Nor must it be supposed, when several regiments of Kentucky Union soldiers are named as engaging in some special conflict, that the number of regiments represents that many thousand troops. The regiments were broken up into detachments, operating in many different places, and when the regiment is mentioned it was a fact in nearly all cases that only a portion, perhaps only a fragment, was present. For this reason the presence of quite a number of regiments by name might be indicated without making the "overwhelming numbers" so often mentioned by the historians, to account for the defeat of the Confederate enterprises.

Shaler and others who have written the histories of Kentucky adopt the claims made for the superior prowess of Confederate troops and record them as historic facts, but when the records of the war are examined it is found that for courage and endurance and efficiency no soldiers

¹ *War Records*, Serial No. 77, pp. 74 to 84.

could excel those who made up the Union organizations in Kentucky. Nor were there any leaders more vigilant and persistent, or who led troops with more energy and enthusiasm and devotion, than the Union generals of Kentucky and the officers of these organizations. It is not history but sentiment that would seek to exalt the qualities of soldiership of either side in the conflict over the other, and when the facts according to the records are considered no such distinction appears to have existed.

CHAPTER XVI

THE GUERRILLA EVIL

IT is necessary to mention with some detail the character and work of guerrillas in Kentucky during the war, especially toward the end, in order to remove the impression made on many minds by writers of so-called history that the Kentucky Unionists, in one way or another, were responsible for a very deplorable condition of affairs which existed.

Great consideration was shown to Kentucky by the authorities at Washington in the selection of officers for local command in the State. General Robert Anderson of Sumter fame was a Kentuckian, and the first officer placed in charge, General William Nelson, was also a Kentuckian. In July, 1862, General J. T. Boyle was placed in command of the District of Kentucky. He was one of the most distinguished citizens of the State, the son of one of her greatest judges, well acquainted with the people, and most highly esteemed. Other Kentucky officers were kept on duty in the State, and in the sections where they were best known. Among these were General E. H. Hobson, General J. M. Shackelford, General S. S. Fry, General E. H. Murray; also, Colonels Charles H. Hanson, T. B. Fairleigh, Marc Mundy, Cicero Maxwell, John Mason Brown, John H. Ward, Saunders Bruce, were at different times assigned to commands in the State. The administration of military affairs was thus largely entrusted to men well known and of the highest character. On the 15th of February General S.

G. Burbridge was placed in command of the district. He had made a fine reputation as a soldier in the field, and no officer was more highly regarded. He raised the Twenty-sixth Kentucky Infantry and led it as Colonel until made General. He commanded a brigade in 1862 when General Bragg entered Kentucky; was in like command under General Sherman at Chickasaw Bayou, under Grant at Vicksburg, and under Banks afterward. He was a native of Logan County, Kentucky, and his appointment was regarded as eminently appropriate.

During his administration of affairs the work of guerrillas in Kentucky was so active, and so much trouble was given by them, he was ordered to deal with them and their aiders and abettors and sympathizers with great severity.¹ It must be remembered that the great majority of the people of Kentucky were Unionists. From the Union homes the young men had gone out as Union soldiers, leaving their homes without protection. Therefore, we naturally find an order of General Grant to Burbridge, beginning as follows:

“That habit of raiding parties of rebel cavalry visiting towns, villages, and farms where there are no Federal forces, pillaging Union families, having become prevalent,” etc. (directions being then given to abate the evil).

Not only did these raiding parties mistreat the Union population of Kentucky, but made war upon isolated bodies of Union troops, government stores, railroads, bridges, and all persons and property in any wise connected with or used by the Federal forces.

Burbridge's rough handling of these raiders and their aiders and abettors brought down upon him the maledictions of the Confederate element in Kentucky, which never did from the beginning to the end of the war come to realize that the Union side was rightfully in control in

¹ See Appendix, § 18, p. 253.

Kentucky, but always acted as though they believed Kentucky was a Confederate State, and that the Unionists were intruders.

It would require a volume to deal with the administration of Burbridge in detail. He published his own defence against what he called "vituperation heaped upon his head," in which he copied the orders under which he acted. He also published reports of various Confederate officers charging each other with bad conduct and denying that he had done wrong.

It is not the purpose to enter into any controversy about Burbridge in this work, but it is necessary to show with what a desperate enemy it was his fortune to have to deal, in order to explain the situation in which others were placed as well as he.

The principal complaint against Burbridge was that he put in practice retaliatory measures, and caused men to be shot for the killing of Unionists by guerrillas. Retaliation is one of the incidents of all wars. It was practised on both sides in our great struggle, and it is one of the saddest features of war. Jefferson Davis, in his history, tells how he directed "that Major-General Hunter and Brigadier-General Phelps should be no longer held and treated as public enemies of the Confederate States, but as outlaws," to be held, if captured, for execution as felons.

He also says he declared General Ben. F. Butler a felon, to be no longer treated as a public enemy, but "a felon deserving capital punishment," and in the event of his capture the officer in command should cause him to be immediately executed by hanging."

"These measures of retaliation," says Mr. Davis, "were in conformity with the usages of war and were adopted to check and punish the cruelty of the adversary."¹

¹ See Appendix, § 19, p. 354.

Burbridge was practising retaliation, and was acting under the orders of his superiors, and it may be said of his measures, as well as those adopted by Mr. Davis, that they were "to check and punish the cruelty of the adversary." The language is as applicable to the one case as to the other.

Burbridge found the State of Kentucky full of guerrillas—absolutely overrun by them. He caused captured men who had been engaged in guerrilla operations to be taken to the spot where the Unionists were killed and there executed. He could not have taken any but avowed Confederate soldiers, if he took any at all, for every guerrilla captured claimed to be in the Confederate service, not excepting even the notorious Sue Mundy (Jerome Clark). (Collins, i., 157.)

The complaint, therefore, would be much more justly made against the principle of retaliation which both sides practised than against any particular officer who carried out the practice which Mr. Davis says was "in conformity with the usages of war." If retaliation is inseparable from a condition of war, it only goes to show what cruelties and hardships belong to such condition, and ought to serve to deter men from rushing too hastily into war.

But it must not be supposed that Burbridge was the only Federal officer in Kentucky charged with offences at the time, and by the writers of history since.

From the beginning it was charged that Kentucky was under military despotism. Every Federal officer in control was made out to be unworthy for some reason. Abuse was heaped upon all without discrimination, and these ill-tempered criticisms of the war period have been duly reiterated by the writers of history.

Shaler says:

"The Federal commanders had undertaken to regulate a great many matters that did not properly concern them. The

principal offender was Brigadier-General Boyle, of Louisville, commanding the Provost Guard forces in Kentucky. This man was much more vigorous in his dealings with citizens than with soldiers, and for a time carried a high hand as a tyrant in Kentucky."

He also says (p. 320):

"The action of men like Boyle did a great deal to turn many men against the Federal authority. They had entered on the war to preserve the laws that these cheap brigadiers treated with contempt."

General Boyle preceded General Burbridge. Shaler characterizes Burbridge as brutal. Burbridge was succeeded by General John M. Palmer, of Illinois, a Kentuckian by birth, and an honorable man and officer. Yet Shaler says of Palmer that, "though he *fell under the same influences which had guided Burbridge in his course*, he never disgraced his calling."¹ He says General C. C. Gilbert was guilty of a high-handed outrage at one time, and that "greatly to the disgrace of the Union arms" Shackelford refused to observe John Morgan's surrender to a man although he was in fact no officer, nor even a military man.

In such manner a writer of history, echoing the intemperate speeches made in the anger of the hour, carries them into the printed page and into the shelves of the libraries of the country, and thus blackens the character of the Union men of Kentucky who struggled through appalling difficulties to uphold the Union and the cause of our country, while he has only words of extravagant praise for John Morgan and all his men, and all other Confederates.

The unjust comments of Shaler are not founded upon any record. Shaler is quoted in Smith's *History*, but when the documentary history of the war is examined,

¹ See Appendix, § 20, p. 355.

and when even Collins's laboriously gathered "annals" are examined, no foundation for these comments is found.

As another instance of Shaler's echoing the bitter talk of the war instead of writing history, he is especially severe on the Federal provost marshals. Nothing appears upon any record against them, but doubtless there were oral crinations, as there were about every possible phase of Federal control in the State of Kentucky. His language is:

"There can be no doubt that the people of Kentucky endured far more outrage from the acts of the Federal provost marshals than they did from all the acts of legitimate war put together." (P. 353.)

Shaler also places the Union Home Guards of Kentucky on the same plane with guerrillas, the sole basis being that in one item of Collins's *Annals* it is stated that General Burbridge issued an order to his troops, including the Home Guards, against committing outrages, as had been reported. It is not uncommon for commanders to issue such orders, and for this one instance Shaler accuses the Home Guards, who were remarkably well behaved, and really had no charges against them, according to the records, of being so bad as to be classed with guerrillas.

The injustice of such history makes it necessary, therefore, to show who the guerrillas were, who made such a desperate condition of affairs in Kentucky; also, to show what they did, and this will be done from citations from the authentic records, and also from Collins's *Annals*.

Great efforts have been made to make it appear that the guerrillas who infested Kentucky during the war belonged to one side as well as the other. They have been called "deserters from both sides," and "freebooters" from the ranks of the Unionists as well as Confederates. It is easy to write words down, and easy to say anything, but there is nothing in the records upon which to base the statement. On the other hand, the authori-

ties are abundant that the guerrillas were acting under the authority of the Confederate government. They were called out, organized, and sent out for the purpose of damaging the Union cause. They made war on Unionists, and upon Union soldiers, and upon the property of the Federal government. One writer, whose object was to show up General Burbridge as a "miscreant of all colors," said that Burbridge "chose to assume that the guerrilla bands were acting under the orders and receiving the protection of the Confederate commanders." The same writer pays a high tribute to Governor Thomas E. Bramlette, as a man of great intellectual force, courage, and fairness. Yet it was Governor Bramlette who issued a proclamation holding all "rebel sympathizers" responsible for guerrilla raids. He requests the military commandants in the State to arrest and hold responsible "rebel sympathizers," when guerrilla outrages are perpetrated. The historian Collins denounces this for its severity, saying, "It is a sad state of things that suggests, and sadder still that tolerates, such unwarrantable assumptions of executive power." Yet this was Governor Bramlette's proclamation. (Collins, vol. i., p. 130.)

We may as well give this proclamation of Governor Bramlette in full. It is as follows:

"EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
FRANKFORT, KY., Jan. 4, 1864.

"The frequent outrages perpetrated in various parts of the State by lawless bands of marauders can in large degree be traced to the active aid of rebel sympathizers in our midst, as their neglect to furnish to military commandants the information in their possession which would lead to the defeat and capture of such marauders.

"Sympathizers with the rebellion who, while enjoying protection from the government, abuse the leniency extended to them by concealing the movements of rebel guerrillas, by

giving them information, affording them shelter, supplying them with provisions, and otherwise encouraging and fomenting private raids, are in criminal complicity with all the outrages perpetrated by the marauders whom they secretly countenance.

“It is in the power of persons whose sympathies are with the rebellion to prevent guerrilla raids almost invariably, by furnishing to military officers of the United States or State of Kentucky the information which experience has proved them to be, as a general thing, possessed of.

“If all would unite, as is their duty, in putting down guerrillas, we would soon cease to be troubled with their raids. A neglect to afford all assistance and information which may aid in defeating the designs of marauding parties can but be construed as a culpable and active assistance to our enemies.

“I therefore request that the various military commandants in the State of Kentucky will, in every instance where a loyal citizen is taken off by bands of guerrillas, immediately arrest at least five of the most prominent and active rebel sympathizers in the vicinity of such outrage, for every loyal man taken by guerrillas. These sympathizers should be held as hostages for the safe and speedy return of the loyal citizen. Where there are disloyal relatives of guerrillas, they should be the chief sufferers. Let them learn that if they refuse to exert themselves actively for the assistance and protection of the loyal, they must expect to reap the just fruits of their complicity with the enemies of our own State and people.”

The term “partisan ranger” was often used in the records of the period interchangeably with the term “guerrilla.” Both had the same object in view; and that object was the injury of everybody and everything pertaining to the Union cause. Those who care nothing for the records which were made during the war, and who write and speak unsupported assertions for facts, cannot make history by so doing. The history of the guerrillas of

our Civil War is found in the records of the Confederate Congress, in the communications made by the Confederate leaders, and in other documents of that period. Extracts from these will be given, enough to establish the fact that partisan rangers and guerrillas were expressly authorized by the Confederate authorities; that they were expressly sent out to do precisely that which the guerrillas in fact did; that the Confederate commanders used the terms "partisan rangers" and "guerrillas" interchangeably; that under these designations these bands made war upon the cause of the Union.

It will be shown that the work mapped out for and undertaken by the "partisan rangers" was precisely that which the guerrillas were engaged in doing in Kentucky. They were "independent and separate commands," commissioned to go forth in "guerrilla" bands, to operate in the enemy's lines, including Kentucky, where they did, in fact, operate so extensively. It would be puerile to contend that they were to operate upon friend and foe alike, and equally puerile to contend that they were sent out for any other purpose than to infest the country, and do all the damage they could.

It will be seen that there was so much just complaint against these authorized "rangers," made by high officers in the Confederacy, on various grounds, that the Confederate Congress passed an act repealing the act of authorization, with the proviso, however, that such bands as were operating "within the enemy's lines" were not to be discontinued—showing plainly that the evil of the ranger or guerrilla warfare was so detrimental to the Confederate country it had to be stopped, but that Kentucky might continue to suffer under it.

It will appear, too, that the Confederate authorities issued orders to correct the irregularities of the "rangers," excepting those "serving within the enemy's lines."

One of the hardest tasks of the Kentucky Unionists

during the war was to protect themselves and the State of Kentucky from the raids and lawlessness of these Confederate guerrillas, or, as they were universally called in the war time, "rebel guerrillas." The Kentucky Unionists in regularly organized regiments, and in regularly organized Home Guard companies, made unceasing war on guerrillas. They pursued and ran them down and captured them, and so effectually was the work done that all, or nearly all, of the notorious leaders were killed.

On the other hand, it cannot be shown by any records of the period that any roving guerrilla bands were authorized by the State of Kentucky or by the general government. It cannot be shown by any record, Federal or Confederate, that there were any "Union guerrillas," and the effort to lay upon the Union Home Guards of Kentucky blame like that universally laid upon the "rebel guerrillas" cannot be supported by any records of the day.

The following quotations make clear who the guerrillas were. Many more of like nature might be made, but these are deemed sufficient:

"ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
"RICHMOND, June 18, 1861.

"F. A. BRISCOE, ESQ.,
"Winchester, Va.

SIR:—In reply to your letter of June 12, 1861, to Mr. F. A. Baldwin, in relation to organizing a guerrilla force, I am directed to say that such a force when organized, armed, and equipped will be received into service, and commissions issued to the officers thereof from this office so soon as advised of compliance with foregoing requirements. I am, Sir,

"Respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"R. H. CHILTON,

"Assistant Adj. Genl."

(*War Records*, Serial No. 127, p. 395.)

The following is an extract from a letter from William

Skeen, written to the Confederate Secretary of War, from Warm Springs, Virginia, June 30, 1861:

"When I had the honor of an interview with you some ten days ago upon the importance of establishing a guerrilla service in the northwest, I understood you to agree with the views presented, and that you would ask the concurrence of the President, and in the event of his approbation, that the service would be ordered. Since, I have waited anxiously a communication from you; anxiously because as a citizen of the northwest I am deeply interested not only in defeating the enemy but in whipping him by any and all means and as speedily as possible." (*War Records*, Serial No. 127, p. 415.)

This letter was answered as follows:

"CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEP'T,
"RICHMOND, July 15, 1861.

"WILLIAM SKEEN, ESQ.,

"Warm Springs, Va.

"SIR:—In reply to your letter of the 30th of June the Secretary of War directs me to say that a battalion raised for the war and armed will be accepted, but not otherwise.

"Respectfully,

"A. T. BLEDSOE,

"Chief of Bureau of War,

"by J. B. Jones."

(*Ib.*, 478.)

On the 13th of July, 1861, B. W. Blakewood wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War, saying:

"Permit me, sir, to introduce to your consideration the advantages that would accrue from a regiment of mounted men on the guerrilla order."

He then describes the kind of men, and says:

"I should like to have the privilege of organizing a regiment on the above plan." (*Ib.* 475.)

To this letter the following answer was made :

“CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEP'T,
“ July 20, 1861.

“COL. B. W. BLAKEWOOD,
“ Spottswood Hotel, Richmond, Va.

“SIR:—In reply to your letter of the 13th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of War to say that a regiment armed and equipped would be accepted, electing its own field officers. But no pledge can be given of the service it will be required to perform or of its field of operations.

“ Respectfully,
“ A. T. BLEDSOE,
“ Chief of Bureau of War.”

(*Ib.*, 491.)

It might be supposed by those who, at the present time, claim to hold “guerrillas” to have been a lot of wretches, “deserters from both sides,” and “condemned by both sides,” that when propositions to organize “guerrilla” regiments or companies or bands were made to the Confederate authorities they would have been indignantly spurned, but the foregoing correspondence shows the contrary, and the following is to the same effect :

“BUTLER, Choctaw Co., Ala., July 26, 1861.

“L. P. WALKER, ESQ.

“DEAR SIR:—Quite a number of men of undoubted respectability are anxious to serve the government on their own account. It is proposed to form a company or companies and proceed against the enemy in any manner that will cripple the enemy most, and do our government most service. It is further proposed in forming such companies and in going to war, in order to sustain such companies, to seize, take, and convey all and every kind of property captured to the use of such companies. In other words, such companies propose going and fighting without restraint and under no orders, and convey the property so captured to their own private use, thereby benefiting their own pecuniary circumstances, as

well as doing their own country good service by crippling the enemy."

He asks if this would be allowed. (*War Records*, Serial No. 127, p. 505.)

Was this proposition rebuked? Was there an indignant response to a plan so utterly sordid and villainous?

The following is the respectful and encouraging reply from the Confederate War Office:

"CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEP'T,
"RICHMOND, Aug. 5, 1861.

"MR. D. M. K. CAMPBELL,

"Butler, Choctaw Co., Ala.

"SIR:—In reply to your communication of the 26th of July, I am directed by the Secretary of War to state that every citizen who can wield a weapon is needed now for the defence of this invaded country. There can scarcely be a doubt that ample opportunities will be afforded, both with policy and necessity, to retaliate in a legitimate and proper manner upon the despoilers of our people."

Nevertheless, the letter goes on, all military organizations must conform strictly to the laws and usages of civilized nations. They must be commissioned and paid by the government, and subject to its orders, in complete subordination to its authority. The letter then says:

"It is true there is too much reason to apprehend the most barbarous conduct on the part of the Northern aggressors—conduct which may render it obligatory on our part to treat them with the utmost severity—and if this be the case you would have abundant opportunities to participate in the captures, forfeitures, and confiscations which must inevitably follow in the train of such a conflict inaugurated by the enemy. Then why should you not organize a corps of just such avengers, and be guided in all things by the wisdom and impartial adjudication of the government? I would therefore suggest that your company be armed and tendered for the war in the usual way—not doubting that opportunities will be

afforded for the exercise of the undaunted spirit of high-toned Southern retribution which seems to have inspired your proposition." (*War Records*, 127, p. 532.)

On the 19th of March, 1862, there seems to have been a change in the manner of replying to propositions to organize such independent companies, as the following appears in the records:

"CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEP'T,
"RICHMOND, Va., March 19, 1862.

"DR. R. G. BARKHAM,

"Tarborough, N. C.

"SIR:—Guerrilla companies are not recognized as part of the military organization of the Confederate States, and cannot be authorized by this department.

"Respectfully,

"J. P. BENJAMIN,

"Acting Secretary of War."

(Same March 20th to Captain Samuel P. Gresham, Forty-seventh Va. Regiment, Fredericksburg, Va. *War Records*, 127, p. 1008.)

Very soon after this, however, the Confederate authorities were expressly authorized to employ troops, under the designation of "partisan rangers," to operate after the fashion of guerrillas. So identical were the two that sometimes they went under one name and sometimes under the other.

April 21, 1862, The Confederate Congress passed an act authorizing the President to commission officers "to form bands of partisan rangers, in companies, battalions, or regiments, either as cavalry or infantry. The companies, battalions, or regiments to be composed each of such numbers as the President may approve." (*War Records*, series 4, vol. 1, p. 1094.)

July 13, 1862, the Governor of North Carolina wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War on the subject of

partisan rangers, mentioning the "large number of partisan rangers authorized or claimed to be authorized" as interfering with the enrolment of conscripts. He says: "Partisan rangers have a kind of separate and independent command which is another attraction, and I might add, a source of detriment."

July 29, 1862, General D. H. Hill, of the Confederate army, wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War as follows:

"I cordially recommend the raising of guerrilla companies and the arming of them by the government, to operate in the counties of Nansemond and Gates, or wherever the infernal Yankees and their rascally Dutch allies can be found. The special duties of the guerrillas is to kill the murderers and plunderers wherever they show their villainous faces."

This was indorsed by the Secretary of War:

"Authorize General D. H. Hill to issue authority for companies of partisan rangers in the counties of Gates, N. C., and Nansemond, Va. Rolls to be returned to the Adjutant-General and the officers commissioned. No restrictions as to age."

April 2, 1862, General Heth, of the Confederate army, addressed the following to the Governor of Virginia:

"I feel it my duty to inform you of certain facts arising from the organization of the irregular force known as "rangers," authorized by an act of the Legislature of Virginia. The companies of this organization which have come under my observation are simply organized bands of robbers and plunderers, stealing the thunder of, and basing their claims to organization upon, the meritorious acts of a few brave men. The parties, or many of them, composing the organization, are notorious thieves and murderers, more ready to plunder friends than foes. With such material as a basis it would be surprising to find organization. They do as they please—go

where they please. The effect of this organization upon the volunteering has been very injurious. Many, especially the worthless, like the privilege of fighting, as they say, on their own responsibility, which, interpreted, means, roaming over the country, taking what they want and doing nothing. The choice arms of the State have been furnished to these people. This has induced many to believe they are a favored organization. A guerrilla force without being closely watched becomes an organized and licensed band of robbers. Properly managed in small parties, they are very efficient. I have contemplated very seriously disarming the two companies now here (Downs's and Spriggs's) simply as an act of protection to the good citizens of this county. A guerrilla chief should be able to enforce obedience and command the respect of his associates. These men (Downs and Spriggs) do neither. This organization has become a loop hole through which hundreds are escaping draft, and, in fact, all service. I respectfully invite your attention to the matter, convinced as I am that but one side of the picture has been presented to you." (*War Records*, series 1, vol. 51, pt. 2, p. 526.)

The report of the Confederate Secretary of War, August 12, 1862, mentions partisan rangers thus:

"The act authorizing bands of partisan rangers has been carried into execution. Apprehending that the novelty of the organization and the supposed freedom from control would attract great numbers in the partisan corps, the Department adopted a rule requiring a recommendation from a General commanding a department, before granting authority to raise partisans. Notwithstanding the restrictions, there is reason to fear that the number of partisan corps greatly exceed the requirements of the service, and that they seriously impede recruiting for the regiments of the line. (*War Records*, series 4, vol. 2, p. 48.)

January 3, 1863, Adjutant- and Inspector-General Cooper made a report to President Davis, in which he mentions partisan rangers as follows:

“ The policy of organizing corps of partisan rangers has not been approved by experience. The permanency of their engagements, and the consequent inability to disband and reassemble at call, precludes their usefulness *as mere guerillas*, while the comparative independence of their military relations and the peculiar rewards allowed them for captures induce much license and many irregularities. They have not unfrequently excited more odium and done more damage with friends than with enemies.” (*War Records*, series 4, vol. 2, p. 289.)

April 1, 1864, General Robert E. Lee wrote to Adjutant and Inspector-General Cooper as follows :

“ Experience has convinced me that it is almost impossible, under the best officers even, to have discipline in these bands of partisan rangers, or to prevent them from becoming an injury instead of a benefit to the service, and even where this is accomplished, the system gives license to many deserters and marauders who assume to belong to these authorized companies, and commit depredation on friend and foe.” (*War Records*, Serial No. 60, p. 1252.)

November 26, 1863, the Confederate Secretary of War, in a report to the President of the Confederacy, thus mentions the partisan rangers :

“ The advantages anticipated from the allowance of corps of partisan rangers with peculiar privileges to stimulate their zeal and activity have been very partially realized, while from that independent organization, and the facilities and temptations thereby afforded to license and depredations, grave mischiefs have resulted. They have, indeed, when under inefficient officers, and operating within our own limits, come to be regarded as more formidable and destructive to our own people than to the enemy. The opportunities, too, afforded them of profit by their captures, as well as the lighter bonds of discipline under which they are held, serve to dissatisfy the trained soldiers of the provisional army, who encounter greater peril and privation but are denied similar indulgences.

“There are certainly some honorable exceptions to the general estimate thus held of the partisan corps, and in several instances partisan leaders have distinguished themselves and their corps by services as eminent as their achievements have been daring and brilliant. They constitute only notable exceptions, and experience of the general inefficiency and even mischief of the organization would recommend that they either be merged in the troops of the line or be disbanded and conscripted.” (*War Records*, series 4, vol. 2, p. 1003.)

On the 11th of July, 1864, General Thomas L. Rosser wrote to General Lee concerning “irregular bodies of troops known as partisans, etc.” He says:

“Without discipline, order, or organization, they swarm broadcast over the country, a band of thieves, stealing, pillaging, plundering, and doing every manner of mischief and crime. They are a terror to the citizens and an injury to the cause.” (*War Records*, Serial No. 60, p. 1082.)

July 16, 1863, authority was granted to certain men “to raise a regiment of partisans within the enemy’s lines” for obstructing communication and transportation on the Mississippi River. (*War Records*, series 4, vol. 2, p. 639.)

July 15, 1863, authority was granted to raise two companies of partisan rangers to be composed of Kentuckians. (*War Records*, series 4, vol. 2, p. 359.)

January 12, 1863, Adjutant- and Inspector-General Cooper issued an order mentioning the irregularities of the partisan rangers, and requiring them to be brought under better control, adding, however, “Such partisan corps as are serving within the enemy’s lines are for the present excepted from this order.” (*War Records*, series 4, vol. 2, p. 585.)

February 17, 1864, the act authorizing partisan rangers was repealed, and another enacted making them the same

as regular cavalry, and that all bands organized under the first act should be brought in connection with the regular forces. Provided, however, that "The Secretary of War shall be authorized, if he deem proper, for a time or permanently, to except from the operation of this act such companies as are serving within the lines of the enemy, and under such conditions as he may prescribe." (*War Records*, series 4, vol. 3, p. 194.)

It appears from the foregoing quotations that the Confederate authorities saw clearly that partisan ranger service was either simply another name for guerrilla service, or that it engendered guerrilla service, and that it was precisely such service as Kentucky was suffering under. They saw the viciousness of it and endeavored to lift it off themselves, but "within the enemy's lines" it might go on unchecked.

It therefore was a fact that from 1862 until the end of the war Kentucky was overrun and infested with these irregular bands, who always claimed to be "Confederate soldiers" when captured, and, in fact, they were operating in Kentucky after their own peculiar manner by the express authority of the Confederate government.

Without giving the details of Collins's *Annals*, but only a general statement, it will be shown that he mentions the burning of thirteen court-houses by Confederate raiders. He gives not less than twenty instances of wanton plundering of towns by the same. He mentions fifteen instances of killings of Union men by the same. He notes nine instances of wanton burning other than court-houses by the same. On the other hand, he notes only one instance of plundering by Home Guards, no killings and no burnings. Only one court-house is mentioned as burned by the Federals, and that was not intentional, but "by the carelessness of Federal soldiers."

The wanton burning of court-houses is so striking it is proper to mention them particularly.

“December 1, 1863, Confederate cavalry enter Mt. Sterling, burn the court-house, and clerk’s offices.”

“March 21, 1864, court-house at Owingsville burned by the carelessness of Federal soldiers.”

“June 1, 1864, guerrillas visit Stanton, Powell Co., burn the jail, and turn over the clerk’s office. They destroyed the court-house previously.”

“December 4, 1864, guerrillas visit Owingsville, Bath Co., rob the stores and make a bonfire in the street of many records and court papers from the clerk’s office.”

“December 23d, 1864, court-house at Campbellsville, Taylor Co., burnt by General Lyon’s Confederate troops after removing the records to a place of safety. Other outrages committed.”

“December 28, 1864, Captain Basham and 20 guerrillas dash into Hardinsburg, Breckinridge Co., capture the Home Guard arms in the court-house, and set fire to that and other buildings.”

“January, 1865, General H. B. Lyon, Confederate forces, on their way out of the State, visit Burkesville, Cumberland Co., burn the court-house, plunder the stores, and impress horses.”

“January 8, 1865, court-house and public records at Owensboro burned by guerrillas under Davidson and Porter.”

“January 25, 1865, guerrillas have recently burned the court-houses at Albany, Clinton Co., at Marion, Crittenden Co., and at Taylorsville, Spencer Co.”

“February 21, 1865, guerrillas burn the court-house at Hodgenville, Larue Co., because it had been used as a barracks for Federal soldiers.”

General Lyon’s cavalry also burned the court-house at Hopkinsville, and Morgan’s cavalry burned the court-house at Lebanon.

A good statement of who guerrillas were is found in the history of Morgan’s cavalry, by General Basil W. Duke. He tells how troops who are well paid and

clothed have little inducement to go into such practices, and then says:

“Troops whose rations are few and empty, who flutter with rags, and wear ventilated shoes which suck in the cold air, who sleep at night under a blanket which keeps the saddle from a sore-backed horse in the daytime, who are paid (if paid at all) with waste paper, who have become hardened to the licentious practices of cruel warfare—such troops will be frequently tempted to violate the moral code.

“Many Confederate cavalry so situated left their commands altogether and became guerrillas, salving their consciences with the thought that the desertion was not to the enemy. These men, leading a comparatively luxurious life, and receiving from a good people a mistaken and foolish admiration, attracted to the same career young men who, (but for the example and sympathy accorded the guerrillas and denied the faithful, brave and suffering soldier) would never have quitted their colors and their duty.

“Kentucky was at one time, just before the close of the war, teeming with these guerrillas. It was of no use to threaten them with punishment. They had no idea of being caught. Besides, Burbridge shot all he could lay his hands on, and for their sins, many prisoners (guilty of no offence), selected at random or by lot from the pens where he kept them for that purpose, were butchered by this insensate bloodhound.”¹ (Duke's *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, p. 530.)

Bad as all this was, it was aggravated by another method of throwing irresponsible bands into Kentucky to depredate on all that appertained to the Union cause. The Confederate authorities expressly commissioned men to enter Kentucky to recruit for the Confederate service. This work must have been secret and without uniform, and thus the State was filled with characters such

¹ See Appendix, § 21, p. 356.

as will be described in a letter written by Confederate General N. B. Forrest.

In the year 1864 and early in 1865 Kentucky was full of bands of Confederates, operating as they saw fit. In January, 1865, General John C. Breckinridge sent his kinsman Colonel Robert J. Breckinridge into the State to require Confederates in the State to report to him, under penalty of not being recognized, if captured, as prisoners of war. Colonel Breckinridge was captured with this order in his possession. (*War Records*, Serial No. 103, pp. 764, 770.)

The following letter from Confederate General N. B. Forrest to the Confederate Secretary of War is very interesting. It serves to explain who were the men who were roaming about Kentucky, claiming to be authorized Confederate soldiers, and acting as described not only by General Forrest but by the records, and in Collins's *Annals*:

“HEADQUARTERS FORREST'S CAVALRY CORPS,
“WEST POINT, Miss. March 18, 1865.

“HON. JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE,
“Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.

“GENERAL:—I take the liberty of addressing you relative to the state of affairs in the district of southern Kentucky, and to bring to your notice and knowledge existing evils which can alone be corrected by yourself as the chief of the War Department. It is due to myself to state that I disclaim all desire or intention to dictate. So far from it, I hesitate even now to make known the facts or to suggest the remedies to be applied. No other motive than the ‘good of the service’ prompts me to address you.

“A military district was formed in southern Kentucky, including a small portion of west Tennessee, and Brigadier-General A. R. Johnson assigned to the command of it. The object in creating this district was doubtless for the purpose of raising and organizing troops for our army. Its permanent

occupation by any force raised within its limits was not expected or calculated upon.

“If it was, the sequel shows that both in raising troops or holding the territory the experiment is a complete failure. General Johnson was often reported to have from 1,200 to 1,800 men, was finally wounded and captured and his men scattered to the four winds.

“Brigadier-General Lyon then succeeded him, and was driven across the Tennessee River into north Alabama with only a handful of men. Nothing has been added to our army, for, while the men flock to and remain with General Johnson or General Lyon, as long as they can stay in Kentucky, as soon as the enemy presses, and they turn southward, the men scatter, and my opinion is, they can never be brought out organized until we send troops there in sufficient numbers to bring them out by force.

“So far from gaining any strength for the army, the Kentucky brigade, now in my command, has only about 300 men in camps (3d, 7th, and 8th Kentucky Regiments). They have deserted and attached themselves to the roving bands of guerrillas, jayhawkers, and plunderers who are the natural offspring of authorities given to parties to raise troops within the enemy's lines.

“The authorities given to would-be colonels, and by them delegated to would-be captains and lieutenants, have created squads of men who are dodging from pillar to post, preying upon the people, robbing them of their horses and other property, to the manifest injury of the country and our cause.

“The same state of affairs exists in west Tennessee. The country is filled with deserters and stragglers, who run away and attach themselves to the commands of those who have the authorities referred to. They never organize, report to nobody, are responsible to no one, and exist by plunder and robbery. There may perhaps be a few exceptions, but as a general thing, men who besiege the department for such authorities are officers without position or command, who, by flattering representations, recommendations, and influential friends, avoid the ranks by obtaining authorities to raise

troops within the enemy's lines. I venture the assertion that where one succeeds and organizes a command, ninety-nine fail, and that they take twenty men out of the army to one placed in it.

"I therefore unhesitatingly recommend that all parties holding such authorities, or acting under orders from those who do hold them, be ordered to report with what men they have to the nearest department commander, within a limited period, for consolidation and organization, and those failing so to report, to have their authorities revoked, and themselves subjected to conscription whenever caught.

"Do not understand me as reflecting on General Johnson or General Lyon; they did all they could, no doubt, to carry out the objects of the department in their district. They have failed, and the fact to my mind is demonstrated most clearly that the conscripts and deserters in west Tennessee and Kentucky will never come out until brought out by force.

"If all the authorities to raise troops in the enemy's lines are revoked, and the mustering officers ordered out, troops can be occasionally sent in under good and reliable officers, to arrest and bring out deserters, and break up the bands of lawless men who not only rob the citizens themselves, but whose presence in the country gives a pretext to Federal authority for oppressing the people.

"I am, General, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"N. B. FORREST, Major-General."

From the beginning to the end of the war the Federal authorities were in control of the entire State of Kentucky, with two brief exceptions, the first being when the Confederates first entered in 1861 and for about four months controlled the extreme southern border, and, second, in the year 1862 when Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith overspread some of the central portion for about two months. During all the years of the war, with these brief exceptions, the State was fully in the possession of the Federals, and a large part of the troops used in its

protection were Kentuckians. As has been already stated, the administration showed that consideration for the State which caused it to place Kentucky officers, and Kentucky troops, upon this duty. The work of the officers and soldiers, in conjunction, oftentimes, with troops from other States, was that of defence and protection. There was nothing in the State which they wished to destroy. They were to maintain the railroads and all bridges, guard all government property, and prevent, in so far as they were able, the destruction of anything. That unlawful acts by lawless soldiers would sometimes occur were incidents inseparable from the presence of large numbers of soldiers in any war, and in any country, but that the Federal soldiery in Kentucky oppressed or outraged the citizens is simply unwarranted assertion. The Federal forces were not "quartered" upon the people. They did not "subsist upon the country." Rations for the men and provender for the beasts were issued from the supplies of the commissaries, precisely as if the troops were in a country destitute of subsistence. When supplies were obtained the government paid for them, or gave written obligation to pay.

If Kentucky had not had the irritation of conflicts with the raiders from the Confederacy, the war would have been felt but lightly.

On the other hand, the records show that the Confederates came into Kentucky to make her feel the heavy hand of war. They came for destruction, and for supplies of horses and other stock, and whatever else came to hand. Government property, wherever found, was taken or destroyed. Buildings in towns were burned. Court-houses, especially, seemed to be proper to be burned. Money was taken from banks, goods from stores, jewels from private houses. Whatever was wanted was taken wantonly. The proof of all this is found fairly well set forth in Collins's *Annals*. Without being a fair or

impartial chronicler (for he was an intense Southern partisan) yet in order to make a chronicle at all he must needs, from the nature of the case, in setting down the deplorable incidents of the war, note scores perpetrated by Confederates to one which was not. He did not gather all, nor anything like all, the guerrilla outrages, but it is not likely he overlooked any perpetrated by Union men. The principal complaints Collins has against the Federal authorities are upon political grounds—blaming the officers for interfering with the personal liberty of citizens and for holding them responsible for the outrages of guerrillas. And it must be borne in mind that he makes even so mild a man as Governor Bramlette the principal “offender” in this particular.

In noting the striking events in Kentucky during the war, Collins gives more than a hundred instances of outrages perpetrated by the raiders—killings, burnings, lootings, and such like crimes. Practically none does he give as perpetrated by Unionists.

Although Collins, in making his *Annals*, sets down almost nothing as against the Home Guards, yet the historian Z. F. Smith has done them the injustice to class them with the guerrillas in a general statement supported neither by fact nor by reference to any authority whatever. He says with truth that “Confederates came to prowl and prey upon communities in defiance of all restraints of civilized warfare, marauding bands of outlaws, who perpetrated murders, robberies, arson, and outrage”—but without warrant of any record or citation of authority adds—“as wantonly as did the worst element of the other side.”

The injustice is that the Home Guards, acting with the regular military, were making war upon the lawless bands. While one side came into the State for purposes of mischief, the other side was organized and used in the State for the purpose of protection. Moreover, it was in

large measure Kentuckians protecting themselves, and the task they had was to protect themselves from the intentionally destructive raids made into the State by rangers and guerrillas which the Confederacy sent out generally, but afterwards drew in, so far as their own territory was concerned, but left them in full riot when "serving within the enemy's lines," which included Kentucky.

CHAPTER XVII

HALLUCINATIONS

THOSE who favored secession in Kentucky were confident that the State would follow the lead of the other seceding States. While it was plain in the early part of 1861 that there were many Union men in the State, all the advantage seemed to be with the secessionists. They had the Governor and public arms of the State, and they felt sure of the Legislature. With such odds, it seemed to be a well-nigh assured fact that the State could be seceded.

The extremely narrow Union margin in the Legislature by which the first step toward secession was prevented, did not convince the intensely earnest secessionists that the State was really Union in sentiment; nor were they convinced by the voting of 1861, although such large majorities were polled by the Unionists. It was too hard a task for the friends of the Southern movement to give up Kentucky as hopeless. Nothing that occurred could convince them that the people of Kentucky would adhere to the Union, when all the burning appeals were made to them, portraying the magnificent future of the Southern Confederacy, and depicting the intolerable oppressions and despotic purposes of the friends of the Union. Nor was the idea given up wholly at any time. The hallucination that the people of Kentucky were willing and anxious to join the Southern movement caused great injustice to be done to the friends of the Union. This injustice was twofold. The constant heralding of the

error that the people were for the South led to harsh criticism of the Union leaders, and it led to much questioning of the genuine loyalty of the State. The people of the South were made to believe that the Union leaders in Kentucky were perfidious and two-faced, while the people in the North came to think that nearly every man in Kentucky was either a traitor or at least of doubtful loyalty.

The sentiment thus created has never been wholly eradicated. While it may be lost sight of in the minds of many who prefer that all such matters should be forgotten, the histories which have been written still preserve the error, and it is but just to the memory of great and good men that the contrary should be set forth, that the history of the past may not always present to readers and inquirers a grievously false impression.

It has been affirmed that there was, in some sort, a compact between the friends of the South on one side and the Unionists on the other in regard to neutrality; that "this compact thus formed was not violated by the Southern men"; that Mr. Lincoln gave assurances that if Kentucky would remain neutral, "no hostile step should tread her soil"; that "the Southern leaders awoke too late to a realization of the fact that they had been circumvented"; that "under the guise of neutrality, the war was prepared to subjugate Kentucky"; that "the history of no country, or no part or period of the late civil war, presents a darker chapter than that which records the first six months of the war, and the means by which Kentucky was finally occupied by the Federal army and, thus bound, claimed to be loyal in the sense of sanctioning such a policy"; that the Southern sympathizers in Kentucky rested secure in the confident expectation that nothing would be done to interrupt the relations of the State toward the North and the South, which "vain delusion" was suddenly dispelled by the organization of troops at

Camp Dick Robinson, and on that account the Confederacy was compelled in self-defence to advance her troops into the State, September 3, 1861. It has been said that Kentucky had chosen for herself the position of neutrality; which the South tenaciously respected, and that on the other hand the government of the United States repudiated it from the beginning, and repeatedly violated it, and scoffed at those who trusted to it for protection; that President Lincoln acted with duplicity, also General McClellan, and the great men of the Union party; that they were all filled with deceit and treachery, and that a systematic scheme was concocted to mislead the innocent, credulous, and unsuspecting Southern sympathizers. Therefore, when the Confederate troops came into the State, September 3, 1861, proclamations were issued apparently in good faith, notifying the Kentucky people that, whereas they had been so duped and hoodwinked by the Federals, now the opportunity was offered for them to arise and assert their rights.

The extravagant charges of the day have since been reiterated by writers of historical works. In Z. F. Smith's *History of Kentucky*, published in 1886, he uses this language:

“The door had been thrown widely open by the bold act of General Nelson at Camp Dick Robinson, and no longer the thin disguise of pretext could conceal that the authorities at Washington and the positive leaders of the Union cause, grown bold by the advantages they had won in the Fabian strategies of delay, were now concurring to throw off the mask of neutrality, and to lead the great mass of her people to a committal to the policy of coercion under the plea of loyalty and patriotic duty. The great majority of the people, who had been profoundly sincere and honest in the adoption of neutrality before, beheld now the misleading illusion vanish before their illusion of hope.”

The representations made at the time are also echoed in Jefferson Davis's history of the War. He says:

"As far as the truth could be ascertained, a decided majority of the people of Kentucky, especially in its southwestern portion, if left to a free choice, would have joined the Confederacy in preference to remaining in the Union." (Vol. i., p. 398.)

He also says:

"I have thus presented the case of Kentucky, not because it was the only state where false promises lulled the people into delusive security until by gradual approaches usurpation had bound them hand and foot, and where despotic power crushed all the muniments of civil liberty which the Union was formed to secure, but because of the attempt which has been noticed to arraign the Confederacy for invasion of the State in disregard of her sovereignty."

The fact is, the secessionists of Kentucky, and through them the leaders in the Confederacy, were firmly set in the conclusion that Kentucky rightfully belonged to the South, when the people themselves declared in every way they could, and in the most unmistakable manner, that they would not join in with secession, but would adhere to the Union.

Shaler in his history truthfully says:

"The tone of the Southern States in assuming that Kentucky belonged to them, but was kept in her relation to the Union by fear, was deeply offensive to the State pride."

The repeated assertions that the majority of the people of Kentucky were in favor of secession virtually pledged the State to the Southern Confederacy, and when it was discovered that not a step could be taken in that direction, the reasons assigned were treachery, duplicity, and bad faith on the part of everybody who opposed secession.

The unwarranted attitude of the Southern leaders

toward Kentucky is illustrated in a letter written to General A. S. Johnston by George W. Johnson, who was made "provisional Governor" of Kentucky. The date is October 15, 1861. He says:

"At present, a large portion of the people of Kentucky have neither the protection of State, Federal, nor Confederate law. The people by large majorities maintained at the polls the position of neutrality and peace, while the Legislature, repudiating the only doctrine it dared assert before the election, have plunged the State into war. Large majorities of the people have always been and are now in favor of a permanent connection with the South, whilst the Legislature, urged by an insatiable ambition and party spirit, have forced her into an unnatural connection with the North—the most unnecessary, foolish, and criminal act, in our opinion, ever perpetrated." *War Records*, Series 1, vol. 4, p. 450.)

George W. Johnson also says that

"since Lincoln's election there were but two parties in Kentucky, the States Rights party and the Union party; that the States Rights party were at all times in favor of connection with the South; that even the Union party was in favor of ultimate connection with the South; that this was their party creed when members of Congress were chosen in the summer of 1861; that when Congress met the Union Congressmen threw off disguise; that this aroused the people to violent and extreme denunciations."

He calls this a simple and "true history" of the Union party in Kentucky, but fails to include in it a mention of the August election, when the people voted for Union men by an enormous majority, thus ratifying the action of their Congressmen.

President Davis transmitted Mr. Johnson's letter to the Congress, saying it is manifest the people of Kentucky by a large majority wish to unite their destinies with the South, and that there is "Merit enough in the application

to warrant the disregard of its irregularity," and that "we may rightfully recognize the provisional government of Kentucky." (*Ib.*, p. 753.)

It was upon the hallucination that the people of Kentucky did not know what they wanted, and that their voting signified nothing, or that they were deluded and deceived, that the Confederate commanders when they came into the State appealed to them as they did.

In September, 1861, General Albert Sidney Johnston, in a proclamation addressed to the people of Kentucky, said:

"If, as it may not be unreasonable to suppose, these people desire to unite their fortunes with the Confederate States, to whom they are already bound by so many ties of interest, then the appearance and aid of Confederate troops will assist them to make an opportunity for the free and unbiased expression of their own will upon the subject."

Such an expression could have only sprung from complete hallucination. "These people" had declared their will at the polls when no army was on hand of either side to "assist" them, in the month previous. Yet they were appealed to as though they had not, and as though the presence of the Confederate army was necessary to enable them to express their free and unrestrained will. Again, when General Bragg came into Kentucky in 1862, he issued a proclamation based upon the idea that the people only wanted the opportunity which the presence of a Confederate army would give them to reverse the judgment they had rendered when no soldiers of either side were in the State.

His address is here given in full:

"BARDSTOWN, KY., September 29, 1862.

"TO THE PEOPLE OF KENTUCKY:

"The armies of the Confederate States now within your borders were brought here more as a nucleus around which the

true men of Kentucky could rally than as an invading force against the northwest. As you value your rights of person and property and your exemption from tyranny and oppression you will now rally to the standard which protects you, and has rescued your wives and mothers from insult and outrage. Troops in any number will be received by companies and armed and will be organized into regiments as fast as practicable, company officers to be elected by their own men, and field officers to be appointed by the President, on recommendation of the commanding general, after passing a proper examination. Companies should repair, as soon as formed, to Bryantsville and report to the officer charged with the organization of recruits. Arms and ammunition are there ready for issue to all. The usual pay and bounty will be given. Twenty companies of cavalry are wanted. After they are supplied, infantry only will be received. Cavalry recruits will be received in any of the regiments now in the field. This is the last opportunity Kentucky will enjoy for volunteering. The conscript act will be enforced as soon as necessary arrangements can be made. For further information as to details, apply to Major-General S. B. Buckner, who is charged with the superintendence of this duty.

“BRAXTON BRAGG,
“General Commanding.”

(*War Records*, Serial No. 110, p. 367.)

It would be impossible to conceive of any hallucination more extraordinary than an appeal to the people to rally to a standard for rescue from oppression, and at the same time declare to them that if they did not voluntarily rally they would be conscripted! There was a strange sound in the words:

“This is the last opportunity Kentuckians will enjoy for volunteering. The conscript act will be enforced as soon as necessary arrangements can be made.”

They had an effect not strange but natural. At the very time General Bragg was expecting the rally to his standard the Kentucky Unionists were crowding into

regimental organizations to resist his invasion of the State, and he retired a little after, shaking off the dust of his feet against the people who would not receive his gracious offer to volunteer or be conscripted.

The attitude of the Southern leaders toward Kentucky was peculiar, and the manner in which writers since the war have followed their claims and statements made during the war has produced false impressions and done great injustice.

Confederate General Hodge, writing in Collins's *History of Kentucky*, makes an effort to state the case fairly, but in doing so shows that he was under the spell of the invincible hallucination which was upon all. The task is too great for any of them to grasp the proposition in its full truth, that Kentucky was in point of actual fact really a Union State.

They must all qualify the case in some way. General Hodge accepts the proposition that the people of Kentucky were Unionists, but he finds that they were so simply from blind and unreasoning acceptance of an inherited idea, not from intelligent judgment. He also adds the qualification that they all believed in the abstract right of secession. He says:

“He must be struck with judicial blindness who, in arriving at conclusions drawn from a careful retrospect of the action of the people of Kentucky during this crisis, will deny that a vast majority of the people of the State were devoted to the cause of the Union, and deeply impressed with the necessity of its preservation, if possible. In truth, the sentiment of devotion to the Union was more nearly akin to the religious faith which is born in childhood, which never falters during the excitements of the longest life, and which at last enables the cradle to triumph over the grave. The mass of them did not reason about it. The Union was apotheosized; it was thought of and cherished with filial reverence. The suggestion of its

dissolution was esteemed akin to blasphemy. To advocate or to speculate about it was to be infamous.”

Then he adds:

“But it must not be less clearly apparent to the observer that a decided majority of the people believed honestly in the abstract right of a State to secede and a vast majority were firmly opposed to the attempt to coerce the people of the State to remain under the control of a federative government which had become unacceptable to them. Nearly all classes of public men, nearly all classes of private citizens, held firmly, as a cardinal principle of political faith, the soundness of the doctrine of the celebrated Kentucky resolutions of 1798-9, which, in substance, declared that each State was the final judge of the remedies it should pursue when aggrieved by the action of the Federal government of the allied States. . . . They, as a people, undoubtedly believed that the action of the Southern States in seceding was unwise and ill-advised, but the abstract right they did not deny.”

Hodge could acknowledge that voting for the Union at least indicated a superstitious devotion, but cannot make even that acknowledgment without qualifying it by a wholly gratuitous assumption.

It was this hallucination which led to the crimination of the Union leaders in Kentucky, by the men who went south. They could not and would not be convinced that Kentucky took her stand against the Southern movement, and therefore would have it that some persons deceived and deluded the people. They freely gave this idea expression.

Another hallucination which led to great injustice was that, although actual war was raging, conditions were normal and affairs of all sorts ought to go on in the usual way. Although thousands were perishing in actual battle, and although two great contending powers were striving, each for its own existence, many persons in Ken-

tucky rested under the delusion that in the midst of such a conflict any abridgment of personal right was an unjustifiable interference. Especially was entire freedom of speech insisted upon, and any molestation on account of incendiary or treasonable speaking was called an "outrage."

This was well illustrated in the case of Vallandigham, of Ohio. He claimed the right to make inflammatory speeches in Ohio, which tended to injure the National cause, and in answer to the defence he made when arrested, Lincoln used the celebrated illustration: shall the soldier boy who deserts his post be shot, and the wily agitator who induced him to do so go free?

It may be admitted that military management did injustice in certain cases, but in the throes of actual war this was to be expected. It was a fight, not a peaceful arbitrament, and ideas of self-preservation would be uppermost, even though peaceful rights suffered. But in Kentucky there was a demand that the daily current of life should flow on as evenly as if all were peace, and if the serenity of the hour were interrupted, violent denunciations of the military followed. Antipathy grew up against the whole administration of Federal affairs, and as Kentucky officers were generally in charge in Kentucky, the censure fell primarily on their heads, and through them upon all Kentucky Unionists. One of the most common complaints was on account of the arrest of alleged innocent persons. This was called "high-handed interference" with the rights of citizens. Other military interferences were also complained of at the time. Doubtless some injustice was done at the time by the military, and also by those who denounced the military, but a more uncalled-for injustice has been perpetrated since the war by various writers who have placed upon the historic page the wholesale crimination rife at the time, but not sustained by any record evidence. Shaler finds

that Kentucky officers like Boyle were tyrants. He tells of Boyle being in command of the Provost Marshals, and alleges gross and crying evils of the system. Without authority, he says that Bragg recruited from the "class of persons who had suffered in person or their sympathies from the brutal tyranny of the Provost Marshal system, many of them men of conservative Union proclivities who had been turned into rebels by the outrages of the military authorities."

He also finds that the management of military affairs in Kentucky, which, as elsewhere stated, was largely in the hands of Kentucky officers, brought into "utter degradation the solemnity of an oath, which was a lamentable feature of the civil war." He also finds that there were "flagrantly unjust methods." One was holding "rebel sympathizers" responsible for guerrilla outrages. Yet it was Governor Bramlette who was peculiarly responsible for this method of stopping this evil. Another was the complaint of military interference at elections, though his own statement of the case shows this was a popular perversion of the day instead of truth. He correctly states that

"the desperation to which the people were brought by the system of guerrilla raids can hardly be described. In the year 1864 there was not a county in the State that was exempt from their outrages."

Yet he condemns the methods by which the Kentucky officers sought to stamp out the evil.

No word of censure does Shaler have for the conduct of Confederate officers. He distinguishes between guerrillas and Confederates, although the records show that the guerrillas were appointed, authorized, and sent out by Confederate authority. Although it is shown in the official reports of Confederate officers, and in Collins's *Annals*, that John Morgan's raiders indulged in much unjustifiable conduct, no word of condemnation has the

historian Shaler. On the contrary, he finds that Morgan was the chevalier of the war, without fear and without reproach. He enlarges upon his "audacity, swiftness, and fertility of resources," and commends the "endurance and vigor of action" of his raiders.

The historians Collins and Smith are alike in tone to Shaler, and in their unfair renderings of all that transpired in Kentucky during the war there is an exhibition of sympathy with the Confederate cause, and an antagonism to the Union cause which brings to mind the exaggerations and distortions which were prevalent while the struggle was on.

The feeling of the Southern sympathizers in Kentucky was not only bitterly against the Union cause, it was ardently enlisted on behalf of the Southern cause. There was rejoicing at every National defeat, and depression over every Confederate defeat. The Federal side was despised and the Confederate side was worshipped. Upon the subject, therefore, of dealing with citizens who were animated by such feeling, it is well to consider how and in what manner the Confederates dealt with the people within their jurisdiction who favored the Union and not the Confederacy. As early as August 14, 1861, the President of the Confederacy issued a proclamation on the subject, known as the Proclamation of Banishment. It was made pursuant to an act of the Confederate Congress, and duly warned every male citizen of the United States who was fourteen years of age or upwards, then within the Confederate States, and adhering to the government of the United States, to depart from the Confederate States within forty days, otherwise they would be treated as alien enemies. It was graciously provided, however, that such citizens may remain if they acknowledge in due form the authority of the Confederacy, and declare their intention to become citizens thereof. No such conditions were imposed upon the citizens of Ken-

tucky by the Federal authorities. Very many of its population in complete sympathy with the South resided in the State continuously during the war. Compared with the number of such citizens, the number of those who were for some cause, or at least alleged cause, interfered with, was exceedingly small. The instinct of self-preservation moved the Confederacy to make a sweeping order of banishment, but in Kentucky the same instinct was restrained within degrees of moderation unknown to the Southern government, which was idolized by those in sympathy with it. The knowledge of this fact at the time ought to have moderated the passions of the hour, and especially it ought to cause writers of history to refrain from iterating the abuse and denunciations which were so abundant while the trouble of war was upon the country. Yet Shaler's *History*, and especially Collins's *Annals*, abound in these criminations, and the echo of them has so gone into many general histories.

It is the same in regard to retaliatory acts. Retaliation was not confined to one side alone. It was practised by both, and if the one is condemned for it, both should be. On the first of May, 1863, the Confederate Congress enacted a remarkable law on the subject—especially remarkable in the light of subsequent events. Section 3 of the act provided that for the violation of the laws and usages of war by those acting under the authority of the United States the President is authorized to cause full and complete retaliation to be made. Section 4 provides that every white person, being a commissioned officer, *who shall command negro troops shall, if captured, be put to death.*¹

The instinct of self-preservation led the Confederate authorities to adopt stringent methods to defeat what they regarded as gross misconduct on the part of the

¹ See Appendix, § 22, p 354.

United States forces. So also in Kentucky, the instinct of self-preservation caused retaliatory measures to be adopted, to stem, if possible, the wild tide of guerrilla outrages. That such harsh measures were adopted by both sides ought to be shown by the impartial historian, and one side ought not to be condemned as brutal while the other is made to appear without blame.

In the year 1863 there were two candidates for Governor, Thomas E. Bramlette and Charles A. Wickliffe. Both were Union men, but Wickliffe had become dissatisfied with the conduct of the war for the Union, while Bramlette, at that time, was in no way disaffected. At the election in August Bramlette received 67,586 votes, and Wickliffe 17,344; the total vote being almost 85,000. At the time, the complaint was made of military interference at the polls, and Bramlette's election was attributed to this cause. Collins says 40,000 were refused a vote or else kept from the polls by military intimidation. Shaler also tells of the growing hatred of such military interference. Smith, in his history, says: "Under the military surveillance of the election the Union candidates were all elected with little opposition."

In all this a peculiar thing appears: Shaler himself shows that if we add to the 85,000 votes cast at this election the number of men who had gone out as soldiers, it will make the full vote of the State. It is easy to see that this is true. The total vote cast in 1860, at the Presidential election, was 145,862. Now, if we allow 20,000 Confederate soldiers gone from the State, and only 40,000 Federal soldiers, there is a total of 60,000; which, added to the 85,000, makes 145,000 votes. How, then, can it be, as Collins says, that 40,000 were kept from voting?

In the same way, when other wholesale charges are investigated, they turn out to be groundless.

In the year following, Governor Bramlette himself,

and with him many of the Union men of the State, became antagonistic to the administration of President Lincoln. Various causes contributed to the change, and many insisted that they had not changed, but that the administration had changed. Emancipation influenced some; others were irritated by the presence of Federal soldiers. Whatever ill-fortune came was laid at the door of the administration, and it became popular to speak harshly of President Lincoln.¹

But there was always an old guard of the tried and faithful Unionists who stood by the colors. At the Presidential election in 1864 nearly 38,000 voted for Lincoln, while 64,000 voted for McClellan. The Union men who voted for McClellan were still for the Union, and for the prosecution of the war, only they believed McClellan would put down the rebellion more successfully than Lincoln.

This singular hallucination was not peculiar to Kentucky. It pervaded the States North to such an extent the popular vote for Lincoln was but little larger than that for McClellan—being 2,200,000 for Lincoln and 1,800,000 for McClellan. Lincoln's majority in Indiana was only 10,000, and in Ohio McClellan received 205,000 votes.

Thus in the North as well as in Kentucky many fell into the delusion that McClellan could in some way suppress the rebellion and end the war better than Lincoln, but all this class still believed in the Union and were opposed to its dismemberment.

One of the hallucinations of the war time was the well-known claim on the part of the Southern people of their own superiority over the Northern people in many particulars, and especially in courage and military prowess. The records and literature of the period

¹ See Appendix, § 23, p. 354.

abound in expressions of this claim. All this might well be left unnoticed by the historian, or at most be mentioned as one of the harmless features of the times. But for the historian gravely to assert the same as a fact is a reflection either upon his judgment or his fairness.

Especially is this true when it is made to appear that in the division of the Kentucky people those who supported the Southern side were in some way superior to those who adhered to the Union.

Of those who went south, nineteen became general officers, and twenty-eight Unionists became general officers. If the personal claims of their military leaders are investigated one by one, it will be found that they are much alike. All of the Federal generals were native-born Kentuckians, but not all the Confederates were. Many of both sides had distinguished ancestry. The military services they rendered were alike creditable.

One of the unfortunate features of the war in Kentucky was the disunion of families. On both sides were found men of the same name—brothers and near relatives. If the casuist should desire to determine which set of men were of the higher order—those who went South or those who stood by the Union, perhaps the only clue he could have would be the relative merit of the respective causes espoused, thus indicating character by the choice made. The result would be that those persons who regarded the Southern Confederacy as higher and holier than the State or National government would decide that way; those who have real regard for States' rights, and a true estimate of the value of the National Union, might decide to the contrary.

But the hallucination of the hour, that whatever was Southern had a flavor of superiority, and that the Union cause was on a lower plane, has been duly brought forward as a fact, notably by the historian Shaler.

He makes it appear that "40,000 of the natural leaders

and fighting population of the State" left at once for the South in September, 1861 (p. 269). Then he estimates the number to be 35,000 (p. 282). He also finds that the State Guard amounted to about 15,000 men (p. 246). Then he says the State Guard consisted of 10,000 men (p. 257). Then that the State Guard as a whole went over to the Confederacy (p. 259). With the idea, then, that thirty-five or forty thousand, including the whole State Guard, went out at once in the early fall of 1861, it is natural that he should write:

"It would require many pages to give even a list of the prominent citizens of the State who passed its borders on the way to the Southern army. In the month following the abandonment of neutrality, the roads were filled with the hurrying throng of horsemen and of wagons conveying munitions on their way to the Confederate camp that had been pitched beyond the southern and eastern borders of the State for their reception.

"The Federal government pressed what troops were available for service in the State, but for a month or more the central part of the Commonwealth was held by the recruits that had been gathering at Camp Dick Robinson and by the companies of Home Guards. The process of enlistment in the Federal regiments went rapidly forward—but the material fit for immediate service had left the State to return as invaders."

In other words, as he expressed it in another place, the loss of 40,000 of the natural fighting population "had left the State with little material that could be made into good soldiers." (P. 269.)

In another place he speaks of the Commonwealth having lost the first flower of her military material. (P. 282.)

All of this extravagant writing turns pale and sickly when read in the light of the official report of the Confederate Adjutant- and Inspector-General Cooper made in

February, 1862, showing that the actual number of men up to that date furnished to the Confederacy by the State of Kentucky was 7950.

But the extravagant writing is based on the hallucination of the hour that nothing was so grand and glorious as the Southern cause, and we are prepared for the final conclusion of this historian as follows :

“The Kentucky troops in the Confederate army, being fewer in number and from the richer and more educated part of the State, were, as a whole, a finer body of men than the Federal troops from the Commonwealth. The rebel exiles were the first running from the press, and naturally had the peculiar quality of their vintage more clearly marked than the later product.” (P. 375.)

It is this character of writing, putting sentiment instead of the facts of the case, that calls for an account that will at least suggest the sources of correct information. If Z. F. Smith is correct in his history, it was about 10,000 who left Kentucky for the Confederacy in the fall of 1861. If the Inspector-General of the Confederacy, writing an official document for practical use, knew the situation, there were exactly 7950 Kentuckians in the Confederate service in February, 1862.

It is a fact also that all of the State Guard did not go south. Many members of it remained. In the city of Lexington there were three companies; one went south with Captain John Morgan; two remained. One known as the “Chasseurs,” under Captain Sanders Bruce, became the nucleus of a regiment, the Twentieth Kentucky Infantry, and this company furnished forty commissioned officers to the volunteer service. The other, known as the “Old Infantry,” under Captain S. W. Price, became the nucleus of the Twenty-first Kentucky Infantry, and was led by Colonel W. S. Price until he was made a brigadier-general.

Captain D. W. Lindsay, commanding a company in Roger Hanson's regiment of the State Guard, struck his company tents and marched his company home from an encampment held in May, 1861, in Woodford County because recruiting for the Confederate army was allowed in the encampment, and, with the assistance of G. W. Monroe, Orlando Brown, and other members of the company, recruited, organized, and took the field with the Twenty-second Kentucky Volunteer Infantry. And Captain R. M. Kelly, who was also an officer in the same State Guard regiment, left the same and became Colonel of the famous Fourth Kentucky Volunteer Infantry.

Other like instances might be mentioned.

Now, if the facts are to be the basis of judgment, instead of the invincible hallucination which so enchained the mind of the historian, and if we consider the report of the Confederate Adjutant- and Inspector-General, that in February, 1862, there were 7950 Confederates from Kentucky, and then take the report of the Adjutant-General of Kentucky that there were before that date 38 Kentucky Union organizations, exclusive of Home Guards, and that these were enlisted to the number of near 30,000 in the months of July, August, and September, 1861, it would seem that it is nearer the truth to say the "first running of the press" was to the Union regiments.

CHAPTER XVIII

PATRIOTISM OF THE KENTUCKY UNIONISTS

THE great value of the service of the Kentucky Unionists to the general cause of the Union was in the first place their holding Kentucky in the Union. Whether it be agreed that other States—notably Tennessee and Virginia—were led into secession by “hasty and inconsiderate action,” or by the free will of their people, there was great danger that the same methods which accomplished the secession of those States might have been successful in Kentucky. With the advantage of the machinery of the State government, the energetic use of argument and persuasion, based upon interests and feelings identified with the seceded States, the odds were fearfully against the Unionists. If the Union leaders had been less active and earnest, or if the people had been less firm in their devotion to the Union, the scales might have turned otherwise than as they did. It required wisdom and prudence and self-control on the part of the leaders to prevent a headlong action, and it also required intelligent perception of the real situation on the part of the voters to prevent them from being led into what was called at the time “the vortex of secession.” Whether or not Kentucky was a turning weight in the scale, the fact that it remained in the Union made the restoration less difficult than it would have been if it had followed the other Southern States.

The Unionists of Kentucky served their State and country under much unjust censure. At the first they were blamed for what they did in holding the State in the

Union. At the last they were blamed for all the miseries which necessarily attended a condition of war. They were subjected to much abuse at the time, but it is not just that the evil-speaking that was current should stand as the history of the period, and in writing general accounts it is error for the historian to state the expressions of one side of a sharp controversy as if they showed the whole case.

The administration of President Lincoln did not deserve all the malediction it received in Kentucky. It was fair in dealing with the Kentucky people, but they became restless under long-continued military control, and some strongly expressed their dissatisfaction, forgetful that war was raging.

The administration had to contend with a gigantic opposition, and its steps on the battle-ground of Kentucky could not always please. Antagonisms arose, and hard speeches were indulged in. But the condemnation of the war policy of Mr. Lincoln was not justifiable any more than every specific act of officers and agents was justifiable. The war had to be carried on even if mistakes did occur and antagonisms did arise, and it was well for the country that in Kentucky there were great men who could overlook minor matters, and stand firmly by the administration through all its troubles.

The historians freely condemn "unwarranted transgressions" of the laws both by the State and National authorities (Shaler, 345; Collins, i, 130). It is said that "the iniquitous system of interference with the civil law had now (1864) pretty thoroughly separated the better class of Union men from all sympathies with the Federal government" (Shaler, 348). Yet the example was followed in the Confederacy by providing for the enlistment of negroes under the advice of General Lee and President Davis. See Davis (*History*, pages 515 to 519). The draft is also condemned, while there

is no word against Confederate conscription even in Kentucky.¹

Animadversions are continued after the close of the war, making history say that the troops should have been withdrawn from Kentucky sooner, but "the appetite for military methods had gained a very strong hold on the United States," and that "it suited the purpose of a political body that had fattened on the system of passes and permits to maintain in time of peace a system that had its only justification in the hard conditions of war, if it can find justification at all." (Shaler, 362.)

This historian, true to such exacting philosophy, condemns, as a rule, whatever was done in time of war as well as peace, and, writing for history the side of the case as expressed by the disaffected at the time, only finds that a good word can be spoken for President Lincoln after the reins had passed into the hands of his successor. Forgetful that Lincoln had been, all through the weary years of the war, subjected to bitter reproaches by those whom this writer most admires, he says after his death:

"If Lincoln had lived we may well believe that his admirable good sense, which enabled him to help his native State whenever he could see her in trouble, would have removed these barriers to the tide of peace and good will." (P. 362.)

Nor does he hesitate to say, immediately following, that which severely reflects upon Lincoln's administration in the last two years of the war. Speaking of the military authorities in Kentucky, his words are:

"In two years they did what neither the Confederate solicitations nor arms could do: they had driven the people, not out of their affection for the cause of the National Constitution, but out of all sympathy with the ways of its representatives then in power." (P. 364.)

¹ See Appendix, § 24, p. 354.

This attitude of some of the people in Kentucky toward the administration then receives the following approbation :

“A more complete or more wholesome discontent never affected the Kentucky people. A contest into which they had entered with really noble emotions had degenerated into a petty political game. They felt that their vast sacrifices had brought them sore evils for reward.” (P. 364.)

If history can ever be made to reflect a true view of the situation in Kentucky, it will show that the discontent never reached the point of giving up the Union, and it will further show the wholesome patriotism was in that body of unflinching supporters of the administration who respected and honored Abraham Lincoln while he was alive as well as after his death, and who were unaffected by the popular clamors of the day against him and his administration.

In the second place, the Union soldiers of Kentucky fought the battle for the Union in a way peculiarly necessary, and better than it could have been done by any other troops. While the bulk of these soldiers were incorporated with the great armies at the front, and performed their duty there in the same manner as the regiments from the States North, yet a large number served in the State. In organized regiments and in organized militia they were engaged from the very beginning in holding back Confederate advances so that they rarely reached the northern border, and were limited to the middle and southerly parts of the State. In the war time there was railroad connection from Cincinnati to Lexington, and from Lexington to Louisville, and from Louisville to Nashville and beyond. The existence of the large armies at the front was dependent upon these roads, especially the one from Louisville to Nashville. Their protection was essential. The Louisville and Nashville road was

taxed to its utmost with heavy trains carrying supplies southward. Long trains of freight cars loaded with provisions and munitions of war carried soldiers on the roofs of the cars. Returning trains were laden with the sick and wounded. The requirements became so great that in the absence of a bridge at Louisville tracks were laid through the streets of the city to the water's edge, and were also brought to the water on the opposite side. Loaded cars were ferried over and drawn up the bank and hurried down the road. It is remembered by those who were with the armies at the front that cars appeared labelled with the names of railroads all over the North and West. General Sherman says in his *Memoirs* that he was puzzled to know how the respective roads would ever recover their cars, and the soldiers remember that the appearance of these cars, so labelled, caused immense cheering, for they knew that in some way supplies were being brought from far back in the rear.

It was the importance of the railroads through Kentucky which caused General Sherman to urge upon General D. W. Lindsay, who was then at the front in command of a brigade, to return at once to Kentucky and accept the position of Adjutant-General of the State, which had been tendered to him in order that he might by his great energy and knowledge of the situation effectively aid in the work of organizing troops in the State to protect the essential lines of communication.

To defend and protect these lines no troops were so well adapted as those who were familiar with the State. It has already been shown that early in the struggle it was Colonel John M. Harlan with Kentucky troops who came upon General Morgan at Rolling Fork and forced him to abandon the line of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and also that Morgan's exit from the State at that time was hastened by other Kentuckians led by Colonel William A. Hoskins.

Also that, when Morgan came at other times, his work of destruction was stopped by Kentucky troops. His expressed purpose in 1864 to cut the road from Cincinnati to Lexington, and then move on to the Louisville and Nashville road, was frustrated before he had time to injure either. Others besides Morgan, notably Generals Lyon and Pegram, and many lesser raiders, were successfully prevented from burning bridges and tearing up tracks. It will be remembered that in 1862 Home Guards stopped a column of Morgan's troops at Augusta, and by a bloody fight prevented the execution of a plan to cross the Ohio and move down upon Cincinnati; also, that when Morgan did cross the Ohio in 1863 the Kentucky pursuers were so hard upon his track that at one time he travelled ninety miles in thirty-five hours, and they finally captured him.

The city of Louisville was a place of immense storage of supplies necessary for the army, the destruction of which would have been an enormous loss. Time and again Louisville was threatened, but never taken. The Kentucky Unionists were conspicuous in defending all these interests. In defending their State they were defending the National cause.

If it had been true that Kentucky had joined the Confederacy, and that three times as many of her citizens had gone into the Confederate army as went into the Union army, it might have been true that great battles would have been fought upon the soil of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and it is from such reflections that the value of the services of the Unionists of Kentucky can best be appreciated. In the letter of General Humphrey Marshall to Governor Magoffin, mentioned in another chapter, he uses this language:

“In what does the Kentucky soldier differ from the abolitionist from Massachusetts who is serving in the army of the United States? Do they not sleep at the same camp-fire, eat

from the same messpan, and draw pay from the same treasure? Are they not commanded by the same officers, and used to carry forward the same nefarious policy?"

In his own phraseology he expresses the exact truth. The defenders of the Union were the same whether from Massachusetts or Kentucky. Shoulder to shoulder they stood for the same great cause, not for abolition, not for subjugation, not for conquest, but to maintain the honor of the flag, and to save from destruction the American Union.

Nothing can be more plain than that the Kentucky Unionists adhered to the Union from a clear perception of its inestimable value, and an equally clear perception of the fact that its dismemberment would be absolutely ruinous. The expression of this sentiment is found in the speeches of the leaders, in the newspapers, and in the resolutions of the local conventions.

It is to the credit of these people that they resisted the frantic appeals to take sides with the seceded Slave States to which they were bound by many ties. It was not in anger but in sorrow that they joined hands with the other loyal States to uphold the cause of the Union. There is a genuine pathos in the speech of Hon. Archibald Dixon at Louisville in April, 1861:

"My sympathies are with the South, but I am not prepared to aid her in fighting against our government. If we remain in the Union we are safe."

And again:

"In a just cause I will defend our State at every point and against every combination, but when she battles against the law and the Constitution, I have not the heart, I have not the courage, to do it. I cannot do it; I will not do it. Never strike at that flag of our country nor follow Davis to tear down the Stars and Stripes."

Colonel James F. Buckner said in a speech in Christian County:

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“If the Union is lost, all is lost. Of what use are my slaves if we have no government? Life itself will be worthless if this glorious Union is destroyed.”

In 1864 Governor Bramlette issued the following call:

“Kentuckians to the rescue. I want 10,000 six-months men at once. Do not hesitate to come. I will lead you. Let us help finish this war and save our government.”

The stand of the Kentucky Unionists was well expressed in the Holt letter already referred to:

“It is in vain for the revolutionists to exclaim that this is ‘subjugation.’ It is so precisely in the sense in which you and I and all law-abiding citizens are subjugated. . . . We impose no burden which we ourselves do not bear; we claim no privilege or blessing which our brethren of the South shall not equally share. Their country is our country, and ours is theirs, and that unity both of country and government, which the providence of God and the compacts of men have created, we could not ourselves without immolation destroy, nor can we permit it to be destroyed by others.”

On the subject of the importance of preserving the Union Mr. Holt said in his letter:

“No contest so momentous as this has arisen in human history, for amid all the conflicts of men and nations the life of no such government as ours has been at stake.”

The preservation of the American Union was the greatest achievement ever made by any portion of the human race. No other event can compare with it in the magnitude of its importance. Great as was the founding of the Republic, it would have become a mockery if the movement of 1861 had subverted and destroyed it. All the predictions of the impossibility of a free republic would have been fulfilled, and instead of the establishment of the principles of liberty and equality, monarchical institutions would have been set up in America. The successful assertion of the right of secession would have been fatal to the existence of a republican nationality

on this side of the Atlantic capable of resisting the encroachments of European monarchy. Instead of the United States of to-day, which without a question asserts the Monroe Doctrine, the condition of the South American republics would prevail in North America, with no power anywhere to resist alliances with foreign nations.

This truth was expressed in an address delivered by Edward Everett July 4, 1861, in which he said: "If the Southern Confederacy is recognized, it becomes a foreign power." Then he asked if the United States would surrender its territory to England, France, or Spain. Why, then, should it surrender to the Southern Confederacy? "Let it be remembered," says he, "that in granting to the seceding States jointly and severally the right to leave the Union, we concede to them the right of resuming, if they please, their former allegiance to England, France, or Spain. It rests with them, or any one of them, if the right of secession is admitted, again to plant a European government side by side with that of the United States on the soil of America."

If, therefore, it was praiseworthy in our forefathers to cast off the British yoke and erect upon this continent a government by the people, which was aptly called "a new order of the ages," what could they themselves contemplate with more satisfaction, if permitted to view the affairs of this world, than the preservation by their descendants of their heritage when the mighty ordeal came.

The earnest utterances of Everett and Holt, and hundreds of like sort, were circulated at the time. In speeches and newspapers and in conversation the same sentiments were reiterated, and the great watchword of the period was the preservation of the Union.

When the attempt is made to disparage or mistake the services of the Union leaders of Kentucky, the appeal is to the records of the period. These records tell the story of their faithfulness and devotion to duty under

the most trying circumstances, which constantly wins admiration, and causes them to stand out in proportions truly grand and heroic. And when the story of the services of the Union troops furnished by Kentucky is correctly understood, they, too, will be understood as having splendidly performed their patriotic duty.

While serving their country they obeyed the behests of their own State. By the act of enlistment they placed themselves under orders. If sent to the front to do battle in connection with the great armies, there they were found. If required to guard long lines of communications, they did that duty. If ordered to police their own State, they engaged in that service. The entire body of these defenders of the Union cause, including the much-needed and much-used Home Guard organizations, acted throughout the war under the orders of the constituted authorities. They were never found roving about in partisan or independent bands. The record of all their service, as shown by official reports, is singularly free from any conduct inviting criticism. When the war ended, the survivors re-entered the walks of peace, satisfied with the grand result, and willing to cast into oblivion all the animosities engendered by four years of strife. They had no hatred of their brothers in the Confederate service when they took up arms, nor when they laid them down. The defence of the Union was the inspiration of the Kentucky Unionists. Living in a border State, they saw with a peculiar distinctness the evil of a dismembered Union, and threw themselves into the ranks of its defenders, assured that only in national unity could permanent peace and order be found. Notwithstanding their heroic services, they have received but scanty mention in the histories, and much of that mention does them injustice. It is hoped that this work will serve a useful purpose in leading to correct views concerning the Unionists of Kentucky.

CHAPTER XIX

THE SOLDIERS

AS an original proposition no reason exists for making any comparisons of the soldierly qualities of the Kentuckians on the respective sides in the war, but as great injustice has been done to the Union soldiers in this respect by the historian Shaler, it becomes proper to bring forward some general facts, in connection with a statement of the services of these Union soldiers.

He says: "The Confederacy received the youth and strength from the richest part of the Kentucky soil. The so-called Blue Grass region," says he, "sent the greater part of its men of the richer families into the Confederate army, while the Union troops, though from all parts of the State, came in greater abundance from those who dwelt on thinner soils." (P. 374.)

He also says: "Of the one hundred and thirty thousand or more Kentucky men who bore arms during the Civil War a very good report can be given. Both as infantry and cavalry they did exceedingly effective service in both armies. The Kentucky troops in the Confederate army, being fewer in number and from the richer and more educated part of the State, were as a whole a finer body of men than the Federal troops from the Commonwealth." (*Ib.*)

Speaking of the soldiers under Confederate General Morgan, he says:

"We find in this remarkable body of men a great capacity at once for dash and for endurance. The force under Morgan, which owed its peculiar excellence more to the quality of the

men and subordinate commanders than to the distinguished leader, developed a new feature in the art of war; vigilance, daring, fertility of resource, a race-horse power of hurling all into a period of ceaseless activity, were necessary for these wonderful raids." (P. 375.)

He also says: "The history of the Federal brigades of mounted troops makes almost as good a showing for these qualities. They lacked subordinate officers of Morgan's type. There were many excellent men among her officers, but no one brigade had such lieutenants as Basil Duke, Hines, Smith, Grigsby, and a host of other extraordinary men that led his forces." (*Ib.*)

He then adds, in a note to confirm the historic statement, that Basil Duke is now a distinguished lawyer, Hines Chief-Justice of Kentucky, Howard Smith Auditor and railroad commissioner, Grigsby a prominent legislator and valuable citizen.

He then considers the infantry troops, and as an example, to show that the Confederates were finer troops than the Federals, he details the service of the First Kentucky brigade (Confederate). The strength of this brigade was, as he states, 1140, thus making this small body stand as the type of the best infantry soldiers from Kentucky. He says that as the Federal brigades were made up of regiments from different States it is "impossible to cite any instances of endurance among these troops that can be compared with that of the First Confederate Kentucky brigade." He adds, somewhat inconsistently, that the history of individual regiments showed the same qualities, but the point made by the historian is that the Confederate troops from Kentucky were finer troops than the Federal troops from Kentucky. In the cavalry service Morgan's men are cited as the illustration. In the infantry service, the First Confederate Kentucky brigade is cited as the illustration.

He then says: "It could be made clear, if space allowed the showing, that the best fighting material came from the richest and most elevated population of the Commonwealth" (p. 377), from which portion he says the Confederate soldiers came.

This is not history, but rather the expression of views and sentiment.

Why it should be said the Blue Grass section contributed its best material to the Confederate army, and that the Union troops went from poorer parts of the State, or why the best fighting material on either side went from the Blue Grass section, there is nothing to show. More men went into the Union service than into the Confederate service from the Blue Grass, and, in so far as any recorded accounts go, the men from other sections on either side were as good soldiers as those from the Blue Grass.

It has been shown that this historian errs greatly in his numbers. In one instance he states that 40,000 Confederates went out at once, in the fall of 1861, and then that 40,000 was the total number from first to last, both of which statements are incorrect, as shown by the quotations from the records, and from Confederate historians. So now, when he uses the figures 30,000 or more, he is manifestly excessive, and so also when he comes to describe these soldiers and tell from what parts of the State the finest came, he falls into like errors.

Shaler having given the First Confederate Kentucky brigade as the example, it is only necessary to quote the following from Colonel Ed. Porter Thompson's history of that brigade. Colonel Thompson served with it, and has written its history. He says of the soldiers of that command:

"They represented Kentucky as a whole and not any particular section of it, not any particular class of its citizens. They came together from eighty-three counties, from homes

dotting the State line from the Big Sandy to the Mississippi, from the Ohio to the Tennessee line, from the mountains, the Blue Grass regions, and the western plains; from city and hamlet and country places, from factories and shops, mines and farms, from schools, commercial houses and the offices of professional men." (P. 23.)

Concerning the capacity for dash and endurance and for courage and invincible determination which the historian finds in Morgan's men, it would be certainly as natural for an impartial writer to cite as an illustration the services of the Kentucky regiments who contended with Morgan, and pursued and captured him, and twice broke up his command, as to cite Morgan's command, giving the names of his subordinates.

The ability of Morgan's subordinates is not questioned, but there is no call for any historian to enter upon invidious distinctions between them and the Federal officers. In no particular did the men named, or any other Confederate officers from Kentucky, excel as soldiers or citizens such Union military leaders as Thomas L. Crittenden, William T. Ward, Thomas J. Wood, L. H. Rousseau, Jerre T. Boyle, Speed S. Fry, John M. Harlan, James S. Jackson, E. H. Hobson, John T. Croxton, Green Clay Smith, D. W. Lindsay, E. H. Murray, T. T. Garrard, B. H. Bristow, R. T. Jacob, John Mason Brown, J. M. Shackelford, John H. Ward, and scores of others who led the Union troops of Kentucky.

The turn of political affairs in Kentucky did not bring preferment to the Union leaders in the State, as a rule, but Colonel Thomas B. Cochran became chancellor in Louisville, and Colonels Morrow, B. F. Buckner, and others were circuit judges, and J. R. Hindman became Lieutenant-Governor; John M. Harlan's great ability is now manifested on the Supreme Bench; Green Clay Smith was elected to Congress in 1863 and 1865, and was

made a Territorial Governor; B. H. Bristow was a most distinguished Cabinet officer, E. H. Murray became Governor of Utah, J. M. Shackelford a Federal judge, William H. Hays and Walter Evans Federal judges, and as honored citizens the list would be too long for mention in this place.

The historian Shaler speaks of the "Federal brigades of mounted troops" as though the Kentucky cavalry regiments were brigaded together. There was but one such organization, but that one not only almost, but altogether, made as splendid a showing as any cavalry on either side during the war. From 1863 until the end of the war, the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th regiments of Kentucky cavalry constituted one brigade, under command of Colonel Lewis D. Watkins. The service of this brigade was with the great armies, and its fighting was at such places as Chickamauga, the Atlanta campaign, and under General Thomas in the campaign which wound up with the battle of Nashville. After that it took part in General Wilson's celebrated expedition through Alabama and Georgia. The names of the places visited by this brigade of cavalry all have a warlike sound: Murfreesboro, Triune, Fayetteville, Wartrace, Tupelo, Tullahoma, Huntsville, Caperton's Ferry, Valley Head, Crawfish Springs, Rossville, Lookout Mountain, Kingston, Adairsville, Etowah, Kennesaw, Sandtown, Atlanta, Nashville, Montgomery, Macon.

The service mentioned of these regiments was but a section of the whole. They had begun their career in Kentucky, attended the armies to Shiloh, followed them on the grand round through Tennessee and back to Kentucky, on the march to Louisville, out to Perryville, and thence back to Tennessee. In all this, the work of the cavalry was peculiarly arduous. It operated under the orders of the commander-in-chief. It had no independent action, no place "to reason why," but only to per-

form the duty assigned, protecting the flanks of the army, scouting, reconnoitring, guarding, fighting back advances, pursuing, skirmishing, and in all respects engaging in the work required of cavalry in connection with large forces of infantry.

The 2d, 3d, and 5th regiments of Kentucky cavalry, with the 9th Pennsylvania and 8th Indiana, constituted a brigade for a time commanded by Eli H. Murray, Colonel of the 3d Kentucky. A notable part of the service of these regiments was in the march from Atlanta to the sea and thence through the Carolinas. The obstacles to Sherman's march were in large degree met by the cavalry, and the report of the young commander of this brigade discloses fighting all the way—at Jonesboro, Lovejoy's, Jackson, Ocmulgee, Macon, Milledgeville, Ogeechee, Waynesboro, Augusta, Sister's Ferry, Averysboro, Bentonville, and other places.

This also was but a section of the service of these regiments. They, too, had been with the large armies from the beginning. The Second Cavalry from first to last was in fifty-six engagements, among them Perryville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Dalton, Kennesaw. Twice in the Atlanta campaign it went with other cavalry entirely around the Confederate army, breaking communications and destroying supplies. In these expeditions it was led by Colonel Elijah S. Watts, a gallant soldier, educated at West Point, and who served continuously with the regiment from first to last.

In September, 1862, two brigades of cavalry operated together under one commander. In this body with other regiments were the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Kentucky regiments. They were on the alert during Buell's march, contending with the Confederate cavalry. They captured a Georgia regiment at New Haven, Kentucky, and after the battle of Perryville were again in Tennessee with Rosecrans's army fighting at various points until the

battle of Murfreesboro, where, the reports say, "Colonel Murray with a handful of men performed service that would do honor to a full regiment."

In 1863 the officers in command in Kentucky petitioned General Rosecrans for the 3d Cavalry, and had it for a time, during which it engaged in the pursuit of Morgan through Indiana and Ohio, but it returned again to Tennessee, and in connection with the 5th and 7th Cavalry served so satisfactorily as to elicit the highest compliments from the commanding officers. All these regiments continued to serve with the armies until the opening of the Atlanta campaign. During this campaign the cavalry had no rest. Eight Kentucky cavalry regiments participated: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 11th. They fought from Chattanooga to Atlanta. Toward the close of the campaign they passed twice around the rebel army, fighting all the way in their work of breaking communications. The reports mention fights at Camp Creek, Stevens Cross Roads, on the railroad at Jonesboro, on the McDonough road, Lovejoy's, and Fosterville; at the latter place a charge was made called in the reports "terrible and magnificent, over infantry and artillery, with sabre and horse's hoof." On the second expedition, which lasted ten days, Colonel Murray's report of his brigade says the movement was attended with daily encounters. "It is impossible," he says, "for any one not a participant to have a conception of the many marches made and successful engagements."

In one of these expeditions, Colonel Silas Adams of the First Kentucky Cavalry, commanding his brigade and having with him his own regiment and the eleventh Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel W. O. Boyle, became surrounded. He refused to surrender, and his commander, General Stoneman, told him if he tried to cut his way out he would be destroyed. Adams replied, "I

will take the responsibility." He lost some men, but extricated his command, and in General Sherman's report he says "Colonel Adams's brigade came in intact."

Colonel Charles S. Hanson, in the report of his brigade, which assisted in driving Morgan out of Kentucky, in June, 1864, especially commends the 37th, 39th, 40th, and 52nd regiments of mounted infantry in the battle at Cynthiana. Of the pursuit he says: "The march of four hundred and seventy miles from Cynthiana to Cumberland River and back to Lexington in eleven days is perhaps the most rapid and trying known in this war. The route passed over the roughest road known in the Kentucky mountains."

Only a glimpse here can be given of the service of these regiments, but it is enough to show that the high encomiums which Shaler passes upon the remarkable dash and endurance of Morgan's men would be just as properly passed upon these Union regiments.

When the historian says, upon the whole, the Confederate troops from Kentucky were better than the Union Kentucky troops, he in effect says they were better than any Federal soldiers from any State, for it would be impossible to find any record of service finer than that of the regiments of cavalry just mentioned, and a few brief suggestions will show that the infantry regiments from Kentucky had as splendid a record as the cavalry.

The following interesting table, compiled from the report of the Adjutant-General of Kentucky, shows the strength of the cavalry and infantry regiments, and gives an idea of what they were numerically, not being regiments in name alone, but all were full:

CAVALRY.

REGIMENTS.	NO. AT ORGANIZATION.	RECR	TOTAL.
1st.....	900	513	1413
2nd.....	997	..	997
3rd.....	1200	..	1200
4th.....	659	167	826
5th.....	789	90	879
6th.....	1007	343	1350
7th.....	939	203	1142
8th.....	1235	53	1288
9th.....	1206	52	1258
10th.....	1176	59	1235
11th.....	1001	279	1280
12th.....	814	876	1690
13th.....	1198	43	1241
14th.....	1273	23	1296
15th.....	503	126	631
17th.....	1211	55	1266
1st Vet. Cav.....	267	..	267
2nd " ".....	659	..	659
3rd " ".....	603	..	603
4th " ".....	594	..	594
6th " ".....	832	..	832
Patterson's Co. Engineers..	43	..	43
Light Artillery.....	629	656	1285
Detachments unclassified..	107	..	107
			<hr/> 23,382

INFANTRY.

REGIMENTS.	NO. AT ORGANIZATION.	RECRUITS.	TOTAL.
1st.....	896	209	1105
2nd.....	876	282	1158
3rd.....	913	163	1076
4th.....	803	1055	1858
5th.....	980	70	1050

REGIMENTS.	NO. AT ORGANIZATION.	RECRUITS.	TOTAL.
6th.....	890	85	975
7th.....	1000	169	1169
8th.....	930	103	1033
9th.....	930	205	1135
10th.....	869	100	969
11th.....	851	128	979
12th.....	882	112	994
13th.....	862	120	982
14th.....	863	462	1325
15th.....	870	99	969
16th.....	878	17	895
17th.....	692	807	1499
18th.....	779	150	929
19th.....	835	127	962
20th.....	873	118	991
21st.....	874	65	939
22nd.....	905	108	1013
23rd.....	942	76	1018
24th.....	664	400	1064
26th.....	519	641	1160
27th.....	627	199	826
28th.....	677	165	842
30th.....	826	56	882
32nd.....	923	..	923
34th.....	792	102	894
35th.....	841	121	962
37th.....	805	71	876
39th.....	817	541	1358
40th.....	841	195	1036
45th.....	874	126	1000
47th.....	769	177	946
48th.....	864	18	842
49th.....	625	321	946
52nd.....	843	46	889
53rd.....	918	140	1058
54th.....	854	..	854

REGIMENTS.	NO. AT ORGANIZATION.	RECRUITS.	TOTAL.
55th.....	873	169	1042
7th Vet. Inf.....	379	..	379
12th " "	639	..	639
14th " "	369	13	382
16th " "	763	..	763
18th " "	646	..	646
21st " "	866	..	866
23rd " "	625	..	625
26th " "	736	..	736
28th " "	394	..	394
			<hr/>
			48,893
Total Infantry.....		48,893	
Total Cavalry.....		23,382	
		<hr/>	
		72,275	
State Troops.....		12,486	
		<hr/>	
		84,761	
Deduct veterans re-enlisting		5,407	
		<hr/>	
		79,354	

Thirty-five of the foregoing regiments were recruited in the summer and fall of 1861, and the number of men they contained, when added to the State troops organized at the same time, exceeded, as has been already stated, the whole number of Confederate soldiers from the beginning to the end.

Many of these earliest-raised infantry regiments saw service before they were mustered in. In July, 1861, the 1st and 2nd Infantry were fighting in West Virginia, at Gauley Bridge, Beverly, Barboursville, Red House, Cotton Hill, and other places. In January, 1862, they joined Buell's army and fought at Shiloh. From that time on, they followed the fortunes of the army of the Cumberland. The 17th and 27th were at Donelson and

Shiloh, and continued with the army of the Cumberland. The 4th, 10th, and 12th Infantry began fighting at Mill Springs, and were in all the campaigns and battles until the close of the war. All the earlier-raised infantry regiments were employed from the first in contending with the Confederates who came into Kentucky in September, 1861, and served at the front continuously. It would be impossible in this place to mention the special services of each one. No one can be said to have been better than any other. They were all alike in respect to efficiency and soldierly qualities. They took part in the great battles of Shiloh, Perryville, Stone River, Chickamauga, Mission Ridge, Resaca, Buzzard Roost, Ringgold, New Hope, Golgotha, Dallas, Kenesaw, Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, Utoy, Jonesboro, Franklin, Nashville, besides innumerable engagements of lesser note.

In the battle of Shiloh and the march to Corinth the following Kentucky infantry regiments participated: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 17th, 20th, 24th, 25th, 26th.

If we desire to contemplate a body of troops not to be surpassed for discipline, courage, and endurance, thought may turn to the notable contingent which marched with General Buell over hot and dusty roads, in a season of scarcity of water, from the southern line of Tennessee to Louisville. Though placed in different commands, there were in that celebrated march the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Cavalry; the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 17th, 20th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 26th, 27th Infantry. The foregoing table will show that all were full regiments. If the officers alone could be named, the list would comprise more than five hundred. At the same time, fifteen other Kentucky regiments were in other fields. The general officers and officers commanding brigades on the great march were Thomas L. Crittenden, Thomas J. Wood, Lovell H. Rousseau,

Speed Smith Fry, S. G. Burbridge, John M. Harlan, Green Clay Smith, John T. Croxton, Walter C. Whitaker, P. B. Hawkins, W. A. Hoskins, E. H. Hobson.

In the battle of Perryville, the 15th Infantry lost its Colonel, Curran Pope, Lieutenant-Colonel George P. Jouett, and Major William P. Campbell. Two lieutenants and sixty-three men were killed and two hundred wounded. Although so shattered, General Rousseau says in his report: "On approaching the 15th Kentucky (though broken and shattered) it rose to its feet and cheered, and as one man moved to the top of the hill where it could see the enemy and I ordered it to lie down." The brigade commander especially commended the regiment. When it was under the terrible fire which caused so much loss it is said Captain James B. Forman "seized the colors, and, mounting the remains of a rail fence, cheered the men to continued resistance."

He was made Colonel of the 15th and was killed in the battle of Stone River, less than three months after Perryville.

In the battle of Stone River the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 15th, 21st, and 23rd were engaged, and all of them were commended for their steadiness, coolness, and bravery. Many of them lost heavily in killed and wounded, both of officers and men. In the 11th, seven were killed and eighty-five wounded, including four officers. The others suffered in like proportion.

In this battle, the 11th captured four pieces of the celebrated Washington artillery. After the battle General Rosecrans, by special order, sent "two fighting regiments"—the 9th and 11th—back to Kentucky, "to replenish their thinned ranks."

The 7th, 19th, and 22nd were with General George W. Morgan at Cumberland Gap in 1862, and with Sherman and Grant at Vicksburg in 1863, and were especially com-

mended in the reports for gallantry and unflinching steadiness in the battles of Thompson Hill, Champion Hill, Big Black, and before Vicksburg.

In the battle of Chickamauga fifteen Kentucky infantry regiments were engaged, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 15th, 17th, 18th, 21st, 23rd, 28th. Nearly all were under General Thomas and contributed powerfully to the holding of the "key point."

All the regiments which fought at Chickamauga suffered heavily, but soon after took part in the storming of Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge. Then many of them were called upon to take up the long, hard march for Knoxville. There ten Kentucky regiments—the 1st, 11th, and 12th Cavalry and the 11th, 12th, 13th, 16th, 24th, 27th Infantry—helped to make up Burnside's force, which, after severe fighting in the field, were beleaguered in the city. The siege was raised as succor approached.

The 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 15th, 17th, 18th, 23rd climbed Mission Ridge in that celebrated charge. General Hooker says in his report of the battle of Lookout Mountain:

"Several regiments were detailed to scale the summit, but to the 8th Kentucky must belong the distinction of having been foremost to reach its crest, and at sunrise to display our flag from the peak of Lookout amid the wild and prolonged cheers of the men whose dauntless valor had borne them to that point."

The 10th Infantry, having begun service in the fall of 1861, and fighting at Mill Springs, and in all succeeding campaigns, was not mustered out finally until June, 1865.

General Jeff. C. Davis said of the 21st:

"This regiment served under my command during the battle of Mission Ridge, and in the subsequent pursuit of the enemy to Ringgold. At Chickamauga Station its gallantry was

so conspicuous as to attract the attention of the whole division. It also accompanied me to Knoxville and back. The hardships endured by the troops in the march called for the highest qualities of the soldier."

The 23rd participated with the picked men in the taking of Brown's Ferry to open the "Cracker line" at Chattanooga, October, 1863.

In the East Tennessee campaign, when Longstreet was moving off toward Virginia, a battle occurred at Beans Station, when the 27th Kentucky held its position at a brick house until both wings of the Confederate line surged past, but this central and critical point was held by this regiment under Colonel John H. Ward until darkness enabled him to retire—a service for which he received the most complimentary mention.

In the Atlanta campaign, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 18th, 20th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 27th, 28th, participated, fighting in the almost daily encounters, and in the large engagements, all of which were so constant as to cause the campaign to be called "the battle of May, June, July, and August." When the strength of these regiments as shown by the foregoing table is considered, the part that was taken by the Union troops from Kentucky in these great campaigns appears in its true magnitude.

The 12th and 24th led the way in effecting the crossing of the Chattahoochie July 9, 1864, at the mouth of Soap Creek, which General Sherman called "one of the brilliant feats in the annals of war."

In October, 1864, an unsuccessful expedition was made from Kentucky against the salt works in Virginia, and again in November and December following another was made against the same place, which was successful. The Kentucky regiments which were engaged in these two expeditions were the 11th, 12th, and 13th Cavalry,

and the 26th, 30th, 35th, 37th, 39th, 40th, 45th, 53d, 54th, 55th Kentucky Infantry, the infantry being all mounted. The accounts show that on these expeditions there was hard fighting, bitter cold weather, and great scarcity of provisions.

The 28th Infantry was in General Whittaker's brigade, at Spring Hill, Tennessee, in November, 1864, which assisted in holding the turnpike against the advance of General Hood. Colonel John Rowan Boone was complimented for the skill with which he fought his regiment, the 28th, at that critical point. It was this particular service which gave General Whittaker the grounds for his explanation as to why General Hood did not "get on the pike" at Spring Hill (a great question in the history of the campaign). He said: "The reason he didn't get there was because he could n't." I was there myself, and had Rowan Boone with me!"

The 26th, having begun its career in Kentucky in the fall of 1861, was in service until July, 1865. On the 22nd day of February, 1865, it was the first regiment to enter the city of Wilmington, N. C.

Of the service of the 12th and 16th in the battle of Franklin, Tennessee, November 30, 1864, General Schofield says in his book—*Forty-six Years in the Army*—that when he saw the centre of his line begin to waver, "For a moment my heart sank, but instantly Opdycke's brigade and the 12th and 16th Kentucky sprang forward." He further says, "It would hardly be possible to frame language that would do justice to the magnificent conduct of Emerson Opdycke's brigade, and Lawrence H. Rousseau's 12th Kentucky, and John S. White's 16th Kentucky. Their action was beyond all praise."

But space does not admit of mentioning more instances; nor, indeed, of giving the proper details of those which have been so briefly alluded to,

so as to make them stand out as strikingly as they deserve.

Of all these regiments it may be said that no records show any reprehensible conduct. On the contrary, all are marked by soldierly qualities in as high a degree as any in the service. As an original proposition, it would be needless to say so much, but as the point has been raised, and as an accredited historian has deliberately written to the disparagement of the Kentucky Unionists who took up arms in obedience to their State and government, it is due them to point to the records of the period for their vindication. In Collins's *Annals* the work of a Southern sympathizer, and in the reports of Confederate officers themselves, it was shown that much that was reprehensible attended the movements in Kentucky of the Confederate troops, so highly extolled by the historian Shaler, while no blemish appears upon the escutcheon of any Union regiment from Kentucky. (i. Collins, 134, 135; *War Records*, Serial No. 77, pp. 74-84.)

Nor are there any grounds for saying any troops were better than the Kentucky Union regiments. To say that the Confederate troops from Kentucky were a finer body of men than the Union troops from Kentucky is equivalent to saying they were finer than any and all others, for the records of the service of the Union regiments from Kentucky are as high and excellent as those from any other State on either side in the war. Nor is there any logic or consistency in the statement of the historian. It is based on the assumption that the Confederates went from the richer parts of the State, which was not true, nor would it signify anything if true. It is shown by Colonel Ed. Porter Thompson that the First Kentucky Confederate brigade, which the historian cites in proof of his statement, did not come from any particular part of the State, but from all parts. The same is true of John H. Morgan's men. One of his regiments

came from the western part of the State, and his men generally were from many sections besides the Blue Grass. Indeed, when Morgan first raided Kentucky, in 1862, he says in his own report that his command consisted of his own regiment, which we may presume were Kentuckians, and the "Georgia regiment of partisan rangers, commanded by Colonel A. A. Hunt, and Major Gano's Texas Squadron, to which were attached two companies of Tennessee cavalry."

If it were true that the Blue Grass section of Kentucky furnished the best soldiers, it is also true that that section furnished more Union soldiers than Confederate soldiers, precisely as it furnished more Union voters than Southern Rights voters.

The whole idea of such distinction is fallacious, and the historian's conception of forty thousand Confederates going off to the Confederacy in September, 1861, giving rise to the fancy that all the fighting material departed, leaving a less martial people to furnish Union soldiers, is nothing but a dream. The truth is, less than a fourth of forty thousand departed at that time. The State Guard did not go as a whole, and at that time not less than forty thousand did join the Union army, if we include the Home Guard companies. Shaler's idea of the "first running from the press" is also only fancy, under the facts as above stated.

Concerning the whole spirit manifested in Shaler's history, it will be understood by many readers when they find in it the expression that the Kentucky troops were "*in no part composed of substitutes, which formed so large a part of the forces from most of the Northern States.*" (P. 357.) A writer who is disposed to cast such a slur upon the great body of volunteers who saved the Union from destruction finds it easy to do injustice to those from the State of Kentucky.

CHAPTER XX

STATE TROOPS, OR HOME GUARDS

ANOTHER branch of the service must be mentioned, which was peculiarly important in Kentucky as a border State. A large part of her military material was organized in companies generally designated as Home Guards, but more correctly called State Troops or State Militia. The Legislature having provided for this organization by act of May, 1861, many companies were at once formed, and upon them at the first beginning of strife was dependent to a considerable extent the defence of the State. They unquestionably prevented the occupation of Louisville by the Confederates in September, 1861, and from that time until the close of the war they played an important part in the protection of Kentucky from injury by raiders of every description.

Almost from the very beginning of the war until the end, and even afterwards, Kentucky was infested with roving bands of Confederates which are described in the chapter entitled *The Guerrilla Evil*.

Mr. Davis says in his *History* :

“I was authorized to commission officers to form bands of partisan rangers either of infantry or cavalry, which were subsequently confined to cavalry alone.” (Vol. i., p. 514.)

These bands came into Kentucky in large numbers, and many were formed in the State. It is only necessary to recur to Collins's *Annals* to see how numerous they were,

and the mischief that was done by them. Of date December 8, 1863, is the following entry:

“Guerrillas swarming in western Kentucky.”

Again, November 30, 1864:

“Guerrillas and Confederate recruits very active in middle and western Kentucky.”

Again, July 5, 1864:

“President Lincoln, alarmed at the prevalence of Confederate and guerrilla raiders in Kentucky, suspends the writ of *habeas corpus*, and proclaims martial law in the State.”

Again, October 9, 1863:

“Guerrilla outrages and successes in eastern Kentucky increasing. Governor Bramlette issues a pronunciamiento, saying the State shall be free from its murderous foes even though every arm be required to aid in their destruction. He threatens a draft unless State Guard companies for home protection are formed immediately.”

In these annals are mentioned in great number the outrages perpetrated by the bands for whose destruction Governor Bramlette called for the formation of more State Guards.

To protect the State against these bands more than twelve thousand men were enrolled under the heads “State Troops Proper,” and “State Militia Proper.” In the report of General D. W. Lindsay, Adjutant-General, are found the names of all these men and their officers. Under the first head there were twelve battalions, as follows:

Frankfort Battalion, seven companies.

Paducah Battalion, five companies.

Sandy Valley Battalion, four companies.

North Cumberland Battalion, three companies.

Three Forks Battalion, seven companies.

Hall's Gap Battalion, four companies.

Mercer County State Guards, one company.
Green River Battalion, four companies.
Middle Green River Battalion, four companies.
South Cumberland Battalion, five companies.
First Kentucky State Cavalry, four companies.
Casey County State Guards, one company.

These battalions consisted of forty-nine companies.

Under the second head there were sixty-two companies, and all came under the designation of Kentucky State forces.

Commenting upon these troops, the Adjutant-General says:

“All of these troops did valuable and efficient service for the State and the General government, as the history of the time would fully show. The Sandy Valley Battalion rendered very important service during the Saltville raid. The Frankfort Battalion protected the capital from the frequent incursions of guerrilla forces. The Paducah battalion protected the southwestern portion of the State. Shortly after the mustering out of this battalion the gallant captain Thomas J. Gregory, Company A, was killed in action while leading a charge against a guerrilla force. The Three Forks battalion was located in the extreme southeastern portion of the State; the Hall’s Gap battalion in the locality between Stanford and Hall’s Gap; the Green River battalion in the counties between the Ohio and Green rivers; the Middle Green River in the southern portion of the State; the South Cumberland battalion, also, in the southern part of the State; the First Kentucky State Cavalry in the central part of the State; the Frankfort battalion was assigned to duty in guarding the Louisville and Lexington Railroad and the country adjacent thereto. All of these battalions performed the most valuable service against the rebels and guerrillas under Morgan, Johnson, South, Lyon, Mundy, Gentry, Jesse, etc., and for some time freed the State from the incursions of these troops, the acts of many of whom were barbarous in the extreme.”

Some of the instances in which State troops were engaged are noted in Collins's *Annals*. These are here given not with the view of showing anything like the extent of their services, but to show that Collins, in gathering the important events of the war, found that the work of the Home Guards called for his attention.

In August, 1862, two fights with guerrillas by Home Guards in Pike County.

August 16th, near Mammoth Cave, Home Guards defeat a Confederate company, taking 77 prisoners.

August 25th, Home Guards from Danville and Harrodsburg surprise and defeat guerrillas.

September 18th, Home Guards fight successfully at Falmouth with Texas Rangers.

September 28th, fight at Brooksville.

May 8, 1863, Colonel W. H. Wadsworth captured Confederate recruits near Maysville.

June 16th, Home Guards attack Confederates unsuccessfully in Fleming County.

September 2d, fight near Cattlettsburg.

June 10th, Confederate raiders attack Frankfort, and are beaten off by State troops.

December 13, 1864, Home Guards defeat Confederates near Newcastle.

June 29, 1865, Home Guards defeat Confederates near Harrodsburg.

February 20th, Home Guards defeat Confederates near Hartford.

March 15th, fight at Pitt's Point.

March 29th, fight near Paducah.

Collins gives in some detail the remarkable fight of 125 Home Guards under Dr. Bradford with 300 of Morgan's men at Augusta, Kentucky, in which the latter lost 21 killed, and although the Home Guards were compelled to surrender, by firing the houses from which they fought, the object of the raid was frustrated. Further mention of

this battle is found in the official records, showing that Colonel Wilson of the 44th Ohio hurried from Maysville to the relief of Dr. Bradford, having with him Colonel William H. Wadsworth, Colonel Charles A. Marshall, and Judge Bush, who led the Home Guards. "More than half of my command," says Colonel Wilson in his report, "were citizens, but all marched and behaved like veteran troops." Colonel Wilson says in his report that his cavalry rushed into the town in time to release some of the Home Guards whom the Confederates "did not have time to parole."

In September, 1862, Governor Robinson appointed William H. Wadsworth to command the State forces in the section of the State about Maysville, and he appointed on his staff the well-known citizens Thomas M. Green, Sam W. Owens, and Richard Apperson, Jr. (Collins, i., p. 111.)

In September, 1863, a general military order was issued "encouraging the organization of Home Guards in Kentucky to put down robbery and violence." They were to report to the military officers, and were supplied with arms. (*War Records*, Serial No. 52, p. 620.) The services of the Home Guards are favorably mentioned in the official reports of numerous generals, among them Nelson, Anderson, Boyle, H. G. Wright, Green Clay Smith, George W. Morgan, D. W. Lindsay, E. H. Hobson. All of them speak of these troops in a complimentary manner and in no other way. Only once does any officer find cause of complaint, and in that instance General Burbridge issued an order reciting that some Home Guards were acting badly and that such conduct would not be permitted. And although Collins, in gleaning the events of the war, so often mentioned the services of the Home Guards, in only one instance does he state that they, in connection with regular troops, were blamable, and that was for what he called plundering.

It will readily occur to any reader that with any troops, however well controlled and disciplined, when in the field engaged in actual war, it will now and then, and perhaps frequently, occur that bad conduct will call for reprimand. Collins's *Annals* abound in mention of plundering, pillaging, robbing stores and banks by the acknowledged Confederate forces, notably those under Morgan, and compared with this the conduct of the Home Guards generally in Kentucky appears blameless. They were operating under orders, and were scattered in all parts of the State for its protection. Twice only is anything alleged against them, while, on the other hand, those against whom they were contending were perpetrating scores upon scores of outrages, killings, plunderings, pillagings, burnings, notably of court-houses, and other buildings in towns, regardless of the possibility of the fires consuming any and all other property. Reference to Collins's *Annals* will abundantly establish this statement, and show to what a terrible and desperate condition the State of Kentucky was brought by the bands of Confederates which swarmed over it, and against whom the Home Guards, conjointly with other troops, had to wage incessant warfare.

The State troops never left the State except in very few instances. The companies were formed for local defence. They were alert and vigilant and exceedingly active. As the Adjutant-General says, "for some time they freed the State from incursions." The companies were made up of the neighborhood men who could not well, on personal account, or on account of their families, go in the regular regimental organizations. These companies inspired confidence wherever they were. Their object was to defend against raiding, and their presence gave a feeling of security to the neighborhood.

Nothing can be more unjust than the unfounded censure of these guardians of the State found in certain

historical treatises. For instance, Shaler has deliberately written that these Kentucky Unionists, organized under authority for the protection of their own homes and communities and State, were the worst enemies the State had. He calls them a "medieval type of soldiery," and says the local disturbances they bred were of more permanent damage to the State than all the larger operations of war that were ever carried on within her borders." (P. 269.) The injustice of this is shown even in Shaler's own history. He details the fight of the Home Guards at Augusta with a body of Morgan's men, and says:

"Though outnumbered four to one by their veteran assailants, they fought for several hours from house to house, killing and wounding about fifty of Duke's men."

Also, that Duke's proposed Confederate expedition into Ohio failed, and that the Confederates "returned with one more experience in the fighting power of the citizen Kentuckian."

He also mentions the fight of the Home Guards at Falmouth, in which they "defeated their assailants, inflicting a loss of six men."

"In a score of other engagements," says he, "these little detached commands, fighting by their thresholds, showed their willingness to combat against hopeless odds, and to endure a degree of punishment which it is hard to obtain from regular troops. Though often overcome, they showed the Confederate troops that the State would not be readily subjugated, and dissipated all the fondly cherished ideas that Kentucky was actually in sympathy with the Confederacy." (P. 317.)

Thus it appears that as he records the facts the Home Guards stand well, but when he expresses views he is moved by bias to put the seal of condemnation upon them.

But the most inexcusable incrimination of the State

troops is found in Z. F. Smith's *History of Kentucky*. Writing of them, he says:

“These were a local sort of military police, organized and armed at the same time with the State Guards, but maintained around the towns and neighborhood centres. While many men of character and integrity were associated with these, and rendered good service in restraining violence, yet they offered the tempting opportunity of gathering into their organizations the shiftless, prowling, and lawless element which more or less infests every community at the expense of its peace and good name. The usual compensation, the subordination of civil authority to a dispensation of military license, and the free and easy service with little risk or sacrifice, made for them a long holiday of each year of their visitation upon the country. Too frequently for the honor and good repute of our civilization, officers and privates availed themselves of the armed license to perpetrate needless and barbarous murders, to spoliates upon and appropriate or destroy property, to arrest and imprison men, and to injure, terrify, and annoy with ruthless and cruel inhumanity.”

After having given this expression of partisan feeling upon the page designed for historic narration, and well knowing how the pages of Collins teem with instances of misconduct on the part of Confederate raiding parties, he undertakes to make his unfounded aspersions of the Home Guards appear impartial. He says:

“These phases and experiences of depravity are not phenomenal with Kentucky, nor were they a peculiar outgrowth of one cause militant or the other. We shall see that from the ranks of the splendid manhood of the Confederate army there came out to prowl and prey upon communities, in defiance of all restraints of civilized warfare, marauding bands of outlaws, who perpetrated murders, robberies, arsons, and outrages, and under the abuse of Confederate authority, as wantonly as did the worst element of the other side.”

It may be set down as incontestably true that if the Union Home Guards of Kentucky had even approximated the character given them by Shaler and Smith, their character would have been made known by deeds, and it is equally true that if there had been such deeds they would have been chronicled by Collins. That they are not chronicled by Collins is proof positive that they did not exist and never occurred. Collins was intense in his Southern sympathy, but he could not record deeds which never occurred. Therefore, he sets down nothing, practically speaking, against the Home Guards, while the raiding bands against whom the Home Guards operated are shown by Collins to have committed deeds of villany by scores and hundreds.

Nor do the official records contain any reports which reflect upon the conduct of these Home Guard troops, while they abound in specific mention of the innumerable crimes of those whom these State troops were fighting. These records and Collins's *Annals* may not be searched by general readers, but general historic presentations in the form of Smith's and Shaler's are apt to be consulted.

It is shown in another chapter that the administration at Washington placed Kentucky officers in charge in Kentucky, as a general rule, on the supposition that they would be most acceptable to the people. But, whether they were Kentuckians or not, there was continuous complaint of "high-handed outrages." Nor was this unnatural at the time. The people grew weary of government by soldiers. Military rule is far from as agreeable as the civil. Therefore, complaints against the military which were so common at the time may be excused, but it is not excusable to transfer them to the historic page to make appear as history matters which were complained of under such circumstances.

The system of Provost Marshals belongs to a condition of war. It is as necessary as many other systems in such

time. It was established in Kentucky and was one of the unwelcome features of war time. The logic of the situation was simply this: War has its necessary concomitants, and the only way to avoid them is to avoid having war. That the Provost Marshal system in Kentucky was especially harmful does not appear in any record. Doubtless, the officers were complained of at the time, and that they were blameless in all that they did no one would allege. But if they had been the agents of a ruthless despotism, their track would have been marked by deeds, and those deeds would appear in the records. Especially would Collins have gathered them, and noted them in his *Annals*. That they do not appear in this manner is proof that they did not occur, and the real truth is, the Provost Marshal system in Kentucky was not chargeable with any special wrong, and was not an agent for intolerable tyranny. Yet the historian Shaler deliberately states, as one of the charges against the Unionists of Kentucky, that:

“There can be no doubt that the people of Kentucky endured far more outrage from the acts of the Provost Marshals than they did from all the acts of legitimate war put together.” (P. 353.)

This historian may not have regarded any feature of the war as “legitimate,” but it brought upon the soil of Kentucky vast contending armies; it caused terrible battles to be fought; it brought raiding troops, which were opposed by bodies of Federal troops. Both careered over the State incessantly. All this was war, and all the evil which attends war inevitably followed. Yet it is gravely narrated for history that the Provost Marshals, against whom the records are practically silent, inflicted more damage than the contending armies. This is in keeping with the statement that the Home Guards were of more permanent damage to the State than all the large operations of war put together. No more extravagant or

unjust statements could be made, and it seems to spring from a desire to show that in all the ramifications of Federal control in Kentucky there was always ground for censure. Shaler often recurs to the subject of Provost Marshals. He calls the system a "brutal tyranny," and speaks of the protests against it "from all good citizens"; that it "disgusted the people" and that many Unionists were "turned into rebels by the outrages of the military authorities" in this connection.

Having classed the Home Guards with guerrillas, so he also classes the Provost Marshals and guerrillas together. His language is as follows:

"A vast number of bandit gangs, nominally in the Confederate army, but really without any control from commissioned officers, roamed over the State in all directions, robbing, murdering, and burning as they went. It seemed for a time as if civil government would be broken to pieces by these two mortal foes to order—the guerrillas and the Provost Marshals." (P. 351.)

The Provost Marshals, like the Home Guards, were Kentucky Unionists. They were striving to protect Kentucky from the disastrous consequences of border warfare, which had brought upon the State a condition so desperate that Shaler himself says it "could hardly be described." They were not making disorder. If disorder had not come from other sources they would not have been called into service. Yet the historian classes the defenders of order with those who had brought on the troubles.

But the extravagancies of Shaler appear in many ways. An instance will be given, not because it affects Kentucky Unionists, but simply to show the extremes to which he goes in dealing with events where there are grounds for censuring the Federal side. He gives an account of General E. A. Payne and his associates, who

were in charge of western Kentucky for a time. He says, "It was charged that they had been guilty of extreme cruelty and extortion," and their conduct, says he, "had not had its parallel since the tyrannies of the Austrian Haynau."

Now, with all that may be said against any officer on either side in our Civil War, it may be set down to the credit of the American people that an Austrian Haynau never appeared from first to last. Haynau, in dealing with the participants in the Hungarian revolt of 1848, is said to have held "bloody assizes," and among his numerous victims were titled men and distinguished leaders of the Hungarians. Those who were fortunate to escape death at his hands found refuge in other countries, and among them Kossuth came to the United States. No such conduct occurred anywhere in our Civil War. The comparison is simply hyperbole, and may be classed with the same writer's placing the Union Home Guards of Kentucky and the Provost Guards on the same plane with guerrillas.

Another specimen of unjust and uncalled-for writing by this same historian is his characterization of Colonel Frank Wolford and his regiment. The language used is as follows: "Colonel Wolford, a partisan commander, who had done excellent service with his regiment of irregular cavalry."

Wolford's regiment was the First Kentucky Cavalry. It was recruited in August, 1861, at Camp Dick Robinson. In that month it guarded the train which carried arms from Lexington to Camp Dick Robinson. It fought at Camp Wildcat in October; in January, 1862, at Mill Springs. From that time on it was on incessant duty, fighting at innumerable places against raiders in Kentucky; operating with Buell's and Rosecrans' armies; with Burnside in east Tennessee; with Sherman in the Atlanta campaign. Why Colonel Wolford should be

called a partisan, or his regiment irregular, does not appear from any record or authentic mention.

These instances are given to show that the spirit of a historian may be such that his statements are to be taken with caution. In a certain sense it would be history to record precisely what was the temper of a people, and how they manifested it, through a period of conflict. It could be truthfully said that severe and bitter things were uttered in Kentucky during the war time. Aspersions and criminations were dealt out with a free hand; all this is true. But to record upon the historic page those free-spoken charges and criminations of the day as embodying the truth, as to men and events, is unjust to the actors of that period. The records all show that a desperate condition of affairs existed in Kentucky. In the contest, which lasted through months and years, several remedies were resorted to, but the Kentucky Unionists were resisting those who were fighting against the stand the people of the State chose to take on the side of the Union. They were contending for the peace and security of their homes and firesides. The Union Kentucky soldiers in organized regiments at the front were fighting for the preservation of the Union. The organizations in the State were engaged in suppressing a local warfare which was precipitated upon the State as one of the unfortunate incidents of a state of war. In no form of organization did the Kentucky Unionists seek to devastate their own State, nor did they roam in partisan bands into any other State.

CHAPTER XXI

THE NUMBER ENGAGED

DURING the entire war Kentucky was subjected to incessant raiding, and the protection of the State was largely entrusted to Kentucky troops. Regiments of cavalry and mounted infantry were especially employed, and they had a toilsome and difficult service. The raiders were, in large measure, Kentuckians, and with every command coming into the State were men who knew the country and could serve as guides. Besides this, the State was full of men who sympathized with the Confederate cause, who could always be depended on to give information. On this account raiding was made the more easy, and the difficulties of defending were increased. Concentration of Union troops would be made where it was thought the raiders might be met, but information given would lead to movements elsewhere. This is so natural it only needs to be thus briefly mentioned, but it is necessary to understand it in order to avoid falling into the common error that whenever the raiders were worsted it was by superior forces.

One of the gross misunderstandings of the situation, not only in Kentucky but everywhere, is that Confederate defeats were always owing to a larger Federal force.¹ This has been iterated by so many writers of history that it is proper in this place to comment upon it. There were no better soldiers on either side than the Kentucky regiments who were so conspicuous in the protection of the State. Their officers were brave, faithful, and full of

¹ See Appendix, § 25, p. 355.

activity and energy. No truer men were in the service than the Hobsons, Wards, Shackelford, Jacob, Wolford, Hanson, Boyle, Fry, Croxton, Bristow, the Starlings, Harlan, Smith, Lindsay, Murray, Brown, and others, and the men they led. They were vigilant and untiring, but it was not possible for them to concentrate at every point where the danger was, and it occurred most frequently that the whole of some raiding command was met by only a fragment of the troops operating against them. Sometimes, therefore, it occurred that the Federal force would be overpowered. Again, it would occur that the raiders would meet with discomfiture at the hands of a smaller force than their own. It would require a volume to give the details, and it will not be attempted here.

The subject, however, naturally leads to the consideration of the relative numbers of soldiers engaged in the war on the respective sides, and to a removal of a very common misapprehension that the Federal forces were vastly superior in numbers to the Confederates. If the disparity had been as great as it is often stated, the State of Kentucky could have been protected far better than it was. Troops could ill be spared from the front to protect the rear. The protection of the rear was left to just as few as could possibly do the work, oftentimes so few that they were overworked with incessant riding and incessant vigils, and when collisions occurred the enemy would have the superior force.

Misleading statements made by various writers convey the impression that on the Federal side there were 2,700,000 soldiers from first to last, while on the Confederate side there were only 600,000 all told. If such had been the case, the task and the burden which were cast upon the soldiers of the Union to overthrow the Confederacy would have been much lighter. If it had been true, then it might have been true, also, that the rough handling of the Confederate raiders in Kentucky was by "overwhelming

numbers." But that such was not the case is shown by an examination of the records of the period. It is interesting to examine these records, for it is from them alone that the truth is to be obtained. All statements and estimates which ignore the records are valueless. Wild figures are continually given. Assertions are made orally and in writing. It is only by considering the official documents of the period that a fair approximation of the exact numbers and the ratio between them can be made, and as this vitally bears upon the hard task the Kentucky Union soldiers had in protecting and defending their State from constantly recurring incursions, an examination of the subject will here be presented. Alexander Stephens gravely writes as follows in his history :

"One of the most striking features was the great disparity between the numbers of forces on the opposite sides. From beginning to end quite 2,000,000 more Federal troops were brought into the field than the entire force of the Confederates. The Federal records show that they had from first to last 2,600,000 men in the service, while the Confederates, all told, could not have much, if any, exceeded 600,000."

This character of general statement is found in all the Southern accounts. It is made to appear in books, pamphlets, magazines, papers, speeches, and even inscribed upon monuments.

A late expression is by the Governor of Louisiana, at the annual reunion of Confederates at New Orleans, 1903. He says :

"With a total enlistment of 600,000 you confronted 2,800,000."

When writers and speakers so express themselves, it must be from ignorance or from wilful misrepresentation. If from ignorance, it is inexcusable, for the record facts are open to all. If from a deliberate purpose to mislead, it is unwise, for the use of such figures will cause intelligent people to discredit any other statement they make.

We will first inquire as to the alleged 2,700,000¹ Federal soldiers, and then consider how the actual number on the Confederate side compares with the alleged 600,000. The number 2,700,000 never represented the number of soldiers in the armies of the Union, and never purported to do so. All it ever represented was the total number of *enlistments* appearing on the records, regardless of how the number was made up.

The same records which give the figures 2,700,000 expressly show that the 2,700,000 enlistments were made up by numerous *re-enlistments*. One man, enlisting twice or thrice, each time increased the number of enlistments; but he was only one man.

If every individual soldier in the war had enlisted twice, the 2,700,000 figure would represent just half that many men, or 1,350,000. The records do not show that this occurred, but they do show that at least one third, or more, of the 2,700,000 recorded enlistments are re-enlistments.

At the first, it was not supposed the war would be of long duration, and men were called out for one hundred days' service. There were also six-months, nine-months, twelve-months, and three-years organizations. All this was natural, as the war continued longer than was first expected. So also it was natural that, as the short-term organizations went out of service, the men comprising them would enter the service again in the longer-term organizations. In this way hundreds of thousands were added to the record of enlistments without increase of men. In the years 1863 and 1864 a very large proportion of the three-years men re-enlisted in the veteran organization, and this increased the record of enlistments largely over 200,000 without adding a single

¹ Round numbers. In Nicolay and Hay's *Life of Lincoln* it is said: "There were 2,690,401 names on the rolls, but these included re-enlistments."

soldier. This fact in regard to the 2,700,000 aggregate of enlistments has been set forth at large in ways and times innumerable. To ignore it is simple obstinacy. It is, in fact, what is called "Cyclopedia information." Appleton's *American Cyclopedia*, published in 1876, gives the number of enlistments, and says the 2,700,000 "does not correctly represent the number of different persons under arms, as it includes re-enlistments." The *Encyclopedia Britannica* gives 1,500,000 as the total number of soldiers of the Federal armies. Greeley's history of the war, published in 1866, gives the total of enlistments, and adds, "As many of these were mustered in twice or thrice, it is probable that there were not more than 1,500,000 men." In Scribner's *Campaigns*, a volume of "Statistics" gives the total of enlistments, and adds, "Men who re-enlist are counted twice or more often." The actual number of men who by enlisting and re-enlisting made up the paper record of 2,700,000 has been variously estimated from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000. It is conservative to place it at not over 1,700,000. It is not at all probable that it reached 2,000,000.

Upon this point the census of 1890 is useful in the same way that it is useful in ascertaining the number of the Confederates, as will presently appear. This census shows the total number of soldiers and sailors of the United States living in 1890 to be 1,034,000. Allowing 1,000,000 of these to be ex-soldiers of the Civil War, it would be impossible, by adding all who had died, to swell the number up to 2,700,000. If we add the 350,000 who lost their lives during the war, it would require that 650,000 should have died between the close of the war and 1890, in order even to reach 2,000,000, and as this is excessive, it shows that there must have been fewer than 2,000,000, all told.

This is confirmed by another fact: It is a record fact that there were 1,000,000 volunteers to be discharged at

the close of the war.¹ Adding the 350,000 who lost their lives in the war, it would require over 1,200,000 additional to make 2,700,000, which is so palpably excessive it shows that it was by the re-enlisting of the same men that the 2,700,000 aggregate of enlistments was made up.

There are exact records of the enlistment of all the Federal soldiers, according to the various terms for which they enlisted. From these records calculation has been made of the number if all are put on a three-years basis. The result is 1,556,678, which number in reality represents the actual Federal force which contended with the Confederate force obtainable by volunteering and conscription.

From all that has been said it is plain that, instead of 2,700,000 soldiers in the Federal armies, the number was considerably below 2,000,000. And according to the best estimates it did not exceed a figure between 1,500,000 and 1,700,000 all told. This latter is the number given by Woodrow Wilson in his recently published history. His language is that the Federal forces were "in all 1,700,000." It is but reasonable to conclude that this distinguished historian has given these figures after investigating the records, and making the proper deduction from the aggregate of enlistments which is required by re-enlistments.

It was this band of 1,700,000 patriots, who went to the field from the loyal portion of the population of the non-seceding States, who fought the battle. They were not furnished by the total population, but went from that element of the people who saw nothing but ruin and disaster in a dismembered Union.

What was the number on the Confederate side? The various estimates have been gathered in a volume entitled *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War*, by Colonel Liver-

¹ They were scattered all over the country, some in the main armies, and others guarding thousands of posts in cities and towns, and along railroads, and generally protecting the territory which had come under their control.

more, of Boston, but it would be impracticable to go over them all at this time.

We have seen that Stephens gives 600,000 as the total from first to last. Many others make the same statement. Adjutant-General Cooper says no record of the number is to be found. In 1869 Dr. Joseph Jones, a Confederate surgeon, published a pamphlet, stating that "the available Confederate force, capable of active service in the field, did not during the entire war exceed 600,000." He says his "calculation is given only as an approximation."

In a recent able address by General Thruston, of Nashville, an ex-Federal officer, he says that Dr. Jones's figures have been followed and republished in various forms, and quoted and requoted until in the South they have come to be regarded in some sort as official.

In the South the number 600,000 is popularly stated as the total of the Confederate soldiers. So firmly is it fixed that it controls any and all other figures.

Those who have sworn by the 600,000 figure are ready to dismiss every statement that conflicts. And yet the sole foundation for it consists in estimates which complacently disregard the record figures. The statement of Dr. Jones is that "the available force capable of effective service in the field did not during the entire war exceed 600,000 men." At the very beginning of this inquiry we may well ask, if the "available force capable of effective service in the field" was 600,000, what was the number of those not so available and effective? For these must be added to arrive at the whole, just as in giving the total on the Federal side all are counted, including militia and "emergency men" and irregular organizations and veteran reserves, organized at the very end of the war, the greater part of whom never served in any capacity. General Thruston has pointed out that the average *effective* strength of the Federal army was sixty-five per cent. of the enrollment, and that in the same proportion

Dr. Jones's 600,000 would represent an enrollment of about 1,000,000.

According to the census of 1890, there were then living in the United States 432,000 ex-Confederate soldiers. These figures are quoted in an historical report by General Stephen D. Lee at a recent Confederate reunion. If to this 432,000 is added the number who lost their lives during the war, and the number who died in the twenty-five years between the close of the war and 1890, what becomes of the 600,000 figure?

On this point, we may note that General Thruston gives the figures engraved on a monument at Austin, Texas, as follows:

“Number of men enlisted: Confederate armies, 700,000; Federal armies, 2,859,132. Losses from all causes: Confederate, 437,000; Federal, 485,216.”

Now, if the losses were 437,000 in the war, and many having died between the close of the war and 1890, and 432,000 were still living in 1890, what becomes of the 600,000 figure?

Again, we may go to the official records, and by adding the totals of the Confederate forces, as given early in the year 1864, we find there were then in the field, according to these reports, 481,160. If, then, we add all those who went into the service after that date under the urgent calls, and also add all who had been killed and died up to that time, and also add prisoners, what then becomes of the 600,000 figure?

The census report of 1890 alone takes the 600,000 number out of the case, for no method of ciphering can be devised to reduce the number of the dead during the war, and for twenty-five years after, to only 168,000.

It is a plain proposition, therefore, that there were more than 600,000, and the question arises, is there any record evidence of the actual number?

The answer is, there is record evidence to show that

the total number of Confederate soldiers was 1,000,000 or more. Nor is this in any sense a new or recent statement. It is often said, when the facts are set forth, that a discovery has been made. It is no discovery; it is only bringing forward the record facts of the case, which have existed all the time. The *Century War Book* published in 1887, contains the following:

“Official returns show the whole number of men enrolled (present and absent) in the active armies of the Confederacy as follows: January 1, 1862, 318,011; January 1, 1863, 465,584; January 1, 1864, 472,781; January 1, 1865, 439,675. Very few, if any, of the local land forces, and none of the naval, are included in this tabular exhibit. If we take the 472,000 men in service at the beginning of 1864, and add thereto 250,000 deaths occurring prior to that date, it gives over 700,000. The discharges for disability and other causes would probably increase the number (inclusive of the militia and naval forces) to over 1,000,000.”

It is stated by James G. Blaine, in his history, that the Confederates numbered more than 1,000,000. In General Thruston's address it is said: “General Ainsworth, of the War Department, has recently estimated their strength at about 1,000,000.” In Nicolay and Hay's life of Lincoln the number is stated at about 1,000,000. In many other places we find this figure given. These are here mentioned to show that there has been a repetition of the 1,000,000 figure as continuously as of the 600,000 figure, the former following the record facts, the other being assertion only.

A very careful estimate has been made of the total Confederate force from the number of regiments and other organizations known to the records. By counting them all, and allowing a fair average number of soldiers to each, it has been estimated that the total number was about 1,000,000.

Another estimate has been made, based upon the record of returns of the Confederate armies at different periods, which also makes a total of about 1,000,000. Estimates have been made based upon the census of 1860, and upon the reports of the several States of the numbers they respectively furnished. These make more than 1,000,000.

Another method of computation is to take the official returns of the armies on both sides during the different years of the struggle, and note the ratio. This shows that the Federal forces never at any time outnumbered the Confederates as much as two to one; the Federals, also, being scattered, and the Confederates concentrated.

Manifestly, any estimate which counts the number formally *surrendering* as the total of the Confederates in the closing days of the war is absolutely valueless. The number surrendered was about 175,000. But the reports show that three months before the end there were more than 450,000 Confederate soldiers. What became of the difference between that number and the 175,000? The reports also show that the Army of Northern Virginia had 150,554 three months before the surrender, and at the surrender there were less than 40,000. What became of that difference? There can be no other answer than that many dispersed and went to their homes without waiting for the formalities of surrender. This is confirmed by the Confederate reports in those last three months, which show great losses by desertion.

General Thruston, who has carefully studied the records, has reached the conclusion that there were about 1,100,000 Confederates, all told.

Why were there not more than 600,000 Confederate soldiers? Why not more than 1,000,000? According to the census of 1860, there were more than 1,200,000 men subject to military duty in the eleven seceded States, and

aid went to them from the border States of not less than 100,000. If the whole number of Confederate soldiers was only 600,000, we have the spectacle of the eleven Confederate States furnishing only 500,000 soldiers!

Never were more impassioned calls for volunteers. Never were reasons for going to war more urgently represented. It was called a fight against a ruthless, brutal invader. It was called a fight for home and country, for altar and fireside, wife, mother, and child. The shirk was held up to scorn and execration. One of the great leaders said it was not a question of who could go, but a question of who could stay. Added to irresistible appeal were two conscription laws: one early in the war, taking all of the usual military age, and one later, robbing the cradle and the grave; and yet it is unblushingly claimed that only 500,000 men could be obtained from the eleven seceded States! If this were true, under all the circumstances, it would be cause for shame and humiliation. As it is not true, those who utter it ought to be branded as slanderers of the Southern people.

If we take the number of soldiers furnished to the Confederacy according to the published claims of the seceded States, we have the following table:

North Carolina (population 992,000).....	127,000
Tennessee (population 1,100,000).....	115,000
Alabama (population 964,000).....	100,000
Mississippi (population 791,000).....	85,000
Virginia (population 1,500,000).....	150,000
Georgia (population 1,059,000).....	130,000
Florida (population 140,000).....	15,000
Louisiana (population 708,000).....	53,000
South Carolina (population 703,000).....	60,000
Arkansas (population 435,000).....	45,000
Texas (population 604,000).....	50,000

Making a total..... 930,000

To which must be added those who went from the border States of Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland, making a grand total of more than 1,000,000. These figures from the several States are authentically claimed and published. They are natural considering the populations of the States. They are consistent with one another, according to population. Under the circumstances of the case, they are what would be expected. These figures show, with a fair uniformity, one soldier to ten of total population in all the States, and this very uniformity in the ratio confirms its correctness.

The census returns of the United States, including that of 1900, just published, show that there is one in five of population of military age. There being 6,000,000 white population in the Confederacy, and the war lasting four years, giving opportunity, as Jefferson Davis said, for the growing-up youths to enter the service, it is plain there were first and last more than 1,000,000 men in the South capable of military duty, the number in fact being over 1,200,000. When, therefore, the aid of the border States is added, the question may be asked in wonder, why were there not more than 600,000 Confederate soldiers? Why not more than 1,000,000?

The foregoing presentation of the case is established by unimpeachable authority, as will now be shown.

In January, 1864, an official report was made to the Confederate government by Colonel E. D. Blake, Superintendent of Registration, which is published in volume 3, series 4, page 95, *War Records*. It gives in detail the number of men furnished up to that time (close of 1863) from six of the Confederate States. The other five are not included in the report. The six which are reported are as follows:

	POPULATION.	FURNISHED.
Virginia	1,500,000	153,876
North Carolina.....	992,000	88,457
South Carolina.....	703,000	60,127
Georgia	1,057,000	106,157
Alabama.....	964,000	90,857
Mississippi.....	791,000	66,982
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	6,007,000	566,456

Here is an authoritative official statement, made not for controversy, but for practical use in the midst of the conflict, and in strict line of duty. It outweighs all the approximations and guesses made since the war for the purpose of minimizing the numbers engaged; and when analyzed, it conforms to the figures just spoken of as natural, reasonable, and consistent.

The six States mentioned furnished, up to the close of 1863, 566,000 soldiers. The war lasted through 1864 and three months of 1865, during which time the appeals to rally to the cause were most urgent. The records show that in this period of the war General Lee was peculiarly active in urging the increase of the army. He repeatedly insisted that all should be brought into the field. He advised that all the work of the army should be done by negroes, so as to send all detailed men into the ranks. His language was: "Get out our entire arms-bearing population and relieve all detailed men with negroes." The records also show that at this period the Bureau of Conscription was sweeping into the ranks every male white, between seventeen and forty-five, with absolutely unsparing zeal and diligence. Under the extraordinary pressure just at that time, we may be sure these six States sent in enough new soldiers to run the figures far above 600,000. Thus, out of a total population of 6,000,000 in these six States, more than 600,000 soldiers went to the field. In this we see the ratio of one soldier

to ten of the total population already mentioned. Now, let us take the other five seceded States:

Arkansas, with a population of.....	435,000
Texas, with a population of.....	604,000
Tennessee, with a population of.....	1,100,000
Louisiana, with a population of.....	708,000
Florida, with a population of.....	140,000
	2,987,000

One soldier of ten in total population is as natural from these as from the above six, which were officially reported. This gives nearly 300,000 to be added to the above 600,000, or over, and to this must be added those who went from the border States, Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland, making a total of 1,000,000 or more.

From all that has been said, it is plain that 600,000 in no way represents the total number of soldiers who fought for the Confederacy. It is also plain that 2,700,000 in no way represents the number of Federal soldiers. To so use these figures shows a partisanship which is willing to ignore the record facts, and accept as truth the pleasing fallacy of the simple assertion of three or four or five to one.

The inexorable logic of the official records shows that on the Federal side there were not over about 1,700,000 soldiers, while on the Confederate side, taking statements of the several States and adding them together, and taking the official Confederate records, there were not less than 1,000,000, and according to many estimates made from Confederate records more than 1,000,000.

This corresponds with the figures given by the latest and most reliable historian, Woodrow Wilson, who we have seen places the number of Federal soldiers at 1,700,000. And in regard to the Confederates he uses this language:

“The total military population of the South was 1,065,000; 900,000 of these she drew into the armies.”

To this 900,000 must be added, of course, those who went from the border States, which would make the number at least 1,000,000.

This eminent author, in stating the total military population of the South at 1,065,000, only gives the number as it stood at the outset of the war. In the course of the four years of struggle others came up to the requisite age, and were freely used, as shown not only by this author himself, but also by the President of the Confederacy in his speech in Georgia in the year 1864.

Nor does this statement of the military population of the South exhaust its resources in men. It is well known that there is much to be done in warfare beside what is done on the firing line. A vast amount of work and labor must be performed, requiring even greater physical strength than to carry and fire the musket. The 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 of negroes in the South are by no means to be left out in considering the strength of the Confederacy. Jefferson Davis says in his history, volume 1, p. 303: “Much of our success was due to the much-abused institution of African servitude, for it enabled the white men to go into the army and leave the cultivation of their fields and care of their flocks, as well as their wives and children, to those who, in the language of the Constitution, were ‘held to service or labor.’ ”

From the beginning of the struggle to the end, negroes were employed in large numbers to do the work which in the Federal armies was done by enlisted soldiers. Mr. Davis might, therefore, enlarge his remark that the negroes did the home work while the white men were fighting, by saying also that negroes did the fatigue duty of the armies while the white soldiers fought on the front line.

Fort Donelson was constructed by negro labor drawn

from Tennessee and Kentucky by forcible impressment. The records show that negroes labored on the fortifications for the Army of Northern Virginia from Manassas to Petersburg. Also at Fort Fisher and Wilmington, and Charleston and Savannah, in Georgia, at Vicksburg, and all other points. The reports of Confederate generals, of the Confederate government, and of State governments make numerous mention of negro labor. At an early period Generals Magruder and Kirby Smith, in the West, report that many soldiers were detailed as teamsters and that their places should be supplied by negroes. The Confederate Congress authorized this to be done. General Beauregard ordered negroes to be employed on fortifications. At one time General Lee called for 6000 negroes to labor on fortifications, and was authorized to impress them. Again, the Secretary of War directed General Lee to impress 20,000 negroes for employment in the army. General Bragg advocated calling out the negroes just as troops were called out. The Legislatures of the States passed laws for impressment of negroes. The authorities at Richmond authorized the military to obtain as many slaves as were necessary for repairing railroads.

Such are some of the numerous proofs found in the official records of the immense use of negroes in performing the labor of the army which would otherwise have fallen upon the soldiers, thus releasing the soldier from handling the pick and spade and axe and wagon whip, so that he might handle the musket.

Against the armament of the South, with all its strength as shown by the record facts, the soldiers for the Union had to advance and contend. They were to stand to the work until organized effort to dismember the great American Republic was broken to pieces and destroyed. The soldiers who, by repeated re-enlistments, made the

paper aggregate of 2,700,000, but in actual numbers were not more than 1,700,000, had to carry on the war through difficulties which appear insurmountable as we now look back upon them. That it required more soldiers to wage the war against the Confederacy than were necessary to defend it is too plain a proposition for anything but simple mention. General Thruston, in discussing the subject, illustrates it by the war in South Africa. He says superiority of ten or more to one did not bring success to British arms at once. Great Britain sent out 445,000 soldiers against 30,000 or 40,000 Boers. Yet this "wretched little population of Boers," as Lord Salisbury called them, defied the power and prowess of the whole British Empire for two or three years.

The fighting qualities of the people of the seceded States, the skill of their officers, the enthusiasm for their cause, were all of the highest order. Such people were not to be quickly overcome. They had a great and rich territory, and the aid of a laboring population, able-bodied, and completely subservient. They fought on the defensive, with short lines of communication, with no foe in the rear. That their cause did not succeed reflects a credit upon the fighting qualities of the National soldiery, and upon the ability of their leaders, which makes all words of praise insignificant. The best material of the country volunteered to save the Union, and no eulogy can do justice to the great uprising. The sudden display of energy, the march in panoply of war, the purely patriotic enthusiasm, the continued resolution, and undying courage and devotion through campaigns and battle, all go to make up the brightest page in the annals of war.

APPENDIX

§ 1. General B. W. Duke, in his history of Morgan's cavalry, emphasizes the charges of bad faith on the part of the Kentucky Unionists, and in mentioning the act of the Union Legislature in September, 1861, which directed Confederate General Polk to withdraw from the State, says: "But the cup of shame was not yet full—this unblushing Legislature passed yet other resolutions to publish to the world the *duplicity and dissimulation which had characterized their entire conduct.*" (P. 52.)

Such writing is not history.

The names of many of the leading Unionists so characterized are found in a chapter in this work. Nine had been elected to Congress in June, 1861. The Legislature mentioned was elected in August, 1861.

The charge of duplicity falls upon such Kentuckians as Guthrie, Nicholas, Breckinridge, Wickliffe, the Robinsons, Marshalls, Speeds, Harlans, Dixon, Bullitt, Wadsworth, and hundreds of like noble men associated with them.

§ 2. The acknowledgment that slaves were property, and that there was a state of war, justifies completely the Act of Emancipation. Mr. Lincoln said: "Armies the world over destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it, and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy except in a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel."

§ 3. This was the same position as that of Jefferson Davis. His State having called a convention, he still remained in the United States Senate and, as he says

himself, "sought by every practical mode to obtain such measures as would allay the excitement and afford to the South such security as would prevent the final step, the ordinance of secession from the Union." (Davis's *History*, vol. i., p. 302.)

§ 4. On the 20th of April, 1861, Judge Henry Pirtle, the distinguished Chancellor, addressed a letter to Governor Magoffin, in which he says:

"Our State has in her primary meetings of citizens, and in her General Assembly, taken the position of a mediator, asking for peace and settlement of difficulties between divisions of her distracted countrymen." (*Louisville Journal*.)

§ 5. On the 26th of April, 1861, Judge William F. Bullock, of Louisville, made a speech at Cincinnati, in which he said:

"We believe she [Kentucky] can retain a position of neutrality. She claims she can act the part of a mediator, but go for the Union as it was, and the Constitution as it is." (*Louisville Journal*, April 27, 1861.)

§ 6. An act of the Confederate Congress approved March 6, 1861, provided a force not to exceed 100,000 to repel invasion and maintain possession of Confederate territory, and insure tranquillity and independence. (*War Records*, Serial No. 127, p. 126.) (Res. p. 4.)

§ 7. "The foot of the oppressor is on the soil of Georgia. He comes with lust in his eye, poverty in his purse, and hell in his heart. He comes a robber and a murderer. How shall you meet him? With the sword at the threshold—with death for him or for yourself.

"But more than this, let every woman have a torch, every child a firebrand. Let the loved homes of our youth be made ashes and the fields of our heritage be made desolate. Let blackness and ruin mark your departing steps if depart you must, and let a desert more terrible than Sahara welcome the vandals. Let every

city be levelled by the flame, and every village be laid in ashes." Extract from an address to the people of Georgia signed by Howell Cobb, R. Toombs, M. J. Crawford, Thomas R. R. Cobb, published in the *Courier* at Bowling Green, February 8, 1862.

§ 8. Hon. Charles A. Wickliffe was in Congress in August, 1861, and, having heard the result of the August election, rose in his place and said:

"Mr. Speaker, I will inform the House that this morning the news from Kentucky is to the effect that she is wholly for the Union; that as she was one of the first to come into it, she will be one of the last to leave it." (*Congressional Globe*, August 6, 1861.)

§ 9. Dr. William Bailey, who is now at the head of the medical profession in Louisville, was then a young man who had been educated at a military school. He raised a company, which he drilled, and he was called upon to drill other companies. Sometimes several companies combined, and were drilled as a regiment by him. From these organizations many went as line officers into the regular volunteer regiments. Dr. Bailey himself became the surgeon of the Ninth Kentucky Cavalry. The services of Dr. Bailey as an officer prior to his taking commission as surgeon were extremely valuable in early laying the foundation for militia companies composed of men who were not so situated as to go into the regularly enlisted organizations, but continued through the war as guardians and protectors of their respective communities.

§ 10. In Hay and Nicolay's *Life of Lincoln* a report of a committee to distribute the arms brought to Kentucky by General Nelson is quoted from, to the effect that:

"This Board have superintended the distribution of the whole quantity of 5000 muskets and bayonets. We have been reliably informed and believe that they have

been put in the hands of true and devoted Union men who are pledged to support the Constitution of the United States, and the enforcement of the laws; and if the occasion should arise to use them to put down all attempts to take Kentucky by violence or fraud out of the Union."

The committee added that this had greatly strengthened the cause, that 20,000 more could be safely intrusted to the Union men who were applying for them and eager to get them, and recommended that the system of arming Kentucky be resumed and widely extended.

The report was signed by Charles A. Wickliffe, Garrett Davis, J. H. Garrard, James Harlan, James Speed, Thornton F. Marshall, J. F. Robinson, W. B. Horton, J. K. Goodloe, J. B. Bruner, Joshua F. Speed. (H and N., vol. iv., p. 237.)

§ 11.

"MONTGOMERY, ALA., April 22, 1861.

"GOVERNOR B. MAGOFFIN,
"Frankfort, Ky.

"SIR:—Your patriotic response to the requisition of the President of the United States for troops to coerce the Southern States justifies the belief that your people are prepared to unite with us in repelling the common enemy of the South. Virginia needs your aid. I therefore request you to furnish one regiment of infantry without delay to rendezvous at Harper's Ferry, Va. It must consist of ten companies of not less than sixty-four men each [etc.]

"L. P. WALKER, Secretary of War."

(*War Records*, Serial No. 127, p 231.)

§ 12. As to violation of neutrality:

General Zollicoffer, on August 6, 1861, wrote from Knoxville to the authorities at Richmond as follows. After mentioning the posts of military organization in Kentucky, he says:

“The principal gaps in the mountain are Cumberland, Big Creek, Elk, and the passages by Chitwoods and Camp McGinnis, but there are innumerable bridle-path passes intervening between Cumberland Gap and Camp McGinnis. My purpose is to form a chain of infantry posts at Cumberland Gap, Big Creek Gap, Elk Gap, Camp McGinnis and Livingston, for which I have thirty-three companies which I propose to use as scouts, advance posts, and to pass intelligence rapidly along the line of infantry posts.”

§ 13. Col. R. M. Kelly of Louisville prepared a full account of the Union Club for the Loyal Legion. (See vol. iii., p. 278, Ohio Commandery.)

§ 14. As General Humphrey Marshall had been active in organizing troops for the Confederacy in the summer of 1861, and went out of the State in the fall of 1861 into southwestern Virginia, it would be natural to suppose that he had a considerable force of Kentuckians with him. In September, 1862, when he was to co-operate with the force of Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith, by moving into Kentucky, he reported the strength of his command as follows: 54th Virginia, 750; 29th Virginia, 300; 21st Virginia, 250; 43d Tennessee, 700; 5th Kentucky, 750. These were infantry. His cavalry was as follows: Kentucky Rifle Battalion, 350; Virginia Rifle Battalion, 300; Shawhan's Cavalry, 200; Caldwell's company, 30. It thus appears that all the Kentucky troops he had were one infantry regiment, 750, and one cavalry battalion, 350—in all, only 1100 Kentuckians.

General Marshall says in his report:

“I want you to say whether in rear of my line in Kentucky I shall at once put conscript law into execution. I think it may be as well to do so. I have instructed my officers as follows: Men must now choose their side. If they are on our side, they must obey the law of Congress and join the army at once. If on the other side, they must not be left in my rear, and must go forth and stand the draft the Union men are

enforcing in Kentucky. When men are not within the military ages, I enjoin them to come forward and take the oath of allegiance, and if they do not come they should be considered and treated as enemies. My policy is to make an armed occupation of the State as far as we penetrate it, and to organize our system, leaving only friends behind us."

It should be noted that at that time there was no drafting of Union soldiers—simply volunteering. And when historians complain of the Federal policy in Kentucky, they should not overlook the methods of the Confederate leaders toward the Unionists of Kentucky.

§ 15. When war is raging it is not an act of despotism for either side to protect itself from the injury resulting from opposition within its own lines. When non-combatants in Kentucky presumed upon the leniency of the National authorities to give aid and comfort to those against whom the government was at war, they brought upon themselves the natural consequences of being dealt with by arrest and imprisonment. The existence of actual war made it necessary to deal severely with any one who was helping the enemy. Any other course would have been trifling when the fight was on and the lives of soldiers were at stake. The singular insensibility of many persons in Kentucky to so plain a proposition caused much trouble, and much complaint against alleged despotic acts. Unreasoning opposition to the military grew up because men persisted in acting as though it was a time of peace, and not a time of actual raging war.

§ 16. Another act recited that, whereas the Legislature at Frankfort undertook to appropriate \$5,000,000 for the prosecution of the war, it is enacted that the property of every citizen of the State is exempt from the payment of any part thereof, and any officer who shall undertake to collect such money shall be guilty of

high misdemeanor and be fined not less than \$100 nor more than \$500.

Approved Dec. 21, 1861.

(*War Records*, Serial No. 127, p. 807.)

§ 17. General Speed S. Fry, in his testimony before the Buell Court of Inquiry, said:

“My opinion is that Bragg and Smith had a double object in view in invading Kentucky. One was to provide their army with such provisions and clothing as they could take from the citizens; another was, if it was in their power, to hold Kentucky by power of arms and make it a part and parcel of the Southern Confederacy. They gathered together all the provisions and clothing they could find in the portion of the State through which they passed, but finding that they were unable to hold the State against the army that was pursuing them, they determined to evacuate it.”

§ 18. General Speed S. Fry, reporting from Camp Nelson, December 2, 1864, says: “The most horrid outrages are being committed; that within the past few days fourteen inoffensive citizens, including one discharged soldier, have been killed in Washington County alone.” (*War Records*, Serial No. 94, p. 28.)

§ 19. On the subject of retaliation, Jefferson Davis says that on June 3, 1861, a ship sailing under a Confederate commission was captured and the crew threatened with treatment not as prisoners of war; that he at once wrote to President Lincoln advising him that the same fate would be visited on prisoners held by the Confederacy as was suffered by the crew. His language was, “Retaliation will be extended so far as shall be requisite to secure the abandonment of a practice unknown to the warfare of civilized man.”

At a later period another privateer was captured, and the crew threatened with death. “Immediately,” says Mr. Davis, “I instructed General Winder at Richmond

to select one prisoner of the highest rank to be confined in a cell appropriate to convicted felons and treated in all respects as if convicted and to be held for execution in the same manner as might be adopted for the execution of the prisoner of war in Philadelphia. He was further instructed to select thirteen other prisoners of the highest rank to be held as hostages for the thirteen prisoners held in New York for trial as pirates." (Vol. ii., p. 11.)

§ 20. The indiscriminate condemnation of all Federal officers simply because they held command, and utterly regardless of anything done or not done, is illustrated in the case of General John M. Palmer. He was an officer of the highest character and of national reputation as an eminent civilian as well as soldier; yet being in command of the District of Kentucky he is called in Collins's History a "petty tyrant" and "autocrat." Collins also sneeringly speaks of his "commanding the military, the negroes, and the churches in Kentucky." General Palmer having issued an order closing certain gambling houses in Louisville, Collins also calls this "military interference in order to keep his hand in." Collins also says: "Some of the very men who were among the foremost to welcome and cajole the petty tyrant General John M. Palmer, when he made his advent in Kentucky as the successor of General Burbridge, are now willing to see the latter reinstated in preference." General Palmer was indicted by the State grand jury for "enticing slaves to leave the State," but the court dismissed the charges.

The attitude of the Southern sympathizers toward any and every one who stood for the Union is thus shown by their perfectly reckless and unjust treatment of such an honorable and fair man as General Palmer.

§ 21. It is a peculiar fact that although Burbridge was charged with "military murders," being his retaliatory executions, no notice appears to have been taken of the same by the Confederate authorities. Burbridge was not

outlawed as some other generals were, neither was there any retaliation for the "murders" he was charged with. If they had been so infamous and as inexcusable as represented, it seems almost certain some action would have been taken by the Richmond government.

§ 22. Although such severe measures were decreed against Federal officers who might command negro troops, the Confederacy, under the advice of General Lee and President Davis, passed a law for making soldiers of the negroes; so that in this respect both sides were alike. The whole story is told by Jefferson Davis in his history that General Lee gave his "unqualified advocacy of the proposed measure," and that he himself "argued the question with members of Congress," and that "finally the bill passed." (Jefferson Davis's *History*, vol. i., pp. 515 to 519.)

§ 23. While there were men who supported McClellan upon the Chicago platform, it may be said without qualification that the Kentucky Unionists who supported him did so upon his letter of acceptance, in which he pledged himself, if elected, to prosecute the war. The expressions of his letter particularly acceptable to them were as follows:

"The preservation of our Union was the sole avowed object for which the war was commenced."

"The Union is the one condition of peace."

"The Union must be preserved at all hazards."

"No peace can be permanent without Union." That if elected he would "re-establish the supremacy of the law," and do his best "to restore the Union."

§ 24. When historians make a point of bringing to the front the miseries, real or imaginary, which war entails, it is but fair to take into account like conditions on both sides and not make it appear that one side alone is guilty. In a communication from Governor Vance of North

Carolina to President Davis, February 9, 1864, he uses this language:

“Conscription, ruthless and unrelenting, has only been exceeded in the severity of its execution by the impressment of property, frequently intrusted to men unprincipled, dishonest, and filled to overflowing with all the petty meanness of small minds dressed in a little brief authority.” (*War Records*, Serial No. 108, p. 818.)

§ 25. In a review in the *American Historical Review*, July, 1904, of Lord Wolseley’s book, *The Story of a Soldier’s Life*, it is said:

“In England, many still believe that the Southerners won all the victories, and were eventually crushed by five to one of their own force. Few appreciate the fact that the numbers afoot until the last year, when the Confederacy was already lost, were but as three to two, while interior lines, and perhaps better strategy, enabled the Confederates to bring as many men into tactical touch as the Federals.”

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